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2Abstract
British.land revenue policy in the Ceded and
Conquered Provinces, has five distinct phases, and a chapter
is devoted to each. Chapter One examines the early years of
the policy (1801-07) when the Bengal influence was
dominant. At this stage, an insignificant awareness of the
local situation existed* Despite the shortcomings of the
early arrangements, a beginning was made in resolving the
deplorable state of affairs inherited from former rulers.
Chapter Two (1807-13) analyses the reasons for the rejection
of the permanent settlement announced in the early years.
During this period the influence of the Home Authorities
was decisive. As an alternative to the permanent settlement,
a periodical settlement based on Adam Smith's ideas, was
proposed by the Court of Directors, Chapter Three (1813-22)
shows the emergence of the new plan of settlement. This
plan was developed in Bengal, although the influence of the
Home Authorities was behind it. Chapter Four (1822-33)
explains the arrangements epitomised in Regulation VII of
#
1822 and examines the failure of settlements under it. In 
the Fifth Chapter, the revision of policy which was 
finalised in 1833? is examined. This had become necessary 
in consequence of the failure of Regulation VII of 1822,
The arrangement of 1833 was essentially the contribution of
3Lord William Bentinck*
The present work is primarily based on a study of 
the unpublished records of the East India Company and the 
private papers of several administrators of British India*
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7Introduction
The present work is a study of the formation of 
British land revenue policy in the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces between the years 1801 and 1833• An historical 
study seemed extremely desirable because of the absence of 
any work treating the subject between those years 
exhaustively. There are several works which include some 
discussion on the policy and its working.
It is always an unpleasant task to point out the 
limitations of existing works (in order to justify one’s 
own work), but in the interest of historical scholarship, it 
has to be performed, Kaye’s book'*' published in 1853* though
not the first one touching upon the revenue policy, makes
2
an interesting contribution to the subject. It was written 
soon after the first great settlement was brought to a 
conclusion in 184-9* He presented the growth of the North 
Western Provinces land revenue system in an attractive style 
so as to interest the general reader in British Indian
1, The Administration of the East India Company» pp,239-61,
2, fthe fifth Report of 1812 was the first publication to 
review British policy in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
up to 1811, See pp.4-8-54-; J.H.Harington’s, An Elementary 
Analysis of the Laws and Regulations, published in l8l4- 
15 gives an account of Regulations and land revenue 
arrangements. It is a compilation from Regulations and 
revenue papers and roughly brings the story up to 1815.See 
Vol.2, pp.299-333-, 372-3, 379-90, 396, 418, 44-1, 449-51, 
483-5, 525-6 and 564.
8administration. There is, however, no analysis of the 
orientation of policy or its working; and his acquaintance 
with the source material is negligible. Baden-Powell1s work 
was published in 1892* and in it also, a very casual 
description of the period 1801-33 is to he found.^ Both as 
a survey of the technical aspects of land revenue 
administration, and as a discussion of land tenures in 
general, it will continue to he of interest to scholars. In 
a work of great magnitude, it is obvious that source 
material cannot he adequately examined; besides, he was an 
administrator who lacked the time to devote himself entirely 
to research. It would he only fair to consider it as a 
standard and major work on the British Indian land system, 
and as essential reading for any researcher into Indian 
agrarian history. Dr. B.E. Misra's work was published in 
1942. It covers a period of nearly a century and a half, 
and includes N.V.P. , Oudh and Benares. In its scope the 
work is very ambitious, but its size permits only a bare
p
outline of policy. But it does create some footholds for 
any subsequent researcher. The primary source material has 
not been examined by Dr. Misra, who bases himself on some 
of the Settlement Reports, and official publications.
1. The Land Systems of British India, 2, pp.14-27*
2. Land Revenue Policy in the United Provinces, pp.15-28 
and
9Dr, B.B. Misra makes some advance upon earlier work* 
He has seen some revenue letters and despatches and some 
revenue consultations, as also the private papers of Henry 
Wellesley. His description of the discussion on the 
permanent settlement is good, hut his narration of the 
growth of policy after 1813 somehow peters out. Besides, 
there are some errors.
In Dr. Eric Stokes's work, one is taken on to an 
altogether different plane, and one is treated with a feast 
of utilitarian ideas and their influence on various British 
policies in India, including the land revenue question of
p
the Western Provinces. It is indeed, an original and 
brilliant work, and such shortcomings as shall be pointed 
out here or subsequently, do not seriously detract from its 
worth. Stokeses pre-occupation is to find a link between 
utilitarian political economy and Indian land revenue. For 
the most part, his discussion begins only around the year 
1820, whereas certain crucial decisions regarding revenue 
policy for the Western Provinces, had been taken between 
1801 and 1815* Dr. Stokes shows no awareness of this and 
thus ignores the historical setting of the policy. To begin 
around 1820 and without background information is to begin 
abruptly, and at the risk of distorting the exposition of
1. The Central Administration of the East India Company, 
pp. 141-54 "sind- 2o5^i"5>
2. The English Utilitarians and India, see particularly 
Chap.2.
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policy, and the influences underlying it. He has relied upon 
published official papers and the Bentinck MSS., but these 
are in no way adequate to the understanding of the land 
revenue policy. Even enough study of the source material in 
regard to land revenue policy, does not always seem to be 
enough.
Dr. W.C. Neale!s work is a new and important 
accession to the literature on the agrarian history of the 
Uttar Pradesh.^ The time span covers a period of over a 
century and a half, and the sources consulted are inadequate. 
Here we are concerned only with the period 1801-33 to which
p
this work hardly makes any contribution. Dr. Neale's data 
for the early period exclusively come from secondary works.
Dr. Sulekh Chandra Gupta's book is the latest 
addition in the field of British agrarian policy in India.
The region and period of Dr. Gupta's book is the same as 
that of the present writer. There are some common topics 
discussed in Dr. Gupta's book and in the present work. 
Overlapping in two works covering the same region and period, 
is inevitable. Dr. Gupta's book came at the moment when the 
present writer's draft of the thesis was ready. As such, it 
has not been possible to refer to Gupta's work in the 
appropriate places in the present thesis. Therefore, an
1. Economic Change in Rural India, etc.
2. ibid., See parts of Chaps. 3,4, and 7 for the early 
period.
5* Agrarian Relations and Early British Rule in India, etc.
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analysis of its limitations has "been appended to this 
thesis.^
Although Dr* Gupta has touched upon some aspects of 
land revenue policy, the present work has its own 
justification* The choice of the period is dictated hy the 
fact that it constitutes a formative and therefore a very 
important phase in the growth of land revenue policy in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces. The region was acquired 
between 1801 and 1803 by cession and conquest* The Nawab 
of Oudh ceded the districts of Bareli, Moradabad,
Parrakhabad, Etawah-, Kanpur.t Allahabad and Gorakhpur in 
1801. The districts of Northern and Southern Saharanpur, 
Aligarh and Agra were conquered from Sindhia in 1803* The 
same year Bundelkhand was ceded to the British by the Peshwa.
A uniform administrative organisation for the three 
distinct units was not attained until 1805. The Ceded 
districts were placed under a Board of Commissioners headed 
by a Lt.-Governor between 1801 and 1803 and six Collectors
p
were appointed. The political agent in Parrakhabad
functioned as a Collector of that district until 1806.
The Board of Commissioners functioned as an autonomous body
with revenue and judicial authority. The Collectors also
*
1. Appendix A.
2. See East India Register for 1803, P*19; See below
3. East India Register for 1805 (2nd ed.), p.17*
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combined the two functions. At the Presidency a special
unit called the Ceded department, was created to supervise
the administration of this region. In March 1803, these
arrangements were scrapped. The Board of Revenue took over
revenue administration. Civil Courts were established in
each district. A provincial Court of Appeal and Circuit was
created at Bareli which shared its function for the region
as a whole, with a similar Court in Benares* The Bengal
revenue and judicial code was introduced. The Conquered
districts were first placed under Lord Lake's authority
but Collectors were appointed. Bundelkhand was looked after
by a political agent, but in 1804- a special Commission with
three members was created, and a Collector and a Judge were 
1appointed. The Board of Revenue shared jurisdiction in 
revenue matters with the Commission* In 1805 the Regulations 
introduced in the Ceded districts were extended to the
p
Conquered districts and Bundelkhand.
In 1807 the Ceded and Conquered Provinces were 
allowed a regional revenue authority designated the Board 
of Commissioners, consisting of two members.^ In 1819 
Gorakhpur was taken away from its jurisdiction and placed 
under that of the Board of Commissioners for Bihar and 
Benares. In 1822 a reorganisation in revenue supervision
1. Bg.R.D., 2'-!-.4-. 1835? 3? para.4-.
2. See Regs. VIII and IX of 1805*
3* See below, pp.115-16.
4. B.B.Misra, The Central Administration etc., p.14-5*
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took place. Each, of the three regional authorities was 
designated the Board of Revenue* One for the Lower Provinces, 
the second for the Central Provinces and the third for the 
Western Provinces. Bundelkhand, Allahabad and Kanpur were 
placed under the Central Board."1' The arrangement of the 
three Boards proved cumbersome and inefficient; therefore, 
by Regulation I of 1829 they were abolished and one 
authority denominated the Sadr Board of Revenue at Calcutta, 
was created for the whole Presidency excluding the Delhi 
territory* At the same time, divisional Commissioners of 
revenue with judicial powers, were created, The Western 
Provinces had eight such Commissioners, In 1830, when 
Bentinck went on tour to the Western Provinces for the 
purpose of solving the land revenue problem of the region, 
a branch Board called the Sadr Board on deputation was
2
created with full revenue jurisdiction over the province*
This Board later became the Sadr Board of Revenue for the 
North Western Provinces. In 1807 there were eleven 
Collectorates in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* By 1833 
the number had risen to twenty with six sub-Collectorates,
As to the subordinate Indian agency, Tahsildars had been 
created in 1802 and Patwaris and Kanungos were retained 
from the beginning.
1. Ibid. * pp. 14-8-9; East India Register for 1823 (2nd ed.),
2. Ibid., 14-9-52; East India Register for 1830 (2nd ed.),
p. 19.
3* East India Register for 1808 (2nd ed.), pp.17-8; Ibid., 
for 1833 (2nd ed.), pp.20-22.
4. See below Chap.l.
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The judicial organisation underwent very little 
change* Under Regulation VII of 1822 Collectors were vested 
with judicial powers subject to the ordinary Courts of law*^" 
A Special Commission to investigate fraudulent transfers 
of land functioned between 1821 and 1829.^ The Revenue 
Commissioners created in 1829* also had judicial powers*
To make judicial administration efficient, a Sadr Diwani 
and Nizamat Adalat was established for the Western 
Provinces in 1832.^
The subject in itself, is of great importance, and 
to make intelligible what the British did, it is necessary 
to expound the origin and nature of land revenue policy in 
its historical setting* An explanation of the origin of 
land revenue policy is a simple matter* Land and the 
revenue from it, has played a predominant role in Indian 
history* The political stability of the state and its fiscal 
viability, its sinews of war and peace, rested on capital 
extraction from land* It has been called jama, khiraj or 
land revenue. The extraction of capital however, could not 
take place in a vacuum; it had to be in the context of the 
agricultural economy, and the rights in land - natural or 
customary or proprietary* The obverse and inverse sides of 
capital extraction, were the genesis of land revenue policy*
1. See Chap. 4-.
2* See Chap* 1*
3. Under Reg* V of 1831.
There was an ideal of policy. Policy was to be such as to 
harmonise the state’s interest with that of the landed 
rights. It was to be fair to all concerned, though its 
fairness was a matter for the state to decide* But the state 
would have to make its decision consistent with the written 
or unwritten traditions of the country* And where the state 
deviated from those traditions, then it had to lay down 
new principles intelligible to the people* The two aspects 
of policy - that is, the collection of revenue, and the 
protection of agriculture and the people - were well 
understood in India* To carry out that ideal in policy was 
no easy matter; nonetheless, no Indian ruler could 
absolutely disregard it except at the cost of political, 
and economic instability, and his ultimate downfall. The 
response to the ideal on a great scale was possible under 
a strong and centralised administration, such as Akbar had 
created, which lasted until Aurangzab* The problems of 
assessment of revenue, and its collection were resolved, 
new firmans were issued, and a revenue administrative 
structure was created*
The emergence of splinter states in the eighteenth 
century, and their failure to continue a strong administration 
produced aberrations in the main principles of policy. They 
could not be completely ignored but fairness was replaced 
by arbitrariness; and revenue collection by the state was
16
transformed into an unregulated, and -uncontrolled revenue 
market* The Mughal firmans became excluded from practice, 
and no new firmans were issued to cope with the changed 
situation.
Having explained the foundations and the nature of 
land revenue, it is necessary to give a brief review of 
Mughal policy. Much of the region under study, was very 
close to the centre of the Mughal Empire, it was the cradle 
where Mughal institutions and culture were nourished. It 
also remained more or less within the tight control of the 
Mughal rulers.
Akbar was perhaps the first ruler who succeeded in 
giving form and consistency to the reciprocal basis of the 
traditional land revenue policy. It was that the state 
demands payment, and the people require protection from 
over-assessment, extortion, famine, and violence. It was 
this two-fold basis, upon which Akbar raised his land 
revenue system. His main contribution was to lay down 
certain rules for the collection of revenue in the Khalsa 
Land.
The salient features of his system were systematic 
measurement of the land, the application of the sanctioned 
assessment rates at one-third of the average produce of the 
land, the separation of all miscellaneous exactions from 
land revenue, the collection of revenue in cash, and
17
encouragement to cultivation,1 His system demanded an
efficient administrative organisation, and that was duly
created* It consisted of a chain of officers from the Diwan
at the top, to the village headman and Fatwari at the
hottom of the administrative hierarchy, The working of the
system, however, mainly depended upon the Ami ah for whose
2
guidance elaborate instructions were laid down*
To an ordinary peasant, as Moreland has remarked, 
the system must have appeared simple* So far as the revenue 
demand was concerned, the peasant was not exposed to 
tyranny. But the general effect of the system on the people 
much depended upon the manner of administration*
Akbar fs system was an achievement in the 
development and implementation of land revenue policy, but 
it was not destined to last. It demanded great vigilance at 
the top, and his successors did not show the same degree of 
attention as he did. It began to deteriorate from the reign 
of Jehangir itself, and by the time Aurangzeb came to 
power, it had undergone a change for the worse.
1. R.P. Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, 
pp.316, 321 and 124-3; W.H.Moreland, Agrarian System of 
Moslem India, pp.114 and 112.
2. W.H.Moreland, Agrarian System of Moslem India, p.lll;
For the latest account of Mughal Land revenue system, 
see I. Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 
particularly Chap•6.
3. Ibid., p.115.
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The zabti system of assessment had given way to a 
summary manner of assessment; and the revenue demand varied
from one-third to one-half of the average produce of the
2 3land. The khalsa land decreased, while ,jagir, farmed and
grant land had increased. Agrarian disturbances were
gradually mounting, and the local administration had become
lax and corrupt. In the later half of his reign, Aurangzeb
had no time to devote to internal problems. Consequently,
the land revenue system was fast sinking into degeneration.
The period following Aurangzeb’s death witnessed the
widening gulf between the principles and practice of the
ystem.
The break-down of the Mughal Empire, created an 
11-round chaos and the revenue system became full of 
berrations. The contract-revenue system was fast replacing 
h-e khalsa system, the amount of revenue from land was 
eclining and its collection was becoming difficult; new 
and extensive taluqdaris and zamindaris were being formed 
at the expense of hereditary rights in land, villages were 
being depopulated and agriculture was in a state of 
dislocation. The Marathas and the Nawabs of Oudh who wielded 
authority in the region, were observing a conspiratorially
1* Zabli = regular or detailed mode of assessment as 
developed under Akbar. Later on also used for crops 
paying at cash rates.
2* Khalsa = revenue of that portion of land which was 
directly under state management.
3. Jagir = revenue of land assigned to military servants.
y
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incompetent indifference towards the manifold problems.
They were intellectually almost deficient* It was at this 
point that the British rule was extended to the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces,
The main tenets of the policy as expounded above,. 
were tenable in the case of the British also. Its fiscal 
aspect became all the more important because it was expected 
to solve British financial problems in India, In the early 
nineteenth century, land revenue contributed predominantly 
to the Bengal revenues; and the revenues not only met the 
civil and military expenditure of Bengal, but also 
subsidised the finances of the Bombay, and Madras 
Presidencies, and of the smaller British Colonies on the 
Indian Ocean* Revenues also bore the cost of transmitting 
the Company*s investment, and the interest on the public 
debt. Land therefore sustained the British imperial interest 
in India, Great attention was therefore paid to the 
formation of policy.
The British not only inherited the ideals of the 
traditional policy, but also the aberrations that had crept 
into the land revenue system of the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces, Thus from the very beginning, the British were 
beset with problems. In the formation and implementation of 
British policy, several interlinked questions have to be 
asked. What were the objectives of the policy? How it was
20
to be implemented? Whether the Bengal government or the 
Home Authorities had a major hand in shaping policy. What 
were the influences at work behind policy - the Local 
situation or zamindari or raiyatwari experience or abstract 
principles of political economy or a combination of them? 
Does the policy admit of an interpretation as to its 
formation to a single idea such as utilitarianism or 
conservatism or liberalism? What was the consequence of the 
policy, i.e. how were the government, the ’property1 holder, 
the raiyat, and agriculture to fare from it?
The present work attempts to place British land 
revenue policy in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces in its 
proper perspective. Its evolution was not a straight­
forward process nor was there an exclusive adherence and 
commitment to principles of political economy. It contained 
both conservative and liberal elements and its method in 
the final form was empirical.
The thesis is based on an analysis of the 
unpublished documentary sources of the East India Company 
and the private papers of Henry Wellesley, of Lord Minto, 
the first Earl, of James Cumming, of Lord William Bentinck 
and of Edward Anderson Reade. Some parliamentary papers and 
official publications of documents have also been used. 
Besides, secondary works and articles in journals have also 
been consulted.
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Chapter 1 
The Early Arrangements, 1801"07
The opening years of British rule in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces witnessed a deplorable state of affairs, 
in regard to the condition of the people, the state of 
agriculture, revenue collection, trade and commerce, and law 
and order. However, it must be pointed out that, relatively 
speaking, the condition of the Conquered districts was 
better than that of the Ceded districts*1 This was because
of the better administration of the Marathas as compared to
2
that of the Nawab of Oudh. Even in the Ceded districts 
there were certain exceptions to the bad state of affairs* 
The regions which were in an exceptionally bad condition 
were Rohilkhand and Gorakhpur* The traditional attitude of 
the Nawab to Rohilkhand had been hostile, which was in a 
great measure responsible for its ruin* In Gorakhpur the 
revenue management,was terribly extortionate* J
A few contemporary observations substantiating the
3
above statement will not be out of place* John Anstruther 
who had travelled as far as Allahabad from Calcutta in 1800, 
and had traversed the NawabTs territory for about thirty
1. G,D* Gutherie to J. Fombelle, 22*1*180^, B.0*C. Proc.,
29*11*1805, 6.
2* Ibid*
3* He was Chief Justice in Bengal*
2 3
1miles described it as a fdesertT. John Routledge, the first
British Collector in Gorakhpur, made a series of remarks on
the state of cultivation and revenue administration. Although
the soil was fertile, cultivation was neglected in some parts
while in others it was entirely relinquished. The oppression 
2
of Amils had "been so great that in one year four lakhs of
•3
raiyats were known to have emigrated from Gorakhpur, The
decline of cultivation had so much affected the revenue that
many villages which were on the rent-roll, individually paid
two to five rupees annual revenue. The area of each such
U
village was over 500 bigahs. Of villages which had been 
absolutely abandoned, Routledge wrote to Groeme Mercer 
Secretary to the Board of Commissioners for the Ceded 
Provinces, f... not a hut remains and the sites of many of 
the villages can only be discovered by tanks and puccka wells 
and their names would certainly have been unknown to me, but 
for the established custom of entering them in the records 
of the K a n o o n g o e s . I n  regard to the management of the 
revenue, Routledge wrote to Henry Wellesley, falthof I have
1. Quoted by D. Dewar, TThe Administration of Ceded Provinces 
under Henry Wellesleyf, The Journal of U.P. Historical 
Society, June 1918, P*5U.
2* Amil = contract revenue collector. Also known as Nazim, 
Chakladar, and Musta.jir.
3. J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 1U.1.1802, G.N, Saletore 
(ed.), Henry Wellesley Correspondence, p.9, hereafter 
referred to as H.W. Corres.
U. J.Routledge to G. Mercer, 25*7#l802, Ibid., pp.3U-5j Bigah, 
standard one in Western Provinces = 3025 sq.yards = 5/8 of 
an acre. In Bengal = 1600 sq. yards = 1/3 of an acre,
5# J. Routledge to G. Mercer, 1U.12.1802, Ibid.. p.U2.
24/
been only a short time in the district, the number of arzees 
presented to me have enabled me to obtain some knowledge of 
its present state, and which is that it is entirely without 
any sort of administration, that the inhabitants are most ^  
cruelly oppressed and the jumma declining so rapidly that, 
without the introduction of some system, the whole province, 
which is now nearly a waste, would, in course of one or two 
years, become an entire scene of desolation.
Archibald Seton, one of the Gommissioners who had been
deputed to form the settlement of Reher, a sub-division of
Bareli district, drew a moving picture of some of the 
2
•parganas* The raiyats were m  abject poverty and there 
existed a great scarcity of bullocks, Formerly the parganas 
were in a prosperous state of cultivation, particularly in 
the production of sugar-cane; fat present1, however, Seton 
wrote to Henry Wellesley, Lt.-Governor and President of the 
Board of Commissioners for the Ceded Provinces, fthe 
surrounding scene exhibits nothing but long grass jungle.
The country is indeed rich in point of soil, well watered
and b tifully wooded; but in point of improvement it looks /
1. J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 26.12.1601, Ibid., p,2*
2. Pargana = A revenue and administrative unit, comprising 
a group of villages and forming a small sub-division of 
a district.
3. A Seton to H. Wellesley, 4*12*1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.178.
as if it had been created yesterday*^ Similarly, Welland
25
the first Collector in Kanpur, wrote to the Board of 
Commissioners that, 'the subjects in this part of the 
country are in the most abject poverty* Let the face of the 
country be examined and there will be hardly a manufacture 
found, or an individual in such circumstances as to afford 
the payment of a, tax* The whole is one desolate waste in 
which tyranny and oppression have hitherto universally 
prevailed#
According to Henry Wellesley who submitted two reports 
on the trade and commerce of the Ceded districts to the 
Governor-General, it was in a languishing state* In a not 
too distant past trade and commerce was in a flourishing 
condition* Rohilkhand was famous for its high quality 
sugar, which it supplied to the North-West regions, to the 
Panjab, to the hill districts, to the Doab, and to the 
Deccan* The Doab was well known for its cotton, and 
Allahabad was the heart of the cotton trade in Northern
p
India* Some trading in grain had also been in existence*
Trade in the Conquered districts was also in a defying 
3condition* It must be pointed out that the importance of 
trade and commerce particularly in articles like sugar and 
cotton, with reference to the growth or decay of 
agriculture and land revenue was considerable* The decline
1* Quoted by D* Dewar, op.cit* * p#55*
2* H, Wellesley, Report on the Commerce of Ceded Districts, 
29*5*1802 and 16.6.1802, Board's Collection 2803, 
pp.lU-22, Ul-3, Si and 83-U#
3* G.D. Gutherie to J. Fombelle, 22.1*1801, op*cit*
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in trade and commerce was the result of disturbed political
conditions, combined with the exactions of petty chiefs from
the merchants and traders*
Just as. trade and commerce and agriculture were in a
state of disorder, so was the general situation of law and
order for the region as a whole. The misgovernment of the
past had driven a section of the population to disorderly
conduct, most of whom were formerly peaceful raiyats. Seton -
narrated how one of them told his story to him: M I was
formerly a ryot, but finding I was not allowed to reap what
I had sown, I became a robber *•.. 1
A brief analysis of the working of the indigenous
revenue system will show how these conditions were produced.
The progressive collapse of central authority in Northern
India had created a great land revenue problem. Innumerable
2
chieftains had sprung up at the mufassal level, variously
3 b 5called Rajas, Taluqdars and Zamindars. They not only
controlled land but also governed their local units. They
1. A. Seton to G. Mercer, 28.2.1803* H.W. Corres., p.107*
2. Mufassal = interior or countryside, a subordinate or
separate district.
3. Ra.ja = a title given to Hindus of rank by Muslim rulers, 
or hereditary when descending from a Prince; later assumed 
by adventurers also.
k* Taluqdar = holder of a taluq. Taluq - a dependency, an 
'estate1or tract of land.In G. & C.P. he did not have 
'proprietary'right over the entire, taluq.
5* Zamindar » an occupant of land or landholder.
6. Por similar developments in Benares, See B.S. Cohn, 'The 
initial British impact on India a Case Study of the 
Benares Region’, Journal of Asian Studies. August I960, 
pp.i22-2i+.
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were in possession of mud forts and maintained their own
military force. (Prom this statement, however, Rohilkhand
must he excepted, because the past oppression had eliminated
intermediaries, and generally only raiyats existed). The
Nawab of Oudh, who represented the Mughal Emperor, enforced
the State’s claim to revenue by resorting to revenue farming
or the i.jara system through the Amils. The local Chiefs and
Amils fall into two distinct groups, although neither
functioned collectively. The Chiefs controlled the land and
the Amils were in control of the collection of the revenue.
The amildari system was of two types. In the one case the
Amils realised the revenue directly from the Chiefs, and in
the other from the headmen of villages in areas where there
were no Chiefs in existence. There were also some exceptions
to the amildari system. Certain Chiefs paid their revenue
directly to the Nawab’s treasury: their lands were called
Huzur Tahsil ’estates’. In the Conquered districts two
1
modes of revenue collection were prevalent, the amani
2
and revenue farming. The latter was similar to the 
amildari system in Oudh.
In Oudh the amildari system was the permanent and
1. Amani = Collection of revenue directly by government 
servants.
2. G.D. Gutherie to J. Fombelle, 22.1.180U, B.O.C.
Proc*, 29*11*1805, 6; Conversation with Mohiuddin, Peshkar 
Collector’s Kutcheri Aligarh, 29*1*1831> Bentinck MSS. 
2650; Conversation with Qazi Husain Ali Khan of Gwalior, 
17*2.1831, Bentinck MSS. 2650.
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predominant form of revenue collection, although the Amils
themselves were temporary and kept changing in quick
succession. The only notable exception was Almas Ali Khan
who not only continued for a number of years, but also
exercised jurisdiction over a large part of the country.’*’
The Nawab used to auction the amildari annually, generally
2
for a period of one year. The immediate commitment of the 
Amil on appointment was to pay 10 to 15 per cent of revenue 
in advance and to meet all assignments on account of the 
NawabTs troops stationed in his jurisdiction. Thus even 
before he had realised a single rupee as revenue he was made 
to pay a considerable sum in advance. This meant that the 
Amil must be either a rich man or he must borrow capital at 
a substantial rate of interest from the bankers at Lakhnau. 
Besides his office had a precarious existence as he was 
liable to be dismissed at any time of the year, if there
were intrigues against him in the Nawab’s court. According
to John Lumsden the Nawab used to cancel valid engagements
L
in favour of individuals offering him a nazarana and 
increased revenue.^
1. Extract from a letter of Resident at Lakhnau, to G.G., 
21.6.1798, H.M. 236, p.387.
2. J. Lumsden to Lord Wellesley, 29*10.1798, H.M.236,
PP.537-51*
3* Lord Cornwallis to the Nawab Vazir, 12.8.1793> H.M.236, 
p.267.
U. Nazarana = gift or present from an inferior to superior.
5. J. Lumsden to Lord Wellesley, 29.10.1798, op.cit.. 
pp .5*41-43.
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Thus the Amil from the very “beginning had a motive to
resort to extortion. He had already made a financial gamble
which he must make good before he was removed or dismissed#
In this he was helped in several ways by favourable
circumstances. He was often, as Lord Cornwallis suggested,
a creature of the Nawab Ts mu.tasaddis (revenue clerks) who
t
covered up or concealed his malpractices# The Amil himself 
was vested with revenue, executive and judicial powers.2 He
appointed his entire subordinate staff, maintained his own
■3
private troops, and was also supported by the Nawab Ts 
troops in the collection of revenue#
The method adopted by the Amil in realising the 
revenue was that he either entered into an engagement with 
the landholders or village headmen himself or resorted to 
sub-revenue farming# In Etawah, for instance, Almas Ali had 
sub-rented the villages to Taluqdars, Zamindars and 
independent revenue farmers. Where the Amil engaged for 
the collection of the revenue he realised it, as Scott 
mentioned, mercilessly, with the use of force, and by 
completely disregarding local custom and his own original
1. Lord Cornwallis to Nawab Vazir, 12.8.1793# ou.cit.. p.269*
2. S»B.Smith, rHakim Mehdif, The Journal of U CP. Historical 
Society, September 1917? p.170.
3. Lord Cornwallis to Nawab Vazir, 12.8.1793# on »cit., p.267# 
U, See Revenue accounts of Etawah for 1209 Fasli,Bg.R.C.
30o9«lS02, Ik; Baden-Powell is quite wrong when he states 
that Almas Ali preferred to engage with village Zamindars, 
See The Land-Systems of British India« 2, p.12.
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1 2 agreement, Routledge made similar observations, and on
his arrival in Azimgarh he discovered that the Amil had
imprisoned several Zamindars on charges of non-payment of
3
revenue which were in fact without foundation. The degree 
of oppression in Gorakhpur was so great that in one year 
four lakhs of cultivators had emigrated. In 1800 the Amil 
of Gorakhpur, Kasim Ali Khan, not only seized all the crops 
he could carry, hut also the cattle and moveable property 
belonging to the Zamindars and raiyats.^ It is no wonder 
therefore that the amildari system was unpopular.
It was only natural that under the i.jara system 
agriculture suffered, and consequently the revenue declined. 
The chief gainer under such a system was the class which 
took a professional interest in the collection of the 
revenue. The Amils. the mutasaddis and the bankers must be 
considered as a well coordinated group who between them made 
possible the working of the contract revenue system. In 
other words they were the people who had commercialised the 
collection of the revenue and retained their monopoly over 
the revenue market. It is significant to note that revenue 
farming implied the functioning of a revenue market. The 
prospective revenue farmers in principle bid against each
1. Coll, Scott to H. Wellesley, 16,12.1801, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.173*
2. J. Routledge to G. Mercer, 25*7*1802, H.W.Corres.> p.31*
3. J . Routledge to H. Wellesley, 19*2.1802, Ibid.» p.17*
4. J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 14.1.1802, Ibid., p.8.
other, and the revenue was settled as a result of such
"bidding. In practice, however, it was an unregulated and
uncontrolled market* It functioned not as a self-operating
mechanism with fair-play for all concerned, "but as a result
of state expediency combined with the intrigue of cliques
at Lakhnau. It underlined the weak character of government
which shied from a detailed and well regulated mode of
collecting revenue, and relied upon a fraudulent market
instead* The market also implied a fair development of
capitalism without which it would not have functioned at all
The faceless people who controlled and operated the market
ruthlessly and unscrupulously also implied the emergence
of ’economic man’.* The motive was profit and power* It also
clearly implied the economic exploitation of the country "by
urban men. It also meant that the surplus which remained in
the country after the payment of revenue was not to be
entirely appropriated by the rural people. A  considerable
part of it was now being taken by urban men* While the
country was being impoverished and the revenue declining
they must be considered to have made large fortunes* For
instance, the annual income of Almas Ali, the Amil of
Etawah and Kanpur, was supposed to be eleven lakhs of 
1rupees. The next group to benefit must have been the
1. Coll. Scott to H. Wellesley, 16.12.1801, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.173*
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Ra.jas, Taluqdars and Zamindars. But among them only those 
who successfully resisted the Amils on the one hand, and 
extorted from the village Zamindars and raiyats on the other, 
must he considered to have made fortunes. It may also he 
asked how under such a system, where two interests 
predominated, i.e., those of the Chiefs, and Amils and their 
masters, the tenures at various levels were affected? A 
continuous destruction and creation of tenures must have 
occurred* At any rate the question of ownership or 
proprietary* rights must he considered to have heen utterly 
confusing.1
Thus the problems awaiting the British in agricultural 
conditions and the realisation of the revenue were of 
immense proportions. In order to tackle them Lord Wellesley 
decided to create as a temporary measure a strong local 
authority, in the form of a Board of Commissioners consisting 
of * several of the most experienced, able, and active of the 
Company’s Civil Service ...♦* This was to he presided 
over by a Lieutenant-Governor. To give weight and authority 
to the Local administration in an unsettled province, Lord 
Wellesley appointed his own brother to the position of 
Lieutenant-Governor. Henry Wellesley was the chief
1. For the concept of ownership, See Chap. 3«
2* Lord Wellesley to Court, 13* 11.1801, Board* Collection, 
2385, P.l.
3* Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, 1A.11.1801, Martin, 
(ed.) Despatches, 2, pp.608-09.
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negotiator of the Treaty of Lakhnau of 10 November 1801, by 
which the British acquired the Ceded districts. He was in 
Lakhnau when his appointment and the Constitution of the
X
Board were announced on 14 November 1801. The three
members appointed to the Board were Mathew Leslie, Archibald
2
Seton, and John Fombelle, all experienced Bengal Civil 
Servants. The chief task of this temporary administrative 
unit was to prepare the country for a stable land revenue 
arrangement. It was not expected, nor was it destined to 
accomplish any final arrangement in that regard, yet it was 
this commission which was responsible for the early land ^ 
revenue policy - a policy from the consequences of which the 
subsequent administration could not completely extricate 
itself.
Before we examine how the revenue was collected, it 
is necessary to analyse the objectives of the policy and the 
plan through which these objectives were to be accomplished# 
In the formation of early policy, Henry Wellesley was given
1. Commission issued by Lord Wellesley, 14.11.1801, Bg.P.G.
18,2.1802, 7; B.B. Misra wrongly states that the 
administration was placed under the Lt. Governor and 
Board of Commissioners in February 1802, See The Central 
Administration of the East India Company, 1773-l"834, 
p.l4l. What is true is that the Commissioners took up 
their duties in February 1802, N.B. Edmonstone to the 
Commissioners, 30.1.1802, Bg. P.C. 18.2.1802, 9#
2. Commission issued by Lord Wellesley, Ibid; B.B. Misra 
wrongly states that Scott, Resident in Lakhnau, was a 
member of the Board of Commissioners. See The Central 
Administration, p.142 f.n.
a free hand, subject of course to the instructions of Lord
Wellesley, which were based on the advice of George Barlow,
and John L u m s d e n O n  Ik July 1802 a public proclamation
containing the settlement plan was issued, and at the same
time instructions were issued to the Collectors and
2
Tahsildars on settlement-making. The emergence of this 
settlement plan was the result of much reflection, and part 
of a much wider problem of overhauling the Nawab*s 
administration, as it was found to exist in the Ceded 
districts. His administration was undoubtedly despotic, and 
had produced evil consequences, therefore, *... a very great 
change in the internal management of the Ceded country •.•f 
was the primary object in Henry Welle si ey*s view. As the 
only developed form of administration was the Bengal 
Regulation system, it was natural to adopt it as a model for 
the Ceded provinces. This was clearly in Henry Wellesley*s 
mind, but subject to certain qualifications. In introducing 
a change of administration in the Ceded districts, he wrote, 
the habits, customs and prejudices of the people ought to be 
taken into consideration, because *any sudden or violent 
innovation would not fail to be viewed with an eye of
1 . Lord Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 29.5.1802, Eur. MSS.E.175*
2. B.O.C. Circular letter to Collectors, lh.7#l802, H.M.582, 
pp.2^04-05; B.R.Misra wrongly states that the proclamation 
in the Ceded Provinces was issued on Iiw7*l805, See Land 
Revenue Policy in U.P.. p.17; Tahsildar = Indian Officer 
in charge of a subdivision with revenue and police powers.
3. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7*1.1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E*l80.
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jealously and distrust, and might he attended with very
serious c o n s e quences.To  decide therefore the applicability
of the Bengal Regulations, the pace of their introduction,
and any modifications necessary, would require a study of
2
the local situation. The settlement plan of 1802 for the
Ceded provinces was therefore the product of the interaction
of the Bengal principles of settlement making, and the local
3
situation as it was thought to exist.
The objective of the settlement plan itself was to 
promote the improvement of revenue and agriculture, so that 
eventually a permanent settlement could be made. These 
objectives were to be realised by temporary settlements.
Even temporary settlements are governed by certain guiding 
principles relating to their duration, the persons from whom 
engagements were to be taken, the determination of landed 
rights, the calculation of the assessment, and the 
realisation and security of the land revenue. The Settlement 
plan of July 1802 took into consideration all these aspects 
of settlement-making.
A three-stage settlement covering a period of ten
1. Ibid,
2. Ibid.
3. The Settlement plan of 1802 was incorporated in the 
Regulations introduced in the Ceded districts in 1803. 
These Regulations made comprehensive provisions regarding 
all aspects of land revenue policy and were substantially 
based on Bengal and Benares Regulations. See Bg. J.L. 
(C.P.), 20.10.1803, paras. 3-lu
3lf
years and culminating in a permanent settlement was
envisaged. The first and second leases were each to he of
three years duration, and the third was to he of four years.
The first settlement was to commence from 1802-3 (Fa&Li
1210).1 Lord Wellesley, Henry Wellesley, and the Court of
Directors were unanimous on the necessity of short
2
settlements in the beginning. The reasons for this are not 
-far to seek# The oppressive way In which the' Amils ~ had 
realised the revenue had affected the information in the 
revenue accounts on the one hand, and the knowledge of the 
resources of the country on the other# Accuracy of knowledge 
was dependent upon the accuracy of the information contained 
in the records, and of fresh information obtained through 
investigation. But neither the records nor the available
3
knowledge of the resources was reliable, and new information 
could not be obtained forthwith. Thus, until more accurate
information was forthcoming, a settlement of a longer
l±
duration was inadvisable. Besides, as agriculture was 
expected to improve during the ten year period, so it was
1. Proclamation of 1^.7*1802, Arts. 1-U, H.M. 582, pp*246h-67* 
B.B. Misra wrongly states that the first triennial 
Settlement in the Ceded Provinces was. to begin from 
1803-Oh. Op.cit., p.200.
2. G-.G-. to Secret Committee, 13*3*1802, Board’s Collection 
2385, p.12; H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7*1*1802, 
op .cit.; Bg. draft D., 1.9*1803, 192, para.28.
3. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7*1.1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers., Eur. MSS. E.180.
km G-.G-. to Secret Committee, 13*3*1802, op.cit.
thought Just that the government should benefit
proportionally. A longer lease would leave all the
advantages of improving agriculture to the land owners alone#
On the other hand, if the revenue was to be increased by
making annual settlements for ten years, it would adversely
affect agriculture. Therefore, the ten year period was split
into three settlements to satisfy the interests of
agriculture and the government.
Lord Wellesley intended to exclude the destructive
1
practice of revenue farming. The settlement therefore, in
2
all practicable cases, was to be made with the Zamindars.
(The term Zamindar was used in the Bengal sense, i.e. land
lord or proprietor). Their claims were to be determined by
the fact of possession, and those who claimed but were not
in actual possession were to be referred to the Civil 
3
Courts. The reason for acknowledging the Zamindars apart
from their natural right, was essentially the belief that it
would give them confidence, which in its turn, would
stimulate agricultural activity, and place the revenue on
4
secure foundations. That is why provisions were also made 
for separate engagements from small landholders within 
larger Zamindaris, technically called ’separation1, and also
1. Lord Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 29*5*1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E. 175*
2. Proclamation of 14*7*1802, Art.l, H.M.582, p.2464.
3. Instructions to Collectors, 14*7*1802, Ibid., pp.2419-20.
4. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7*1*1802, op.cit.
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for the admission of Zamindars who had "been excluded from 
engaging for their lands under the amildari management.
The separation of ’dependent estates and Talooks’, 
from the par#ana zamindaris, in the case of a dispute over 
separation "between the two parties was to "be decided on the 
fact of possession, and the aggrieved party was to seek 
redress in the Civil Court."1’ (It should "be pointed out that 
the use of the term ’Talook* as meaning a dependency of a 
pargana zamindari was misconceived, as taluqs and Taluqdars 
were not subordinate to pargana Zamindars in the Ceded 
districts. This was obviously a mistaken notion adopted 
under the influence of local conditions in Bengal. Dependent 
’Talooks1 should therefore be taken to mean dependent
o
2amindaris which did exist in the Ceded districts). Many 
Zamindars under the Oudh administration were known to have 
been excluded from the management of land. Consequently a 
variety of individuals had occupied their situation, and the 
British decided to set things right by making provision for 
the admission of those excluded Zamindars. It was provided 
that if the first triennial settlement was made in the first 
instance with individuals who posed as ’proprietors1 or with 
the revenue farmers, then such engagements were liable to be
1. Instructions to Collectors, 1U.7.1S02, Arts. 5-6, op.cit..
pp. 2/4.17-20.
2. B.B. Misra has wrongly accepted Taluqdars as subordinate 
to the Zamindars in the Ceded districts. Op. cit., p,201.
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cancelled on the appearance of the real ’proprietors7 and on 
their readiness to accept engagements, settlements were to 
"be made with them. This provision was however, subject to 
certain conditions. The real ’proprietors’ were to prove 
their claims within the currency of the first lease if they 
desired immediate possession. No rule was laid down as to 
how such claims were to he proved. If they put forward and 
proved their claims after the expiry of the first, three . . . 
years, then they were to he put in possession only at the 
end of the ten year period.'1' But hy an order of 7 August 
1802, part of the provision regarding the restoration of 
dispossessed ’proprietors’ was modified. The period within 
which they were to he put in immediate possession, was 
reduced from three years to six. months, and those who came 
forward and proved their claims after the six-month period 
hut within the first lease, were to he restored only after 
the expiry of that lease. Claims for restoration after the 
first triennial settlement were still to he considered as 
stated in the original provision. The modification of the 
original rule arose from the need to promote the improvement 
of agriculture. The feeling that the first engager was 
liable to he dispossessed at any time during the first lease 
would discourage him from undertaking any improvement of 
land.2
1. Instructions to Collectors, 14.7.1802, Art.13, op.cit., 
pp.2425-28.
2. B.O.C. Circular Letter to Collectors, 7*8.1802, B.O.C. 
Proc. 16.8.1803, 28.
40
Thus the plan from the very outset, acknowledged the
right of Zamindars to engage for the payment of revenue,
hut it also took into consideration the course which was to
he followed if the Zamindars did not exist in some areas or
if they existed hut were not willing to take engagements.
In such cases a village settlement with the Mukaddam or
Pradhan^ was to he formed, and even if a village settlement
2
was not possible, such lands were to he held khas.
Just as confidence was to he created among the
Zamindars hy offering engagements to them, so was confidence
to he created among the cultivators hy protecting them on
the hasis of custom and usage. All existing ahwahs or cesses
were to he consolidated with land revenue, and the Zamindars
were prohibited from imposing any new ones. The Zamindars
were to issue pattas to the cultivators, containing the
amount of their rent and the manner of its payment.
Similarly, the cultivators were to tender kahuliyats or
counter engagements to the Zamindars confirming the terms
■5
set out in the pattas.
1. Mukaddam and Pradhan signify the same,village headman.
2. Proclamation of H u 7*1602, Arts. 8-9, H.M. 582, pp.2*4-69“ 
70; Khas = Collection of revenue hy subordinate revenue 
servants from individual raiyat; used when intermediaries 
did not engage for revenue or when they did not exist.
3* H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7 •1*1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.180; Instructions to Collectors,
1U.7*1802, Arts. 9-10, H.M. 582, pp.2U21-3.
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In the formation of the assessment, a two-fold aim 
was kept in view - first, the engagements for revenue 
concluded between the officers of government and the 
Zamindars, and secondly, those existing between the Zamindars 
or other engagers and the cultivators* These two aspects of 
the assessment were to be put on secure foundations on the 
basis of contractual arrangement. Under the Nawab, the abuse 
was not so much in the formation of such engagements, but in 
their enforcement. The Amils disregarded written or customary 
engagements in the most rapacious manner, which compelled the 
Zamindars to do likewise in regard to the cultivators. Henry 
Wellesley was therefore in favour of enquiring into the 
customary relationship between the Zamindars and the 
cultivators, i.e., the rate and mode under which the 
cultivators paid.’*' If any alteration was necessary, he was 
in favour of postponing it until such time as the gradual 
reformation of the revenue management had taken roots. The 
written engagements "which were to be introduced between the 
Zamindars and the cultivators, and between the officers of 
government and the Zamindars seemed to Henry Wellesley an 
adequate reform to aim at in the first instance. This would 
banish the principal evil prevalent under the Nawab Ts 
administration, and the terms of written engagements would
1. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7•1*1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.180.
42
"be easily ascertainable between the two parties, or in a
Court of law in disputed cases.1
In determining the nature of the assessment, two
courses were open - either to have a fixed, equal, and 
2
annual nama during the currency of a lease or a rasadi jama. 
By a fixed, equal, and annual jama it was meant that the 
amount of the jama was to remain the same throughout the 
lease, that the jama of any.one. year, was to be. equal .to the 
resources of land under cultivation, and that the revenue 
demand was to be annual# But under a rasadi assessment the 
revenue was to increase progressively every year. Lord 
Wellesley was opposed to a rasadi jama because in spite of 
the benefit to the government from its adoption, the risk 
of the deterioration of agriculture was so great. Moreover, 
there did not exist any method of calculating precisely the
increase from one year to another according to improvements 
in agriculture. Therefore, the ’fixed, equal, and annual*, 
principle was the safer one to adopt for each of the three 
projected leases. And this principle was actually laid down 
in the settlement plan.** But an increase in the revenue was 
to be obtained in the second and third leases. At the end of 
the first lease in 1805, two-thirds of the increased assets
1 . Ibid.
2. Jama = Land revenue. Originally applied to land revenue 
plus cesses.
3. Lord Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 29*5*1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.175*
k* Proclamation of lU.7.1802, Art. 1, H.M. 582, p.2^65.
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were to be added to the expired .jama of that lease, which
would constitute the jama of the second lease. At the end of
the second lease in 1808, three-quarters of the increased
assets were to be added to the expired .jama of that lease,
thereby constituting the jama of the third lease.
The assessment was to be formed only for the land 
2
revenue. The sayer collection was to be separated, and the 
Zamindars were prohibited from levying it., .which was the- 
existing and injurious practice. The calculation of the
£i
assessment was to be based on a scrutiny of the jamabandi 
for the past few years, combined with a reference to the 
existing conditions of the festatesj the accounts and 
information already in possession of the revenue officers,
5
and such other information as was likely to be forthcoming. 
As regards the quantum of the government demand, and the 
residue which was to be left to the engagers from the gross 
assessment, no mention was made in the settlement plan# But 
the intention must have been to leave an amount equal to 
10 per cent of the jama, as this principle was actually 
observed in forming settlements, and was also considered to
1. Ibid., Arts# 2-3, pp.2U65-66.
2* Sayer = internal or transit duties on goods.
3# Proclamation of 1^.7*1802, Art.l, op.cit.; Instructions 
to Collectors, 1*4.7*1802, Arts.11-12, op.cit.» pp.2U23-25»
4. Jamabandi =■ statement of amount paid by raiyats to 
intermediaries in a village or the village rent-rolls, 
also applied to the district rent-roll.
5. Instructions to Tahsildars, 1U*7*1802, H.M. 582, p.2U53; 
Instructions to Collectors, li|..7.l802, Art 1, Ibid.,
p.2*412.
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be the practice, at least in theory under the Nawab of Oudh.
At the expiry of the ten year period, as already 
mentioned, a permanent settlement was to be concluded, for 
which certain conditions were laid down. It was to be made 
with the same persons’ who had successively engaged and 
fulfilled the terms of the first three settlements, and were 
willing to engage for a permanent settlement, provided that 
better claimants to an engagement did .not. come.forward in 
the meantime. The permanent settlement was to be made only 
for such land '... as shall be in a state of cultivation 
sufficiently advanced to warrant the measure, on such terms 
as Government shall deem fair and equitable, a due regard 
being had to the actual state of the country, and its means 
and capability of further improvement.
For the formation of the settlement and the collection 
of the revenue, an institutional frame-work was created. The 
Collector was to supervise while the Tahsildar was to do the
bulk of the work, and at the pargana level, the office of
2Kanungo was to be retained at least temporarily. The 
Patwaris must also have been used although the plan no­
where makes any reference to them. This omission was,
1. Instructions to Collectors, 11+.7.1802, Art .11+, Ibid., 
pp.21+31-32; Proclamation of 11+.7.1802, Art.l;, Ibid., 
P.2U67.
2. Kanungo = a. village or district revenue officer who kept 
records of land and revenue, and when required, explained 
local practices and public regulations.
3* Patwari = village accountant and record keeper.
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however, rectified hy a Regulation in 1803, when the Patwari
1
was semi-officially recognised. The Tahsildar was to play
a key role in the entire revenue work, mainly because of the
lack of knowledge of the early Collectors regarding revenue
matters, and the desire on the part of the British to
conciliate or pacify the country through the Tahsildars.
In the employment of Tahsildars, Henry Wellesley had
2the parallels of Oudh and Benares before him. The Amils 
in Oudh and the Tahsildars in Benares, were revenue 
contractors. The only difference was that the Amils 
exercised uncontrolled powers while the Tahsildars in 
Benares, (although powerful because of their police powers) 
functioned under restrictions and supervision from above.
It would not be wrong to suggest that the Tahsildar was the 
British version of the Amil. Henry Wellesley himself 
suggested that the Tahsildar who lacked the tyranny of the 
Amil would be readily acceptable by the people because of 
their long subjection to the latter. Besides, the tahsildari 
office, which would be respectable and important, would open 
avenues for the employment of higher classes of Indians.
This would, on the one hand, make the British government 
popular, and on the other, reconcile the higher classes to
3
the change of political power.
1. See below, ,p. 4-8.
2. See H.Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7*1*1802, Henry 
Wellesley Papers, Eur. MSS. E.180.
3. Ibid.
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The Tahsildar thus had a very important place in the
settlement plan. He was vested, not only with revenue, hut
with police powers also.^ The amount of revenue entrusted to
him for collection was to he between two and three lakhs of 
2
rupees. If any Zamindar was dissatisfied with him, the
Collector at his discretion, was to allow such Zamindar to
3
pay his revenue directly to his treasury.t uoTahsildar was to
he responsible for all.balances of. revenue and. expenses of-
collection within his own jurisdiction. He was to he
remunerated not hy a fixed salary, hut hy a commission on
collection which was fixed at ten per cent* (This was
subsequently increased to 11 -^ per cent, on account of his 
» L
police duties)4 It should he noted here, that the Tahsildar
combined the characteristics of a government servant, with
those of a revenue farmer. The office was not only powerful,
hut also lucrative, and the Collector was asked not to
weaken the authority of the Tahsildar when complaints made
5
against him were on light and insufficient grounds. The
main reason for this seems to have been the expectation that
c
Indians of 'character and responsibility would come forward 
to fill the office, and in order to encourage this trend, the
1. Instructions to Collectors, lU.7.1802, Art.23> H.M.582, 
p o 2kk0•
2. Ibid., Art.21, pp.2^37-38.
3* Ibid.. Art. 28, p.2W+5.
k. Ibid., Art. 23, p.2^39*
5* Ibid., Art,28, pp.2UU5-^6.
Ibid., Art.20, p.2^ +36*
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authority of the Tahsildar must he upheld and made to look 
dignified. However, it was realised that the power of the 
Tahsildar was liable to he ahused if no safeguards were 
provided. Accordingly, the Collector was. to make sure that 
one Tahsildar did not hold more than one tahsildari 
Jurisdiction,*^ or any other situation in addition to it; and 
the amount of revenue to he collected hy him, was not to 
exceed three,lakhs of rupees*.The Collector on.his part, was
to supervise all revenue settlements, and the collection of
S
the revenue, and was himself to form the Settlement and
2
receive the revenues of large zamindaris in his district*
To assist settlement making and to protect the
raiyats the office of Kanungo, which was generally in
existence, was to he retained. It was only proposed at this
stage to retain Kanungos until the expiry of the ten year 
3
period* The ancient function of the Kanungo was to maintain 
records and supply information regarding land, revenue, land 
owners and cultivators*^ He was also the dispenser of 
revenue law. Now he was only required to supply information 
required in the formation of the settlement, i*e*, data
5
regarding the assessment, and resources of 'estates! This
1* Ihid., Art*22, p.2^38.
2. Ihid*, Art.l6, p.2433.
3* B*0*C. Circular Letter to Collectors, 1^*7*1802, H.M.582, 
pp.2^75-77; H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7*1*1802,on.cit* 
R.N. Nagar, 'Kanungo in the N.W.P. 1801-33 Indian 
Historical Records Commission Proceedingst XVIII, p*ll6.
5* B.O.C. Circular Letter to Collectors, In.7*1802, op.cit♦» 
pp.2^75-77.
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office passed into the British hands in a state of decay. 
Under the Nawab, between the pulls and pressures of the 
Amils and Zamindar the office fell into disuse, and its 
records became out of date. The personal position of the 
Kanungo had become precarious. As Routledge wrote to Henry 
Wellesley, !... those who assisted the Amils in their undue 
exactions incurred the resentment of the Zemindars who 
appear to have put some of them to. death,, and those, who . . - 
refused their assistance to the Amils were punished by 
confinement and treated in the same oppressive manner as 
the Zemindars • were treated by the Amils.1
Similarly the Patwari, who kept information regarding 
village accounts and ’proprietary’ and cultivating rights, 
was also suffering from the general aberrations of the times. 
The Patwari indeed maintained his accounts and passed 
information to the Kanungo, but due to his having become the 
servant of the Zamindar. the authenticity of his accounts 
was questionable. Regulation XXIX of 1803 brought him 
partially within the official orbit by requiring him to 
furnish information to the Collector and the Civil Court,
yet he was allowed to continue as an employee of the 
2
Zamindar.
1. J. Routledge to II. Wellesley, 25*7#1802, H.W.Corres.. 
pp.31-32.
2. Reg. XXIX of 1803, S.2.
4-9
For the security of the revenue the sale laws as
applicable in Bengal and Benares, were to he used sparingly
and as a last resort in the Ceded Provinces. Lord Wellesley
and Henry Wellesley were of the same opinion in regard to
this important point. Their reasons were several. In Bengal,
in spite of the considerable duration of British rule, a
large number of the Zamindars had lost their lands under the
operation of the sale law. So in an unsettled country like
the Ceded Provinces, the danger of the results of the sale
laws was even greater# It was feared that the vigorous
people of this region would easily be driven to 'despair1 by
the application of the sale laws. Henry Wellesley apprehended
that this would be considered by them as an oppression worse
than they had suffered at the hands of the Amils.^
But what alternative to the sale laws was to be
adopted, was not clarified. Henry Wellesley had only
suggested that some less offensive course should be
adopted. This could mean that a defaulter would be
temporarily suspended from his engagement, till the dues
2
were recovered. Moreover, security for the payment of 
revenue had to be tendered by all types of engagers, as also 
by the Tahsildars. The engagers had to give security to the
1. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7*1#1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur# MSS. E#l80; Lord Wellesley to H. Wellesley,
8.3.1802, Cited by D.Dewar, op.cit.. p.6k*
2# H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 7#1.1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.180.
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extent of one-fourth of the .jama. and the Tahsildar had to
do the same to the extent of his largest instalment of
1
revenue collection. This practice had become a common
feature of revenue collection under the Nawab. Its retention
under the British shows the apprehension they felt about
revenue collection.
However, by Regulations XXVI and XXVII of 1803,
detailed provisions, including, the sale of. land- for arrears
of revenue, were introduced. The provisions related to two
kinds of arrears - those that accrued on each monthly
instalment and those that remained at the end of the fasli
year. It was in the latter case that the extreme measure of
selling the land by a public auction, was to be applied. In
the ease of arrears of monthly instalment, a mixture of
Judicial and coercive provisions were laid down. The
proceedings of the Tahsildar and the Collector involved the
defaulter as well as his surety. In his Jurisdiction, the
2
Tahsildar first served a dastak on the defaulter, and If 
the arrears remained unpaid after five days, then a dastak 
was to be served on the surety. If the arrears remained 
unpaid after five days of the latter dastak. then the 
Tahsildar was to send the persons involved to the Collectorfs
1. Instructions to Collectors, Ilu7*l802, Arts. 8 and 2k,
H.M» 582, pp.2^19-20.
2. Dastak = written certificate.
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2.
office. The Collector was directly responsible for
realising the jjama, which was payable by the seventh day of
each month. If it remained unpaid, the Collector was to
serve a dastak on the parties concerned or send a verbal
communication. If the ,1ama continued to remain unpaid by the
li+th day of a month, then on the following day the Collector
was to issue another dastak requiring the presence of the
persons in his office. The persons directly summoned l>y the *
Collector and those sent by the Tahsildar were to be
confined by the Collector’s authority for a period not
exceeding ten days. If the dues remained unpaid even then,
the parties were to be sent to the public jail and the
Collector simultaneously applied to the Civil Court for
their further confinement. [Such confinement would obviously
last until the dues were realised]• The land of the persons
so confined were to be held khaa until the defaulters or the
sureties paid the dues. The confinement provision was not
applicable to persons who had satisfied the Collector that
the dues would be paid before the month expired, or to those
who were incapacitated from paying the instalment owing to
natural calamity, or to those joint ’proprietors’ whose
’estate’ was managed by a manager who was responsible for the
2
default, oi* to the female proprietors'. If the dastak of
1. Reg. XXVII of 1803, SS. 3,10,11 and 5.
2. Ibid., S3. 7,11,14/1, 13 and 50.
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the Collector remained unanswered, then proceedings in the
Civil Court were to he started against such persons.’1’
Instead of confinement and khas collection the Collector
could employ two other alternatives. He could order either
the distraint of the defaulters* personal property or the
attachment of their land. The latter process was to he
applied strictly with a view to induce the defaulters to pay
the arrears. Both these processes were to he executed by
the Tahsildar. A judicial check upon the action of the
executive was provided hy making the Tahsildar and the
Collector liable to prosecution in a Court of Law for any
ahuse of power in issuing dastak, or in confining the
-their *z
defaulters, or in distraining his personal property.
At the end of the fasli year, if arrears of revenue
accrued on malguzari land then it was liable to public
auction.^ The term arrears of revenue also included default
5
in takavl repayment. If the proceeds from the sale of land 
did not equal the amount due, then the proprietor* or the 
revenue engager was exposed to the sale of his personal
g
property also. Land paying revenue hut engaged for hy a 
revenue-farmer was not liable to auction on default. Several
1. Ibid.. S.22.
2. Ihido, SS.14/2 and 52.
3. Ibid,, SS.16/1 and 33-42.
4. Ibid., S.17/1- 17/5.
5. Ibid,, S.43.
6. Ibid., S.47.
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ways were provided for realising the arrears in this case.,
The successive alternatives were: the land was to he handed
over to the person appearing to have the hest claim to its
ownership on agreeing to discharge the arrears (without
foreclosing ’proprietary* claims of other individuals who
were to establish their individual claim in a Court of Law);
if it did not materialise then the engagement was to he
offered to the Mukaddam on his agreeing to pay the arrears;.
if this was refused then the present revenue-farmer was to
he continued on agreeing to pay the arrears subsequently or
the land could he let to a new revenue-farmer on terms
adequate for realising the arrears; even if this alternative
did not materialise, then, the land was to he held khas.
If it was considered necessary hy the Board of Revenue, the
revenue-farmer*s personal property was liable to he sold for
the default of revenue*1 The reason for not putting to
auction the land under a revenue-farmer, is clear* There was
no ’proprietor* in that land, so it could not he sold. In a
joint ’estate’, the share of a defaulter was not to he sold,
hut it was to he transferred to the other co-sharers on their
agreeing to discharge the arrears* The defaulter was entitled
to re-possession after the co-sharers had been compensated
2
from the management of his land. Similarly, the Collector
1* Ibid*, S.18/1-4*
2. Ibid** S.17/1 and 17/4.
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was discouraged from recommending the sale of a fractional 
share, i.e., a four-anna or an eight-anna share etc. of a 
joint undivided Estate*. There were two reasons for this. 
There was a single assessment for such an ’estate* and if a 
portion of this ’estate* was to be sold, then the assessment 
for it would have to be determined. This would be Inconvenient 
from the administrative point of view. Secondly, the 
separation of the fractional share would depreciate the 
value of ’property*. [The alternative here also would be to 
transfer for the time being, the defaulter’s share to the 
other co-sharers]. If the share was to be sold, the express 
sanction of the government was to be obtained, but in case 
of a decree of the Civil Court, such a sale would be 
automatic. In both these cases the intended portion to be 
sold, would have to be separated and given a jarna.^  Land 
thus was liable to be auctioned, not only for the arrears of 
revenue, but also in execution of judicial decrees arising 
from money transactions.
The sale of land for arrears of revenue was to fall 
essentially on ’property* owned by a single person, and the 
joint ’property’ as far as possible, was not to be put up to 
sale. But under a judicial decree, no form of ’property’ was 
immune from a public sale. When an ’estate* was liable to be 
sold either for arrears of revenue, or in the execution of
1. Reg. XXVI of 1803, S.13.
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a judicial decree, it was not necessarily to toe sold entire. 
Only that much of it was to toe selected for sale as would 
yield an amount equal to the sum outstanding together with 
interest if any, and the cost of sale. The land so selected 
for sale, was to toe assigned a jama, [so that the future 
revenue would not toe affected, and the purchaser would know 
his obligation]. The selection of land commensurate with the 
amount outstanding,, was to toe. on. the toasts, of the-current 
money value of land. But in two cases the ’estate1 was to 
toe sold entire. Where the sadr jama did not exceed Rs.500 a 
year, the ’estate* was to toe sold entire, because a jama 
less than that, was considered to toe inconvenient and 
difficult to realise. In a case like that, to separate part 
of the land from the ’estate* would mean a jama much below 
Rs.500. In a large ’estate’ where land could toe easily 
separated and a jama could toe assigned to the land so 
separated, tout if the ’estate’ was so circumstanced that its 
division before sale was considered to toe disadvantageous
2
to the present ’proprietor , it was then to toe sold entire.
Any yield from the sale of land in those two cases in excess 
of the amount outstanding, any interest due on it and the 
cost of sale, was to toe handed over to the former ’proprietor*.
The process of the sale law for arrears of revenue
1. Ibid.. S.2/1-2; Reg. XXV of 1803, S.37.
2. Reg. XXVI of 1803, S.2/3-U.
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would commence at the lowest level of the administrative 
machinery. The Tahsildar would recommend to the Collector, 
the Collector would request the authority of the Board of 
Revenue, and the latter would seek the sanction of the 
government and issue orders to the Collector consistent with 
those received from the government. Under no circumstances 
was a sale of land for arrears of revenue to take place 
without the previous sanction of the - g o v e r n m e n t T h e  sale 
of land in execution of a judicial decree, was to take place 
at the instruction of the Board of Revenue to the Collector, 
All Civil Courts were required to send copies of decrees 
passed hy them, to the Board of Revenue, And the latter was
2
to inform the government of action taken on judicial decrees, 
Notice of the public sale of land was to be advertised at the 
Collector’s office, at the district court, at the mufassal 
town in which the land was situated and at the office of the 
Board of Revenue at Calcutta* The notice was to be in 
Persian and Hindi languages and it was to be advertised at 
least a month before the date fixed for sale. It was to 
specify the land, its location, the assessment, the hour and 
date of sale. The sale was to take place either at the 
Collector’s office or at that of the Board of Revenue as 
decided by the government. The defaulter and his surety
1 . Ibid., S*lU.
2. Ibid., SS.16-7 and 25•
3. Ibid., S.5.
57
were debarred from buying land for which they had defaulted. 
At the same time no fictitious sale of land was to be 
allowed. In both the cases, the penalty for buying illicitly 
was forfeiture of land to the government. However, land 
bought by an authorised agent for his principal was to be 
legal.1
On the face of it, the provisions regarding the
realisation of arrears of revenue, were exceedingly fair and
circumspect. Its working however, entirely depended upon
the efficiency of the revenue administration and on the
understanding of the rules by the people who owned land.
Such was, however, not the case. The laxity of administration
combined with certain social factors, led to some fraudulent
2acquisition of land by certain types of people. This 
result was actually sought to be prevented by the provisions 
of the sale law. There is always perhaps a gap between the 
idea and its execution.
Reverting to the plan of 1802, all the terms set out 
therein, were to be fully, clearly, and distinctly 
advertised, as well as entered in the settlement engagements.
3
Lord Wellesley was emphatic on this point. According to 
his observations, the engagements between the government and
1. Ibid.. SS.10 and 9.
2. See below, pp. 105-11.
3. Lord Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 29.5.1802, Henry Wellesley 
Papers, Eur. MSS. E.175*
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the engagers, and "between the engagers and the cultivators
were to he reduced to a contract cognisable in a Court of
Law* It was to he sacred and inviolable. This would create
confidence among the people in government, make them happy,
improve the country, and make the government effective.'1’
The settlement plan was on all sides, considered to
he well calculated to achieve its objectives. Henry Wellesley,
the Board, of.Commissioners, Lord Wellesley, the Bengal.......
government, and the Court of Directors were of the same 
2
opinion. The government was particularly eloquent in its
praise of the plan. To the Court, the Bengal government
wrote that the plan was to he 'founded in wisdom and justice
and to he judiciously calculated to promote the improvement
of the country, to secure the happiness of Inhabitants and
3
to confirm their attachment to the British Government.*
In 1803, when a complete revenue code was introduced
in the Ceded Provinces, the settlement plan was incorporated
k
in Regulations XXV and XXVII. The provisions of revenue 
regulations of 1803, not only incorporated the plan hut were 
also an advance upon it,
1. Lord Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 8.3*1802, cited hy D.Dewar, 
op.cit., pp.62-3*
2. See H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 18.7*1802, Board's 
Collection, 2803, pp.89-90; Proclamation of Ik.7*1802,
Art.13, H.M. 582, pp.2k72-73; Lord Wellesley to H.Wellesley,
1.11.1802, H.M.582, pp.2k83-8U; Bg. P.L. 23*2.1803;
Bg. P. draft D., 25*8.180k, 167, para.18.
3. Bg. P.L., 23*2.1803, para.k.
k* Reg. XXV of 1803, S.29; Reg. XXVII of 1803, S.53*
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T l^e Zamlndars, Taluqdars and other proprietors1 were 
already recognised as having the right to engage for the 
settlement of the revenue. Regulation XXV of 1803 went a 
step further and confirmed the proprietary rights of 
Zemindars, Talookdars, and other descriptions of land­
holders possessing a right-of-property * in their holdings in 
accordance with the laws and usages of the country and the 
regulations introduced hy the British, /Proprietary.1 rights. . 
at the same time were made transferable hy sale, gift or 
otherwise, subject only to the personal law of individuals, 
and the indefeasible right of the state to revenue from the 
transferred land.^* Provision was also made for the 
restoration of proprietors1 who were likely to be excluded 
from the management of their Pstates* in the forthcoming 
settlements. Such exclusion would result either from their 
refusal to engage or from the rejection of their terms of 
engagement by the government. In such cases, either a khas 
settlement was to be formed or the lands were to be let to 
revenue farmers. In cases of khas settlement the proprietor^1 
were to be restored at any time on their agreeing to pay the 
assessed revenue. Where the lands, were let in farm such 
restoration was to take place after the expiry of the lease, 
on their undertaking to pay the revenue fixed on such lands. 
But if the revenue farmer agreed to an immediate restoration
1. Reg. XXV of 1803, SS.3^ and 36.
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and the government approved of it, then the proprietorsT
were to he restored on paying the required assessment.*^
A proclamation of lU July 1802, had already provided
for the grant of pattas to the raiyats. By Regulation XXX
of 1803 the form of these pattas was further clarified, and
the year 1807-8 was set as the final date for the completion
and delivery of the pattas. In a rent-rate dispute between
Zamindar . and raiyat the-government refrained from defining -
their respective rights. Such disputes were to he determined
hy the Civil Courts on the hasis of custom and written
2
engagements if in existence. But the government in regard
to the collection of rent, armed the Zamindars, Taluqdars
and revenue farmers with the power of distraint without
■5
going to a Court of Law. On the other hand, the government
reserved the right to legislate in future for the protection
Ll
of the raxyats.
Regulations XXXI and XXXVI of 1803 prescribed rules 
for determining the validity of rent-free tenures. There 
were two categories of rent-free tenures called non-Badshahi 
and Badshahi. The non-Badshahi grants were those which were 
given hy Zamindars or Ami].s. It was believed that a 
considerable number of such grants were in existence# Some
1 . Ibid., S.33.
2. Reg. XXX of 1803, SS.^-7 and 9.
3. Reg. XXVIII of 1803, S.2. 
k. Reg. XXV of 1803, S.35.
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were given for avowedly charitable and religious purposes,
"but most were for the benefit of the grantors themselves.
The grantees were used merely as a cover for misappropriation. 
The Badshahi grants covered those given by the Mughal 
Emperors, the Nawabs of Oudh and Farrakhabad, and the Rohilla 
Chiefs before their defeat in 177U. Such grants were for 
religious and charitable purposes, and in recognition of 
services rendered, b y .individuals. . Many of the-grants under 
both categories were believed to be held under fabricated 
titles*^
In determining the validity of non-Badshahi grants, 
a time-scale principle was applied* Grants made before 
10 November 1789 were to be treated as> valid, if the grantee 
had actually obtained possession of the grant and held it
h
before and after that date without the payment of revenue. 
Grants made between 10 November 1789, and 1 January 1801, 
were to be considered valid if confirmed by the British 
government. Such confirmation would be given if the lands 
were actually held rent-free before 1 January 1801. All
1. Reg. XXXI of 1803, S.l.
2. Reg. XXXVI of 1803, SS.1-2.
3. Reg. XXXI of 1803, S.l and Reg. XXXVI of 1803, S.l.
i4. Reg. XXXI of 1803, S.2/1; it is not clear why grants 
made before 10 November 1789 were to be valid. The only 
plausible suggestion is that the government had a twelve 
year limit in view. The Treaty of Lakhnau was, signed on 
10 November 1801 by which the Ceded Provinces was 
acquired.
5. Ibid., S.2/2.
grants made after 1 January 1801, were to "be considered void
1
unless they had been made hy the British government itself.
Grants which had been made before 1 January 1801 for
religious purposes, which had been appropriated accordingly
and which did not exceed ten bigahs in each case, were to
2
be uniformly considered valid. Badshahi grants were to be 
considered valid if held rent-free before 1 January 1801. 
Those, made, after .1 January 18.01 were to. be considered invalid 
unless made by the British government itself. The holders 
of the non-Badshahi and Badshahi grants were required to 
register with the government within a period of one year.
The investigation of the rent-free tenures was to be
conducted by the Collector and for the resumption of invalid
Ll
grants, he was to prosecute the holders in a Court of Law.
It may be briefly noted that behind the early policy 
as reflected in the plan of 1802 and the Regulations of 1803> 
three distinct influences were at work - those of Bengal, 
Benares and the local situation. The 1793 revenue code for
Bengal had established what is characterised as the zamindari
s
system of land settlement. Under it the Settlement was madeK
with Zamindars, who were at the same time, acknowledged as 
proprietors. Land was made a transferable commodity on private
1 . Ibid., S.3*
2. Reg, XXXI of 1803, S.2/?
3. Reg. XXXVI of I8O3, SS.2 and 3.
iw Reg. XXXI of 1803, SS.7 and 19; Reg. XXXVI of 1803, SS.7 
and I k .
and public account* Concern was expressed for the welfare 
of the raiyats and the government had reserved the right to 
legislate in their favour# Rules had been framed for the
disposal of claims to rent-free tenures. And above all, a
s
permanent Settlement had been made. In all these aspects 
the policy in the Ceded Provinces clearly followed the 
Bengal pattern. The only difference was that in Bengal a
permanent settlement .had been made., while in-the Ceded.......
Provinces it was to be made after a lapse of ten years.
Even in the ten year time limit, there was nothing new. It 
was merely an echo of what John Shore had recommended for 
Bengal, and which was accepted at one stage by the 
government before the announcement of permanency of 1793*
In the permanent settlement of Benares of 1795# adequate 
and real protection was accorded to the raiyats and the 
government’s knowledge regarding them had increased since 
the 1793 Bengal arrangement* The influence of this increased 
knowledge can be clearly seen in the arrangements for the 
Ceded Provinces. In Benares, the Tahsildar was an essential 
feature of the revenue organisation* The creation of 
Tahsildars for the Ceded Provinces was the result of Benares 
experience, combined with whatever virtue there was in the 
Amil1 s office under the Nawab of Oudh. Finally, the local 
situation had dictated the need for short settlements, the 
inclusion of revenue farmers among others, as the medium of
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revenue collection, the provision regarding khas settlement 
and the insistence on tendering security hy revenue engagers 
as well as the Tahsildars.
The settlement plan had several defects. No provision 
was made to investigate ’proprietary* rights, yet they were 
declared to he vested in Zamindars1 Taluqdars and individuals 
vaguely described as ’others’. The provisions for restoring 
’proprietors ’. ousted under the. Nawab, &nci also those who 
would he excluded in the forthcoming settlements, were 
vague, and conflicted with the provision of making successive 
settlements with the ’same persons’. The excluded 
’proprietors* would thus continue to he excluded, their 
chance of restoration would steadily diminish, while the 
revenue farmers who engaged in their place, would have the 
greater opportunity of acquiring ’proprietary* rights. 
Similarly, the provisions for acknowledging ’proprietary* 
right in land on the basis of possession, while directing 
a claimant to ’proprietary* title, who was not in possession 
of land to a Court of Law, were dangerous. The basis on 
which the Courts were to decide ’proprietary’ disputes was 
not laid down. Again, in regard to the protection of 
cultivators, no definite arrangement was prescribed* It was 
merely laid down that the rent disputes were to be decided 
by the Civil Courts on the basis of custom. How the Courts 
would acquire a knowledge of the customs of the country in
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the absence of investigation, was not even realised*
The proposed increase of assessment from one 
settlement to another, was based on unnecessary optimism. 
The condition of agriculture was known to be bad, yet no 
provision was made in the plan for either maintaining the 
same .jama, or even reducing it from one lease to another if 
the agricultural situation worsened. For making a permanent 
settlement too, the conditions laid down were extremely 
vague* The clear condition ought to have been a definite 
ratio of cultivated to waste at which a permanency of 
assessment would be granted.
The most dangerous provisions were those for the 
realisation of revenue, the creation of Tahsildars, their 
powers and remuneration, and the provision of security from 
the Tahsildars as well as the engagers. These brought the 
revenue system within the influence of the monied class, 
and thus continued the practice which was prevailing under 
the Nawab,
But the settlement plan and the Regulations with all 
their defects, constituted the framework of the early 
settlements in the Ceded districts. The same provisions 
with variations regarding the dates were extended to the
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1 2 Conquered districts and to Bundelkhand.
Before the implementation of the settlement plan is 
examined, it is necessary to analyse the revenue realisation 
for the year 1801-02# This was the year in which the Ceded 
districts were acquired, and to that year the settlement 
plan discussed above, was not applicable# The amount of
revenue after Henry Wellesley and Col. Scott had bargained
■3 . . .
with the Nawab, ■ was fixed at Rs.l3,523,i47U. Although the
1. The districts conquered from Sindhia comprised Agra, 
Aligarh, Northern and Southern Saharanpur. Here the first 
triennial settlement was to begin in 1805-06, which was to 
be followed by another three year settlement, and then by 
a four year settlement. At the end of which a permanent 
settlement was to be formed# Reg. IX of 1805, SS.3-5 & 7«
2. In Bundelkhand the first triennial settlement was to begin 
from 1806-07 which was to be succeeded by two more trienn­
ial settlements, and then a permanent settlement was to
be formed# Reg. IX of 1805, SS.6-7# B.B.Misra wrongly 
states that the triennial settlement was to begin in 1807- 
OS which was to be followed by another triennial and then 
a quartennial one# On.cit.. p#201.
3# Rev. Statement of Ceded Districts, 10.11.1801, H.M.579* 
p.799; originally the Nawab had estimated the revenue of 
Ceded Districts at Rs*13,553>468. Henry Wellesley and 
Scott who had negotiated the Treaty of Lakhnau considered 
that part of Nawab fs revenue which related to Rohilkhand 
and Gorahkpur as inflated. Henry Wellesley and Scott's 
paper of 30.10.1801, H.M. 581, pp*1580-82. Apparently 
Henry Wellesley and Scott did not meet with much success 
as the difference between the Nawab fs original figure and 
the Treaty figure was a mere Rs.30,000. It has been stated 
by B.B.Misra and B.R.Misra that the Nawab fs Treaty .iama 
was deliberately exaggerated to appease and amuse the 
British. See, The Central Administration, p.203, and Land 
Revenue Policy in U.P.. 0 .68. Both of these writers have 
followed P.N.Wright, Pinal Report on the Settlement of 
Cawnoore District (1878), pp*31-32. The implication of 
WrighVs statement was to absolve the British from the 
responsibility of subsequent overassessment in the Ceded 
districts by shifting the blame on to the Nawab’s treaty 
.jama# This statement is, however, utterly misleading.
continued on page
f *n* 3 continued from page
The evidence alleging an inflated jama is that of Henry 
Wellesley and Scott, hut only in regard to Rohilkhand and 
Gorakhpur» Even if the charge of exaggerated .jama is 
accepted, yet the fact that the British were aware of it 
in 1801 is inescapable* And this awareness was disregarded 
when the Nawab’s .jama was increased hy Rs*22 Lakhs in 
1801-02 it self a See "below, p* 68* There is no connection 
between the Nawab1 s lama and subsequent over-assessment*
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Treaty was signed in November 1801, the British revenue 
claim was to have retrospective effect from September 1801, 
which was the beginning of the Fasli year 1209. The Nawab fs 
officers had already formed engagements and had also 
realised four revenue instalments before the introduction of 
the British authority.*1’ The British summarily revised the
p
Nawab fs .iama which was fixed at Rs. 15,712,6^4. This 
increase of nearly 22 lakhs of rupees, it should be noted, 
fell on the unrealised instalment of the 1209 Settlement.
The districts of Allahabad and Etawah chiefly bore this 
heavy increase, which amounted to ten and nine lakhs of
3
rupees respectively. And the revenue realisation within the 
year fell short of the demand only by rupees 1,006,14-88.^
In the collection of revenue it was intended to 
continue the Amils under the supervision of the Collectors. 
But with the exception of a few Amils arid sub-Amils in the 
Allahabad district, the Amils refused to function under the 
British, There were several reasons for this. A great 
distrust subsisted between them and the Zamindar s., but the 
complaints against the Amils under the Nawab1s administration
1. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 23.3.1802, Bg.R.C.
30.9.1802, 15.
2. Statement of Revenue for 1209 (fasli), 21,5.1803, Board1s 
Collection 2803, p.209.
3. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 26.1,1802, Bg.R.C.
30.9.1802, 9; H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 15.2.1802, 
Ibid.. 13.
k* Statement of Revenue for 1209 (fasli), op.cit.
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always went unheeded. Under the British, all complaints 
would he looked into, and the Amils would he restrained from 
exercising untrammelled authority. The Amils were very 
anxious to depart from the Ceded districts. The hurried 
departure of Amils from Gorakhpur offers a good illustration 
of their anxiety at the change of political power. The Amils 
and their staff suddenly departed, as Routledge wrote to 
Henry Wellesley, ,... to avoid the insults and illtreatment 
they apprehended from the inhabitants in consequence of the 
oppressions they had while in power exercised over them 
without any restraint....'^  The revenue realisation 
therefore, for the unexpired portion of 1209 was entrusted 
to revenue farmers in Rohilkhand, Etawah and part of 
Allahabad, to the Amils in the rest of Allahabad, and to 
Tahsildars in Gorakhpur.
The settlement of 1209 in Allahabad, Etawah and 
Rohilkhand offers a very interesting illustration of the 
working of the revenue farming system. The land revenue 
demand of Allahabad amounted to Rs.3^78,U0U. Out of this 
Rs.l,029*683 was in the hands of revenue farmers and the 
rest in those of the Amil and sub-Amils. The farmed portion 
of Allahabad comprised eleven parganas which were engaged 
for by nine revenue farmers. One of them, Babu Naik Singh, 
engaged for three parganas with a total jama of Rs.3^-9,356.
1, J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 25 »7*1802, H.W.Corres.. 
p.29.
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For the farmed revenue there were three sureties - Babu Naik 
Singh, Devkinundan, and the Raja of Benares, who stood 
surety for Rs.612,477, Rs.331,205, and Rs.85,001 
respectively. Prom this it would appear that Naik Singh was 
a revenue farmer as- well as a surety.1 In Etawah, which had 
a iama of over Rs.27 lakhs, the collection was entirely 
in the hands of revenue farmers. In all, seventeen revenue 
farmers realised the revenue. Even some Taluqdars were among 
the revenue farmers (e.g. Raja Jaswant Singh, Kunwar Pritam 
Singh and Raja Chattrasal). In Rohilkhand, comprising Bareli 
and Moradabad, the land revenue amounted to over Rs.46 lakhs, 
out of which over Rs.42 lakhs was in the hands of revenue 
farmers. The number of revenue farmers who engaged for this 
amount, was fifteen which included two pargana Zamindars.
The professional revenue farmers in this region were mostly 
Muslim. A revenue of over 20 lakhs of rupees was engaged for
3
by only four of the Muslim revenue farmers. In the 
collection of revenue for 1209 the revenue farmers, Amils 
and Tahsildars, were remunerated at the rate of ten per cent 
on the collection.^
1. See Settlement Account of Allahabad for 1209 (fasli).
Bg. R.C. 30.9.1802, 11.
2. See Settlement Account of Etawah for 1209 (fasli). Ibid. .14.
3. See Settlement Account of Rohilkhand for 1209 (fasli).
Ibid.. 16.
4* It should be pointed out that the handful of revenue 
farmers, Amils and Tahsildars must have earned Rs.15 
Lakhs in collecting the revenue. The revenue realised 
within the year was approximately Rs.14,700,000.
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In revising and fixing the assessment for the year 
1209 Fasli. the data taken into consideration were 
inadequate. As the year in question was well advanced, there 
was hardly any time to scrutinise the accounts even if 
reliable accounts had been available. In fact, the accounts 
furnished by the Amils in Allahabad, Etawah and Rohilkhand 
were utterly unsatisfactory. The Amils were in the habit of 
keeping their accounts in the most perfunctory manner. In 
Gorakhpur even those accounts were not available. Either the 
Amils did not keep any accounts or they destroyed them 
before leaving Gorakhpur.'1' One Am 11 prohibited his deputy
2
from revealing anything to Routledge even from his memory.
In the absence or unreliability of the accounts of the Amils.
it was natural to look to the Kanungos. But the Kanungos had
not been in regular possession of their office, and the
Amils never furnished them with counterparts of their
accounts. On the contrary, the accounts maintained by the
Amils. which were presumed to be false, were certified
3
under compulsion by the Kanungos♦ Another possibility was 
to look for the accounts of the Zamindars and their Patwaris. 
John Routledge did obtain accounts from this source, and 
stated that the Zamindars and Patwaris were positive as to
1, J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 26.7.1802, H.W.Corres.,td.29.
2. J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 8.2.1802, Ibid.. p.13.
3# J. Routledge to G. Mercer, 17.12.1802, Ibid.. p.
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their accuracy.'*' However, it is highly doubtful if those
2
accounts were accurate. Thus the revised assessment of 
1209 was based on arbitrary grounds. And the enhancement of 
revenue by Rs.22 lakhs on the .jama of the Nawab and in the 
context of the deterioration of agriculture was excessive 
and unfortunate.
The collection of revenue in the Conquered provinces 
and Bundelkhand between the years 1803-05, was done on a 
summary basis. Very little is, in fact, mentioned in the 
official correspondence about these settlements. The demand 
for I8O3-OU, and 180U-05 was slightly over Rs.51 lakhs, and 
slightly less than Rs.57 lakhs respectively. The collection 
for the first year was over Rs.43 lakhs, and for the second 
above Rs.UU lakhs. Thus the large arrears of revenue for 
the two years taken together which amounted to over Rs.21 
lakhs, would indicate over-assessment for the Conquered 
Provinces and Bundelkhand also.
During the period 1802-07* two settlements in the 
Ceded districts, and during 1805-07 one settlement in the
1. Ibid., p.k5*
2. The Amils and Zamindars were in a state of perpetual 
conflict. The Amils could easily avail themselves of the 
accounts of the Zamindars by employing pressure and force. 
It was in the interests of the Zamindars to deceive the 
Amils. The Zamindars thus had a motive to conceal the 
assets of their holdings and falsify their receipts. But 
that part of the zamindari accounts which related to their 
annual payments to the Amils would, of course, be accurate.
3. See, SRRNWP.. 1, p.370.
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Conquered districts and Bundelkhand were formed under the
settlement plan discussed above. The settlement in the Ceded
and Conquered Provinces was formed with a heterogeneous set
of people, therefore no particular group of engagers can he
precisely identified for the province as a whole, with whom
settlements were overwhelmingly made* All that can he said
is that the settlements were made with Zamindars, Taluqdars*
village Zamindars, revenue farmers and headmen of villages,
and where hone of those categories existed or where they
existed hut did not wish to engage, a khas settlement was 
1
formed* The immediate need of collecting the revenue was 
the main reason for accepting engagements from a variety of 
individuals* This prevented the Collectors from determining 
who were the right persons with whom the settlements were 
to he formed* (The plan had laid down the Zamindars» 
Taluqdars, and ’other proprietors’ as the right individuals
n
for settlement forming).
1. In Gorakhpur for instance, village Zamindars were given 
preference over the large Zamindars* This did not mean 
complete exclusion of the Zamindars or the revenue 
farmers or a khas settlement* All these forms stood side 
hy side* See J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 28.10.1802,
H.W*Corres., pp.38-40; in the Conquered districts 
Taluqdars"“were given the first option to engage* See 
Collector of Agra to BOR*, BOC* Proc * 12*8.1806, 9;
In Bundelkhand as the predominant tenure was Bhaiyachara, 
a form of joint tenure, the settlement was made with the 
representative of the community; In Kanpur Zamindars and 
revenue farmers were alike accepted, A Welland to 
J. Richardson, 21*3.1803, B.O.C. Proc., 12.4.1803, 4;
In Rohilkhand revenue farmers and village headmen 
together with khas settlement was the main feature.
2* See ahove, pp* 37-4-0, and see "below, p.59.
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In forming the assessment of the Ceded districts, 
two important deviations were made from the principles laid 
down in the settlement plan. The one related to a rfixed, 
equal, and annual1 .jama, the other to the increase of the 
assessment during the second settlement over the first. By 
an order of 28 August 1802, the Board of Commissioners 
prescribed a rasadi settlement at the discretion of the 
Collectors.^ Most of the districts of the Ceded Provinces, 
hut particularly those of Bareli', Moradabad and Gorakhpur, 
were settled under the rasadi jama. This principle was also 
applied to the Conquered Provinces when the triennial 
settlement was formed there. Although the administration had 
been theoretically opposed to a rasadi jama, compelling 
reasons forced it to sanction one. The depressed state of 
agriculture and the general lack of resources in the hands 
of Zamindars was considered both by Henry Wellesley and
2
John Routledge, to defeat the ffixed and equal1 principle. 
This difficulty was heightened by a partial failure of rain 
in 1802 principally affecting Rohilkhand. Under the rasadi 
assessment so formed, the amount of the first year was to 
be lower than would otherwise have been the case. This 
decrease in the first year was to be made good by a gradual 
increase in the following two years.
1. Reg. XXV of 1803, S.30.
2. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 10.2.1803, H.M.583, 
pp*7~9; J* Routledge to H. Wellesley, 28.10.1802, op.cit.
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When the second triennial settlement of the Ceded 
districts became due in 1805-6, the question of increasing 
the revenue assumed importance. It had been provided in the 
settlement plan that two-thirds of the increased assets
1
would be absorbed in the .jama of the second settlement.
But in 1803-U a severe drought prevailed in the Ceded 
Provinces which had forced the government to grant large 
remissions and suspensions of revenue. In spite of this, 
considerable arrears of revenue had accumulated for the 
years 1803-^ . and l80l*-5, numerous ’estates1 were sold for 
arrears and engagers had absconded from fear of failure to 
fulfil their obligations. Thus on the eve of the second 
Settlement, the country was not in a condition to bear an 
Increase of revenue, nor were the engagers willing to agree 
to an increase* The situation arising from the drought and 
the danger to the economy and the revenue from any attempt 
to force the .jama, was fully recognised by Regulation V of 
1805, which rescinded the provision regarding the increase 
in the .jama which had been envisaged in the plan as well as 
in Regulations XXV and XXVII of 1803. It was now provided 
to make the second settlement at the annual .jama of the 
first in cases where rasadi settlement was not formed. And 
where rasadi settlements were made during the first
1. See above, pp. 4-2-3♦
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triennial settlement, then in those cases, the jama of the 
second settlement was to he governed hy that of 1804-5 
(which was the last year of the first triennial settlement).1
It was, however, found necessary to modify even the 
above rules for the districts of Gorakhpur, Moradabad, and 
Bareli. In Gorakhpur the assessment of 1804-5 was unequal, 
therefore the Collector feared that no one would come forward 
to engage for the over-assessed ’estates1. The Collector of
Moradabad reported that the ill-effects of drought were so
deep that the assets of 1805-6 were not equal to the jama
of 1804-5* In Bareli too, the condition was similar to
that of Moradabad. The government therefore had to allow
deductions from the jama of 1804-5> in forming the second
Settlement of Gorakhpur, and Bareli while the jama of
Moradabad was to be based on the figures of 1803-4* This
lowering of the jama in the first year, was to be made good
4
by the last year of the second settlement.
1. Reg* V of 1805, SS.1-3 and 5; Bg. Govt, to BOR., 22.4.1805, 
B.O.C. Proc., 26.4.1805, 9; Bg. R.L.(C & C.P.), 1.8.1805, 
para.50; In cases where settlement for the second 
triennial was already formed under the original provisions 
of increase, then they were not to be readjusted under the 
new provisions, Reg. V of 1805, S.7 .
2. Collector of Gorakhpur to BOR., 9*5*1605, B.O.C. Proc.
21.5.1805, 12.
3. Collector of Moradabad to BOR., 13.7.1805, Ibid.,
30.7.1805, 18.
4. Bg. Govt, to BOR., 6.6.1805 and 10.8.1805, B.O.C. Proc.
14.6.1805, 25 and 20.8.1805, 10.
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The assessment of the triennial settlements was
arrived at "by consulting the rent-rolls of the existing year
and that of the preceding years, which gave a rough idea of 
the actual revenue which the lands were capable of hearing. 
The figure thus arrived at was considered in the light of 
the supposed assets and the expectation of improvement in 
the resources of the land in the course of three years. This 
yielded the gross revenue, from which the expenses of 
collection and 'proprietary* allowance were deducted to
give the net revenue demand. The settlement of Gorakhpur and
Agra offer a good illustration of assessment making. To 
Henry Wellesley, the Collector of Gorakhpur wrote that the 
assessment of his district was calculated upon the best 
information he had, which related to the ascertained assets 
of the previous year, the produce expected from the 
extension of cultivation since the British acquisition, and 
the expected annual improvement of cultivation during the 
triennial Settlement which was calculated by the Zamindars 
and revenue farmers according to their own resources and 
the capability of the land,1 In Agra, according to the 
Collector, the assessment was calculated on the basis of 
revenue estimates, with reference to the revenue figures of 
the past five years, and his information on the state of
1. J. Routledge to H. Wellesley, 28.10.1802, B.O.C. Proc. 
2^ -.6.1803, 21.
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cultivation.’*'
The first triennial jama as formed by Henry Wellesley, 
showed a total increase of over Rs.80 lakhs on the jama of 
the Nawab at which the Ceded districts were acquired. But 
the jama of the second triennial settlement of the Ceded 
districts fell below that of the first at an annual average 
of around Rs.12 lakhs. The jama of the first triennial 
settlement of the Conquered provinces and Bundelkhand also 
showed a considerable increase over that of 1803-4 .
Henry Wellesley, the government and some of the 
Collectors were extremely pleased with the arrangement under 
the first triennial settlement in the Ceded Provinces.
Henry Wellesley wrote in his report of 10 February 1803, 
that the settlement was formed on the basis of the 
’permanent security of the Land Revenue, and the gradual 
improvement of the Country.! He spoke of the jama as being 
moderate and believed that at the end of the first
3
settlement, it would amount to two crores of rupees. The 
government, writing to the Court in 1803, lavished high
1. Collector of Agra to BOR., 25.7.1806, Ibid., 12.8.1806, 9.
2. See Bg.R.L., 15.4.1804, para.5, and 22.5.1807, para.49;
The jama of the Nawab was Rs.13,523,474, See above p. 66# 
The first triennial jama 'as fixed by H. Wellesley was 
Rs. 15,619,127; 16,16277^6; 16,802,063; the jama of the 
second triennial was Rs .14,414,26l; 14,920,348; 15,272,1+15;
jama of Conquered Provinces and Bundelkhand for 1803-4 
was slightly above 51 lakhs, see above p. 72# The jama 
for 1805-6 to 1807-8 was Rs.8,668,751; 8,777,494 and 
8,927,396.
3. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 10.2.1803, H.M.583, pp.45- 
46 and 11-12.
praise on Henry Wellesley’s arrangement, which it considered
to he wise.^ William Leycester, the Collector of Moradahad,
expressed optimism about the settlement of his district,
which he thought was calculated to benefit the people as well
as the government* He also believed that the people were
2
extremely satisfied with the arrangement he had made. 
Similarly, Alexander Ross, who formed the first triennial 
Settlement of Agra, was confident about it* He considered
3
his assessment.to be equitably and carefully distributed*- 
With regard to the second triennial settlement of the Ceded 
districts which was made at a reduced jama as compared to 
the first Settlement, the government stated to the Court 
that, the 1... jumma had been adjusted with the strictest 
attention to the actual resources of the land*.**’^
The above views were, however, more in a mood of 
self-complacency and self-congratulation, than in a spirit 
of objective assessment of the arrangements made in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces* When we take into consideration 
the consequences of the drought of 1803-U in the Ceded 
Provinces and closely examine the basis of assessment, not 
only will the fact of over-assessment emerge, but also the 
defective method of forming the assessment.
1. Bg. R.L. (C.P.), 20.10.1803, para.5.
2. Collector of Moradabad to Bg. Govt., 22.ii-.l803, B.O.C.
Proc. 2iw5.l803, 1U.
3. Collector of Agra to BOR., 25*7*1806, op.cit.
4. Bg.R.L.(C & C.P.), 15*5*1806, para*32.
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In the year 1802-03 the revenue collection was smooth
hut in 1803-01+ the situation was dramatically reversed.
From all districts extensive damage to crops was reported
due to the drought, the Tahsildars expressed reluctance to
guarantee revenue collections, and the Malguzars^ and
cultivators alike, were impressing upon the revenue officers
their inability to fulfil their obligations. To meet this
situation, some of the Collectors had recommended part
suspension and part remission of the revenue instalments,
while others proposed only the suspension of a few 
2
instalments. The Board of Revenue was faced with a crisis 
the magnitude of which it at first failed to conceive. Its 
attitude was based upon the principle of upholding the 
contractual aspect of the revenue arrangements. If, its 
argument ran, the government did not share in the profits of 
the engagers in an exceptionally good season, then the losses 
of a bad one must be borne by themselves. The argument was 
reinforced by the hope of a good rabi or winter crop to 
balance the damage to the kharif or autumn crop. The
1. Malguzar = a person who pays revenue for himself or on 
behalf of others to government or to a ’proprietor’ or to 
a Zamindar. He may be a sole or joint proprietor’ or a 
holder under a proprietor’ or the state.
2. Collectors to BOR., See B.O.C. Proc. 16.9.1803, 3-6; 
27*9.1803, 1; 25.10.1803, 26; 15.11.1803, 13 and 15*
6.12.1803, 1 and 17; 27.12.1803, 1; 13*1.1801+, ll*; 
7.2.1801+, 17; 6.3.180U, 17; 20.3.1801+, 3; 6.1+.1801+, 25;
13.k. 1804, 3; 25.5.1801+, 1 ; 6.7.1801*, 2.
J
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Collectors were therefore instructed only to grant
suspensions of revenue at their discretion.**' But the failure
of the winter crop, also forced the Board of Revenue to
abandon its earlier attitude and to agree in principle to
grant remissions in addition to the suspension of revenue 
2
instalments. The government grudgingly approved of the 
action of the Board of Revenue.
The amount of remission for 1803-Oh was Rs.1,959*550.
In spite of- this, the arrears of revenue for the same year
. U
were Rs.2,570,969* which was followed by a heavy deficiency
'in the succeeding year also. The difficulty of realising the
revenue was worst experienced in Moradabad, Bareli, Kanpur
and i0.1ahabad. In Moradabad* for instance, there was an
arrears of Rs.866,093 in 1803-Oh and Rs.835,396 in the
5
following year. The Collectors gave different reasons for 
the arrears of revenue. William Leycester, the first Collector 
of Moradabad, considered that the Maratha war and the
1. BOR. to Collectors, B.O.C* Proc. 25*10.1803* 28; 
15.11.1803, Ik; 6.12.1803* 2 and 20.
2. BOR. to Bg. Govt., B.O.C. Proc. 16.12.1803* 5*
3. The Bengal government required a full ascertainment of 
injury suffered from drought and consideration of the 
ability of individuals to discharge their obligations, 
before giving indulgences* It also desired the Collectors 
to warn the engagers* that in future the government would 
not assist them under similar circumstances. See Bg.G-ovt. 
to BOR., B.O.C. Proc. 30.12.1803, 22; 6,U.l80h, 1; 
9.10.180U, 16.
h. BOR, to Bg, Govt., B.O.C. Proc. 2h*9.l805, 2.
5. Collector of Moradabad to BOR., lh.10.1805, B.O.C. Proc.
29.10.1805, 18.
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consequences of the drought were the main reasons;*^- to which
his successor, Charles Lloyd, added the rasadi .jama of the
first settlement and the explosive character of the people
2
of the region also, as contributory factors. The Collector
of Bareli had also given more or less the same reasons in
explaining the arrears in his district. By sheer coincidence
the explanations of. the Collectors of Allahabad and Kanpur
were similar to each other. Both blamed the revenue engagers
for the default. It was alleged that in Allahabad the
revenue farmers and Zamindars had wilfully deteriorated and
mismanaged the lands with intent to defraud the government,
and that in Kanpur, they had either misappropriated or
U
concealed the assets of their lands.
In March 180U, in the midst of the continuing crisis, 
the government, writing to the Court, still clung to the 
illusion that the triennial .jama was based on ’fair and 
liberal principles’. The fairness and moderation of 
government was brought home by pointing to the ease with 
which the revenue was collected in the midst of unfavourable
1. Collector of Moradabad to BOR., 20.2.1805, Ibid.,
5.3.1805, 8 .
2# Collector of Moradabad to BOR., lU.10.1805, op.cit.
3* See Collector of Bareli to BOR., 27.8.1805, B.O.C. Proc. 
13.8.1605, 10.
U. Collector of Allahabad to BOR., 19.7.160U, B.O.C. Proc. 
7.8.180U, 38; Collector of Kanpur to BOR., 23.7.180U, 
Ibid.. 19.
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circumstances in 1801-02, and also the smooth realisation
in 1802-03* The fiscal debacle of the next year was
attributed to the failure of crops, and the want of ?opulencef
among the engagers who could not make good the default from
their private funds.1 In May 1806, writing once again to
the Court on the question of arrears, the government added
some more reasons to those it had previously given. These
additional reasons were the loss to cultivation from the
Maratha war, from the neglect of the cultivators .and-from -
the encroachment of the rivers* And it also admitted that in
some instances, arrears had resulted from the difficulty in
ascertaining the actual resources of the lands, when the
2province was acquired. It should be pointed out that the 
government contradicted its earlier position over the 
question of assessment, but it admitted over-assessment only 
in rsome instances**
Among the reasons for the arrears, the drought and 
over-assessment must be considered to be the basic ones. The 
factor of political turmoil had affected only the frontier 
districts of Moradabad, Bareli, Farrakhabad and Etawah, but 
its influence on revenue collection was very small, though 
at one stage military force was employed in collecting the 
revenue of Moradabad and Bareli. Similarly, the encroachment
1. Bg.R.L. 15*3*1804, para.l6.
2. Bg.R.L. 15*5*1806, paras. 20-21 and 31*
3* See B.O.C. Proc. 27*12.1803, 12; 30.12.1803, 17;
31.1.1804, 17; 26.6.1804, 8;. 14.12.1804, 13; 21.12.1804,
32; 26.3*1805, 3; 23*4.1805, 16.
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of rivers on cultivated land was a minor cause, and the 
argument regarding the integrity of the engagers, and the 
indifference of the raiyats if it had any substance, was 
merely an indication of over-assessment.
In spite of the remissions and suspensions, many
<L
engagers had urged the cancellation of their leases, and
some went to the length of deserting and absconding from
their holdings, and thus inviting their own ruin. Cases of
desertion on the part of engagers, occurred with, greater . . . .
1
frequency in Bareli and Kanpur. Even the cultivators - 
those docile and enduring people - loudly voiced their 
protest against the pressure upon them. In some of the 
narganas. in Kanpur, they demanded a reduction in the payment
due from them by one-half, and actually went to the length
2
of abandoning cultivation until their demand was met - a 
kind of agrarian strike.
The fact of over-assessment was aggravated by the 
extortion of the Tahsildars over whom the control of the 
Collectors was lax. Even when complaints were brought
*5
against them the Collectors tended to support them. In
1. See B.O.C. Proc. 26.8.1803, 14; 4*9*1804, 5; 10.1.1804,
26; 6.3.1804, 19; 14.12.1804, 15; 1.3.1805, 1.
2. Collector of Kanpur to BOR., B.O.C. Proc, 28.9.1804, 26-27*
3. Because without the Tahsildars the Collectors would be 
helpless, and no revenue would be realised. In the early 
period, even the government upheld the attitude of the 
Collector to Tahsildars. The government had in fact 
conceived of lending full support to the Tahsildars when 
their employment was under discussion. See below, pp*85-7 
and see above pp. 45-7*
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April 1805, an incident occurred in Allahabad, which
epitomises the oppression of the Tahsildars, and the
indifference of the Collector and the government to it* A
large body of cultivators and small Malguzars .had poured
into the district Court to complain against the Tahsildars
for extortion, assault and bribery* The Collector interpreted
the situation as a strategy of the cultivators and Malguzars
to obtain a reduction of the assessment* He opposed the
prosecution.of the-Tahsildars which he believed was based on
!frivolous charges1, and advocated the return of the
individuals to their parganas* Both these factors threatened
to throw the revenue realisation out of gear. However, the
cultivators did not depart, nor did the Judge, Towers Smith,
comply with the Collector's wish to drop the charges against
the Tahsildars,because he did not consider them to be based
on 'frivolous' grounds* The conflict between the Judge and
2
the Collector was brought to the notice of the government* 
Towers Smith was very sympathetic to the grievances 
of the cultivators and Malguzars, as he had been closely 
watching the activities of the Tahsildars, and the men who 
controlled them* He pointed out that Richard Ahmuty, the 
first Collector of Allahabad, while forming the triennial 
settlement, was beset with difficulties in obtaining
1 * Collector of Allahabad to BOR*, 17.6.1805* B*0.C* Proc*
5.7.1805, 1.
2. BOR. to Bg* Govt., 16.7.1805, Ibid*, 13*
86
engagements, as substantial ’proprietors* were non-existent
in the district. The Collector offered the collection of a
substantial portion of revenue to two powerful and
unscrupulous individuals - the Raja of Benares and
Devkinundan Singh. These two stood as sureties for the
revenue and set to work through a number of Tahsildars and
naib-Tahsildars1 whom the Judge characterised as the f..#
most desperate fortune hunters . ♦.* from the city of Benares.
Armed with police, magisterial and revenue powers the
Tahsildars and their assistants, exercised every species of
oppression in their exactions and extortions, either for
themselves or their principal. There was no redress from
their tyranny, and those who dared to raise their voice
against them, were falsely charged for arrears of revenue,
and sent through the Collector to the district Court for
2
confinement and prosecution.
1 • Naib-Tahsildar = Deputy Tahsildar.
2* Judge of Allahabad to Bg. Govt., 29♦6.1805, B.O.C. Proc.
26.7.1805, 10. The Ra.ia of Benares had stood surety for 
Rs.467,822 and Devkinundan for Rs.369,285 out of an 
annual assessment of Allahabad of Rs.2,^27,232, B.O.C.
Proc. 31.3*1807, 1; Devkinundan had a notorious reputation. 
He had a special interest in collecting revenue in Benares 
where he corrupted two Collectors in furthering his own 
interest. He was efficient in collecting revenue and in 
disposing of troublesome tax-payers and was well versed in 
the working of the Courts and the Regulations. See 
B.S.Cohn, fThe Initial British Impact on India a case 
study of the Benares region1, oo.cit.. p.U27; During the 
first triennial settlement Devkinundan had made a sum of 
Rs.161,522 through extortion, Judge of Allahabad to Bg. 
Govt., 29*6.1805, op.cit.
The ultimate and desperate result of this oppression
was. the present collective complaint of the raiyats and
Malguzars, which was not frivolous, hut whose truth
compromised the good faith of the government in the eyes of
the people# Towers Smith had done his best to check the
abuses of subordinate servants, but he admitted his inability
to cope with the *... intrigue, cunning, influence, affluence
and incorrigible villainy ...’ of individuals like
Devkinundan.1
The spirited stand of the Judge was coldly received
by the government, which had the revenue aspect of the
dispute uppermost in its mind# Towers Smith was strongly
reprobated by the government, which believed that his action
had only emboldened the cultivators and the Malguzars in
harraasing the Tahsildars, and thereby dislocating the
2
realisation of the revenue.
In response to the ever-increasing complaint of the 
Collectors regarding their difficulty in realising the 
revenue arrears, the Board of Revenue at first instructed 
the Collectors to sell the personal property of the 
defaulters; and, if it did not equal the amount of the 
default, to offer the lands to .the co-sharers (or any other 
individual) on their agreeing to discharge the arrears.*^
1. Judge of Allahabad to Bg, Govt#, 29.6.1805, Ibid.
2. Bg. Govt, to BOR., 18.7.1805, B.O.C. Proc, 257771805, 7.
3# BOR. to Collectors of Kanpur and Allahabad, Ibid.,
7.8.180*+, 21 and 39.
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This, however, did not improve matters, and in Kanpur many
defaulters were imprisoned and few of them had any visible
property to realise the revenue from. The Board was therefore
compelled to authorise the sale of land to realise the
arrears of revenue.1 The sale of land which was. mostly
ordered in Kanpur also proved ineffective as a slight and
2
insignificant response came from the buyers. Thus the lands 
remained in the hands of government, and where land was sold
it was usually at a reduced assessment......................
A few concrete instances and the views of some 
Collectors on the pressure of the assessment, would fully 
substantiate the argument of over-assessment during the 
first triennial settlement in the Ceded districts. In a 
•pargana in Kanpur which had a jama of Rs.23,813, only 
Rs.13,223 was realised, and when the pargana was sanctioned 
to be sold, the jama had to be reduced to Rs.17,655* A 
number of Estates* in Moradabad assessed at an amount of 
Rs.92,485, when abandoned by the engagers in 1805-06 was put 
up for auction, and the highest jama offered for them, was 
only Rs.42,786. When the assessment of the second
1. BOR. to Collectors, Ibid., 13.11.1804, 34; 4.1.1805, 14;
19.2.1805, 44; 30.9.1806, 14.
2. Collector of Kanpur to BOR., 7.12.1804, B.O.C. Proc. '
21.12.1804, 12.
3. See J. Cumming, General view of the Defective Administra­
tion of the Revenues and of Civil Government which has 
hitherto obtained in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
(1812), H.M. 529, pp.31-32; hereafter referred to as 
General view* This is a lengthy paper running into 264 
pages.
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settlement was under discussion, the Collector of Bareli had 
informed the government that the original amount was over­
valued and the engagers would refuse to accept it unless 
reductions were granted.1 In Gorakhpur also, the Collector
was of opinion that the jama was not only high, hut unequal 
2
also. The decision of the government to forego any increase 
of revenue in the second settlement, and even to allow a 
reduction of the .iama in some of the districts, was also 
indicative of general over-assessment, although the 
government did not fully acknowledge it.
It should he asked what led to over-assessment in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces?^ To answer this, is to take 
Into consideration the institutional weakness imported from 
Bengal under which the Collector functioned, the unreliability 
of the available revenue records, and the continuation of 
the ’contract agency1 system of collecting the revenue as 
practised by the Nawab of Oudh and the Raja of Benares. To 
this may be added the continuous strain on the Indian 
revenues and the promise of a. permanent settlement as the
» PP*32-33*
2. See above, p.76.
3. See above, pp.75-6 and 83.
k* It should be pointed out that the .jama of the second
triennial settlement of the Ceded Provinces was also high, 
for the simple reason that it was based on that of the 
first settlement. Similarly, the triennial settlement of 
the Conquered Provinces was also heavily assessed because 
it was formed in the same way and under similar conditions 
as that of the Ceded Provinces.
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sub-conscious reasons for as quick an augmentation of revenue 
as possible*
It has been pertinently observed by James Cumming,
that when the Collectors or Commissioners*^ spoke of
assessment| they meant the amount received as revenue from
the Zamindars or revenue farmers and not the demand made by
2
them on the raivats. No information was ever conveyed in
regard to the principles of assessment in the villages which
should have been the source of all sadr~assessment. It was
not at all known if the rates were applied on different kinds
of produce or on soils, or if the payments of the cultivators
were in kind or if a share of the actual produce was
commuted for in money or if fixed rents obtained* Indeed, no
defined principles were laid down for the guidance of the
Collectors in the settlement plan of 1802 or even 
3
subsequently. Even the government was not aware of what 
should be done to obtain authentic data for assessment. The 
Collectors, the temporary administration under Henry 
Wellesley, the Board of Revenue, the Commissioners and the 
government alike, were in a state of ignorance regarding the 
method of calculating the assessment.
1. He was referring to the Commissioners appointed in 1807, 
who were R.W. Cox and H. St.George Tucker.
2. J. Cumming, General view, op.cit.. p. 65*
3* See above, pp. 4-3-4. Henry Wellesley had in mind the 
enquiry of customary relationship between the Zamindar 
and raiyat, but nothing was done in this direction*
See above, p • 4-1*
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The manner of realising the revenue in Bengal under 
the permanent settlement had prevented the growth of revenue 
knowledge'based on local scrutiny and personal investigation, 
as for example, had been developed under Read and Munro in 
the Madras Presidency. The acknowledgement of the Zamindars 
as landlords, and the creation of landlords where Zamindars 
did not exist, had a hearing on administrative convenience 
in Bengal. The Zamindars were left to monopolise (if they 
cared to do so) all matters relating to the'interior 
arrangements of their zamindaris, and the Collectors were 
restricted hy law from interfering in the local concerns of 
the province. Thus the Collector in Bengal, and consequently 
the higher authorities were deprived of correct information 
regarding the various aspects of the land revenue 
arrangements. Whatever information the Collector possessed, 
was what was communicated to him. He was merely a receiver 
of revenue. It was from such Collectors engaged in a limited 
sphere of revenue work, that Collectors were selected for 
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces.
The ill-equipped capacity of the Collectors to tackle 
the assessment problem was made more acute, by the absence 
of any attempt to systematise and modernise the revenue 
records. The quick succession of settlements culminating in 
a permanent one, as envisaged in the government’s policy, 
was, in itself, the greatest hindrance to the acquisition of
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revenue knowledge* Instead of using the Tahsildars, Kanungos, 
Patwaris and Zamindars to procure reliable information, not 
only was no control exercised over them, hut they were left 
to pursue their individual or combined self-interests. The 
Collectors were absolutely in the hands of subordinate 
revenue servants.’*' The Tahsildars were powerful, well 
remunerated, unscrupulous and semi-independent* The Kanungos 
were the key revenue officials possessing hereditary revenue 
records, ill-paid under the British, and of late their 
records had become antiquated; this was perpetuated under 
the early British policy. The Patwaris were the servants of 
the Zamindars with low remuneration, which would attract 
only a semi-illiterate class of people, barely capable of 
keeping any accounts* It should therefore be pointed out 
that in the early period, no reliable revenue knowledge 
existed at any level of the administration and that the 
settlements were formed on the basis of antiquated or 
supposed or even fabricated accounts,
1* For the role of subordinate revenue servants, see 
R.N. Nagar, 1Employment of Indians in the Revenue 
Administration of N.W.P. 1801-33’, The Journal of U.P* 
Historical Society, December 19^0; 1The Kanungo in the 
N.W.P* 1 8 0 1 - 3 3 Indian Historical Records Commission 
Proceedings* 19^2; !The Subordinate Services in the 
Revenue Administration of the N.W.P, 1801-33’, The 
Journal of the U.P* Historical Society* December 19^2; 
rThe Tahsildar in the C. & C.P. 1801-33*, The Journal of 
U.P* Historical Society* (N.S.) Part 1, 19 5 k •
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The unreliability of the records was openly admitted
by the Collectors and Commissioners after 1807.1 The
Collector of Etawah stated that the tahsildari accounts were
based on the antiquated documents of the Kanungos, or the
verbal reports of the Patwaris. No authentic information
could be pieced together from the Patwari-zamindari accounts,
which were generally inaccurate and in some cases, absolutely
false. The Collector knew of a Taluqdar who summoned his
Patwaris'every year, to give up their original accounts,
which were either concealed in some secret place or
2
destroyed altogether. The Collector of Gorakhpur, in reply 
to the instructions of the Commissioners (of 1807) calling 
for tahsildari statements on the quantity of lands, was 
opposed to the preparation of any such statements. His 
reasons were that in 180U-5 a statement of the kind asked 
for by the Commissioners was prepared by the Tahsildars, 
Kanungos and Patwaris, who were still in office; and to ask 
them to revise it would give them an opportunity to benefit 
themselves. In general, he had no confidence in the integrity 
of the Tahsildars. The Collector of Agra in his report of
1. After 1807 under the Board of Commissioners, some 
questions had begun to be asked, which revealed a 
terrible state of affairs of the early period, and slowly 
led to the beginnings of improvement in revenue affairs.
2. J. Cumming, General View, H.M. 529> PP*52~5*i and 71#
3. Ibid., pp.57-60.
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September 1807, sanguinely talked of obtaining details of
every kind of land in cultivation, and their customary rates
of rent in about two months* time. However, in the same
report, he stressed the futility of depending either on
Pat war i or Kanungo accounts* As the Patwaris were the
servants of the Zamindars, no credit was to be placed in
their accounts* The estimates of the Kanungo prepared in the
ordinary way, would be slanted in favour of the Zamindar*
Even if he chose to give the supposed real capacity of the
Estates* that would remain unsubstantiated from want of proof
of accuracy.’*' In Allahabad, as the first Commissioners
t
remarked, the Tahsildari records were utterly unsatisfactory,
K
and those of the Kanungo equally unreliable. (In ALlahabad 
generally but particularly in Ekdallah pargana the Kanungos 
held lands, which would give them the motive to fake the 
records)
Ignorant as the Collectors were, and unreliable as 
the records were, the situation was further worsened by the 
continuation of the contract revenue system. This was 
undoubtedly the easiest way of increasing and collecting the 
revenue. A professional class of revenue farmers linked with 
bankers and sureties, was already in existence. The 
Tahsildars either belonged to this class or were aligned
1. Ibid.t pp.5^-55.
2# Commissioners* Report, 13.4.1808, paras. 20lj--05, Bg.R.C. 
20.6.1808, 2.
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with it or were its willing tool. To become a Tahsildar 
required sufficient financial means as he had to furnish 
security to the government. If he had no capital of his own
| he was sure to become a tool of prosperous speculator. If
| he had capital of his own it was easier for him to obtain a
I
| surety, His office had social and financial advantages, it
i
I
| brought him ten per cent on the collections. The larger the
I
amount of his demand and collection, the greater would be 
his profits. He thus had a sense of purpose in fixing the 
demand at a higher pitch. So far as the engagers were 
concerned, no regard was had to the ownership or possession 
of land. All that mattered was who accepted the .jama 
proposed by the Collector or Tahsildar. which in itself was. 
determined by competitive bidding, thus opening the door for 
the revenue farmer.
s
The case of Allahabad, whose early Settlement was 
characterised by Cox and Tucker as 'fictitious1, offers a 
good illustration of auction^bidding. The second Collector 
of Allahabad, writing to the Board of Revenue and the 
government in June and November 1805, showed how the jama 
of the first triennial settlement was determined. No 
ascertainment of the assets was attempted and the documents 
used were few and imperfect. The Settlement was made with
A
persons bidding the highest jama. In this bidding even the 
'proprietors' were involved from the wish to retain their
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lands and agreed to pay the competitive jama. But a large 
number of engagers came from the city of Benares who had no 
knowledge of the quantity of lands under cultivation or the 
state of cultivation, and who engaged for entire parganas 
at a high assessment,1
If the early settlements led to over-assessed and 
unequal .jama, they also produced considerable injury to
landed rights. The rights fall into four categories - those
 2
of the Zamindars. Taluqdars. village Zamindars and raiyats.
It has been argued by James Cumming that the Zamindars and
Taluqdars according to the custom of the country, were not
the proprietors of the holdings in their Jurisdiction, They
were mere Collectors of the revenue of their respective
zamindaris or taluqdaris for which they were remunerated by
the ruling power. In their private capacity they might have
owned lands, but in their official capacity as Zamindars or
Taluqdars they certainly did not own the zamindaris or 
3
taluqdaris. The incontrovertible evidence in support of this 
argument was the observance of the law of primogeniture, in 
the succession to zamindaris or taluqdaris, whereas the law
1* Collector of Allahabad to BOR,, 17.6,1805, B.O.C, Proc.
5.7.1805, 1; Collector of Allahabad to Bg. Govt*,
19.11.1805, Ibid., 2^,12.1805, 2.
2. This classification is used in the sense in which the 
British acknowledged the rights or what they thought
the proprietary1 rights were. For a discussion on rights 
see Chap.3 below.
3. J. Cumming, General View, op.cit,, pp.lli3-i+5 and 175n.
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of property was that of the Joint succession of male heirs,
hoth among the Hindus and Muslims. The right of property
in land was basically vested in the village Zamindars. In
this case also it should he stated that the village Zamindar
who engaged in behalf of his co-sharers, was not the
’proprietor* of the whole village, but only of that portion
which belonged to him. From the standpoint of revenue
collection he stood in the same position in regard to his
village as the Zamindar stood in relation to his entire 
z
Zamindari* He formed a direct link with the Zamindar or 
Taluqdar or his subordinates and agents. It should, however, 
be pointed out that the official position, the influence, 
the opulence and the hereditary nature of the office of 
Zamindar. Taluqdar. and village Zamindar placed them at a 
vantage point in acquiring lands or even in encroaching upon 
the rights of others. At the lowest level were the rights of 
the raiyats. some of whom paid their dues at a fixed rate, 
and had certain privileges attached to their tenure.
The Regulations in the first place had confounded
the various rights relating to land. The description of
s
individuals with whom Settlements were to be made, and 
whose supposed ’proprietary* rights were confirmed, was 
based on artificial and erroneous rules, instead of being 
deduced from the real state of things and the nature of 
landed institutions. When those rules were framed in 1793
98
very little acquaintance with the language of the country 
existed and almost no study of the customs and landed 
institutions had heen made. Those rules had "been extended to 
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces without any enquiry about 
their suitability, although Henry Wellesley as well as Lord 
Wellesley, had intended to modify them according to the 
situation. Accordingly the Zamindars and Taluqdars were to 
be the persons with whom the settlement was to be made. The 
use of the term ’other actual proprietor’, was an alternative 
or saving clause where Zamindars or Taluqdars did not exist. 
It was not used in any specific sense or even defined, but 
it was probably intended to mean the village-Zamindars and
o
the Mukaddams. The meaning of the terms ’proprietor ’, 
’estate’, zamindari and taluqdari were not defined in any of
As
the Regulations, and were used in the official correspondence 
indiscriminately. For example, a Zamindar. a Taluqdar and a 
village Zamindar would all be described as ’proprietor’.
The term estate would be used for a zamindari. taluqdari 
and a village under joint ownership. The rules relating to 
the acknowledgement and determination of ’proprietary’ 
rights, to the separation of smaller holdings within a 
bigger one,and to the division of joint-hoidings were utterly 
inadequate. In regard to the protection of raiyats, the
1 . See above, pp»,34~-5«
2. J. Cumming, General View, H.M.529, PP*149-50.
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patta Regulation had nothing radical to offer. It was simply-
designed to prevent the extension of abuses already in
existence, which would in effect, though unintentionally,
1
allow the existing abuses to be confirmed. It would not be 
unfair to state that in the absence of a knowledge of rights 
on the part of the government, and in the prevalence of 
general confusion in the province, an unintentional, though 
great injury to rights occurred from the haste with which 
laws, and regulations were passed on questions- which were 
not understood by the government.
In the actual handling of the big Zamindars and 
Taluqdars alternative policies were adopted, Where the big 
landholders were reluctant to become peaceful and law- 
abiding subjects of the new government, force was employed 
to crush them; on the other hand, where they accepted the 
British authority, a conciliatory policy was pursued towards 
them. The main cause of contention between the Chiefs and 
the government was over the questions of mud forts and the 
collection of saver duties. It had been the policy of the 
government for political reasons and those of general law 
and order to seek the demolition of the mud forts, and for 
economic reasons to prohibit the collection of sayer duties. 
To the Chiefs the possession of mud forts and the collection
PP*75-77
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of sayer were the sources of strength and wealth and
therefore their surrender was against their self-interest.
Those of them who were short-sighted and vindictive resorted
to armed insurrection, in which they were encouraged by the
disturbed political condition on account of the second
Maratha war and the irruption of Amir Khan, Cases of
contumacy occurred mostly in the districts of Etawah,
Moradabad, Bareli, Farrakhabad, Kanpur and Gorakhpur, Such
Chief s were crushed by the use of military force and their
forts destroyed and lands confiscated by the government.^
A  leading example of the severe policy adopted in
cases of recalcitrance may be cited here. Raja Bhagwant
Singh, the Taluqdar of Sasni in the district of Etawah, had
raised himself from a position of obscurity to that of power 
2
and wealth. He had two strong forts, one at Sasni and the
other ar Bijaigarh, well stocked with cannons and surrounded
by a deep and broad ditch. He could muster a force of 20,000
men and could seek support from Raja Daya Ram,a powerful jat
Chief of Hathrass in Aligarh, with whom he had a family 
3
connection. When the British authority was introduced in
1. See B.O.C. Proc. 3-1*1303, 5 and 6; 12.^.1803, 2;
15.^.1803, 1; 13-5-1803, 1; 16.9.1803, Ik; 27-9.1803, 17 
and 18; 7.10.1803, 1^, 33 and 3k; 11.10*1803, 10;
18.10.1803, 7 and 8; 15-11.1803, 9; 3 .1 .180^, 35 
13.1.180U, 6; 2.3.180U, 35 19.6.1801+, Ik.
2. H, Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 12.11.1802, Bg.P.C. 
13-3.803* 15.
3. R. Cunyaghame to H. Wellesley, 28.10.1802, Bg.P.C.
31.3.1803, 18; J. Gerard (Adj.General) to H. Wellesley, 
8,11,1802, Ibid., 20; J. Gerard to J.Ldmsden, n.d.Ibld..21.
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1801 he made no attempt to enter into an engagement for the
revenue of 1801-02. The Collector had to take the initiative
in negotiating a fair arrangement regarding the revenue of 
1
his taluq. The efforts of the Collector proved futile as
Bhagwant Singh was not prepared for any compromise over the
2
saver question. In order to deter landholders from flouting
British authority, a strong military action was ordered
3
against Bhagwant Singh. As a result of this, he had to seek 
refuge in the Maratha territory.
In contrast to this severe policy a conciliatory one 
was simultaneously pursued wherever the Chiefs manifested no 
hostility to the British. Settlements were made with them 
for entire parganas at favourable terms. This was- the case 
in regard to several powerful Chiefs in Saharanpur and 
Aligarh.^ In Aligarh two of the Taluqdars were even allowed 
to retain their forts for a temporary period of time, and 
were paid lavish compensation for the loss of the privilege 
to collect the sayer duties.
The severe and the conciliatory aspects of policy had
1. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 12*11.1802, op.cit.
2. R. Cunynhame to H. Wellesley, 28.10.1802, op.cit.
3. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 12.11.1802, op.cit.
U. See Collector of Saharanpur to C.-in C. IU.7.1805, B.O.C. 
Proc. 2.8.1805, 11; J. Malcolm (Resident at Mathura) to 
Collector Saharanpur 20.7.1805, Ibid., 13.8.1805, 5;
Bg. Govt, to BOR., 15.8.1805, Ibid., 23.8.1805, 15; 
Collector of Aligarh to BOR.b.TTlSOo, 16.7.1806 and
18.8.1806, Ibid.. 29.7.1806, 17; 1 .8.1806, 13;
5.9 .1806, 17*
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originated from the same motive, which was essentially 
political* The apprehensions entertained of the Marathas, 
the Sikhs and the French had a hearing on the polioy towards 
the Chiefs* On the one hand, any outbreak of armed action on 
the part of a Zamindar had to he prevented from spreading to 
the other parts of the province hy a swift military action.
On the other, the possibility of armed insurrection had to 
he avoided hy placating the Chiefs through substantial 
concessions* It was thus an ambivalent policy based on 
expediency. This policy, it should be pointed out, in 
relation to land-owning rights produced contradictory results. 
In cases where the Chiefs were eliminated the opportunity 
for the village Zamindars and Mukaddams to engage for the 
revenue was increased. Where the Chiefs were continued the 
rights of the village Zemindars Mukaddams were neglected.
If that section of the zamindari and taluqdari class 
towards whom a soft policy was pursued benefited under the 
early settlements, then the village Zamindars generally 
suffered under those arrangements. The defects of the 
Regulations regarding proprietary rights have already been 
pointed out. This was also noticed by the first 
Commissioners in their report of April 1808, in which they 
warned the government that until the revenue law was revised 
proprietary’ claims would remain undecided, and in a state
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of conflict.
The rights of village Zamindars were affected in
different ways* Those who were acknowledged as proprietors*
hut excluded from the first settlement because of their
refusal to agree to a jama, found themselves excluded in the
subsequent settlements. Such others who had not established
their claims to *proprietary * rights during the first
settlement were to remain excluded for the entire ten year
period. In both these cases the settlement for their lands
was made with the revenue farmers, and was to be continued
for the subsequent settlements with the same persons as
provided in the Regulation. The acknowledged but excluded,
and the unacknowledged proprietors * were loudly urging
their claims. Some of them according to the Collector of
Etawah had taken their cases to the Civil Court where they
remained undecided. But the majority of claimants did not
go to Court, through ignorance or fear of expense or
2
discouragement at the tardiness of justice.
Where the village Zamindars were comprehended within 
large zamindaris and taluqdaris* the law had recognised the 
former’s right to separation and engagement. In this case 
also, no definite principle was laid down for the guidance 
of revenue or judicial officers. In a dispute over separation
1. Commissioners Report, 13*4*1808, paras*28-29 and 34, 
Bg.R.C. 20.6.1808, 2.
2* See J. Camming, General View, H.M. 529, pp.81-84.
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both parties would plead possession under different tenures, 
and the Regulation did not state what constituted a * proprietor* 
proprietary* right. It was simply provided that where the 
larger landholder was merely a channel of revenue collection 
separation was to take place, hut this question itself 
involved an investigation of the character in which the 
superior holder paid the revenue, which automatically opened 
the question of relative rights.1 As no records existed which 
showed the grounds of exclusion of the village Zamindars it 
was difficult to say, at least technically, whether the 
village Zamindars or the landholders had the better case.
If the village Zamindars suffered as against the 
revenue farmers and the landholders, they also suffered 
amongst themselves where they were recognised and settlements 
were made with them. This related to lands under joint 
ownership with several co-sharers. It was not provided how 
settlements were to he formed in such cases. The person or 
persons with whom settlements were made would surely benefit 
to the disadvantage of the other members of the community.
Nor was it laid down how disputes among them were to be 
decided. Where the joint-holding was in arrears of revenue, 
multiple rights would be annihilated without ascertaining 
the actual persons responsible for it.
1. R.W.Cox and H. St.G. Tucker had expressed this
apprehension in their report of 27*11.1807, q. J.Cumming, 
Ibid.t pp.107-11•
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A great injury also occurred to the village rights as
also to those of some of the holders of large zamindar is
from fraudulent public sales brought about by the Tahsildars.
This mischief was confined to Allahabad, Kanpur and
Gorakhpur# According to Edward Colebrooke and John Deane, who
accidentally discovered the tactics and frauds of the
subordinate servants during the early settlements, the
lands were acquired by putting them on sale for alleged
arrears, by the pretended purchase of obsolete titles, by
transfer in liquidation of alleged arrears, by deeds
conveying the 'property* through mortgages, and by temporary
assignments for a number of years.*1* On enquiry it was
revealed that the persons from whom they acquired lands had
no proprietary * rights, as they were revenue farmers. In
Kanpur such revenue farmers denied that arrears of revenue
occurred when the lands passed from their hands. These lands
were acquired at a cheap price: a village could he had for
between Rs#2 and Rs.lO. And after acquiring land the
purchasers even succeeded in obtaining a reduction of the 
2jama.
In Allahabad for instance, Devkinundan had enlarged 
one paternal *estateT assessed with a .jama of Rs.800 into a
1. See Reports of E.Colebrooke and J. Deane on the Third 
Settlement of Allahabad, Kanpur and Gorakhpur, Bg.R.C. 
2.7.1810, 33; 17.11.1810, 1; 29.12.1810, 35.
2. Ibid.
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taluq of 7 k villages.*** Jai Gopal Pandey in Gorakhpur had
2
acquired two taluqs consisting of nearly 200 villages. In 
Kanpur Mirza Ahmad Baksh who had been Nazir to the first 
Collector, and was an uncle of a Tahsildar. acquired 33
■Z
'estates1 assessed with a .jama of Rs.5&,000.
Such nefarious acquisitions were the result of several 
factors. The Tahsildar and his associates were well 
conversant with the revenue code and its weaknesses. They 
were persons of'financial substance and had their links In 
the Collectors1 and Judges1 establishments to cover up their 
actions and protect their interests in case of any complaint. 
As the Collector heavily relied upon the reports and opinions 
of the Tahsildar it was easy for the latter to further his 
self-interest without the risk of detection. As the Collector 
knew very little about the revenue affairs of the province, 
and as he was completely under the influence of the 
subordinate Indian Civil Servants, his control over them was 
negligible. Finally, the people who were being tricked out 
of their lands had no knowledge of the laws and regulations 
introduced by the British, and may therefore have relied 
upon the Tahsildars. and discovered the loss when it was too 
late. During this period, the government could do little to 
redress these wrongs. But in 1821 a positive measure was
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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taken which to some extent, helped to mitigate the 
consequences of that great evil.
Before 1820 when the decision was finally taken to 
constitute a Special Commission to investigate fraudulent 
acquisitions of land in the early period, some effort was 
made to redress wrongs and positive measures were suggested 
by some of the judicial officers. Soon after 1807 the Board 
of Commissioners was admitting the injury done to numerous 
individuals and found it difficult to suggest a remedy. It 
was capable of providing redress but did not have judicial 
authority* On the other hand, the Civil Courts had the power 
to help victims of fraud, but the clique of subordinate 
servants in the Courts who were themselves manipulators of 
the fraud, would defeat the ends of justice* People were 
aware of it and therefore they did not go to the Courts.
The government, however, had attempted to provide redress by 
extending legal facilities to enable victims to obtain 
possession of land through the Courts. The effort failed 
because of the vested interest of the subordinate judicial 
servants.*1"
A radical and salutary organ was needed to cope with 
the consequences of the great fraud* The proposal of a 
Special Commission was first suggested by the Board of
1. T. Portescue to C.M. Ricketts, 1.9*l8lU, H.M.530, 
pp.576-89.
108
Commissioners in 1810. In 1818 and 1820 the creation of such 
a Commission was strongly urged hy T.C.Robertson, Judge and 
Magistrate of Kanpur. In 1810 the Governor-General had 
declined the formation of such a Commission on the ground 
that first the cases should he examined* In 1820 the 
government no douht, was influenced hy the reformist trend 
which was current in British India and among the Home 
Authorities after the publication of the Fifth Report of.
1812. The only opposition came from the Judges of the Sadr 
Diwani and Nizamat Adalats, who considered a Special 
Commission as extra-legal and investigations into past cases 
which in the first place flowed from state action as a breach 
of faith* The views of the Judges were ignored and 
Regulation I of 1821 was enacted to provide for the 
examination and settlement of complaints against fraudulent 
acquisitions in the early years* The Court of Directors 
fully endorsed this step*^
The jurisdiction of the Commission covered Allahabad, 
Kanpur and Gorakhpur, which were the three affected districts. 
Of these it appears that nothing was done by the Commission 
in Gorakhpur. In Allahabad by 1828, 96 Estates* with a jama 
of Rs.286,826 were restored. In Kanpur, where a total of 1*05
1. B.O.C. to Govt., 18,9.1810, SRRNWP. 3,pp.19-21; Govt, to
B.O.C., 16.10.1810, H.M.530," pp.574-76; Bg.R.L.(C & C.P.), 
10.8.1821, paras. 3,5,6 and 8; Bg.R.D.(W.P.), 2.1.1829, 
paras.6-9.
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auction sales had taken place, 2b3 were complained against 
and 185 were reversed* In Kanpur there were also 6h 
complaints against private sales arising from foreclosures 
of mortgages of which 11 were found bad.'1'
It has been stated that as a result of tahsildar!
frauds half of the lands in Allahabad and Kanpur changed
2
hands and that thousands of landowners were ruined* This 
is, however, an exaggeration. Lord Hastings in his minute of 
September 1815, forcefully discounted the current opinion, 
that the system produced insecurity and transfer of land 
generally* He considered such opinions as inaccurate and
1. J* Dunsmure to H. Mackenzie, 6.2*1828, Bg.R.L* 10.12.1828, 
App.E; B.H.Baden-Powell, op*cit*.p.119. In 1829 when 
revenue administrative reorganisation took place, the 
Commission ceased to function and its power was transferred 
to revenue Commissioners. By Act III of 1835 the attempt
to provide redress was given up. Any fresh complaint was 
to be preferred before the ordinary Court of law, but 
the ones which were pending were to be disposed of. On 
1 January 1835, 322 cases were pending before the Sadr 
Board, 803 before the Commissioner of Allahabad, b?0 
with the Commissioner of Gorakhpur, besides 1,324 
petitions were pending before the two Commissioners for 
the admission of suits. Elsewhere the cases pending were 
negligible. A.R.L., 3*8.1835, 4, paras.2-4; The fairly 
large number of cases was the result of the modification 
of Regulation I of 1821 in 1829* Formerly, complaints 
against transfers during the early years of British rule, 
were admissible. Now complaints relating to any year of 
the British rule were admissible.
2. See D. Bhanu, History and Administration of the North 
Western Provinces. p. 48; R.N.Nagar* *The Tahsildar in the
C. & C.P. 1801-331, op.cit*. p.31*
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a mere 'deduction from appearances'. Lord Hastings, in
all probability, was nearer the truth. Such transfers of
land took place before 1807 and without the knowledge of the
revenue authorities. A precise determination of the quantum
of fraudulent sales is possible only by obtaining the exact
number of 'estates' sold in Allahabad, Kanpur and Gorakhpur
from which cases of fraud should be separated. Such a
determination is, however, not possible. Total annual
returns of public sales during this period were not kept.
Individual cases of sales as they came up before the Board
of Revenue and the government, originated from the reports
of Tahsildars, and there is no reason whatsoever to suppose
that they would incriminate themselves by communicating the
truth. In regard to the private transfer of lands, no
information is available, as it never came up in the revenue
records. It can only be said therefore, that as a result of
fraudulent sales in the three districts, some lands changed
hands. Kanpur is an example of this. In this district,
according to the Second Commissioners, 289 'estates' were
sold for public default between 1802-07, some of which were
2bought by the government itself. This surely does not 
warrant the deduction that half of Kanpur was sold out or
1. Minute of Lord Hastings, 21.9*1815* paras.79-80,
Bg.R.C. 16.9.1820, 33*
2. E.Colebrooke and J. Deane on the Third Settlement of 
Kanpur, Bg.R.C. 2.7*1810, 33*
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thousands of proprietors1 were ruined. It is even difficult 
to say how many of the sales in Kanpur were genuine and how 
many were fraudulent.
To sum up what has "been said above regarding the 
question of assessment and the question of rights, the early 
policy was a failure. Its most vehement critic stated that 
the government, at a time when it was ignorant of the 
resources of the country and lacked the information to [judge 
the best course to secure its own interests and those of the 
people alike, blindly pledged itself to a course of policy
1
for ten years and its permanent adoption after that period.
It was not even aware of the problems facing it which began 
to be slowly understood only after 1807. As late as 1808, 
when certain questions relating to proprietary1 rights 
came for decision before the Bengal Council, it expressed 
its inability to decide them. When compared with the NawabP 
administration, that of the British seems slightly better, 
because the unbridled oppression of the Amils was eliminated 
and at least in theory, a coherent settlement scheme was 
framed. The collection of revenue was sought to be placed on 
sound footing, but in practice the revenue market as it 
flourished under the Nawab was continued. Indeed, the 
settlements during this period were essentially a continuation
1. J. Cumming, General View, H.M. 529* pp.21-22.
2. See Bg. R.C. 20.6.1808, 3-U.
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of practices which the British found to exist in the region 
at. the time of their acquisition of power. Perhaps there 
could have been no other alternative.
If the over-assessment may have adversely affected 
agriculture - an object whose promotion the government 
sought - this was more than compensated by indirect factors. 
The administration brought peace and individual security, a 
pre-requisite to any industry* It linked the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces on the one hand, with the British India 
market, and on the other, through the East India Company Ts 
trade with the international market* Commercially this must 
be considered of far-reaching significance for the 
agricultural products of the region* Also, through the 
introduction of contractual law in revenue collection, it at 
least theoretically created a land market* In actual practice 
this amounted to forced sales rather than a market based on 
competition* There were actually more sales of land than 
there were buyers, and where land was bought, the price was 
a mere trifle. In creating the Western type of ’proprietary1 
right and permitting private transfer of land, the 
implication clearly was to treat land as a marketable 
commodity* In practice there were perhaps very few private 
sales of land* A free-will land market had not yet emerged*
Chapter II
The Rejection of the Policy of a Permanent Settlement
1807 - 15
The Bengal government under Lord Wellesley had
promised a permanent settlement for the Ceded and Conquered
Provinces, But between 1807 and 1813 the applicability of
that policy to those regions was earnestly discussed, and a
radical departure from the Bengal system of land settlement
emerged. The two major policy making organs - the Bengal
government and the Home Authorities - were involved in this
battle of policy making,
A permanent settlement was to fall due in the Ceded
Provinces in 1812-13* and in the Conquered Provinces and
Bundelkhand in 1815-16. For the fulfilment of the promise of
permanency of assessment certain conditions had been set.
The Zamindars must have fulfilled their temporary
engagements, the ’estates’ must be in an advanced state of
cultivation, and the assessment to be offered to the
1
Zamindars in permanency must be accepted by them. The 
Bengal government was so over-anxious to complete the 
arrangements, that it decided to hasten the measure in 
regard to the Conquered Provinces and Bundelkhand. By 
Regulation X of 1807 the three constituent regions of the 
Provinces were to come under permanency in the year 1811-12
1. See Reg, XXV of 1803, S.29 and Reg. IX of 1805* S.6
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and 1812-13* The government also dropped the earlier condi­
tion of a fresh assessment before declaring it permanent*
Now the existing tjama of the years 1811-12 and 1812-13 were 
to be made permanent.'*' The shortening of the time limit for 
the Conquered Provinces and Bundelkhand and the exclusion of 
the condition of revision of assessment originated from the 
same source. That was the belief of the government in the 
efficacy of a permanent settlement in improving the 
conditions of the Zamindars and also of agriculture.
Temporary settlements, on the other hand, were considered to 
be ruinous for all concerned. The government was so 
determined, and at the same time so naive, that in 1807 it 
was asking the court to confirm the settlements which would
p
be made under the provisions of Regulation X, A commission 
which had been appointed under that Regulation to do the job, 
had not even started its proceedings. It was an extraordinary 
request.
On one matter, however, Regulation X of 1807 
contained a sensible clause which was to be used later on by 
the Court as one of the arguments in justifying the legality 
of the denial of permanent settlement. Lord Wellesley, while 
making the promise of permanency in 1802, 1803 and 1805, bad 
omitted to state that the declaration was subject to the 
approval of the Court of Directors, This was actually not a
1. Bee Reg. X of 1807, S.5*
2. See Bg. R.L. 31*7*1807, para.38.
w
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serious lapse on the part of the Governor-General, "because 
before a permanent settlement was made it was bound to come 
up before the Directors, However, the Regulation of 1807 
enacted under the brief tenure of George Barlow included a 
clause stating that the permanent settlement would be 
subject to the approval and sanction of the Court of 
Directors,1
There were two important reasons for appointing a 
temporary commission in 1807., which was put on a permanent 
footing in 1809 by Regulation I of that year. It was on this 
Commission that the government relied for giving effect to 
the policy of permanent settlement. The other important
p
reason was an administrative one. When the temporary 
Commission under Henry Wellesley was dissolved in March 1805? 
the revenue administration of the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces had become the responsibility of the Board of 
Revenue at Calcutta, It was this Board that continued to 
discharge its responsibility for the regions in question 
until 1807, The jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue was an 
extensive one, because it supervised the revenue 
administration not only of the Bengal Presidency but also of 
the Ceded and Conquered Territories, Consequently its control 
over the Collectors and the other subordinate servants had 
not been efficient, especially in the far flung regions of
1, Reg, X, of 1807, S.5.
2, See Bg, R.L. 31«7*1807, paras, 30-31
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Northern India. A il exciting period in the revenue history
of Northern India was about to begin, which required close
supervision which Calcutta was not in a position to provide.
Over-assessment and under-assessment had to be guarded
against, and the declared objects of the governments policy
had to be implemented* Those objects could be best realised
under a local Commission. The appointment of the Commission
of 1807 therefore had a very important bearing on the future
course of policy, and on the land revenue history of the
region under consideration.
The Board of Commissioners was to consist of two
members, and was vested with the same powers which the Board
of Revenue had exercised over the Ceded and Conquered
Provinces.^ These were full control of the revenue
administrative machinery, responsibility for revenue matters,
and continuous consultations with the Bengal government.
The two members appointed to the Commission were R.W. Cox
and Henry St. George Tucker* Of the two, Tucker was the more
important, and subsequently he was to become quite famous in
East India affairs, at the India House. R.W. Cox at the time
2
of his appointment was a member of the Board of Revenue,
1. See Reg. X o f '1807, SS. 1-3*
2. Cox arrived in Bengal in 1781* Up to 1800 he was chiefly 
employed in the commercial branch of the service* In 1801 
he became a member of the Board of Revenue, and-remained 
in that situation until his appointment in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces. He returned to the Board of Revenue 
in 1808, and left Bengal in 1809 after resigning from the 
service. Personal Records, 3, pp.131-32.
•
117
while Tucker had no employment; as he had resigned the 
important office of the Accountant-General in January 1807* 
Tucker had arrived in Bengal in 1786, and began his official 
career in 1791 iu the office of the Accountant-General as an 
assistant. Very soon he obtained fairly important positions 
in the Judicial and Revenue branches of the administration.
In 1794- he was Deputy Register in the Sadr Diwani and Nizamat 
Adalat and Assistant Secretary in the Revenue and Judicial 
department, holding both the offices simultaneously. His 
bent of mind was essentially on financial subjects. He 
became officiating Accountant-General in 1800, in which 
position he was made permanent in the following year. In 
1803 he became associated with Calcutta mercantile houses, 
and in 1804- he resigned his position with the government to 
join Pairlie & Co. He apparently met with no success in 
his commercial speculations and rejoined the Civil Service 
as Accountant-General in 1805* only to resign a second time 
in January 1807^  Tucker, undoubtedly had considerable 
influence in top official circles in Calcutta, which made 
possible his several resignations and re-entry into 
important positions. He was on very intimate terms with
2Minto, as their private correspondence clearly reveals.
1. Personal Records, 3? pp.661-67* D.N.B., LVII, p.282. On 
10 December 1806 Tucker was sentenced for six months 
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.4,000 for attempted rape* 
Ibid., p.281. It was after his release that he was 
appointed a member of the Commission in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces.
2. See Minto MSS. 502.
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The Commissioners were appointed in June 1807 * "but 
they did not assume office until September of that year* In 
their task of forming a permanent settlement, Cox and Tucker 
proceeded with great circumspection. On their own admission, 
as contained in their letters to the government and to the 
Collectors of September 1807, they were partial to a 
permanent settlement. The reasons for their partiality arose 
from their Bengal experience, and from a genuine belief that 
the present prosperity of Bengal was the result of the 
permanent settlement. They wrote to the government expressing 
their willingness to carry out a permanent settlement 
wherever it was found to be desirable. At the same time they 
stated that their private enquiries had shown the existence 
of extensive waste land, which might well be a strong 
argument for postponing a permanent settlement. On the other 
hand, they wrote to the Collectors asking first, for their 
individual opinions on the nature of the settlement to be 
formed in their districts and secondly, for general 
information relating to the state of cultivation, the 
population and the ’proprietary1 rights. Their recommendation 
to the government was to be based on answers to those 
questions.^" It may be of some interest to point out, that 
the government without foreseeing the implications of the 
Commissioners * approach had signified its approval in a
1. Commissioners to Bg. Govt., 7*9*1807, Bg. R.C. 2.10.1807, 
17; Commissioners’ Circular to Collectors, 7*9*1807,
Ibid., 18.
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letter of 2 October 1807-^
Five of the Collectors - those of Agra, Aligarh, 
Kanpur, Gorakhpur and Etawah were quick in replying to the 
Commissioners’ questions* The instructions which the 
Commissioners issued in regard to three of the districts 
incurred disapproval of the government* Between Octo'ber and 
November 1807 there was already a cleavage of opinion on the 
question of permanency between the Commissioners and the 
government •
The replies of the five Collectors show the districts 
with the exception of Agra in a terribly depressed state* 
Waste and rent-free land was extensive* The records relating 
to assessment were defective. In some of the districts 
’proprietary1 rights were in dispute and large taluqdaris 
existed. The Collector of Gorakhpur was, however, in favour 
of an immediate permanent settlement, that of Aligarh was 
totally against its introduction, and the Collectors of 
Agra, Kanpur and Etawah, though they favoured a permanent
p
settlement, actually recommended its postponement*
In October 1807 the Commissioners were quick to make 
up their minds in regard to the settlement of Gorakhpur, 
Etawah and Agra. A permanent settlement of Gorakhpur and
1. Bg. Govt, to Commissioners, Bg. R.C. 2.10.180720.
2. See Collectors of Agra, Aligarh, Kanpur, Gorakhpur and 
Etawah to Commissioners, 29-9-1807, 12.10.1807, 20.10. 
1807, 20.10.1807 and 28*10*1807 respectively, Bg.R.C.
16.10.1807, 17; 6.11.1807, 19; 6.11.1807, 20; 27.11.1807, 
39; and 27-11.1807, 4-1, respectively.
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Etawah should be deferred,1 They did not think the two
districts were fit for it. Therefore a four-year settlement
2
as provided by the Regulation of 1803 was to take effect.
For the district of Agra, on the other hand, the Commission­
ers were in favour of a permanent settlement, and they made 
such a recommendation to the government. They took into 
consideration the smallness of the district, where an 
experiment in permanency could safely be made without much 
sacrifice of revenue* Besides, Agra was a frontier district,
and much political advantage would be gained by awarding a
*
permanent settlement to the landholders.
For the province as a whole, with the exception of 
Agra, the Commissioners in fact requested the government to 
postpone a permanent settlement by altering section 5 of 
Regulation X of 1807, on the grounds that the country was 
not fit for it, the administrative machinery was not equal
ZL
to the task, and the government stood to lose some revenue* 
According to Regulation XXV of 1803 two triennial and one 
quadrennial settlements were to precede the consideration of
5
a permanent settlement in the Ceded Provinces• This ten 
year period beginning from 1802-03 was to end in 1811-12, 
and the question would be raised only in 1812-13* In the
1* Commissioners to Collectors of Gorakhpur and Etawah,
31.10.1807, Bg.R.C. 27.11.1807, 4-0 and 42.
2. Commissioners to Bg. Govt., 31*10.1807, Bg.R.C. 27*11*1807} 
38.
3. Commissioners to Bg.Govt., 5*10.1807, Bg.R.C.16.10.1807,16.
4. See Bg.Govt. to Commissioners, Bg.R.C. 6.11.1807, 28.
5o See Reg. XXV of 1803, S*29*
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Conquered Provinces and Bundelkhand the temporary settlements 
were to last from 1805-06 to 1814-15; in the former they 
were to consist of two triennial and one quadrennial 
settlements, and in the case of the latter, one annual and 
three triennial settlements.^ Here then, the question of 
permanency was to he opened only in 1815-16. Section 5 of 
Regulation X of 1807 Had modified the provisions of 
Regulations XXV of 1803 and IX of 1805, which had laid down 
a Settlement Scheme. Now the permanent settlement was to 
come into force, subject to the approval of the Court of 
Directors, in the Ceded Provinces and Bundelkhand in 1812-13 
at the jama of 1811-12, and in the Conquered Provinces in 
1811-12 at the jama of 1810-11. Thus the 1807 Regulation had 
radically altered the former provisions. The permanent 
settlement was no longer to be considered at the end of the 
prescribed ten year period, but was to become a fact in the 
Ceded Provinces at the end of the quadrennial settlement, 
and in the Conquered districts and Bundelkhand at the end of 
the second triennial settlement. Cox and Tucker considered 
section 5 of Regulation X of 1807 as unrealistic, and 
therefore asked the government to revert to the provisions 
of 1803 and 1805#
The government rejected their recommendation, and 
treated them to a small lecture revealing the Bengal
1. See Reg. IX of 1805, SS.3-7.
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government's blend of administrative and economic policy.
By postponing a permanent settlement, the government agreed 
that some increase in revenue would be obtained. It would 
however be an uncertain increase, not to be compared with 
the reasons underlying the introduction of permanent 
settlement, which had prompted the government to enact the 
rule in question. It was only through a permanent settlement 
that the condition of the landholders would improve, and it 
was only by improving their condition that they would be 
made loyal to the government. A permanent settlement would 
also bring prosperity to the country, which, when combined 
with the increasing wealth of the people, would offer new 
subjects of taxation. To the Bengal government,its own 
arguments appeared weighty when juxtaposed with those under­
lying the proposal to alter section 5 of Regulation X of 
1807*^ The government also approved the proposed permanent
settlement in Agra, and overruled the objections to it in
2
Gorakhpur and Etawah.
The difference of views between the Commission and 
the government on the implementation of a permanent 
settlement was considerable. This difference developed as 
early as November 1807* Cox and Tucker soon resigned, 
essentially for personal reasons (as shall be shown below),
1. Bg.Govt. to Commissioners, Bg.R.C. 6.11.1807, 28.
2. Bg. Govt, to Commissioners, Bg.R.C. 16.10.1807, 23;
Ibid., 27.11*1807, 44.
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and they strongly opposed a permanent settlement in their 
report of 13 April 1808, with the exception of Agra and two 
parganas of Etawah*
A close study of the report of 1808 suggests that 
it was written with a view to prevent a permanent settlement 
altogether* The Commissioners stated that they had toured all 
hut one of the eleven districts of the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces,’1' and had held individual consultations with the 
Collectors* Thus the report.was hased.on their personal 
observations and the recommendations of the Collectors*
The influence of the latter seems to he the more likely; 
because the Commissioners functioned as such only from 
September to December 180?.
The report contained a general description of the 
districts, an estimate of their potentiality and a 
recommendation regarding the settlement of each* In the 
province as a whole, waste land abounded, capital was scarce 
and population was inadequate to the cultivation of the 
available land* In every district, but particularly in 
Moradabad, extensive rent-free tenures existed. Similarly, 
a significant proportion of the land revenue was engaged
1* Gorakhpur was the district which they could not visit, 
Commissioners’ Report, 13*4-.1808, para.207, Bg.R.C*
20.6.1808, 2.
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for by the revenue farmers, especially in Saharanpur# Every 
part of the province was susceptible to improvement# The 
mistakes made in the earlier settlements under the British 
also required correction# Cox and Tucker were therefore 
against an immediate permanent settlement of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces, with the exception of Agra and two 
parganas of Etawah district, situated on the western bank of 
the river Jamuna, for political reasons.^
Cox and Tucker then proceeded to raise formidable 
objections to an immediate conclusion of a permanent 
settlement# The existing gross annual revenue was Rs.22#5 nu
[
On a rough computation one-fourth of the arable land still 
lay uncultivated# They therefore feared an annual loss of 
revenue of Rs #7#5ei* from the conclusion of a permanent
p
settlement# Besides, in big taluqs and ’farms1 about 
whose internal resources nothing was known, an untold loss 
of revenue would result#^ Deficient information about the 
resources of ’estates1, which in their opinion was the 
result of the quick transfer of Collectors, would prevent
£l
an assessment on a ’just and equal footing’# In any case, 
the shortage of population in relation to land would make
!
1. Commissioners' Report, 13.4-,1808, paras. 19,74,76,90-92, 
98,93-5, HI > H8-9,123,150,160,168,191,193,196,198, 
200-01,203-4,207,211, Bg.R.C. 20.6.1808, 2; see above
p.120.
2. Commissioners' Report, 13.4.1808, para. 214, Bg.R.C.
20.6.1808, 2.
3. Ibid., para.215*
4. Ibid., para.217.
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the assessment unequal. The cultivators would move from 
fully cultivated 'estates1 to those containing arable land. 
Such a shift of labour would affect the interest of the 
government and individuals a l i k e T h e  land in the province 
generally was in such a state, that, unless capital was 
invested it was not likely to develop. And the landholders 
generally did not have capital for investment. Consequently, 
no assessment was likely to be formed with reference to the
p
actual capacity of land. Like capital, commerce, .too., had. .
a bearing on agriculture and revenue, the Commissioners
argued. At present the commerce of the country was
undeveloped. A fully developed commerce would give value to
the produce, and stimulate agriculture. Under the present
circumstances therefore, Cox and Tucker stated, the
government would not draw a revenue, 1 from the land
proportioned to its productive powers, until there exist a
demand for its produce sufficiently extensive to bring those
x
powers into action.1^ Another economic difficulty arose 
from not having fixed the value of the standard coin. When 
at a later date the value was fixed, then, either the
Zl
government or the people would be put to loss.
The interest of the people and government would also 
be affected by the existence of revenue farmers, and rent-
1. Ibid., para.219-
2* Ibid.» para.220.
3. Ibid., para.221.
4. Ibid., para0227*
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free tenures. According to the existing Regulations, a
number of 'estates1 would remain in the hands of revenue
1farmers till the end of the ten year plan of 1802. As 
revenue farmers had very little inclination to improve the 
land, Cox and Tucker argued that any limitation of revenue 
in such cases would be, 'attended with very mischievous
p
oonsequences'. The presence of rent-free land in the midst 
of malguzari ^  land was another formidable problem. The 
government would be precluded even from making.an .........
Zl
investigation with a view to its resumption.
Another difficulty in the formation of a permanent 
settlement was the dispute about the ownership of land, 
which was prevalent in almost every district. The rules 
regarding ownership and settlement making were imperfect 
and vague. They were liable to different and conflicting 
construction by Judges and Collectors. Hence how could a 
settlement be made with individuals holding uncertain 
titles, Cox and Tucker asked?^ Similarly, the law relating 
to the partition of *joint-estates' was defective. Internal 
sub-division of such 'estates' created friction among 
members of the community, specially over the question of 
revenue responsibility. As a result the collection of
1. Ibid., paras. 224-25.
2. Ibid.» para. 224,
3» halguzari land = land assessed to revenue or revenue 
paying land,
4* Commissioners' Report, 15.4,1808, para.225» Bg.R.C.
20.6.1808, 2.
5. Ibido, paras. 28,31-54 and 228. See Chap.I,
PPT57-40, 59-60, 64-5, 97-9 and 102-04.
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revenue was affected
The Commissioners also expressed doubts about the 
willingness of the landholders to agree to a permanent 
settlement: they were used only to short engagements, and 
the unfavourable seasons in the previous years had created 
an impression in their minds, which would reject any long-
p
term engagament. Finally, Cox and Tucker drew attention 
to the nature of the promise of permanency made to the land­
holders. . It .could cause - considerable misunderstanding» If 
the Court of Directors turned down the prospects of 
permanency, then, the landholders would consider themselves 
to have been duped by the promise into paying an increased 
revenue. They were used to direct administration, and did 
not understand the organisation of the British government 
in India.^
On several grounds, as described above, the 
Commissioners had recommended the postponement of a permanent 
settlement, with the exception of Agra and the two parganas 
of Etawah. They also recommended that the settlement of 
other districts was to continue according to the provisions 
of the Regulations of 1803 and 1805* During the remainder 
of the ten year plan period several practical steps should
1. Commissioners1 Report, 13•4*1808, paras.35-49» Ibid.; 
Bundelkhand was the region which was becoming a headache 
from the point of revenue collection due to joint tenure.
2. Commissioners * Report, 13*4.1808, para.223* Ibid.
3* Ibid., para.229*
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be taken* The Court of Directors should he requested to 
grant authority to form an unconditional permanent 
settlement ^ at a future date* A more efficient and permanent 
machinery for the administration of the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces should he created* The Collectors should he asked 
to assemble data for assessment. The Commissioners also 
proposed a revision of the rules for the determination of 
land rights and for the prevention of sub-division of 
.'estates* beyond a.certain point. At the expiration of the 
next settlement, 'proprietors' of 'estates' in a high state
i
of cultivation should be granted istmrari engagements; and 
where such a grant was not possible then a rasadi 
settlement for a term of years should be made, and the .lama 
of the last year, whenever circumstances warranted, should
p
be declared permanent.
The Bengal government gave only perfunctory attention 
to the report and to any opposition to the immediate 
conclusion of a permanent settlement. The main reason was 
its belief in the objectives underlying the policy of a 
permanent settlement* Those immediately responsible for the 
policy of haste were George Barlow, Minto, the two 
Councillors, Henry Colebrooke and John Lumsden, together 
with George Dowdeswell, Secretary in the Revenue and
1. Istmrari « right to pay a fixed amount of revenue 
generally during the life of the grantee*
2. Commissioners' Report, 13.4-. 1808, paras. 76,82,254-5* 
256-62 and 266, op.cit.
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Judicial Department. All of them were avowed advocates of a 
permanent settlement, and with the exception of Minto 
had grown into administrators in the Cornwallis tradition. 
George Barlow, now gone to Madras as Governor, had heen very 
closely consulted by Lord Wellesley as early as 1802, while 
the plan for the Ceded Provinces was being hammered out.^"
He was the person who was responsible for enacting Regulation 
X of 1807 during his period as Governor-General* Minto 
himself was a liberal in the Burke tradition, and had been
p
his very close associate. This may well be a reason for
his sympathies for the Zamindars. On revenue and financial
matters as also on other important issues, the influence of
the two Councillors over Minto was considerable.
Minto entertained a very high opinion of the merits and
*
judgement of Henry Colebrooke and John Lumsden. George 
Dowdeswell on his own acknowledgement was behind Regulation 
X of 1807, and until 1812 he must have drafted the revenue 
letters to the Court of Directors, and orders to the Board 
of Commissioners for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces.4
Of all of them Henry Colebrooke stands out as the 
theorist of the Bengal government. The views expressed by
1. See Lord Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 29*5*1802, Henry 
Wellesley Papers, Eur.MSS. 175*
2. Countess of Minto, Lord Minto in India, p.6.
3* Minute of Minto, 2*10.1&13, Minto MSS. 505*
Minute of Dowdeswell, 7*10*1819, Bg.R.C. 17*12*1819, 59; 
Prom 1801 to 1812 he was secretary in the Revenue and 
Judicial Department, Personal Records, 3, p*155*
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him in his minute recur in several of the revenue letters to 
the Court of Directors# Colebrooke had arrived in Calcutta 
in 1783? and began his official duties as an assistant 
under the Persian Translator and in the Secret Department, 
Next, he served successively as assistant to the Collectors 
of Tirhut and Purnia, In 1793 he was appointed Collector of 
Rajshahi, and in 1795 Judge and Magistrate of Mirzapur, In 
1805 he became Chief Judge of the Sadr Diwani and Nizamat 
Adalat, In 1806 he attained the highest office which a 
Bengal civilian could aspire to - a seat in the Bengal 
Council,^ Besides his distinguished official career he 
was a scholar,
Henry Colebrooke and John Lumsden had each written 
a minute on the Cox and Tucker report, justifying the 
government’s policy and dismissing all objections to it. 
Undoubtedly, when the Commission was appointed the 
government had expected it to present arguments confirming 
the policy of a permanent settlement. Of the two, Colebrooke 
was censorious of the conduct of the Commissioners; he even 
questioned their competence to discuss the inexpediency of 
the measure ’which they were selected to execute1.
Especially when the government had already decided the
question, there was no need for them to begin a discussion
2
on the policy, Lumsden, on the other hand, took a balanced
1, Personal Records, 3, pp.127-30,
2, Minute of H. Colebrooke, n,d., para.5* Bg. R.C. 20,6.1808, 
3*
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view of the report: although he differed with the views of 
the Commissioners, he considered those views to "be useful. 
Because, their views would help the Court of Directors in 
making a decision on a permanent settlement.^
Colebrooke proceeded to discuss the question by 
citing the authority of Cornwallis* Ke asked whether 
the Commissionersf objections were not raised in Bengal in 
1789-90, and in Madras in 1799* Had not Cornwallis 
effectively answered all objections, and had not his 
answers received the approval of the Court of Directors?
In the context of the past discussion the objections of the
p
Commissioners should be rejected. A very similar sentiment 
to that expressed by Colebrooke was contained in a revenue 
letter to Court of 15 September 1808.^ Like Cornwallis 
Colebrooke thought that if anything could make the Court 
hesitate in supporting a permanent settlement, it was the 
expression of doubt about the measure in official circles in 
Bengal. He accused the Commissioners of creating a
lL
controversy where none existed. John Lumsden at first was 
much impressed by the objections of Cox and Tucker, and 
some of them he considered still required serious 
consideration. But after reading Colebrooke1s minute, which 
led him to the Bengal revenue proceedings of 1789-90, he
1. Minute of J.Lumsden, n.d., para.A, Bg.R.C.20.6.1808, A.
2. Minute of H. Colebrooke, n.d., paras. 1,2 and 10, op.cit.
3. See para. 42.
4. Minute of H. Colebrooke, n.d., para.17, Bg.R.C. 20.6.1808,
3.
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became a firm supporter of an immediate permanent 
settlement* His minute, however, is an echo, argument for 
argument, of that of Colebrooke,
The fundamental economic principle underlying a 
permanent settlement, as one learns from Cornwallis, 
Colebrooke and the Bengal government was to excite and 
generate agricultural development* Such development 
according to this theory was possible only through the lure 
of valuable private property. It would only be by giving a 
valuable interest in land, that the waste would be brought 
under cultivation, and the cultivated land would improve*
A great obstacle to improvement in India was the scarcity 
of capital, There were, according to the theory, two inter­
connected ways of creating conditions for the accumulation 
of capital, by state action. By perpetually fixing the 
revenue, and by handing over waste land free of tax to the 
’proprietors1, adequate capital would be created within a 
reasonable distance of time. The subsidiary arguments of 
the main principle of the theory were: that the prosperity 
and wealth resulting from a permanent settlement would 
stabilise land revenue, and open new sources of taxation.
In keeping with its fundamental principle, 
Colebrooke explained that the settlement in Bengal and the
1* Minute of J,Lumsden, n,d., para.3, Bg*R*C, 20,6,1808, 4.
2. See Minute of H. Colebrooke, n.d., paras* 14,15,21,22,
24 and 25* op.cit.; Minute of J. Lumsden, n.d., paras.
8-10, Bg. R, C, 26,6,1808, 4.
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Northern Circars of the Madras Presidency were made;. One-
third of the land as computed by Cornwallis was jungle, but
capable of future cultivation* A like proportion lay waste
in the Coromandel Coast. The waste was handed over to the
*proprietors1 - deliberately, While in the Ceded and
Conquered Provinces, Colebrooke complained the Commissioners
considered one-fourth of land which was waste, as too great
a sacrifice. The result of a permanent settlement in Bengal
both Colebrooke and Lumsden claimed had been salutary,
Bengal had prospered. Revenue, despite set-backs in foreign
trade had increased, **
Colebrooke*s purpose in highlighting the principles
of a permanent settlement, and in using Cornwallis*s
authority, was to demonstrate their soundness, and perhaps
to counteract the impression which the Cox and Tucker report
was likely to make upon the Court of Directors, If the
theory of a permanent settlement was sound, there was only
one conclusion to be drawn from it. Colebrooke, with the
zeal of a propagandist wrote in his minute, that if in
Bengal the permanent settlement was *a judicious measure,
which justice called for, which policy dictated, and which
the interest of the Company countenanced ...*; it was much
2
more applicable to the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. 
Economic arguments apart, here it was sheer political
1. Minute of H. Colebrooke, n,d,, paras,11-14, 26-7 and 
32-3, Bg.R.C. 20,6.1808, 3; Minute of J. Lumsden, n.d,, 
paras. 9-10, Bg, R.C, 20,6.1808, 4-.
2. Minute of H, Colebrooke, n.d., para.34* Ibid.
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necessity. The coni^ iiijacious nature of the Zamindars of the 
region was well-known# They must be conciliated, 1 to uphold 
the permanence of the British d o mination*He also gave 
rather an obscure military reason* At the moment there was 
a large dispersion of troops in the region. With the 
conclusion of a permanent settlement many of them could be 
safely deployed elsewhere, if a war broke out# And in peace­
time the size of the troops could be reduced# This would 
save money. ^ .................................................
Colebrooke and Lumsden also controverted the 
specific objections to an immediate permanent settlement 
presented by Cox and Tucker. Like all over-zealous people 
they had ready-made replies to the objections of the 
Commissioners. The controversy in Bengal at the time of the 
permanent settlement recurs in their theme continuously.
Such objections had been raised then, but they did not 
materialise in Bengal and they would not materialise in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces.
Here is how Colebrooke and Lumsden replied to the 
objections of the Commissioners. The estimated future loss 
of revenue which was an important point made by the 
Commissioners, was superficially replied to# Future 
additional revenue from land was an uncertain proposition. 
The loss of land revenue at any rate was not as important
1. Ibid. t para. 34.
2. ibid., paras. 37 and 40.
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as the advantages of a permanent settlement. One of those 
advantages was new sources of taxation. Knowledge of the 
resources of the country was not an important aspect of 
assessment. A perfect knowledge of resources had not 
existed in Bengal, it was not possible without vexatious 
scrutiny; and even if that was applied in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces, reliable information was not possible 
even in the next ten years. Inequality of assessment was 
inevitable, no precision was possible, and whatever 
experience had been gained in the past was to be relied 
upon, depressed population, scarce capital, extensive 
wastes and meagre commerce were evils perpetuated by 
temporary settlements. The currency situation was in full 
control, as the standard weight of the Lakhnau sicca rupee 
was fixed in 1806. Rent-free tenures offered no problem as 
the investigation and prosecution of cases could continue, 
and afterwards their Jama could be added to 1 estates' of 
which they formed a part. No movement of cultivators from 
cultivated to waste and rent-free land had occurred in 
Bengal, and it would not occur in the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces either. The determination of 'proprietary* 
disputes and the admission of 'proprietors' as against 
revenue farmers were not difficult questions. In the first 
case orders had been issued to the Commissioners, but the 
second would require a declaratory Regulation. The infinite 
sub-division in 'joint-estates' would require consideration,
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though it was not a very important subject and could be 
done later on* The relative rights of village Zamindars 
and Taluqdars was a problem not easy of solution*
Information on that question was lacking. It could however 
be settled on the basis of 1 justice and preferable title*.^ 
The Councillors recommended the implementation of 
Regulation X of 1807 generally, though they conceded that 
some exceptions would have to be made. The Regulation was 
-passed with full awareness of the circumstances alleged by
p
the Commissioners. Its abandonment a year after its 
enactment, when certain steps had already been taken would 
not only be a breach of faith, but it would also damage the 
reputation of the government and demonstrate its 
1 fickleness1
v The governments policy in regard to the permanent ' 
settlement of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces was thus 
unaffected by the report of Cox and Tucker. To the Court of 
Directors the Bengal government justified its policy, and 
subtly it even tried to prejudice them against the 
Commissioners1 report. In September 1808 it wrote to the 
Court, that the Governor-General after considering the 
documents relating to a permanent settlement in Bengal,
1. Ibid., paras. 29-31, 41, 48-50, 55 and 57; Minute of 
J. lumsden, n.d., paras. 8-10, 5-6, 11-17 and 20,
Bg.R.C. 20.6.1808, 4.
2. Minute of H. Colebrooke, n.d., paras. 3,4 and 43, Bg.R.C.
20.6.1808, 3; Minute of J.Lumsden, n.d., para.3, Bg,R.C.
20.6.1808, 4.
3. Minute of H. Colebrooke, n.d., para.4, Ibid.
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Benares, Madras, and the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, 
fwas entirely satisfied of the sound policy or rather the 
urgent necessity of that measure ’* The Court were asked to 
consider the Cox and Tucker report alongside Colebrooke1s 
and Lumsden*s minutes.^*
In reality, the difference between the Commissioners* 
report and the government’s policy was not as great as the 
Councillors and the Bengal revenue letters made it out to be* 
Cox. and Tucker had not deserted the permanent settlement 
school of thought* They were only against haste in its 
introduction, in which they were guided by the opinion of 
the Collectors* They had fully expressed their conformity 
to the objectives behind the policy of a permanent settlement. 
They even favoured the interests of large landholders, and, 
in Tucker’s subsequent writing especially, one can discern 
strains of Whig notions of private property and government -
a strain of thought with which Cornwallis is said to have
2
been influenced. At the same time, the Cox and Tucker 
report must be considered to have provided the factual basis, 
with which each and every argument in favour of a permanent 
settlement was to be destroyed* The report made a 
contribution,, even if it was an unwitting one, in 
revolutionising land revenue policy in temporarily settled 
areas* It was unwitting because Cox and Tucker never
1* Bg. R.L* 15*9«1B08, paras* 44-46.
2. Bee Commissioners’ Report, 13.4.1808, paras. 54-57*
Bg. R.C* 20.6*1808, 2.
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imagined that a permanent settlement would be denied for 
all time to come# As early as 1811, when Tucker was in 
London while the Fifth Report was under preparation, he had 
begun to regret the recommendation of the report of which 
he was the co-author.'*" In 1832 his regret was transformed 
into remorse, and in 1837 it had taken the form of righteous 
anger when a permanent settlement was categorically turned
p
down "by the Directors.
The difference that existed "between the views of 
the Commissioners and those of the Bengal government was 
however in no way responsible for their resignation# The 
view of some writers that they resigned because the
*
government did not accept their recommendations is unfounded* 
Their resignation originated purely from private reasons*
In fact they resigned several months before the completion 
of the report of 13 April 1808* In January 1808 Edward 
Colebrooke and John Deane were functioning as the new 
Commissioners* As early as 25 October 1807 Cox had asked 
the government for permission to return to the Board of 
Revenue at Calcutta.^ In a joint letter of 31 October 1807
1* See H. St.G. Tucker to Lord Minto, 6*9*1811, Minto MSS#502 
2* See below pp.428-30*
3# B.B.Misra, op.cit., pp. 14-3 & 206; B.R.Misra, 0£*cit*, 
pp*22-3; The Court had also shown curiosity over the 
Commissioners1 resignation* Bg.R.D. 27*2*1810, para*44*
But in subsequent correspondence no further reference 
was made to the matter; the Fifth Report is also in 
error when it states that Cox*s and Tucker’s resignation 
was due to their differences with the government, pp*
52-3; Likewise the D.N.B. in its sketch on Tucker is also 
in error, LVII, p*2ST*
4. R.W.Cox to Bg. Govt., 25*10*1807, Bg.R.C. 27*11*1807, 47*
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Cox and Tucker had pressed the government to accept their 
resignation*1 Their letter makes their reason for 
resignation very clear* They wrote, *our present situations 
were not sought hy us* The duty was undertaken with 
reluctance, and we shall lay down the trust without regret 
whenever Government shall he of opinion that our services in 
this part of the country may he dispensed with# The duty is 
in our judgement of such magnitude, and we feel it so 
difficult to do justice to it, that we should gladly see it
committed to those who have had more experience and are
2
better qualified for the situation*•«*1 It should he noted, 
the request to resign in October precedes even the first 
difference of opinion which had occurred between them, and 
the government in November over the permanent settlement of 
Etawah and Gorakhpur, and over the amendment of section 5 
of Regulation X of 1807.^ After their resignation Cox 
returned to the Board of Revenue* Tucker was in bad health, 
but in April 1808 he was made a supernumerary member of the 
same Board, in 1809 he became Secretary in the Public 
Department, and afterwards when the Finance Department was
Zl
separated he was the first to be its Secretary* Tucker
was and remained on intimate terms with Minto#'*
1* Bg.R.C. 13.11.1807, 27.
2. Ibid*
3* See above, pp.119-23*
4. Bg. R.L. 15.9*1808, paras. 27-30; Personal Records,3, 
pp.132 and 667; D.N.B*, LVII p*281.
5. See Minto MSS. 5^2 for their private correspondence*
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To continue with the theme of a permanent 
settlement after this slight digression, the government had 
instructed the new Commissioners - Edward Colebrooke and 
John Deane - on 20 June 1808 to accept engagements for a 
permanent settlement with due provision for the approval of 
the Court of Directors*^ Erom the point of view of the 
government's policy, its relation with Colebrooke and Deane 
were also far from satisfactory* The government had 
undoubtedly expected them to make recommendations which 
would be the opposite of the one made by Cox and Tuckei*
Like their predecessors, Colebrooke and Deane were 
subscribers to the theory of a permanent settlement, but 
considered the time was not opportune for its universal 
introduction in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* Both of 
them were able officers and earned distinctive approbation ^  
from the government and the Court of Directors for their 
services as Commissioners* Colebrooke had arrived in Bengal 
in 1777, and. was soon placed under the Persian Translator 
as an assistant. In 1780 he became Persian Translator 
himself, and in the same year his career was almost wrecked*
He had been indiscreet enough to put his name as a joint- 
guarantor of a Capt. Dalrymple for a sum of Rs.50,000, in a 
transaction with the East India Company* Dalrymple defaulted 
and legal proceedings were started against Colebrooke, but 
later on he was allowed three years to make good his
1. Bee below, p. 143*
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guarantee. His prospects afterwards revived; in 178g he 
became Collector of Calcutta, and between 1793 and- 1808 he 
served in the judicial branch of the service in important 
positions in the districts of Chittagong, Dacca, Murshidabad 
and Patna. In January 1808 he was appointed Acting 
President and senior member of the Board of Revenue, but, 
in the same month he was transferred to the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces*^
His junior colleague John Deane had arrived in 
Calcutta in 1791* He was placed as a second Assistant to the 
Judge of Midnapur; in 1793 he was Register to the Diwani 
Adalat in Sarun. From 1794 to 1797 he was transferred to 
the Revenue branch of the service, successively occupying 
the positions of sub-secretary to the Board of Revenue, 
assistant to the President of the same Board and Collector 
of Shahabad. In 1800 he was Judge and Magistrate of Benares 
and in 1801 he was one of the first Collectors to be deputed
p
to the Ceded Provinces. It has recently been stated that 
while he was Judge and Magistrate of Jaunpur (from 1802 to 
1806), a charge of bribery was brought against him by a 
subordinate Indian servant.t From November 1806 until his 
appointment as a junior Commissioner in the Ceded and
1. Personal Records, 7* pp.407-14.
2. Ibid., pp.267-68.
3. dee B.S.Cohn, 'The British in Benares: A nineteenth 
Century Colonial Society,1 Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, Jan. 1962, p.l9£«
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Conquered Provinces, lie was serving as a Judge of the Bareli
Provincial Court of Appeal
On taking charge of their duties Colebrooke and
Deane were in favour of an immediate permanent settlement.
They actually framed specific rules for the guidance of
2
Collectors in forming a permanent settlement. But soon 
after they noticed, like Cox and Tucker, the existence of 
extensive waste land in the province. They therefore became 
advocates of a discriminating permanent settlement. It was 
to be conceded in ■estates' where not more than a third of 
the arable land lay waste. Otherwise only a lease for a 
period of ten years was to be given. A permanent settlement 
or the ten year settlement was to be made with the 
'proprietors'. The revenue farmers were to be continued for 
four years in the Ceded Provinces and for three years in 
the Conquered.Provinces and Bundelkhand. There was nothing 
new in any of their recommendations. Up to a third of the 
waste land in an 'estate* was allowed to the 'proprietor* 
in Bengal and the Northern Circars, A ten year lease had 
been suggested by John Shore on the eve of the Bengal 
permanent settlement. And according to the Regulations of 
1803 and 1805 the revenue farmers were not to be admitted to
1, Personal Records, 7* pp.268-69•
2, See Commissioners to Bg. Govt., 14.3*1808, Bg.R.C.
13.5*1808, 50-51*
3, See Commissioners to Bg.Govt., 26.4.1808 and 17*5*1808, 
Bg. R.C. 20.6.1808, 8 and 12.
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a permanent settlement, because that would prejudice the 
rights of others for ever. In order to convince the 
government of the soundness of their criterion, Colebrooke 
and Deane referred to the Regulations of 180? and 1805# It 
was stated in them that the land must be in a sufficiently 
advanced state of cultivation to warrant a permanent 
settlement.
The governments attitude remained inflexible: it 
was uninfluenced by the second commissioners1 recommendation* 
The permanent settlement was generally to be made. In 
forming a permanent settlement the only caution which seemed 
necessary to the government was to explain to the 
•proprietors1, that the final approval of the Court was 
necessary. In each engagement for a settlement that 
reservation was to be mentioned. Thus in 1808 the 
government had twice ignored the recommendations of the 
local Commission. The settlement work proceeded in 
accordance with the government orders of 20 June 1808.
It may be of relevance to indicate the trend towards 
a permanent settlement, which had been moving for some time, 
from Bengal to the Madras Presidency. A permanent settlement 
in the Northern Circars had already been introduced. In 1798 
Lord Wellesley had ordered the general introduction of a
1. See above, pp. 44, 58 aud 65-6.
2. Bg. Govt, to Commissioners, Bg.R.C*, 20.6.1808, 16;
From the projected arrangement for permanency all 
revenue farmers were to be excluded.
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permanent settlement in the Madras Presidency* With the 
arrival of George Barlow as Governor in 1807 the cause of a 
permanent settlement soon acquired momentum; the Madras 
Board of Revenue was in full harmony with the new Governor# 
It was with the objective of declaring a permanent 
settlement that the decennial leases were generally 
introduced in 1808#^ The similarity and contrast between 
the policies in Madras and the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
in 1808 were: in Madras there was no friction between the' 
government and the Board of Revenue, while in the latter 
there was a considerable difference of views on the 
immediate introduction of the measure between the government 
and the Board of Commissioners# In Madras, before 1808 the 
opposition to the measure had come from Munro and 
Bentinck, but for much deeper reasons# They were opposed 
to the introduction of the Cornwallis system of 
administration# They were not opposed to permanency as such, 
but to the zamindari settlement♦ In the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces the Commissioners had not advanced any of those 
arguments against permanent settlement.
The policy of a permanent settlement in the Ceded 
and Conquered Provinces was kept alive by the Bengal
1. B.S. Baliga, 'Home Government and the end of the Policy 
of Permanent Settlement in Madras - 1802 to 1818*,
Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings,
December 19^5* pp»8-9; C.H.Philips# The East India 
Company (2nd ed#j, p.201#
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government on its own authority until 1811. Thereafter at 
the instance of the Court of Directors that policy had to 
he abandoned, though the Bengal government was to raise the 
question again in 1820 and 1855» and inside the Court it 
was to be raised on three occasions - in 1821, 1832 and 
1837 - only to be defeated on each occasion. As an 
alternative the policy of a periodical settlement was 
proposed by the Court, which in fact became the official 
policy in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. Up to the end 
of the year 1809 in the Revenue Despatches to Bengal, there 
were no instructions regarding a permanent settlement. The 
years 1810-13 were most crucial from the stand-point of 
policy formation. The despatches during those years raised 
fundamental objections to the theory of a permanent 
settlement, rejected the proposals of the government for 
permanency and forcefully propounded the theory of 
periodical settlement* Despite the unwillingness of the 
government to accept the views of the Court, the views of 
the latter became the basis of policy* By 1813 the 
fundamentals of land revenue policy had thus been discussed.
The Court*s criticism of the theory of a permanent 
settlement stands in contrast to its acquiescence in the 
same measure in 1792. What led to the change in its view is 
a question, that can be answered after the discussion
1 . See below (Chap.3 and Conclusion).
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"between the Court and the government has been described#
In its despatches to Bengal of 1 February 1811 and 
15 January 1812, the Court developed a critique of the 
principles underlying the permanent settlement. This task 
was effected shrewdly and in a masterful manner. It 
undoubtedly did not wish to wound the susceptibility of the 
government, nor did it desire to be spiteful to the services 
and achievements of Lord Cornwallis, It used sweet 
reasonableness to produce a change in the government's 
thinking on land revenue policy. The Court disclaimed any 
hostility to the principles of permanent settlement* They 
were 'politic and wise1, and the sentiments behind them 
were 'liberal and disinterested1,^ Yet it asked rather 
pungently if the permanent settlement 1,♦, be so indisputably 
just in theory as to entitle it to our unreserved
p
recognition in all settlements of the land in time to come,1
The Court also stated subtly but contradictorily, that,
permanent settlement was not the issue under discussion;
the subject requiring decision was, whether in future
settlements should the ’proprietors’ be given a pledge that
under no circumstances the revenue should be increased, after
*
it had been fixed once.
To the Court the striking flaws in the assumptions 
behind a permanent settlement were, that they were not
1. Bg. R.D, (C. & C,P,), 15*1,1812, para.65.
2, Ibid., para,77.
5. Ibid., para,75*
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founded on reality - in other words on a knowledge of the 
resources of the country and of the requirements of the 
state and an understanding of the society from which the 
revenue was to be raised,^ The fiscal assumption behind a 
permanent settlement was that an increase of revenue would 
come from indirect taxation* Indirect taxation was a 
concept applicable to England and not to India, where land 
remained the chief source of revenue* The expectations 
entertained-of the rise of revenue in Bengal had not 
materialised* Nor had the permanent settlement taken into 
account the effect of a depreciation in the value of the 
currency on.future revenue* It had also ignored the question 
how the increasing expenditure of the government was to be 
met if no increase in the revenue from indirect taxation 
occurred, while the revenue from land had been pegged down 
for all time to come. Would it not be a sensible proposition 
(especially when no government could predict its future 
expenditure), to keep an opening for the prospective
preplenishing of the exchequer from the land revenue? The 
implementation of the permanent settlement was also 
defective. It did not provide for an institutional mechanism, 
whereby the resources of the land could be ascertained, and 
the nature of landholding together with the subordinate 
rights could be understood. On both heads mistakes were
1* Bg, R.D* (C. & C.P.), 15.1.1812, para*64*
2. Bg* R.D., 1.2.1811, paras, 26-36,
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committed in Bengal, even when the British had known the 
region for ne^ly thirty years*1
On the question of the permanent settlement in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces, the attitude and reasoning 
of the Court fall into two distinct parts, first the 
arguments and instructions contained in the despatches of 
27 February 1810 and 1 February 1811, and secondly those 
contained in the despatches of 27 November 1811, 15 January 
1812 and-29 January 1813. Both parts were interconnected#
In the first part no commitment was held out to support the 
governments policy, and the implication was clear that the 
Court did not favour an immediate permanent settlement. The 
reason for circumspection was that the proceedings relating 
to a permanent settlement were not yet before the Court. In 
the second part, when the relevant papers had reached the 
Court, an immediate permanent settlement was rejected, and 
that rejection was justified.
In 1810 the Court wrote to the government: !... we 
desire to be distinctly understood that it is not our 
meaning to proceed immediately to a settlement of these
p
countries [Ceded and Conquered Provinces] in perpetuity.1 
Even if the Court subscribed to the theory of a permanent 
settlement, no decision would be given until all the papers 
relating to the measure were before it.^ In February 1811
1. Bg. R.D. (C.&C.P.), 27*2.1810, paras. 4-6-7*
2. Bg. R.D. (C.& C.P.), 27.2.1810, para.45.
3. Ibid.
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the government was forbidden to declare a permanent 
settlement without the 1 sanction and concurrence1 of the 
Court.^ This simple directive of the Court was intended to 
prevent haste in forming a definitive arrangement* The logic 
was simple but its implications were deep* In the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces the British had been only for a short 
time. Their knowledge of the revenue resources was 
insufficient, and the people of the region were unaccustomed 
to their administration* In Bengal the British had been
comparatively better acquainted with conditions, yet
2mistakes were made. The moral was obvious, as the Court
instructed the Bengal government in 1810, to observe ’...
great caution and deliberation in proceeding in our new
acquisition to a measure [permanent settlement] which alone
must be very important in its consequence*
The parallel of similar directive to Madras and
Bombay Presidencies at once comes to mind* Similarly, when
Lord Wellesley had been advocating a general permanent
settlement in Madras, the Court did not approve of its
immediate introduction* In 1801 it told the Madras
government that no permanent settlement should be made
Zl
without its sanction. In 1804 while reviewing the temporary 
settlements of Canara, Malabar and the Ceded districts the
1. Bg.R.D., 2.1.1811, para.39*
2. Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 27*2.1810, paras. 46-7*
3* Ibid*, para*47.
4. dee M.R.D., 10*4.1804, para.41.
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order of 1801 was repeated; and at the same time it was 
pointed out that very little was known about the revenue 
resources of those districts."^ Again, in 1810 when Jonathan 
Duncan was the Governor of Bombay, the Court, while 
discussing the settlement of the Ceded districts of that 
Presidency, exhorted the government against sudden 
innovation. The customs and habits of the people, it was
p
pointed out, must be studied first.
In the meantime the Bengal government submitted the - 
provisional permanent settlement of Agra, Etawah, Aligarh, 
Saharanpur, Kanpur and Gorakhpur for the approval of the 
Court.^ In November 1811 in a short and perhaps hastily 
adopted despatch the Court rejected the recommendations of 
the Bengal government. An immediate permanent settlement 
was impolitic and unsafe',^ and the Court further stated: 
fthe object of the present dispatch is to caution you in 
the most pointed manner against pledging us to the extension 
of the Bengal fixed assessment to our newly acquired
5
territories1, an exhortation which had been made earlier 
also by the Court. The government was ordered to renew 
expiring leases only for a period not exceeding five years*
In 1809 the Court had exercised its power to refuse a
1. Ibid.
2. B.R.D*, 10.1.1810, paras. 2-13 and 110.
3. Bg.R.L. (C.& C.P.), 30.12.1809, para.99; Ibid., 31.8.1810, 
para.63; Ibid., 12.2.1811, paras. 22-27*
A. Bg.R.D*, 27.ll.1811, para.2
5* Ibid., para.3*
6. Ibid., para.4.
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permanent settlement cf the Ceded districts in Madras.^" And
in 1812 it was to reject a general permanent settlement of
2
the Madras Presidency.
Two sets of factors had combined in producing the
decision of the Court - its growing doubts about the theory
of permanent settlement and the desirability of its
extension in new areas on the one hand, and on the other, the
actual condition of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces from
the standpoint of. local conditions, and the. state .of........
*
cultivation* The first factor has already been explained*-'
In regard to the second point the Court received the reports 
and other correspondence on the settlement of Ceded and
lL
Conquered Provinces only after September 1811* It therefore 
found the views of the two Commissioners confirming its 
doubts. Here is what the Court wrote to the government in 
January 1813: 'the former Commissioners in their report 
d/- 13 June [sic] 1808 expressed themselves decidedly 
adverse to a general application of the principle of the 
permanent settlement to those territories and on grounds 
which we deem to be indispensable and conclusive the actual 
Commissioners [Colebrooke and Deane] recommend so many 
exceptions to the system in their reports as to lead us to 
infer that they do not differ materially in settlement from
1. See M.R.D., 30.8.1809> para.21.
2. See M.R.D*, 16*12.1812, paras. 1-7*
3. See above, p. 1^5 ff.
4. See Bg. R.D. , 27«11«1811, para.4; Ibid.» 29*1«1813* 
para.85.
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their predecessors *
There was no need for the Court to underpin its 
order of November 1811 with many specific arguments* The 
Court drawing upon the reports of the Commissioners pointed 
out that in fact neither the revenue resources nor the 
ancient customs of the landholders were known to the 
government* The consequences of the early British 
assessment had not yet been overcome* There was extensive 
waste land in every district* The Zamindars themselves 
desired no permanent settlement nor did they understand its 
significance* A permanent settlement would only produce loss 
of revenue* The measure in relation to the Ceded and
p
Conquered Provinces was premature. While rejecting the
permanent settlement of the Ceded district of Madras
Presidency in 1809, the argument given by the Court was
partly similar to what was given for the Ceded and Conquered
Provinces* The Court had then stated, that, the knowledge
*
of revenue resources and of the people was not known*
In spite of the Court’s criticism of a permanent
settlement and its denial in 1811, it had not written it off
h.
completely for any future consideration. Yet the Court 
earnestly desired a departure from that policy when it 
proposed a periodical settlement to the serious consideration
1. Bg. R.D.,(C. & C.P.), 29*1.1813 9 para * 91•
2. Bg. R.D. , 27*H*1811» para.4; Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.),
29«1#1813j paras. 85 and 90.
3* See M.R.D., 30.8.1809* para.21.
4. See Bg. R.D. , 27*H*1811, para.4.
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of the government* A periodical settlement was a mean 
between a temporary and a permanent settlement* It was 
deduced from Adam Smith's teaching on land-tax. Adam Smith 
had shown the prevalence of two forms of land-tax in 
western countries - constant and variable. A land-tax based 
upon a constant valuation, (by which Adam Smith meant, that 
once the tax was fixed it remained unalterable), had two 
basic flaws. It ignored the rise and decline in cultivation,
which would over a period of.time_make.the burden of .......
taxation upon individuals unequal. Secondly, it did not 
take into account the possibility of a future alteration in 
the value of silver or in the weight and fineness of the 
coin. If the value of silver or the weight and fineness of 
the coin was to increase then the landlord would be a loser. 
If the converse happened then the state would be the loser. 
The constant valuation principle was thus unsuited to 
changing circumstances. A land-tax in his opinion should be 
so devised, as to overcome inconvenience to either party 
for all time to come. The physiocrats had advanced the 
principle of a variable land-tax, which took into account 
the rise and fall of land-rent or the improvement and 
decline of cultivation. Adam Smith accepted the principle of 
a variable land-tax and showed that if it was properly 
administered, it was better than a constant land-tax, and 
unobjectionable. The real danger to be guarded against 
under a variable land-tax was the discouragement to
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agriculture* If the landlord was exempted for a period of 
time from the enhancement of his tax, so as to sufficiently 
indemnify him for improvements carried out hy him, 
cultivation would continue to improve. The interval between 
revisions of land-tax should not be too long, but in the 
interests of agriculture and revenue it was better that it 
be too long, rather than too short. Adam Smith believed 
that the state from a regard to the improvement of its own 
revenue would sufficiently indemnify the landlord, because 
that was the basis of the improvement of agriculture; and 
the improvement of agriculture and revenue was one of the 
principal advantages of a variable land-tax. The revision 
of the land-tax at stated intervals would adjust itself to 
changes in the value of silver and the standard of the coin.
Basing itself on Adam Smith’s teaching the Court 
developed its theory of periodical settlement* In that, the 
Court saw a novel truth for India both from the standpoints 
of agriculture and revenue. To justify the theoretical 
soundness of its theory the Court quoted from The Wealth of 
Nations. Where Adam Smith’s views did not support some of 
the Court's proposals, it went beyond them.
A periodical settlement at stated intervals of 15 
to 20 years based on a survey, and ascertainment of 
resources had all the advantages of a permanent settlement
1. See A* Smith, The Wealth of Nations, (edB E.Cannan, 
University paperbacks, 1961)« £, PP *> 352-55 and 358-59*
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without its disadvantages. It would prevent inequality of 
assessment , and produce a future increase in revenue* It 
was neither exceptionable in principle nor difficult in 
practice, A survey and inspection of accounts would not be 
vexatious to the people, because they were used to such 
scrutinies* It would also correct the maladjustment between 
revenue and agriculture arising from changes in value of 
specie and the coin* Here an impressive extract from Adam 
Smith was quoted:u 'in all the variations of the state of 
society, in the improvement and in the declension of 
Agriculture; in all the variations of the value of silver, 
and [in] all those in the standard of the coin, a tax of 
this kind would, of its own accord and without any attention 
of government, readily suit itself to the actual situation
of things, and would be equally just and equitable in all
2
those different changes1"*
A periodical settlement, the Court argued, gave the 
government a motive for undertaking reproductive works* In 
every country a minimum obligation to maintain public works 
had to be discharged by governments. In India such an 
obligation was the greater both by tradition, and in view of 
the backwardness of society* If the government was to fulfil
1* Bg.K.Do (C.& C.P.), 15.1.1812, paras* 81-2, 79-80, 83-6, 
07-9, and 72-4.
2o Ibid,, para.90; see also A.Smith, op.cit., p.359;
B.fi.Misra, op.cit*, pp.208-09 makes no distinction 
between the quotation in question and the advocacy of the 
Courtc He gives the impression that the observation 
contained in the quotation originated from the Court*
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that duty then it had 1 a right to indemnity for the expence 
incurred in the undertaking*1 The obligation and the 
indemnity would be best secured under a periodical 
settlement, and not under a permanent settlement* Under the 
latter the government might shrink from undertaking public 
works, because no 1 indemnity1 would materialise* Or in spite 
of it, if the government fulfilled its obligation the 
benefit would go exclusively to the Zamindars * To support 
its argument the Court quoted Adam Smith, this time out of 
context and putting altogether a different meaning upon it* 
The quotation was, 111 to draw the attention of the sovereign 
towards the improvement of the land from a regard to the 
increase of his own Revenue is one of the principal 
advantages proposed by this species of [Land]-tax,111 i*e.
p
a periodical settlement. Adam Smith had not considered the 
improvement of land through state initiative, but through 
the efforts of the landlord and the cultivators* In the 
above extract what he meant was, that under periodical 
settlement revenue was bound to increase; safeguarding it 
would be the adequate reason for the state to allow a period 
of indemnity to the landlord for improvement carried out 
by him.^
Finally, the Court observed, as Adam Smith had done, 
that a periodical settlement would lead to a harmonious
1. Bg. R.D. (C. & C.P.), 15.1.1812, paras* 95-8.
2. Ibid., para.92; See also A. Smith, op.cit», p*3?8* 
3# See Ibid., pp.358-9*
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understanding between the government and the people 
regarding land-tax. For the third time Adam Smith was quoted 
but the quotation was inaccurate. A periodical settlement 
would ,Mgive to the rule of settlement the character of a 
perpetual and unalterable regulation or what may be called 
a fundamental law of the Commonwealth rather than that of a 
tax to be levied according to a certain valuation.1
The Court had really set its mind on periodical 
settlement, but it avoided giving this impression to the 
government. The government was to consider it seriously, yet 
it was by no means an 'inflexible* line of policy. Its 
consideration might modify the principles of permanent 
settlement, or if on further consideration the principles of 
a permanent settlement still appeared to be sound, then a 
periodical settlement would not be necessary. Perhaps to 
soften the impact on the government of its order on the 
immediate permanent settlement*the Court did not extinguish 
future hopes. The government was told that if at a future 
date a permanent settlement was introduced, all 'precipita­
tion or haste* was to be avoided; and precautions were to 
be taken against the adverse effect of the depreciation in
1. Bg. R.D. (C. & C.P.), 15*1.1812, para.91; The correct 
quotation should have been, *it would, therefore, be 
much more proper to be established as a perpetual and 
unalterable regulation, or what is called a fundamental 
law of the Commonwealth, than any tax which was always 
to be levied accordingly to a certain valuation,* See 
A. Smith, op.cit., p.359*
2. Bg.R.D. (C. & fl.P.'), 15*1.1812, paras64- and 107*
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the value of money.^
The government reacted very strongly against the 
Court's criticism of a permanent settlement, against its 
denial in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, and against 
the proposal of a periodical settlement. The criticism of 
the theory of a permanent settlement made by the Court, to 
recapitulate briefly, were that indirect taxation was not 
applicable to India, and revenue from other sources had not 
sufficiently materialised in Bengal; that it had not taken 
into account the effect of depreciation in the value of 
currency on revenue; and that it had not taken into 
consideration the necessity of knowing the resources of the 
country, and the customs and prejudices of the people*
The government stated that the expectation of 
increased revenue from indirect sources had materialised 
considerably* In future it would increase more with the 
increase in population, and with better means of collecting 
it* It was a misnomer to state that under a permanent 
settlement a 'sacrifice' of revenue occurred* Its main 
objective was to improve agriculture. Where a government
absorbed 85 per cent of the gross collection, agriculture
2
was bound to remain at a low level* Bo far as the 
depreciation in the value of money was concerned, it was 
not likely to occur in India for a long time to come* or
1* Ibid., para.107#
2» Bg. R.L. (C. & C.P.), 17*7*1813» para.16.
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even for centuries# The value of money had remained constant 
since the British rule* This was borne out by the fact that 
the price of grain, and the wages of labour had remained 
stationary# Even if a heavy influx of bullion from other 
countries was to take place, it would be counteracted by 
external and internal factors. The demand from England and 
China for bullion would drain part of that influx# The rise 
in population and the habit of hoarding would absorb the 
remainder. There was on the other hand a likelihood of a 
shortage of precious metal.^
In regard to the sources of assessment, the 
government maintained that whatever be the revenue system 
they would remain the same* For the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces the information available was greater than at the 
time of the Bengal permanent settlement, and it was not 
likely that the mistakes of the latter would be repeated.
The revenue realisation of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
had been satisfactory, and there was no danger of loss of
revenue, arising from what the Court had considered to be a
2
defective state of information. The government went on to 
defend the permanent settlement by stating that it did take 
into account the customs and prejudices of the people, which 
were the basis not only of the public revenue but also of 
the Indian Empire. The misgovernment of the past had made
1. Ibid*, paras. 17-24.
2. Ibid., paras. 5-13*
1 GO
the people disorderly. Once they realised the benefits of 
real property they would settle down. A similar situation 
had existed before the permanent settlement in Bengal, but 
now the people were peaceable.^"
The situation arising from the rejection of a 
permanent settlement by the order of the Court of 27 
November 1811, was a real embarrassment to the government.
The sole cause of this had been the enactment of Regulation 
X-of 1807* Of course the government would not admit its 
mistake. Instead, it tried to overcome the embarrassment in 
two ways. On the one hand it returned to the provisions of 
permanency as contained in the Regulations XXV of 1803 and 
IX of 1805, and on the other it tried to persuade the Court 
to grant authority to modify its order of 1811* The strategy 
of the government was clear. If it did not succeed in 
obtaining modification of the order of 1811, then, the next 
best thing was to revert to the Regulations of 1803 and 1805* 
The matter was considered to be of such importance that 
Minto, who had hitherto contributed nothing to the 
discussion, decided to join the fray over a permanent 
settlement. He wrote a minute in July 1812, and in August 
sent a private letter to the chairman of the Court, and in 
October 1812 the government sent a revenue letter through 
the Secret Department.
1. Ibid., paras, 17-8.
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A retreat to the provisions of 1803 and 1805 was 
heavily defended, and certain spiteful remarks were passed 
on the Court, The defence of the Regulations of 1803 and 
1805, and the remarks on the Court were unnecessary* The 
Court had only prevented an immediate permanent settlement, 
criticised the theory behind it and suggested a periodical 
settlement, hut it had not asked the government to erase the 
declaration regarding a permanent settlement from the statute 
hook* .The government.undoubtedly, was in a state, of panic,. . - 
and it feared the Court might not approve a return to the 
early Regulations* The government therefore argued that by 
the proclamation of 14* July 1802 and the Regulations of 
1803 and 1805, a clear promise of a permanent settlement had 
been made to the landholders* The Court had been fully aware 
of it, and it had not asked either for their annulment or 
modification* It had actually maintained silence in regard 
to those provisions, a silence virtually amounting to its 
’tacit acquiescence* in them*'*’ Moreover, those provisions 
had not included the necessity of the Court’s sanction of 
the measure. The promise of permanency thus still stood, and 
its abandonment when the ten year period had expired in the 
Ceded Provinces, or two-thirds of that period in the 
Conquered Provinces and Bundelkhand, could not be reconciled
p
to ’the dictates either of policy or justice1* Accordingly
1. Minute of Minto, 11*7*1812, enclosed in Bg*S*R.L*, 
9.10*1812; Bg. S.R.Lp, 9.10.1812, para.7.
2. Bg. 8.R.L., 9*10.1812, para.8.
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the government had enacted Regulations IX and X of 1812, by 
which section 5 of Regulation X of 1807 was repealed* 
Ironically, the modification now carried out by the 
government had been rejected by it when proposed by Cox and 
Tucker in 1807*^ The provisions of 1812 with some 
modification revived those of 1803 and 1805* In the Ceded 
Provinces the permanent settlement was to be made in 1812-13 * 
and in the Conquered Provinces and Bundelkhand in 1815-16; 
in the manner as provided -in the early Regulations«- The 
modification introduced was that those ’estates1 which were 
not found to be fit for a permanent settlement by the Board 
of Commissioners would be settled for 3 or 5 years or any
p
other period as determined by the government* It should be 
noted that the two Regulations of 1812 did not lay down any 
criterion of fitness or unfitness for permanent settlement.
Having receded from the policy of Regulation X of 
1807 > the government wished for a modification of the order 
of the Court of 1811 in cases which would admit of a 
permanent settlement* Although the order did not constitute 
a breach of faith, because the permanent settlement was 
subject to the sanction of the Court, the Zamindars were 
unaccustomed to the constitution of the British government 
and must have taken the declaration for granted* (The latter 
part of the argument it should be noted had been made by
1* See above, pp.120-22.
2. See Reg. IX of 1812, SS.1-5 and Reg. X of 1812, SS.1-5*
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Cox and Tucker in their report of 13 April 1808)* The 
government regretted that the Court had perhaps not studied 
the minutes of Henry Colebrooke and John Lumsden, who in its 
opinion had forcibly answered the objections of Cox and 
Tucker* The government further argued that the Zamindars 
in anticipation of a permanent settlement had invested 
capital in the improvement of the land* Refusal would put 
them to loss. It would disappoint them, and create a
I
political problem for the. government*. In the. near. past, the 
population of the region had given evidence of violent 
behaviour on trifling matters* Minto was serious when he 
wrote to the Chairman of the Court, fa more powerful 
incitement to seek redress by combination & violence, can 
be given in no country & cannot extend to a larger & more 
powerful class of the community, than injuries done, or 
apprehended to be done, to the whole landed property of a
country, & the invasion of all its rights both in possession
2
and inheritance.1
The government did not agree with the Court’s view 
of the advantages of a periodical settlement* It flatly 
stated that a periodical settlement would not only have a 
detrimental effect upon agriculture, but would also tend
1. Bg. S.R.L., 9*10.1812, paras* 12-18; Minute of Minto, 
11*7*1812, enclosed in Bg0 S.R.L., 9*10.1812*
2. Minto to Chairman of Court, 22*8.1812, Minto MSS.502*
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to check its e x p a n s i o n I n  support of its statement the 
government was not far behind the Court in quoting from 
Adam Smith# It claimed that Adam Smith himself had admitted 
certain exceptions to the theory of a variable land-tax. 
However, the quotations used by the government from The 
Wealth of Nations, do not support its objection to a 
periodical settlement# The only condition laid down by Adam
p
Smith was sound administration. This was fully acknowledged 
by the Court when it. was recommending a survey, ascertainment 
of resources and a long duration as the basis of periodical 
settlement.^ Here is what the government quoted:™if by 
such a system of administration a tax of this kind be so 
managed as to give not only no discouragement but on the 
contrary, some encouragement to the improvement of land, it 
does not appear likely to occasion any other inconveniency 
to the landlord, except always the unavoidable one of being
h
obliged to pay the tax.'" This quotation does not support 
the statement of the government that a periodical 
settlement would be destructive to agriculture# The second 
quotation used by the government was a complete distortion 
of Adam Smith1s exposition of a variable land-tax# It quoted 
from the beginning of a paragraph which stated the objection 
to variable land-tax, but left out Adam Smith’s solution to
1. Bg. R.L. (C. & C.P.), 17.7.1813, paras. 25-7*
2. See A.Smith, op.cit., pp.358-59*
3. See above, pp. 1$4— 5.
4. Bg# R.L. (C. & C.P.), 17«7»1813* para.28; see also
A.Smith, op.cit., p.359*
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overcome it* The quotation in question was: ™the discour­
agement which a variable land-tax of this kind might give 
to the improvement of land, seems to he the most important 
objection which can be made to it* The landlord will 
certainly be less disposed to improve, when the sovereign 
who contributed nothing to the expense was to share in the 
profit of the improvement*1 The crucial portion that was 
left out, which would have put the quotation in perspective 
was^ 'even this objection might perhaps be obviated by 
allowing the landlord, before he began his improvement, to 
ascertain, in conjunction with the officers of revenue, the 
actual value of his lands, according to the equitable 
arbitration of a certain number of landlords and farmers in 
the neighbourhood, equally chosen by both parties; and by 
rating him according to this valuation for such a number of 
years, as might be fully sufficient for his complete
p
indemnification,1
The government also attacked the link shown by the 
Court between periodical settlements, and reproductive works 
of the state* It was based upon the assumption of increasing 
revenue* Such an increase, according to the government, 
would never materialise under a periodical settlement* It 
categorically stated that the revenue derived from the Ceded 
and Conquered Provinces had reached its optimum point. Any
1, Bg.R.L. (C. & C.P.), 17.7*1813$ para.29; See also 
A,Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 2, p.358.
2, See A, Smith,' Ibid,, p *358.
effort to force up the revenue would only react adversely 
upon the public resources themselves. The best course was to 
limit the statefs role in reproductive works to those of 
'indispensable necessity'. Such a restricted responsibility 
was best performed Tinder permanent settlement, and had in 
fact been discharged in Bengal. The 'indemnity1 of which 
the Court had spoken would come, according to the government, 
indirectly from the growth of commerce. The ‘proprietors' 
themselves would undertake many reproductive works under a 
permanent settlement, because the 'profits of their industry 
and capital1 would have already been guaranteed to them."**
On a comparative consideration of the merits of a 
periodical and a permanent settlement, the government gave 
its verdict in favour of the latter. Its advantages, the 
government thought, were self-evident. As to the periodical 
settlement, the government reflected, if the objections to 
tithes in England were valid, they applied more forcibly to 
India, The periodical settlement would spell the doom of 
agriculture. A permanent settlement was, according to the
p
government, the only desirable policy.
On receipt of the views of the government on 
permanent and periodical settlements, and the steps taken 
in modifying Regulation X of 1807, the Court effectively 
defended its order of 1811, restated its objections to an
1. Bg.R.L. (Co& C.P.), 17#7*1813, paras, 30-31
2. Ibid., paras. 38-41, 33-7, 4-2 and 56,
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immediate permanent settlement, and gave a clear, ruling on 
the question for the guidance of the government* The Court, 
however, did not reply to the defence put up by the 
government for the theory of a permanent settlement, nor to 
the criticism of the theory of a permanent settlement* There 
does not appear to he any clear reason for not replying on 
those two heads* The only explanation that can he advanced 
as likely seems to he the superficiality of the arguments of 
the government* The Court perhaps.thought that the. only . . . 
effective way of defeating the governments objections was 
by presenting an incontrovertible case against an immediate 
permanent settlement*
The Court argued that its order of 1811 was fully 
consistent with Regulation X of 1807 * which had provided for 
its sanction. It was also consistent with the Regulations of 
1803 and 1805* In them, two conditions were laid down - the 
1proprietors1 must have fulfilled their engagements and the 
land must be in a sufficiently advanced state of cultivation* 
The Court was aware that those Regulations had not provided 
for its sanction* The reason for this, the Court thought, 
was the vagueness of the second condition, which led the 
government to omit the inclusion of a reference to the 
Court* It was not stated what constituted an advanced state 
of cultivation. This clearly implied that the question was 
open for future consideration, in which the Court was bound 
to be approached by the government. It was this construction
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which the Court had put on. the indiscretion of the 
government in 1803 and 1805; otherwise the government would 
have been censured by the Court.^ Between 1807 and 1811 the 
government had taken several steps towards a permanent 
settlement. These were, in the Court’s judgement, 
premature. Its disinclination was first expressed in its 
despatch of 27 February 1810, which was repeated in that of 
1 February 1811. As the information relating to the Ceded 
.and.Conquered.Provinces increased, the disinclination of
the Court was transformed to disapproval as expressed in the
2
order of 27 November 1811. On the one hand, the 
decisiveness of the government had been growing in 
implementing a permanent settlement, on the other the doubts 
of the Court had solidified into a firm refusal# The Court 
was, as it wrote to the Bengal government, ’called upon to 
interpose between the design and its execution*, emanating 
from Regulation X of 1807.^ It cannot therefore be 
maintained, as the government had commented, that the Court 
was silent in the early years. It was silent no doubt so 
far as the correspondence was concerned, but the silence was 
meaningful and judicious.
No loss to the ’proprietors1 and no political danger 
to the government were to flow from the denial of a permanent 
settlement, argued the Court. The government had maintained
1. Bg. R.D. (C. & C.P.), 16.3*1813* paras. 7-H*
2. Ibid., paras. 11-13•
3. £bid., para* 11.
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a contrary point of view* The Court stated that the 
government had instructed the Collectors to explain to the 
‘proprietors1, that the permanent settlement depended upon 
the Court!s sanction. In the decision of the Court, 
therefore, there was no compromise of public faith**** 
According to the views of the Collectors and Commissioners, 
there was an acute shortage of capital in the region. How 
could the Court agree with the government's view that the 
.'proprietors1 , in anticipation of a permanent settlement,- 
invested capital in improving the land* Even if it was 
agreed that they did spend capital on land, the Court 
believed they had every prospect of a return under the
p
periodical settlement* The Court sought as much political 
stability through the land revenue policy as the government. 
But it was not to be achieved through the permanent 
settlement. It would in fact produce grave results because 
rights to land were in conflict with each other, and the 
data of assessment were insufficient. The notion of 
permanency was foreign to the people, who, if they had a 
choice, would prefer their own system. There was thus no 
political danger to be apprehended from withholding a 
permanent settlement*
The government had considered a permanent 
settlement applicable to the region, and it was confident
1* Ibid., para. 19. 
2* Ibid.% para. 20*
3. ibid., para. 22.
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that the Colebrooke-Lumsden minutes had fully demonstrated
it, and had sought authority to modify the Court’s orders
of 1811. 80 far as the Court was concerned the minutes of
the Councillors had made no impression upon it, and it was
guided by the local situation as shown in the report of Cox
and T u c k e r T h e r e  was no need to withdraw its order, as a
permanent settlement was simply not applicable to the Ceded
and Conquered Provinces. The government had stated that
there was no likelihood of the mistakes committed in Bengal
recurring in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, as more was
2
known here and revenue administration had been very good.
This view was utterly without foundation, and the Court was
quick to notice it. It was a well-known fact acknowledged by
the Collectors and Commissioners that the data of assessment
were hopelessly out of date. Very little was known about the
tenures. Such questions as what rights the Taluqdars, the
Zamindars and the village Zamindars possessed were not even
raised* No one had even bothered to ask what rights the
raiyats had, what portion of the produce they paid and how,
z
to the revenue engagers. Mistakes in Bengal had arisen 
from want of information on all those points* Nor was there 
any prospect of obtaining information after the permanent 
settlement had been concluded. From the experience of
1. Ibid., para.16.
2. See above. /p*159*
3. Bg. R.D. (c; & C.P.), 6.1.1815, paras. 22,33 and 40;
Ibid., 17.3-1815, para. 13; See also Chap.l.
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mistakes in Bengal a positive conclusion should he drawn*
The conclusion according to the Court was the need for 
inquiry on all the aspects of settlement-making,^ Many 
“blunders in the triennial settlement of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces had “been made, ’Proprietary1 rights were 
in conflict. Large revenue farmers were in existence. Waste 
land was immense. The Zamindars did not understand the 
implications of a permanent settlement. They were not fit to
p
receive, this, “boon., . There. were. thus, according to the .Court,, 
no grounds for an immediate permanent settlement of the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces.
In regard to the future formation of a permanent 
settlement, the Court gave unequivocal instructions in order 
to prevent misconstruction of its intention by the 
government. It took a logical and legalistic basis for its 
instructions. The Regulations of 1803? 1805 1812 were to
be strictly observed. Those Regulations provided for a 
permanent settlement of land in an advanced state of 
cultivation. The Court argued on the basis of those 
Regulations that the waste land was to be completely 
excluded from a permanent settlement, or that if the waste 
was to be included it must be inconsiderable. To this 
interpretation, the Court pointed out, the government also 
subscribed, as it had enacted the two Regulations of 1812
1, Bg. R.D* (C* & C.P.), 6.1,1815? paras.34-5*
2. Ibid., paras. 39-40; see also Chap.l,
172
and accepted certain exceptions to permanency. Further, the 
Court laid down that the resources of the land must he 
ascertained, and rights in land must he investigated* Its 
final decision would depend upon the Court, on the hasis of 
the proceedings of the government.
In reality the Court let it he known to the 
government that there was no immediate prospect of permanent 
settlement. If waste could he completely separated from the 
cultivated land, one of the objections of the Court would, 
have heen obviated. Such a separation was not possible,
p
because in the heart of every ‘estate* existed waste land.
It was also not possible to lay down a distinct criterion 
for developed 1 estates', and none of the Regulations had 
provided for it.^ (Unless every 'estate' was measured and 
surveyed a paper criterion would be meaningless). As few or 
none of the 'estates' would qualify for a permanent 
settlement, the Court wrote to the government, 'We were
inclined to believe that the measure would be postponed
j h
in|;oto.' To the Bengal government, the danger of a partial 
measure was also pointed out by the Court. It would create a 
tension between the haves and have-nots. On top of it, the 
former would attract cultivators from the latter, an 
argument presented by Cox and Tucker also.
1. Bg*R.D, (C.& C.P.), 16.3*1813, paras.14-15 and 23-4; Ibid., 
6.1.1815, para. 54; Ibid., 17*3*1815, paras.10, 14 and 15*
2. Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.),~T773*1815, para.11.
3. Ibid., para.10.
4. Ibid., para.15*
5. kg. R.D* (C. & C.P.), 16.3*1813, para.23; See above, 
pp.124-5.
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The government under Hastings ultimately agreed with 
the views of the Court, that the immediate consideration of 
a permanent settlement was a false question# The basic 
questions relating to rights and resources were to be 
resolved first.^ So in none of the settlements under 
Regulations IX and X of 1812 was a permanent settlement 
recommended by the government# The Court on paper allowed 
the promise to be retained, but in practice a permanent 
settlement was rejected for all subsequent occasions# On two 
occasions before the mutiny, in 1820 and 1835 the measure 
was to be revived by the government, only to be summarily
p
rejected by the Court.
It may now be asked what were the influences working 
behind the rejection of the policy of a permanent settlement? 
We may ask whether the raiyatwari experiment, or the 
influence of the Fifth Report of the Committee of the House 
of Commons, which was under preparation between 1810 and 
1812, had anything to do with the policy of the Home 
government in regard to the Ceded and Conquered Provinces#
We may also ask whether the rejection was independent of the 
influences of the raiyatwari and the Fifth Report; and based 
on the considerations of the mistakes of permanent 
settlement in Bengal and the facts which were found to be in 
existence in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces# We may
1. Bg. R.L* (C. & C.P.), 7*10.1815* paras. 4-6#
2. See below (Chap# 3 and Conclusion;#
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further ask whether the financial embarrassment of the 
Company arising from the problems of Indian revenues had any 
connection with the rejection of a permanent settlement and 
the undertaking of re-thinking of administrative policy by 
the authorities in London. It may also be of interest to ask 
whether the Court of Directors, or the Board of Control was 
the organ basically responsible for the rejection of a 
permanent settlement and the creation of an alternative
policy in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. ................
In regard to the raiyatwari and the Fifth Report, 
it is not proposed to discuss their long-term effect upon 
the revenue system of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces here. 
The analysis to be presented here will be confined to the 
question of the rejection of a permanent settlement in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces. Munro had returned to England 
in 1808; and it has been stated that he gradually succeeded 
in converting the Court and the Board to his views.’*' This is, 
however, a loose observation signifying very little so far 
as the permanent settlement is concerned. Of much greater 
substance is the suggestion put forward in a recent work, 
which states that the Court and the Board shared Munrofs
1. B.S. Baliga, * The influence of the Home Government on
land revenue and judicial administration in the Presidency 
of Port William in Bengal from 1807 to 18221, (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1933) p*317* Munro rs 
views = raiyatwari and a judicial system in which British 
judges would playmuch lesser role than in Bengal.
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views by 1814-*^ Even this suggestion, so far as the Court 
was concerned, would admit of an important qualification*
The Court’s enthusiasm for raiyatwari ultimately turned out 
to be a short-lived one, as can be seen from the fact that 
in 1814- and 181? it opposed the Board for its extension to
p
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* The facts which cannot 
be refuted are: that James Cumming who wrote the Madras part 
of the Fifth Report was a great supporter of the ideas of 
Munro; that the Earl of Buckinghamshire and John Sullivan, 
both of whom had served in Madras were sanguinely favourable 
both to raiyatwari and to Munro’s Judicial ideas.^ It cannot 
also be denied that from 1808 onwards Munro had the 
opportunity to impress the Court with his views or that the 
Court had the opportunity to be impressed by Munro* In the 
revenue despatches to Bengal relating to the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces, during the years 1812 and 1815, the 
notions of raiyatwari were explained, and its introduction
lL
whenever opportunity offered was proposed* As to the Fifth 
Report which was dated the 28 July 1812 had been in 
preparation since 1810* The Bengal part of the Report
1. T*H. Beaglehole, ’Thomas Munro and the development of 
administrative policy in Madras, 1792-1818: the origins 
of ’The Munro System1,1 (Unpublished Ph.D* thesis, 
University of Cambridge, I960), p.14-9.
2. See Chap. 3>pp. 201-04-*
5* See K,A. Ballhatchet, 'The Authors of the Fifth Report 
of 1812', Notes and Queries* 1957? p.4-78; C.H.Philips, 
op.cit., p.202; T.fl. Beaglehole, op.cit., pp* 153-54-.
4-. See Chap. 3? pp. 198-9.
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(pp.1-76) was written by Samuel Davis a former civilian in 
Bengal, and now a director of the Company* The Madras 
portion of the Report (pp#77-166) as has been said before 
was written by James Cumming, clerk in-charge of the Revenue 
and Judicial Department at the Board since 1807
Ever since Davis became a director he was determined 
to, 'unmask the effects of Lord Cornwallis's code • #. and 
to procure that change of measures which the condition of
the people required', as he wrote to Elphinstone at a later
2 ........................................................
date* From his part of the Reportt one can gather a strong
criticism of the results of the permanent settlement in
Bengal between 1793 and 1799• The points on which he
*
directed his attack were well-known to the Court of 
Directors. The permanent settlement had on the one hand 
ruined a mass of large Zamindars, and on the other produced 
a loss of revenue. The ruin of the Zamindars had proceeded 
from various causes, all of them emanating from the 1793 
code. Effective recovery of rent from the raiyats was not 
provided for while the government's arrears were promptly 
realised through the public sale of land. Nor were the 
disposal of rent-cases in the Courts speedy. In 1795 in 
Burdwan alone 30,000 suits were in arrears* The assessment 
at which the permanent settlement was formed was unequal - 
over-assessed land was a natural defaulter# Inequality in
1. See K.A.Ballhatchet, op.cit.* p.478.
2* Quoted in K .A »Ballhatcne11 Ibid.
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assessment proceeded from want of knowledge of resources, 
because scrutiny into the accounts was prohibited, the 
Kanungo office was abolished and the Patwari was declared 
to be the Zamindar1s servant♦
The Fifth Report was, however, not indiscriminately 
critical of the Bengal permanent settlement. After 1799 it 
considered the revenue administration to have improved*
There was less default of revenue, fewer Estates1 were put
p
up for sale and the land had acquired value* It also pointed
out defects in the judicial and police administration of the
*
Bengal Presidency. In conclusion the Report stated although 
there were certain imperfections in the internal 
administration of Bengal, the administration on the whole
4
had been beneficial to the people.
In the report one does not find a condemnation 
either of the principles of a permanent settlement or its 
results in Bengal. Nor does one find in the Bengal part of 
the Report, a plea for the abandonment of a permanent 
settlement in the unsettled regions of the Bengal 
Presidency. What one can infer from the tone and the content 
of the Report is an advocacy for a reform of the revenue 
administration (as also of the judicial administration),
1. Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of
^ S e ^ ^ t  T5IIa"’C6mpany; (1812)7 P.P. 7 , ' " s5T3-----
60-61.
2. Ibid., pp.61-2.
3. Itid., pp.63 and 69-70.
4. m ,  p.76.
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without departing in essentials from the Cornwallis 
principles* This is best exemplified in that part of the 
Report where the revenue administration of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces is reviewed. This section was written 
admittedly on scanty material.'*’ That is why it only gets 
about seven pages, and there is not a single document 
regarding the region in the Appendix which accompanies the 
Report. The Report covers the period 1801-11, and fully 
endorses the attitude adopted by the Court in regard to the .
p
permanent settlement of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces.
It concludes by hoping the Bengal government would postpone 
a permanent settlement, and furnish information on the 
resources, cultivation, produce, mode of collecting rent, 
its proportion taken as revenue, local usage and the 
character of the people; 'All these particulars1, the Report 
states, 'the Court of Directors will naturally desire to be 
made acquainted with, before they proceed to give their 
sanction to arrangements, which are to define and establish 
the land tenures, and fix, in perpetuity, the amount of 
territorial revenue to be derived to the State
James Cumming fully shared Munrofs views on 
raiyatwari (as also on the judicial administration), and 
considered that the Cornwallis system of settlement and
1. Ibid., p.52.
2. p.53.
3 *  T5U . ,  p > 5 4 .
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judicial administration were incompatible with raiyatwari.
It has been written that whether Munro converted Cuiruning 
to his own views, or merely confirmed the conclusions which 
Gumming had already reached was difficult to say.1 That
t
part of the Report dealing with the Madras Presidency and
i
| written by Gumming made a strong case for raiyatwari# There
[
j was no blatant criticism of the permanent settlement.
Indeed, it was admitted, the permanent settlement had
f
! produced a more stable state of affairs in Bengal and in the
I ............................................................................................
Northern Circars, than had previously obtained in those
p
areas. Yet, it was made clear that the raiyatwari mode of 
settlement had many advantages. Its importance was self- 
| evident as a result of some of the experience gained under
permanent settlement (which related to assessment and to the 
persons with whom the settlements were made)# In the Madras 
Presidency, wherever a raiyatwari mode had been pursued, it 
had yielded information relating to the Hindu system of 
economy and the local institutions, which helped on the one 
hand in removing abuses which had crept in under the Muslim 
rule, and on the other created real knowledge of the people. 
Under it, a large body of information relating to the 
resources of the land and the actual situation of the people 
connected with the land, were also obtained. Such possession 
of information was not possible under any other system of
1. T.H. Beaglehole, op.cit., p.158.
2. Fifth Report, p .lS6.
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settlement. The condition of the people, that of agriculture 
and revenue from land, the Report argued, had also improved 
under raiyatwari, With the solid and demonstrable 
advantages of raiyatwari in hand, the Report recommended 
that the mode hitherto adopted of 1 permanently settling the 
land revenues, should be reconsidered in its principles, 
before it be applied to provinces into which it has not yet 
been introduced...f, with such modification and improvement 
as were necessary in the light of knowledge now in
p ..............................
possession of the authorities.
In the essentials of raiyatwari settlement, in the 
comments of the authors of the Fifth Report on settlements, 
and in the official despatches of the Court to the Bengal 
government from 1810 to 1815 ♦ one common feature may be 
seen - a recognition of the need to investigate the resources 
of the land and the rights attached to it. So far as the 
Report and the despatches were concerned the need for 
enquiry had arisen from two reasons. On the one hand the 
mistakes in Bengal had raised doubts about a permanent 
settlement, and on the other, it seemed definite that the 
enquiry which was a common feature of raiyatwari was bound 
to prevent the repetition of mistakes in the new regions 
under British rule. Thus in so far as the need for an 
enquiry was a reason for the rejection of a permanent
1. Ibid., pp.166 and 123-24-.
2. Ibid., p.166.
181
settlement in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, the 
raiyatwari influence was clearly behind it* But* to repeat, 
the enquiry in itself would have meant nothing had not the 
mistakes of the permanent settlement been discovered first; 
and even if the raiyatwari experience had not been there to 
guide the Court, the permanent settlement of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces would still have been rejected. Through 
what process and at what date the Court was influenced by 
raiyatwari are questions which do not admit of a conclusive 
answer. Through its revenue correspondence it must have 
known about raiyatwari soon after 1792, and more particularly 
between 1800 and 1807* Alexander Read was its founder in the 
Baramahal districts, and Munro, who had served under him, 
subsequently gave it coherence in theory and practice, 
particularly in the Ceded districts. Munro*s return to 
England in 1808 may have only strengthened the acceptance of 
the principle of enquiry by the Court, But there is no 
evidence to suggest that his return to England had any 
connection with the rejection of a permanent settlement in 
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces.
Between the Fifth Report and the despatches to 
Bengal there were some other common views. In both we find 
a disinclination for a hasty permanent settlement and a 
need for reconsidering the principles underlying it. In 
neither do we find an absolute condemnation of the permanent 
settlement, nor an absolute denial of a permanent settlement
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in the future* In September 1811 it appears from a letter 
from Tucker (who was in London) to Minto that the India 
House as well as Samuel Davis (who was busy with the Fifth 
Report at that time) in their private opinion were opposed 
to the introduction of the permanent settlement into the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces*^ This consolidation of forces 
against a permanent settlement was at a time when the full
papers from Bengal had not been received and the question
2was not under discussion at the India House* It was also 
two months before the orders of 27 November 1811, and ten 
months before the Fifth Report was finalised# In spite of 
the similarity of views on several points between the Fifth 
Report and the despatches to Bengal, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the former was responsible for raising the 
doubts about a permanent settlement and in contributing to 
its rejection in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* On the 
contrary, there is enough evidence to suggest that the 
Fifth Report merely confirmed the Court’s policy regarding 
the permanent settlement of the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces; thereby strengthening the case against a
1* H* St* G. Tucker to Minto, 6*9*1811, Minto MSS*502;
Tucker does not mention Davis by name but simply as a 
friend who was writing the revenue and judicial report*
As Davis was his contemporary in Bengal, it may be 
assumed that it was to him that Tucker was referring#
2* Ibid.; the papers from Bengal did not reach India House 
until September 1811; the delay had occurred because 
the ship carrying papers from Bengal was lost* Fresh 
copies had to be sent when the loss of the ship was 
discovered.
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permanent settlement in the near future into those regions. 
The despatches to Bengal after the publication of the Fifth 
Report assume a tone of finality, for which that report can 
be considered to have been partly responsible,^ It is of 
course well-known that the Fifth Report, at the instance of 
the Board of Control, led to the despatch of 16 December 
1812 to Madras prohibiting a permanent settlement and 
ordering a reversion to the raiyatwari settlement in the
p
temporarily settled areas* But in Madras too the Court
itself had expressed its disinclination to a permanent
settlement in 1801, 1804 and 1809.
The Fifth Report bears the date 28 July 1812,
whereas the earliest doubt expressed in the despatches to
Bengal is that of 27 February 1810, which was repeated in
that of 1 February 1811* The latter despatch was not
conclusive on the permanent settlement question, but, as
Tucker has mentioned it was ihStjnded to be decidedly opposed
*
to the introduction of that measure * In the despatch of 27 
November 1811 when the Court was in possession of the papers 
relating to the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, the immediate 
permanent settlement was rejected* It may perhaps be argued 
that the Committee of the House of Commons responsible for 
the Fifth Report was appointed in 1810, therefore it was in
1. See Bg« R.D* (C* & C.P.), 29.1.1813; Ibid*, 16*3*18135 
Ibid,, 6.1.1815; Ibid*, 17*3.1815.
2. ¥7r 7 Beaglehole, op.cit*, pp,160-61.
3. H. St. G. Tucker ioTlISto, 6.9*1811, Minto MSS. 502*
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a position to influence the despatches to Bengal* The 
argument is a probable one, but it cannot be substantiated.^ 
As a matter of fact in the private opinion of two 
important individuals, doubts about the extension of a 
permanent settlement to new territories had developed even 
before 1810. Robert Dundas, President of the Board of 
Control, in a letter of 27 August 1808 to Minto had 
considered a permanent settlement and the judicial system to 
be an 'unwise and impolitic measure1; and it was easier to 
avoid the 'original error*, than to retrace the steps 
subsequently. Dundas disapproved of their extension to other 
areas in these words: 'Notwithstanding the high authorities 
whose opinions have concurred in the expediency of the 
Perpetual Settlement and the Judicial System, I cannot bring 
myself to approve of the extent to which they have been 
carried, and the indiscriminate rage for introducing them in 
every corner of our Territories, without the least 
consideration whether they were suited to the habits,
feelings and prejudices of any District or Province where
2
they have been established.' The latter part of the 
argument, it should be noted, is similar to that of the Munro 
system as against that of Cornwallis. It can also be noticed
1. The correspondence between the Board and Court, Court 
Minutes and Appendix, and the proceedings of the 
Committee of Correspondence throw no light on the Fifth 
Report and the permanent settlement of the Ceded an3 
Conquered Provinces.
2. Minto MSS. 172.
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in several revenue despatches to Bengal, Madras and Bombay 
Presidencies; and it can also be found to have been part of 
the hypothesis of the authors of the Fifth Report
Charles Grant, who was Chairman of the Court, in a 
letter of 17 January 1809 to Minto expressed his 
opposition to permanent settlement# He had been an active 
supporter of the Bengal permanent settlement* His views on 
the question now, were similar to those expressed in the 
revenue despatches to Bengal between 1810 and 1815« He 
wrote: f I trust the Permanent Settlement which has been too 
hastily introduced into many districts under the Madras 
Government will not be brought forward in these late 
acquisitions [Ceded and Conquered Provinces] till we know 
them better and the people are more habituated to us* Tho*
I was on the whole one of those who approved of the 
introduction of the Perpetual Settlement into Bengal, as the 
only cure for many inveterate evils, yet I can now at the 
distance of near twenty years see, that it had not fully 
answered all the purposes intended by it; and the first use 
to be made of our experience should be to employ more caution 
in extending that Settlement to countries of which we know 
far less than we did of Bengal# To possess an accurate 
knowledge of the value of lands is indispensable to the 
principles of that system, unless indeed we could without 
this exactness secure a Revenue sufficient for all the
1. Cf# above, pp.147-50 and 178-80; Cf# K*A.Ballhatchet, 
op.cit#, pp.4*77-78#
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purposes of Government, now unhappily far from being the 
case; and it was one of the mistakes of Lord Cornwallis* 
plan to suppose that it sufficiently provided for the 
expenses of the State, as another mistake was that it 
reckoned too much on commerce as a resource for taxation, 
and did not take into account the depreciation of money in 
which the rent was to be perpetually paid.1’*'
The deeper cause behind the expression of doubts 
about permanent settlement seems to have been the financial 
embarrassment of the Company combined with the bad state of 
Indian revenues; and, the clamour that was to be expected at
p
the renewal of the Charter. The financial reason definitely 
forced the Company to look for subjects which required 
reform. Land revenue in this context automatically acquired 
priority. In 1808 and 1809 because of the financial reason, 
the Company was being urged by the Board, the Parliament, 
the Ministry and by several public figures to undertake an 
all-round reform in the Indian administration. A climate of 
opinion for reform was also prevalent in the Court. All this 
we have on the authority of Charles Grant. In the context of 
finance Grant in a letter to Minto was quoting, 1 1 Reform, 
deep Reform, or Ruin1' He went on to state, 1... to satisfy
1. Minto MSS. 192; Grant’s views are similar to the arguments 
of the despatches of 27.2.1810, 1.2.1811 and 15*1*1812.
2. For the state of Company's Finance and Indian revenues 
between 1807 and 1813, see Bg.S.draft D. relating to 
finance 1807-12;Bg.Fn.L.1807-13; Private letters of Minto 
to Buckinghamshire,1807-13, Minto MSS.Box 60,67 and 75 and 
vols.172,192,359,577 & 502; A.Tripathi, Trade and Finance 
in the Bengal Presidency. 1793-1833, Chap.3*
3# C.Grant to Minto, 17.1.1809, Minto MSS.192.
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the public mind as well as to exonerate ourselves, I fear 
we must attempt to exercise the pruning knife ourselves....* 
Minto had orders from the Secret Committee in 1807 for
p
economy and the creation of surplus revenue. This was 
Minto1s financial policy too, but his support for permanent 
settlement ran counter to his instructions on Indian 
revenues. So there was a fundamental conflict between the 
future progress of revenue and the permanent settlement.
Once the Court became fully aware of this, the case for 
permanent settlement weakened. More arguments, theoretical 
and those emerging from the mistakes of Bengal, were added 
to it. Finally, the local situation in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces was such, that a permanent settlement 
even in the absence of doubts regarding it, and even in the 
absence of the financial reason, was still liable to be 
rejected.^ Here is a passage from a despatch to Bengal which 
amply substantiates the statement just made. f0ur 
recommendation1 wrote the Court to the government, 'was 
founded upon one of the most ordinary maxims of government 
namely that, before resolving upon any new arrangement by 
which the interests of the whole body of the people must be 
materially affected, not only its abstract merits, but 
(what is of far greater importance) its suitableness in
1. Ibid.
2. See Secret Committee to Bg. Govt., 14.8.1807; R.Dundas 
to Minto, 9.12.1807, Minto MSS. 172.
3. See Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 16.3.1813, paras. 11-13; See 
Chap. 1 for the local situation.
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practice to the circumstances of the case ought well to he 
considered.* ^
Lastly, regarding the role of Court and Board on 
the permanent settlement question of the Ceded and Conquered
Provinces during the period under review, it is impossible
2
to make a conclusive observation. Despite this limitation 
one can still assert, that, the initiative was coming from 
the Court. Charles Grantfs letter to Lord Minto of 1809 and 
Tucker’s testimony of 1811 show the genuine interest of the 
Courti Although Robert Dundas had shown an interest in the 
question in 1808, the possibility of his influencing the 
Court seems to be slight. He was not a dominating type of 
politician,^ he was too busy in the larger issues arising 
out of the negotiation for the renewal of the Company’s 
Charter to closely follow up the permanent settlement 
question* One can argue that James Cumming at the Board 
might have initiated opposition to the permanent settlement. 
But, it should be noted that he was a minor civil servant 
who came to acquire a reputation only after the Fifth Report 
was completed. He was in a position to influence policy 
after 1812 when Buckinghamshire came to the Board, but by 
November 1811 the permanent settlement had been objected to
1. Bg. R.D. (C. & C.P.), 6.1.1815, para.39*
2. The previous communication on revenue despatches do not 
exist, nor is there any correspondence between the 
Court and the Board on the settlement of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces up to 1813•
3» C.H. Philips, op.cit», p.153*
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and refused. After 1811 only formal and routine discussions
were carried on with the Bengal government. Moreover, as
very few of the despatches were altered at the Board^one
can state that the despatches to Bengal of 1810, 1811, 1812
and 1813 relating to a permanent settlement originated with
the Court. In the context of Grant’s views there is greater
reason to identify the Court as possessing the initiative
?
against permanent settlement. And the Board under Dundas 
fully shared the views of the Court on the permanent 
settlement of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, as would 
appear from his letter of 1808 to Minto.
The rejection of a permanent settlement of the Ceded 
and Conquered Provinces followed a reasonable course#
Mistakes in Bengal raised doubts about it; and the raiyatwari 
technique of making a settlement showed that those mistakes 
were avoidable. The actual rejection of a permanent 
settlement in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces originated 
on theoretical grounds, which the local situation confirmed# 
If the Court was persuasive in rejecting a permanent 
settlement, and if it was not peremptory in recommending a 
periodical settlement it was because of the high esteem in 
which the administrative genius of Cornwallis was held*^
1. B.S.Baliga, 'The influence of Home Govt, on land revenue 
and judicial administration ...' etc., op.cit., p.24.
2. There was similarity between Grant's views and those in 
the revenue despatches from 1810 to 1813*
3# S.Davis had written in a minute of dissent of 9*8.1817» 
the regard for Cornwallis, 'rendered it a species of 
political heresy to doubt the wisdom and expediency of 
his enactments.' App. to Court minutes, 3*
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This can he hest seen hy the fact that Charles Grant was 
extremely critical of the permanent settlement in private 
in 1809? hut in 1815 in a speech in parliament he was 
heavily defending its results in Bengal* The difference in 
policy between the Court and the government was one of 
approach in implementing its objectives* Both desired the 
stability of British rule, a progressive rise in revenue, 
the prosperity of the people and agriculture; which according 
to the Court but not to the government could not be achieved 
through a permanent settlement* Although the permanent 
settlement was rejected and the alternative of a periodical 
settlement was suggested, the future revenue system for the 
region was uncertain* The periodical settlement as yet was 
only a concept. It was to take another decade to shape a 
coherent land revenue arrangement for the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces*
1* See Hansard, XXVI, pp. 519 and 955
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Chapter III 
Shaping the Settlement Mechanism 
1815-22
Between the years 1807 and 1813 enough discussion on 
the land revenue policy for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
had taken place* On the one hand it had been discussed between 
the Bengal government and the Board of Commissioners, and on 
the other between the Court of Directors and the Bengal 
government. The net result had been a postponement of the 
permanent settlement. The problem of implementing the land 
revenue policy was still unresolved. The broad objectives of 
land revenue policy were to obtain an increasing revenue and 
stability for British rule. These objectives could be fully 
realised only through a properly conducted settlement. Land 
revenue policy acquired unique significance because it 
linked the interests of the government and the people* The 
British government could not afford to conduct a settlement 
of land revenue in a slip-shod manner, as had been done at 
* the time of the Bengal permanent settlement* It involved not 
only the fiscal interests of the government, but also the 
rights, privileges, and interests of the agricultural 
community from the bottom of the scale upwards.
There were two well known methods of settlement-making 
in British India. They were the zamindari settlement made 
famous by Lord Cornwallis, and the raiyatwari which was 
developed in the Madras Presidency under Alexander Read and 
Thomas Munro. The permanent zamindari settlement was part of
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the administrative ideas of Cornwallis. The whig argument 
behind it was that a society cannot progress without the 
existence of private property and private property cannot be 
protected without an independent judiciary. The judiciary 
was designed to prevent the wrongs of one individual against 
another, as also to protect individuals from the acts of the 
executive. It was from a belief that the power of the 
executive must be limited that no detailed scrutiny into 
assets of 1 estates', was conducted; nor was an elaborate 
revenue, collecting machinery created.. The. Collector, was . . . 
merely to receive revenue from the Zamindar. The office 
of Kanungo was abolished and the Patwari was made a 
private employee of the Zamindar. As landlords in the 
English sense did not exist the Zamindars were treated as 
such. The creation of a 'proprietary1 class was not to 
expropriate the customary subordinate rights in land, which 
in theory were safeguarded. But in actual practice the 
Cornwallis principle of settlement introduced a radical change 
in landholding. In India 'property' and the 'property-holder' 
had never enjoyed such security as he did under permanent 
settlement, but at the same time 'property' was liable to sale 
on default of revenue. The subordinate rights were also bound 
to suffer as very little investigation into tenures had been 
conducted and because the means through which it could be 
obtained had been snapped. The Zamindar was to suffer initial 
loss arising from unequal assessment, and the government was 
to suffer in the long run by permanently fixing the assessment, 
The Bengal idea of settlement-making was extended to the Ceded
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and Conquered Provinces (minus the permanency of assessment) 
"between the years 1802 and 1805*
The basic idea of the raiyatwari system came from Read 
and was later developed by Munro his one time assistant. 
Raiyatwari settlements formed an important part of Munro!s 
general notions of administration - revenue and judicial.
The form of government advocated by Munro was 'paternalist1
i.e. strong executive and personal rule as opposed to the 
impersonal and mechanical form of government established by 
Cornwallis in Bengal. The -underlying principle in the Munro 
system was conservative, whereas the Cornwallis system was 
unhistorical. Cornwallis had created landlordism on the 
British pattern, which was supported by a judicial system 
British in spirit and largely administered by Europeans,
Under the Munro system the social habits and institutions 
prevailing in a district were to be the basis of revenue 
and judicial system. A country falling in the hands of a 
foreign power was to be governed on the basis of its own laws 
and customs. Indians were to be admitted on a respectable 
footing in the revenue and judicial administration. But 
between the Munro and Cornwallis systems there were 
similarities. Munro was not opposed to reform nor was he 
opposed to the separation of powers and the rule of law but 
desired its modification to suit the preservation of society. 
Munro like Cornwallis aimed at a permanency of assessment, 
the creation of valuable and saleable 'property1 in land, 
and the improvement of agriculture. Neither Cornwallis nor
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Munro introduced revolutionary principles of administration* 
Munro was conservative and so was Cornwallis to some extent. 
Cornwallis had desired no social revolution in Bengal, and 
the whig notion of property and administration introduced by 
him was to create props for preventing the disintegration of 
a crumbling society.*^
In forming revenue settlements Munro ruled out the 
applicability of theories on a European model. His only 
guides were investigation, the understanding of the actual 
state of things and the customs and habits of the people of 
a particular region. He generally found raiyats holding land 
directly from the sovereign in the Madras Presidency; and 
believed that raiyatwari had always prevailed in India and 
that eventually every other revenue system would resolve
p
itself into raiyatwari.
In the raiyatwari system there was little possibility 
of intermediaries flourishing as the assessment was fixed on 
each field, cultivated or uncultivated, and a raiyat was 
directly responsible for revenue to the extent of land in his 
possession in any one year. The revenue would thus rise or 
fall in proportion to the land in the occupancy of raiyats. 
For the payment of revenue the raiyats were severally
1. T.H.Beaglehole, ’Thomas Munro and the development of 
administrative policy in Madras, 1792-1818: the origins 
of ’the Munro System”, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Cambridge, I960), pp.1-3, 96-7, 137,140-41, 
and Conclusion; E.Stokes, The English Utilitarians and 
India, pp.14-16, 22 and 25-6.
2. Minute of Munro, 31.12.1824, Gleig, 3, P-320; T.H. 
Beaglehole, Ibid., pp.137-9.
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responsible for their individual obligations; and with the 
Patel they were jointly responsible for the revenue of their 
village* The assessment was fixed as a result of several steps. 
The total available land of a village or a group of villages, 
cultivated or uncultivated was ascertained by survey. The 
calculation of the assessment was regulated on a consideration 
of the quality of land, its supposed past and present produce 
and the condition of the raiyats. The value of the produce in 
money was estimated and the assessment varied from two-fifths 
to three-fifths of the valuation to suit different 
circumstances* The group assessment once formed was 
distributed on each field and that was to remain fixed. The 
fixed revenue rate was however liable to reduction in the 
event of natural calamity.^
To make land valuable and saleable, to encourage 
agricultural improvement and to augment the land revenue 
Munro had desired a reduction of the rates to one-third of 
the survey assessment. It was at this proportion that the 
assessment was to be permanent on cultivated land. Increased
p
revenue would be obtained from the cultivation of waste land*
1. T.H.Beaglehole, Ibid., p.119; Munro to his father,21.9*
1798? Gleig, 1, p .204; Munrofs evidence before S.C.H.C., 
15*4.1812, Arbuthnot (ed.), Munro, p.107; Munro to 
Collectors of Ceded districts, 30.9*1802, Arbuthnot,
Ibid., pp.604-08; Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 29*1*1813, paras.W=5.
2. T.H.Beaglehole, Ibid., pp.49 and 140-42.
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Out of the two forms of settlement-making that of 
the permanent zamindari settlement was called into question 
by the Home Authorities after 1810, and their doubts were 
confirmed by the Fifth Report of 1812.^ The Madras part of 
that report brought the raiyatwari system into the limelight. 
In consequence some features of raiyatwari seemed applicable 
to the Ceded and Conquered Provinces in the view of the 
London Authorities. Such a view was held even before the 
publication of the Fifth Report.
The Board of Control under Buckinghamshire and to a 
lesser degree under Canning, was very enthusiastic for the 
applicability of the principles and techniques of raiyatwari 
to the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. This enthusiasm was 
the result of several factors. Buckinghamshire and Sullivan 
had the Madras experience behind them. James Cumming had 
written the Madras portion of the Fifth Report. These three 
admired the raiyatwari and disliked Cornwallis’s zamindari 
settlement. Canning had only wished to continue the policy 
of his predecessor. The Court of Directors, on the other 
hand, saw only a limited advantage, that too in its technique, 
and had no sympathy with the principles underlying raiyatwari. 
Nor did it agree with Munro that raiyatwari had originally 
prevailed in India, or that every other system would 
eventually evolve into raiyatwari or that agriculture would 
develop under it. In the view of the Court, raiyatwari was 
useful when properly conducted in discovering the resources
1. See Chap. 2.
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of the country, and when that was achieved it was not to he 
continued. In 1812 the Court had afcceeded to the Board’s 
instruction for the introduction of raiyatwari in Madras with 
mental reservations and was opposed to its continuation there, 
in 1817* The ’chairs’ wrote to Canning, ’the Court were very 
doubtful of the policy of this instruction [of December 1812] 
at the time when it was issued; and though they did not make 
it the subject of formal representation to the Board, they 
acquiesced in it with considerable reluctance•’ Subsequent 
to 1812 the Court had pressed the Madras government to 
implement raiyatwari out of respect for the Board, and to 
maintain consistency in its instructions. The Court even 
believed that raiyatwari would never be established in the 
Madras Presidency, as it was not an accomplished fact as late 
as 1817.1
The Court’s dislike of the raiyatwari system was 
mainly due to two reasons, Firstly, it believed in the 
fundamental soundness of the Cornwallis principles of 
administration and in the usefulness of the Zamindar class* 
Compared to this the principle of bringing the administration 
in line with the customs and habits of the people seemed to 
it to be based on expediency. The Court, however, was 
prepared to admit the defects in the Cornwallis system. The 
Court was therefore prepared to consider administrative 
reforms. That was an important reason for refusing the
1, See Court to Board, 29*12,1814, 5, p.136; Court to Board, 
2.8.1817, pp.237-40, 220-23, and 218-20,
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permanent settlement for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. 
Secondly, the Madras government and the Board of Revenue were 
opposed to the raiyatwari system, Fullerton, a member of the 
Madras Council, was a vehement critic of raiyatwari from 
administrative, fiscal and economic points of view. It was to 
his authority that the Court referred in raising objections 
raiyatwari in 1817.^
Thus in regard to the question of how the settlement 
for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces was to be formed a 
clash between the Court and Board was inevitable. Such a 
clash occurred in 1814-15 and in 1817* Even the instructions 
sent to Bengal regarding raiyatwari seem to contain two 
strains of recommendations between 1811 and 1813* In the 
despatch of 1 February 1811 there seems to be no hand of the 
Board of Control. The recommendation in this despatch seems 
to be similar to the views of the Court. It was recommended 
that an Investigation into landed rights and a survey of 
land and its produce should take place before making a final 
arrangement. The despatch considered raiyatwari to be 
objectionable in many respects, but useful in calculating the
p
assessment. In a despatch of 1812 relating to Cuttack it 
was recommended that wherever revenue farming existed, it 
should be replaced by the raiyatwari mode of settlement. It 
was explained that the raiyatwari system was conducive to
1. Court to Board, 2,8.1817, 5* pp.200-03, 208-09, 213» and 
219-23; Court to Board, 18.9.1817, 6, pp.11-16.
2. Bg.R.D. 1.2,1811, paras. 20 and 24.
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agricultural development and facilitated revenue collection; 
and that it had been successful in the Madras and Bombay 
Presidencies.1 In 1813 a similar instruction was given for 
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. At the same time papers 
relating to the raiyatwari system were sent for the
p
understanding of the Bengal government. In the despatches 
of 1812 and 1813 there seems to be the influence of the Board 
of Control* But it should be noted that the raiyatwari system 
was not ordered to be introduced throughout the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces.
On receipt of the instructions of the Home Authorities 
regarding raiyatwari, the Bengal government proceeded with 
deliberation. It referred the question to the Board of 
Revenue for Bengal and to the Board of Commissioners for the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces. The government in its letters 
to the Court, of 19 June 1813 and of 2 October 1813 questioned 
the applicability of raiyatwari in any form in any part of 
the Bengal Presidency* In this it had the support of the 
Board of Revenue and the Board of Commissioners.
The Bengal opposition to raiyatwari under Minto1s 
administration was based on theoretical and practical 
considerations. The theoretical aspect of the argument 
reflects a fundamental conflict between the Cornwallis and 
Munro principles of administration. The raiyatwari system
1. Bg.R.D. 9*9.1812, para.9*
2. Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 29*1*1813, paras. 27, 29, 32-3 and 
35-6.
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entailed investigation, survey and reliance on the 'native* 
agency. Whereas the Bengal government, though admitting the 
zamindari accounts to he unsatisfactory as the basis of 
assessment, stated to the Court '##. we think that this 
inconvenience is light, compared with the evils resulting 
from the chicanery, exaction and deception of every sort 
practised by Native officers, when employed to make 
measurements and jummabundies'#^ This argument clearly falls 
into line with the principle of minimum interference by the 
executive, and the distrust of Indian agency. According to 
the government, raiyatwari in all its forms may be applicable 
to Madras but not to the Bengal Presidency - the circumstances 
differed# It was further argued that the most
intelligent and respectable officers at the two presidencies 
respectively appear to entertain sentiments diametrically 
the reverse of each other, on questions of primary importance 
to the security of public revenue and the general improvement
of the country. We are by no means disposed to dispute the
authority of Col# Munro in regard to any matter which may 
have fallen under his observation in the course of his 
official duty; but we cannot think that it would be safe to 
attempt to reduce [sic] his opinions to produce in this 
country in opposition to the sentiments of Sir Edward
p
Colebrooke, Mr, Rocke, Mr# Lumsden and Mr# Deane*•
1* Bg. R.L. 19*6#1813, para.ll#
2# Bg# R,L. (C, & C*P.), 2,10.1813, 2, para#18#
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The practical objection to the introduction of 
raiyatwari was that proprietors' existed in the presidency 
of Bengal who were recognised by the Regulations* The 
districts in Bengal were too large and the European staff 
too small for the purposes of supervision* Besides, the khas 
management which the government equated with raiyatwari* 
had signally failed wherever it was introduced in the Bengal 
Presidency, because the land revenue could not be collected 
satisfactorily* Where ’proprietors' did not exist or where 
they were not willing to engage for land revenue, the 
government preferred revenue farming to a khas settlement*^ 
The view of the Bengal government created varying 
reactions in the Court of Directors and the Board of Control* 
In view of the Bengal attitude the Court was prepared to 
withdraw the raiyatwari recommendations of 1812 and 1813#
The Court considered this absolutely necessary so as to 
remove all uncertainty in Bengal regarding the introduction 
of a raiyatwari system* In the revenue draft which became the 
despatch of 6 January 1815 the Court accordingly saw no 
reason for pressing the Bengal government further to adopt
2
raiyatwari settlement in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* 
The Board disagreed completely with the Court and expunged 
part of a paragraph^of the draft, because the Board wished
1* Bg.R.L* 19*6*1813, paras* 9 and 11; Bg.R.L. (C* & C*P*), 
2.10.1813, 2, para. 18; see also Bg.R.L. (C. & C.P.), 
7*10.1815, paras* 67-3*
2* Court to Board, 29*12.1814, 5, pp.136 and 138*
3. Para. 45.
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neither to withdraw from the 1812-13 recommendation nor to 
create the impression that the question was closed# The 
substitution inserted by the Board read thus: 'Without 
meaning at this time to enter anew into the discussion as to 
how far it will be advisable to resort to a Ryotwar Settlement 
in those Territories, we shall here only observe, that at no 
great distance of time that mode of Settlement must in the 
natural course of things, become general whenever engagements 
have been formed#.• under the operation of Regulation 9 of 
1 8 1 1 ' (which had provided for the partition of joint 
'estates1 in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces)# The Board 
was thus giving the impression that it intended to impose a 
raiyatwari settlement in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
and ignoring the objections of the government. The Court, 
however, asked for the restoration of the original paragraph, 
questioned the Board's understanding of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces tenure, and disagreed completely with the 
view that raiyatwari would be ultimately established there, 
as a result of Regulation IX of 1811.^ The Board did not 
agree to the restoration of the Court's draft paragraph, but 
withdrew its alteration and substituted the words, 'but we 
must at the same time declare to you that we are not prepared 
to concur in your reasonings and views upon it [raiyatwari]•
It is our intention to enter into a full & matured
1# Board to Court, 2.1.1815, 4, pp. 14-7-8*
2. Court to Board, 29#12.1814, 5, p«136; see also Bg.R.D.
C. & C.P#), 6.1.1815, para.45*
3* Court to Board, 29*12.1814, 5, pp.136 and 138-41.
consideration of this question, when we shall examine, with 
careful attention, all the official documents which we have 
received from you as bearing upon it*T^  The second 
alteration of the Board was however not inserted in the 
despatch of 6 January 1815? because of a secretarial lapse at 
the India House* Instead the original alteration of the Board 
was included in that despatch* This mistake was discovered 
only in July 1817? and belatedly corrected by writing a
p
secretarial letter to the Bengal government*
Thus a ruling on the introduction of raiyatwari in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces was still pending* A decision 
on the question was however reached in 1817 between the 
Board and the Court* In the revenue draft despatch of 1817 
to Bengal, the Board had made an alteration to which the 
Court was strongly opposed* The Board had wished to see the 
introduction of the raiyatwari system in all the unsettled 
provinces of British India; which in its view was merely a 
restoration of the Hindu system of administration, which 
would be the ‘greatest boon* for the ‘native s u b j e c t s * T h e  
imposition of raiyatwari in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
was against the views of the Bengal government and the Court* 
In a lengthy and valuable letter of 2 August 1817 to Canning,
1* Board to Court, 2*1*1815? 4, p*149*
2. Court to Board, 50*4*1818, 5? PP*93-4*
3* Cited in Court to Board, 2.8*1817?5$? PP*232-3; Por the
circumstances in which the intended order of the Board 
originated, see C.H,Philips, East India Company (1st ed*)? 
pp.211-2; J* Cumming, Correspondence on Ryotwari System,
H.M* 530, pp*286-9.
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the Chairs* therefore rebelled against the whole policy of 
raiyatwari settlement* Canning therefore had to drop the 
raiyatwari recommendation; and with this ended the attempt 
at a wholesale introduction of the raiyatwari system in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces*^ Yet certain features of 
raiyatwari were to be incorporated in the 1822 arrangement 
for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces*
A detailed mode of settlement for the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces remained to be developed* In this regard 
the Home Authorities were only in a position to lay down 
broad principles, the rest was to be worked out by the Bengal 
government* The Home Authorities had already suggested a 
periodical settlement based on investigation and survey, when 
they had rejected a permanent settlement for the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces* Despite the difference of opinion between 
the Court and the Board over raiyatwari * there was agreement 
on the principles of the future settlement of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces# Instructions consistent with those 
principles had been sent to the Bengal government* The points 
of agreement between the Board and Court, as revealed in
p
their correspondence of 1817, were several* First, the 1795
1* See Court to Board, 2.8*1817, 5, pp.215-4*1; Board to 
Court, 16*8*1817, 4, pp.448 and 453-4; Court to Board, 
18*9*1817, 6, pp.16 and 20-21; Board to Court, 16*10*1817,
4, p*464*
2. See Board to Court, 16*8.1817, 4, pp#448-50; Court to
Board, 2.8.1817, 5, pp.241-4; C.H*Philips, op*oit» * p*212*
system was well intentioned, it was considerably beneficial
to the people, but produced a 1 small portion of evil’#**" A
reform of the revenue administration was essential to prevent
similar injury in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces.
Secondly, the experience of Bengal did not justify an
extension of the permanent settlement in the unsettled
regions. Thirdly, the questions of the parties with whom
settlements were to be made and the duration of those
settlements were not to be prejudged. But the creation of
intermediaries where they did not exist was inexpedient.
Moreover, the rights of co-sharing bodies against Mukaddams
and pargana Zamindars , and the interests of the raiyats were
to be safeguarded. Finally, the revenue settlement was to
be based on the principle of bringing the 1 Government into
o
immediate contact with the great body of the people...•*
This was possible only by investigation and survey. The 
investigation which was to be the key of future revenue 
settlements and their nature, was therefore 1 ... to be full, 
patient, and impartial•1^
Although the principles on which the future revenue 
settlements of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces were to be 
made were the same, the assumptions from which the Court 
and Board derived them differed from each other. The Court 
considered that the Cornwallis idea of administration, of
1. Board to Court, Ibid., p.449*
2. Ibid.
3. T5I3., p.453.
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which the land settlement was an important part, was aimed 
at civilising the people, and acquainting them with liberal 
principles. It was based on principles of jurisprudence and 
political economy# While the Cornwallis principles, which 
were also the Company’s principles, desired the improvement 
and betterment of the condition of the people, the policy of 
the Indian governments had been to keep man and his condition 
stationary. Cornwallis had not intended to inflict injury on 
any section of the society; and such suffering as resulted 
from his principles was not inherent in them but accidental 
- arising from administrative failure* There was thus a need 
for administrative reform. In regard to the principles of 
administration also the Court was ready to accept 
modifications to suit the customs and habits of the people. 
But such a modification was to be slow, so as not to ’sap1 
the foundations of the 1793 arrangement
The Board on the other hand seems to have proceeded 
from the assumption that the principles of the 1793 
arrangement were wrong, because they were not suited to the 
state of society in India. And under it the ’native subjects’ 
had suffered terribly. Administrative policy should be based 
on the pre-existing forms of institutions. It thought 
raiyatwari to be the pre-existing institution in India, and 
unlike the Court it had a bias against large landholders. As 
the Court had written, ’the Board seem to be of opinion that 
the ancient Hindoo system of Revenue administration was
1. Court to Board, 2.8.1817* 5* pp.200-03* 213 and 244.
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uniform throughout India and that that system proceeded 
universally upon the principles of a Hyotwar Collection.*^
The Board was against applying the principles of political 
economy to land revenue policy. As Canning wrote to the 
‘Chairs*f *... I apprehend nothing to he so little useful as 
reasoning hy analogy from Europe.to India; as the attempting 
to apply to a state of things , of men and manners so entirely 
distinct & anomalous, those general maxims of political
p
economy....* The strong raiyatwari views at the Board and 
the disparagement of the Cornwallis principles of 
administration were the result of the Fifth Report of 1812 
combined with the influence wielded by such raiyatwari 
stalwarts as Buckinghamshire, Sullivan and Cumming.
As the Board failed in imposing raiyatwari upon the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces, it had no alternative but to 
state the four principles of settlement. The Court had been 
emphasising those principles for the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces in several despatches to Bengal between 1810 and
4
1815# It was the Board therefore which had to modify its 
raiyatwari sentiment in regard to the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces. The opposition of the Bengal government to the 
raiyatwari principles was thus successful.
In regard to the future settlement of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces, the Bengal government had yet to come
1. Ibid., p.236.
2, feoard to Court, 16.8.1817, 4, pp.252-3*
3* See above,pp. 204-05*
4. See Chap. 2.
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into line with the thinking of the Court and the Board.
Under Minto, the government remained unconvinced that an 
immediate permanent settlement was unsuitable or that the 
Bengal mode of settlement-making should be modified* Under 
Hastings1 s administration however, the change awaited by the 
Home Authorities occurred* Even a settlement scheme in an 
embryonic form emerged - much before the famous plan of Holt 
Mackenzie of 1819. The change which occurred under Hastings 
was in the first place the result of the pressure exerted 
by the Home Authorities, particularly after the publication 
of the Fifth Report. That report has rightly been considered 
as marking a fundamental change in British administrative 
policies in India.^ Secondly, Hastings had undertaken a tour 
of the Upper Provinces partly with the object of studying 
land revenue problems and the results of British 
administration. He consulted with the Collectors, and 
particularly with Edward Colebrooke and John Deane, the two
p
Commissioners. The results of Hastings’s observation, study 
and consultation are embodied in his Minute of 21 September 
1815* That minute, remarkable for its understanding of the 
problems involved marks a fundamental departure in the 
principles of settlement-making in the Bengal Presidency, 
and on several important points it anticipates Holt
1. K.A.Ballhatchet, ’The Authors of the Fifth Report of 
1812’, Rotes and Queries 1957, p.4-77*
2. He was on tour from 1814 to 1815, Hastings, The Private 
Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, (ed.) Marchioness 
of Bute, 1^ p7I9S xf; Minute‘of Hastings, 21•9•1815, 
paras, 1-6, Bg.R.C. 16.9.1820, 33.
Mackenzie's scheme of settlement. Thirdly, the settlements
that were made under Regulations IX and X of 1812 were
unsatisfactory. These Regulations, it should he remembered,
were enacted when the Bengal government was restrained from
making a permanent settlement in 1811, and they revived the
provisions of the 1803 and 1805 Regulations, by which a
permanent settlement was to be made in developed 'estates'
only. According to the Regulations of 1812, where a
permanent settlement was not made the duration of a
1
settlement was not to exceed five years. As the criterion
of permanency - i.e. a developed 'estate1 - was a vague one,
and as much land lay waste, the settlements made under
Regulations IX and X of 1812 were five yearly#
The assessments in these settlements were based on
imperfect data for want of knowledge of the resources in an 
2'estate'. In forming the assessment the Collector consulted
the Patwari and the Kanungo and took notice of gratuitous
*
information when it was forthcoming. But the Patwari papers 
were unreliable because of his subservience to the Zamindar; 
and the information furnished by the Kanungo was obsolete 
because his papers had not been revised for an unknown period 
of time. Gratuitous information was liable to be biased and 
even malicious. As a result of these shortcomings the 
assessment could thus be inaccurate, and it was proved to be
1. See above p.162.
2. Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 29*1.1813, para.87*
3. Minute of Hastings, 21.9.1815, paras. 50-51, Bg.R.C.
16.9.1820, 33*
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so, particularly in Bareli, Kanpur and Etawah#^
Inadequate efforts were made either to ascertain or 
to secure ’proprietary1 rights. Engagements with the 
existing individuals were generally continued, hut where 
revenue farmers had engaged for the revenue, they were being 
set aside in favour of the acknowledged but excluded 
’proprietors’. On the other hand, where ’proprietary1 rights 
were in dispute the government did not interfere to solve the 
problem. The Civil Courts were considered sufficient to 
determine disputed cases. What went on between the engager 
and the co-sharer, and between the Zamindar and the raiyat
p
was simply unknown.
The defective nature of settlements from all points of 
view was fully admitted by the government, and fully noticed 
by Hastings in his minute of 1815# Hastings in his minute 
and the Bengal government in its letters to the Court 
suggested several ways of improving the settlement process 
and its technique. Some of those suggestions stood in glaring 
contrast to the attitude on settlement-making under Minto, 
and were no more than an endorsement of the oft-expressed 
views of the Home Authorities.
Hastings pointed out that the settlement of a district 
began simultaneously for all the parganas, and before it 
could be finalised, the lease came to an end. The assessment
1. Bg.R.D, (C. & C.P.), 1.8.1821, 2, paras.45-6 and 48; Bg.R.L. 
(C* & C.P.), 31*l*1815f paras* 4 and 7? Bg.R.D.(C. & C.P.), 
2.4.1817, para.62; Bg0R.L,(C. &C.P.), 1.8.1822,2,para.130,
2. Bg.R.L. (C. & C.P.), 29*10.1817, 2, paras.26-7» Bg.R.D, 
(C.&C.P.), 1.8.1521, 2, para.11.
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therefore became a demand for past debts rather than a future 
contract,^ This could be remedied through a settlement by 
parganas♦ The Collector would then have time to supervise
p
the settlement of each pargana. To protect rights in land
and to accomplish an equitable assessment, the Collectors
were instructed to procure minute information on tenures and
on the internal resources of 'estates1# To achieve accuracy
in assessment and to discover concealed land the aid of
a
survey was.emphasized.. Under Minto.a. survey of. land, had . . . .  
been vehemently opposed in 1813* The Court in its despatch 
of 6 January 1815 answered this effectively by citing the 
example of Madras and the advantages gained in that 
presidency.
In regard to the injury to the rights of the village 
Zamindars and raiyats that occurred in Bengal, Hastings was 
drawing the right conclusion for the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces* In fact, sympathy for raiyats was being expressed 
in Bengal itself since 1809 * when the revenue and judicial 
authorities began discussing the means of securing effectively 
the rights of raiyats. This was independent of the enquiries 
in connection with the Fifth Report, and the trend acquired
1. Minute of Hastings, 21.9*1815, paras. 72-3, Bg*R,C.
16.9.1820, 33.
2. Ibid.* para*76.
3. SgTE.L. (C. & C.P.), 30.7.1819* 2, paras, 12-14.
4. Minute of Hastings, 21*9.1815* paras.26 and 54-5; op*cit., 
Bg.R.L. (C. 8c C.P.), 31.1*1815, para.15, Bg*R.L. (C. & d.P.) 
4.7*1817, 3, paras. 75-8,
5. Bg.R.D*(C.& C.P.), 6.1.1815, paras *22-4, 31 and 34*
6. Bg.R.D.(C.& CoP.), 15.1*1819, para.18.
212
momentum after the publication of that report. The Home
Authorities began to press for a thorough investigation into
tenures, and pointed out that had the enquiries begun under
Warren Hastings not been discontinued on the eve of the
permanent settlement, the village Zamindars and raiyats
would not have suffered in Bengal.^*
Lord Hastings had full sympathy with the village
Zamindars, whom he considered to be 'fundamentally connected
o
with the soil1 and entitled by 1 a custom more ancient than
*
all law1 to a share of the produce of land. Settlements 
were to be made with them. Hastings favoured the protection 
of the raiyats also. And he considered the large landholders 
to be revenue farmers on a more permanent footing than the 
ordinary revenue farmers, but not the 'proprietors’ of their
4
holdings.
On a matter of considerable relevance to the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces the view of the Bengal government was 
erroneous. As one reason for the injury to the rights of 
raiyats in Bengal, it was claimed that the Bengal Regulations 
were responsible. Although the resident raiyats had a 
hereditary right of occupancy in land, and a right to pay at 
a fixed rate, the Regulations unquestionably conferred 
exclusive and transferable proprietary rights in land on the
1. Bg.R.D.(C. & C.P.), 17.5.1815, paras. 12-5; Bg.R.D,
(C. & C.P.), 15.1.1819, paras. 54- and 58.
2. Minute of Hastings, 21.9.1815, para.78, Bg.R.C. 16.9.1820, 
55.
5. Ibid., para,142.
4. rbicL., paras. 78 and 105.
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Zamindars.^ The raiyats consequently suffered; and so did 
the subordinate rights of the village Zamindars.
On the other hand Samuel Davis, James Gumming and the 
Home Authorities maintained, that the Regulations did not 
create rights in land to the disadvantage of the existing 
ones. The provisions of the Regulations secured all varieties 
of rights in land. In practice innumerable instances existed 
in Rajshahi, Chittagong, 24 Parganas, Dinajpur, parts of 
Bhagalpur and Benares of separate engagements for revenue 
even for a few rupees from village Zamindars and Pattidars, 
Protection of the rights of resident raiyats was fully 
accepted by Cornwallis and provided for in the Regulations,
It was the Zamindar1s right to collect revenue and his 
profit from that, which was made permanent, heritable and 
transferable. The only significant concession made to him 
was to grant him a proprietary right in the waste land; and
p
waste land belonged to no individuals. The Bengal government 
also arrived at a similar interpretation of the Regulations 
ultimately in 1822.^
1. J, Cumming, Note on Colebrooke minute of 17*3*1820, n.d. 
Cumming Papers, H.M. 530, pp.142-3? 146, 150-51 and 153-8; 
Minute of E.Colebrooke, 17*3*1820, Bg.R.C.16,9*1820, 7; 
Bg.R.L.(C. & C.P.),'7*10.1815* para.8; Minute of Hastings, 
21.9*1815, para.148, Bg.R.C.16.9*1820, 53.
2. J.Cumming, Rights of Zemindars and Ryots, n.d, Cumming 
Papers, H.M.530, pp.505-37; S.Davis, Rights of Zemindars 
and Ryots, 4.3.1816, Cumming Papers, H.M.530, pp#341-3; 
Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 15*1*1819, paras. 12-14, 40, 43 and 54*; 
J.Cumming, Note on Colebrooke Minute, 17*3*1820, n.d,, 
Ciamming Papers, H.M.530, pp.91-6, 99-100, 103-05, 113-4,
121 and 134-5*
3* See Resolution of Govt*, 1.8.1822, paras.110-18, Bg.R.C. 
1,8.1822, 64.
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The explanation of the injury suffered hy the raiyats 
in Bengal, which was given hy the Home Authorities together 
with the remedy to overcome it and prevent it in the Ceded 
and Conquered Provinces, also found favour with the 
government under Hastings* The injury in Bengal had resulted 
from technical and institutional factors. Ho enquiry or 
record of rights and rent-rates had taken place, except in a 
few cases. The Kanungo office was abolished and the Patwari 
was made the Zemindar1s servant* The Collector was divested 
of the power to decide rent cases, and the Civil Court was 
considered adequate to adjudge cases instead* But the Civil 
Court had no data to proceed upon, and the raiyats even in 
cases of oppression had no chance of establishing their 
complaint. The Zamindar, on the other hand, in order to avoid 
a direct collision with the raiyats used the distraint law in 
a perfectly legal manner to enhance rent* These technical and 
institutional shortcomings had forced the government in 
Bengal to adopt an attitude of non-interference in regard to 
agrarian relations.
The natural deductions from the above premises were 
the effective use of the Kanungo and Patwari, to obtain 
detailed information, and to vest judicial power in the
p
Collector to decide disputes* In the Ceded and Conquered
Provinces the Kanungo and Patwari offices were already in
1* Resolution of Govt. 17*12*1819, Bg.R.C. 17*12.1819,38;
Bg.R.D«(C* & C.P.), 15*1*1819, paras.23, 39 and 46-7*
2. Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.;, 6.1.1815, paras.38 and 100-05; Bg. 
R.D. (C. & C.P.), 15*1*1819, para.78.
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existence* The latter was particularly important in obtaining 
information.'1' In consequence of the instructions of the Home 
Authorities the jurisdiction of the Collector over the 
Patwari was made effective by Regulation XII of 1817• The
principle of vesting judicial power in the Collector was also
2
accepted by the government. The despatch of 15 January 1819* 
while discussing the judicial power of the Collector, 
acknowledged the influence of the Ideas of Warren Hastings* 
The need to vest judicial power In the Collector had been 
realised by the Home Authorities as early as 1814 - the 
influence no doubt of the PIfth Report and the judicial 
reforms in Madras. Similar views were held in Bengal itself, 
independent of outside influence, by Archibald Seton, 
Nathaniel Edmonstone and the Sadr Diwani Adalat* The argument 
behind the principle of judicial power in the Collector as 
explained by the Home Authorities was a simple one* The 
strict separation of judicial and executive power, though 
correct in theory was inapplicable to India. It had never 
been practiced by any TNative Government1 in India. Besides, 
its introduction in the Bengal Presidency prevented the 
dispensation of justice in agrarian matters.
Thus in regard to the principles of settlement-making 
- i.e. the acquisition of minute information on tenures and
1. Bg.R.L.(C. & C.P.), 7*10*1815* paras.14-16; Bg.R.D. 
12.7*1820, paras. 4-30.
2. bg.R.L.(C. & C.P.), 19*8.1815* para«3; see also enclosure 
to the letter.
3* Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 15*1*1819, para.78.
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’assets', the use of surveys and the grant of judicial
functions to the Collector - the government accepted what
the Home Authorities had been inculcating for several years.
For this significant change in the thinking of the
I
government credit must i*e given to Lord Hastings, Such a
change would however, not have occurred by the mere
instructions of the Home Authorities: it was the admission
of the defective nature of the settlements which helped in
transforming the point of view of the government*
The reformist mood of the government facilitated the
emergence and acceptance of a detailed plan of settlement,
for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. But it should be
stated that the ideal of a permanent settlement was not given
up by the government. Indeed, it was believed that a
detailed mode of settlement would lead to that i d e a l E v e n
the Home Authorities in their despatches between 1810 and
2
1815i bad helped to keep that hope alive*
A positive foundation for a settlement was not laid 
down until Holt Mackenzie submitted his famous and massive 
Memorandum of 1 July 1819 to the government* A lead for a 
plan of a settlement should have actually come from the 
Board of Commissioners for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* 
This did not happen, because that Board was an advocate of a 
permanent settlement. Its opposition to a permanent 
settlement in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces during
1* Bee below, pp. 219 and 255-7*
2. See above, pp. 14-8-9> 152, 157 and 171-2*
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1
1807-08 was based on expediency, and not on principle*
Colebrooke and Trant, its preQpit members, pressed for a
permanent settlement in 1818* The arguments were that the
government had pledged itself to a permanent settlement (in
1802, 1803, 1805 and 1807)» and that the assessment had
2
reached a high level.
Holt Mackenzie, as shall be seen, argued from
altogether different premises for his proposals. Mackenzie
came from a literary family in Edinburgh: his father Henry
x
Mackenzie was a man of letters of some'repute# For his 
administrative career Holt Mackenzie was educated at 
Haileybury and Fort William Colleges. He headed the list of 
successful candidates at Fort William College in Arabic, 
Persian* Bengali and Hindustani. His attainments received 
special notice from Minto in a speech at the college. 
Mackenzie!s official career began in 1810, when he was 
appointed an assistant in the office of the Register of the 
Sadr Diwani and Nizamat Adalat* Towards the end of 1815 when 
he had risen to the rank of Deputy Register in the same 
office, he was called upon to officiate as Secretary in the 
Territorial Department, at Hastings’s own suggestion. Later, 
in 1817> when that office fell vacant he became an automatic
Ll
choice. Thus at the age of twenty-eight he officiated, and 
at thirty became a full-fledged Secretary in one of the most
I. See above, pp. 119-28, 14-0 and 14-2-3*
2o Commissioners to Bg.Govt., 27*10.1818, Bg.R.C.16.9*1820,1. 
3* Buckland, D.I.B., p.263*
4-. See Personal” Records, 8, pp.64-1-7.
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important branches of administrationHis interest in 
revenue affairs should therefore be dated from 1815 at the 
earliest and 1817 at the latest*
From some family letters that have survived, Mackenzie
emerges as a man of tender feelings, sincerity and self-
2
restraint. His abilities and bent of mind are best summed up
in a remark Bentinck made to Ellenborough: he *••• is perhaps
the cleverest man in India. It is objected to him that he is
somewhat eopeculative [sic]. In part the opinion may be true
but on the whole he appears to be more enlightened and more
free from prejudice than any man I have met with# With great
talents is united a perseverance and patience in the
investigation of detail that makes him an admirable public
*
officer particularly in the Revenue Department#.##1^
The main problem which induced Holt Mackenzie to 
produce his Memorandum of 1819 was, how to end the temporary 
nature of settlements in accordance with the instructions of 
the Home Authorities between 1810 and 1815# The methodology 
of settlement, which was the great contribution of that 
Memorandum, was derived from those instructions# This we have
IL
on his own admission. He was not applying the rent theory
5
to land revenue and land tenure. He hoped that a detailed
settlement properly conducted would ensure the Home
1* He was born in 1787? see Buckland, op.cit.
2. See the family correspondence in Henry Mackenzie Papers, 
6564-67 and 6369*
3* Bentinck to Ellenborough, 30.9*1829? Bentinck MSS#2594#
4# H.Mackenzie, memo# 1*7*1819? para*663? Bg.R.C. 16.9*1820,4. 
5* See below, p.219 ff° and Chap.4.
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Authorities’ sanction, for the permanency of the assessment*"**
He was not at all opposed to a permanent settlement; the only
2
condition which he thought necessary was a minute survey.
This fact, it should be noted, tells against the notion of
the influence of rent theory to land revenue. However, he
did not favour an immediate permanent settlement, unlike
Colebrooke and Trant. Mackenzie pointedly drew attention to
the weakness in the argument of a high pitch of assessment*
This argument of Colebrooke and Trant lacked a factual basis,
which was possible only with ah accurate estimate of Assets1#
Colebrooke and Trant had also ignored a basic condition of
permanency set by the Home Authorities* An ’estate1 must be
in a high state of cultivation* This according to Holt
Mackenzie, involved showing with reference to solid facts the
proportion of waste to cultivated land in each ’estate’•
Therefore, the plea of permanency put forward by the
Commissioners was untenable.
A study of Mackenzie’s Memorandum of 1819 reveals the
great importance he attached to a methodology of settlement*
Unlike Munro, Mackenzie had no district or village experience
but his contribution to land revenue history is as great as
that of Munro. Both were empirical in their approach to
problems* In both, the ’paternalist’ strain of thought was
present; because they desired the protection and preservation
1. H.Mackenzie, memo.l.7«1819, para.656, Bg.R.C.16*9*1820,4*
2o Ibid., para.273 n.
5. Ibid., para.25^ .
of rural society through state action* In a settlement 
mechanism, Mackenzie saw a unique means of providing social 
justice to the rural society, and of accurately determining 
the state demand. The rights, privileges and interests of 
various grades of people in land could he secured only when 
they were known. A knowledge of tenures was possible only 
through a minute inquiry and its proper record* The inquiry 
was also to be used to settle basic principles before disputes 
arose* On the fiscal side, to secure the interests of the 
state, of the. Zamindar and.of the. raiyat in the produce of 
land, it was necessary to record the actual receipts of the 
Zamindar * ^
For accuracy and justice in assessment, Mackenzie 
advocated the procurement of data on a massive scale through 
a survey of land, and an investigation into the village 
economy and customs* A survey would disclose the area of each 
village, comprising cultivated and waste land* Knowledge of 
the resources of a village would show the adequacy or 
inadequacy of the jama* While noticing the factors affecting
assessment - e.g* soil, produce, market facilities and types 
of cultivators - would ensure justice in assessment* Without 
a survey and investigation, Mackenzie commented, only a loose 
bargain of the Bengal type would be produced* He also drew 
attention to the advantages of the procurement of data for 
assessment - both from the fiscal and administrative points
p
of view* Land revenue would rest on secure foundations*
1. Ibid*, see paras. 302-53*
2. Ibid*, paras*2?8-82, 269-70 and 286-7*
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The records of survey and investigation would be convenient 
and accurate sources of reference for Civil Courts.
From an analysis of the data frent! estimates were 
to be prepared. But the assessment was not to be based on 
’rent1 estimates. They were to be used only in testing the 
authenticity of Patwari and Kanungo accounts* The assessment 
in itself was to be based on past and current collections*
The fnet rent1 principle could not be used as the criterion 
of assessment, because Mackenzie feared it could lead to 
over-assessment due to errors in its calculation. Mackenzie 
endorsed the existing principle of remunerating the revenue 
engager at ten per cent of the jama exclusive of the expenses 
of collection. But in order to give an incentive to the 
Zamindar to improve agriculture, he was in favour of leaving 
him an additional percentage, where an increase in revenue 
was obtained on re-settlement.’1'
In regard to the process of settlement-making
Mackenzie enlarged upon the proposal which Hastings had
2
already made. Mackenzie stressed the need of radical
alteration of the existing process* A district was a large
area, in which settlements began simultaneously* This
prevented the co-ordination of settlement work. The
Collectors were unable to supervise the proceedings of their
subordinates, and the Commissioners were unable to supervise
those of their Collectors. There was thus no possibility of
1. Ibid., paras. 354-5 and 357-62*
2* See above, pp. 210-11.
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detecting error at any level of the settlement machinery*
In consequence, inequality of assessment was comhined with 
injury to rights in land, while the subordinate functionaries 
abused their position*^"
Mackenzie therefore strongly urged a piecemeal 
settlement - pargana by pargana» mahal by mahal» and in a 
year only that much of area was to be settled as was 
conveniently possible to accomplish* Under this process the 
Collectors and the Commissioners would have time to supervise 
the settlement work; and any chance of error would be marginal4 
To achieve success Mackenzie wanted proper utilisation of the 
Patwari and Kanungo offices, and the mobilisation of the
p
pick of the civil service*
To appreciate fully the emphasis Mackenzie laid on 
an investigation into tenures, it is necessary to give a 
brief account of the nature of property and the varieties of 
land tenure in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces# An 
exhaustive analysis of those two subjects, though desirable, 
is not within the scope of the present work*
When the British introduced the term property in 
their revenue Regulations from 1793 onwards, they clearly had 
in mind the western notion of property in land* It never 
occurred to them, or even to such enthusiasts for the 
preservation of Indian custom as Mackenzie or Munro or James 
Cumming, that the western notion of property in land was not
1. Ibid*, paras* 291-4.
2* Ibid*, apras* 301, 294 and 302*
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in fact applicable in India# Thus the term property is used
in the revenue records without definition, the receipt of
the Zamindar or Taluqdar is called rent or rental and his
holding an Estate1#
The attributes of private property in the western
sense are the right to regulate the tenancy of land, that of
appropriating rent and that of mortgaging the land or
transferring it by sale, gift or otherwise* Above all, the
characteristic features of property in the western sense
were its individualistic nature, the rental of the estate,
the easy transferability of land governed by market forces,
and the absence of sentimental attachment to land.
In the Ceded and Conquered Provinces private property
in land in the western sense did not exist. In a recent work
treating the question of private property in land in Uttar
Pradesh, it has been stated it did not exist either
individually or communally. What existed was a common property
in the produce of land, shared according to custom between
the rural society and the Ratja,^ (It was in the share of the
latter that the land revenue was founded). In the Benares
region, as explained in a recent article, control over land
and a share in its produce by the Brahman and Rajput lineages,
2
existed rather than ownership in the western sense.
Both of the above definitions are too general# The
1. W.C#Neale, Economic Change in Rural India, etc# pp#21 and 
27-8.
2. B.S.Cohn, ’From Indian Status to British Contract1,
Journal of Economic History, Dec# 1961, p#619*
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first one is based on the case study of Gcnda district which 
was in Oudh and not in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* 
Besides, it was a backward district in which ancient Hindu 
institutions survived. The second definition is merely an 
unsubstantiated remark on the nature of the land tenure of 
the Benares region.
As a matter of fact in the early nineteenth century, 
proprietary rights in land existed in the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces. This consisted of the right to let land to 
cultivators, and to appropriate the difference between the 
receipts and land revenue, (in addition the proprietor 
received a small allowance from the government)* It included 
also the right to transfer land by inheritance or otherwise 
Proprietary right was, however, not vested in a particular 
class of people, such as the joint village bodies throughout 
the province. The view held by the Home Authorities and some 
individuals in Bengal, like Hastings, Mackenzie and Metcalfe, 
that the village bodies were the proprietary class throughout 
the province was not wholly correct* Their view was based on 
the notion that according to the custom of the country the 
joint bodies had the proprietary rights. But the joint bodies 
were not ancient but of comparatively recent growth, and
1. See SBOR. to G.G.. 25.5.1831, para.6, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 
33; SBOR. to G.G. 3.9.1830, SRRNWP* 2, pp.205-06; Reply 
of W.H*Tyler, 6.8.1831, to queries issued by SBOR* on 
on 24.6.1831, SRRNWP.2, pp.309-12; Reply of J.G.Deedes, 
25*7.1831, to queries issued by SBOR. on 24*6*1831,
SRRNWP. 2, pp.328-31; Reply of C.Macsween, 7•9*1831, to 
queries issued by SBOR. on 24*6.1831, SRRNWP. 2, pp*341~3*
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some of them, as was the case in Bundelkh&nd, founded their
right "by violence• 1 The village bodies, the Zamindars and
Taluqdars between them, constituted the proprietary class,
and there were villages in Rohilkhand where proprietary rights
were not claimed. Compared with the western notion of
proprietary rights those of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces
admit of certain glaring limitations. The pressure of land
revenue was traditionally so heavy that land would hardly
acquire any value. In certain cases the raiyats had the right
pto pay at fixed rates which impinges upon the notion of 
absolute proprietary rights. Nor was proprietary right 
vested in individuals. Land either belonged to the 
communities jointly or to the families in zamindari and 
taluqdari tenures*^ These peculiarities together with the 
absence of sufficiently developed market forces, hampered the 
emergence of a land market. Consequently there was collective 
or personal attachment to land, disturbed only by external 
force or the oppression of the administration of the day.
The joint village bodies according to Edward 
Colebrooke possessed four-fifths of the, proprietary rights in 
the province. These were either of the bhaiyachara or of the
1. See Baden-Powell, The Land-Systems of British India, 2,
pp.98-9, Hl-2, 131-4 and 153.
2. See below, p. 345 ff.
3. See Baden-Powell, op.cit. , p*99; Reply of J.G. Deedes, 
25.7*1831, to queries Tssued by SBOR. on 24.6.1831,
SRRNWP. pp.328-9; Reply of C.Macsween, 7*9•1831, to 
queries issued by SBOR. on 24.6.1831, SRRNWP. 2, pp.340-41.
4. Minute of E.Colebrooke, 12.7.1820, Bg.R.fl. I6.9*1820, 10.
pattidari ^type and their members were cal led village 
Zamindars. Their right was founded either on conquest or on 
colonisation, and their composition was essentially tribal 
or clannish or caste e.g., villages were possessed by
Bundelas, Rajputs, Gujars, Jats or Brahmins etc.,
2
exclusively. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
because of political and social factors, some of their 
villages were incorporated in the large taluqs that had
7
grown. In such of these villages the power of the Taluqdars 
gradually eroded the-rights of village Zamindars in various - 
ways. Under the British, although the Regulations of 1803 
were not specific on the rights of village Zamindars, there 
was nothing detrimental to their interests in the Regulations* 
In practice, however, the Collectors treated the representat­
ive of the community as a proprietor to the detriment of the
Zl
rest. When the village defaulted it was promptly put to
1. The members of the bhaiyachara community held land by true 
and equal division. ]5acn member had parts of good and bad 
land, the division being such that the value of each 
sharer*s land would be equal to that of every one else*s 
share. While in the pattidari the sharers held according 
to ancestral share. Each one had a portion of land 
expressed in bigahs without reference to the fertility of 
land •
2. Baden-Powell, op.cit., pp.110-12; see H.Mackenzie, memo, 
on revision of settlements, 19®10.1826, paras.5,57, 172 
and 48, SRRFWP. 2.
3. See Reply of W.H.Tyler, 6*8.1831, to queries issued by 
SBORr on 24.6.1831% SRRRWP. 2% p.310; Minute of Bentihck 
26.9*1832, para.18, EgHCT. 27*12.1832, 79; J.Thornton, 
Aligarh S.R., pp.252-5*
4* fi.Mackenzie, memo. 1*7*1319, paras. 405, 413-4 and 418, 
Bg.R.C* 16.9*1820, 4.
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sale without investigating how the arrears arose. In 
consequence some injury to the rights of village Zamindars 
occurred, but how extensive that injury was cannot be stated 
yet. Although as late as 1820 a proper understanding of the 
structure of landholding of the joint village bodies or of 
their method of apportioning land revenue did not exist in 
the official mind, greater attention to their tenure was 
being paid since 1807 under the Board of Commissioners.^"
The zamindari tenure, historically speaking, was the 
oldest and most prized form of landholding in-the region.- - -
Its existence is referred to during the earliest period of
2
Muslim rule in India. Some of the Zamindars were descendants 
of Hindu Rajas reduced to minor status by the onslaughts of 
Muslim rule. In the eighteenth century some Taluqdars had 
also turned into Zamindars, while some individuals acquired 
such rights by purchase or by fraud. Under the British, 
individuals acquired zamindari rights by private or public 
sales of land. A zamindari consisted of anything from a 
single village to several hundred villages, and was owned by 
a single person or several persons. If there were several 
sharers the land would not be divided among them, but the 
profits would be shared out in proportion to the individual 
shares expressed in fractions of a rupee. The zamindari 
right in some instances was a very valuable one, the profit
1. See above, p. 104-ff. and see below, pp. 466-8.
2. I.Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, chap.5*
3. H .Mackenziememo. 1.7.1819, paras7 402-£)3and 406, Bg. 
R.C. 16.9.1820, 4.
4. See SBOR. to G.G. 25.5*1831, paras. 6-7, Bg.R.C. 27*12. 
1832,35*
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amounting to several hundred thousand rupees a year.^ The
proprietary and revenue engaging rights of the Zamindars were
2
fully acknowledged by the British since 1802.
The taluqdari tenure originated in the seventeenth
century, became consolidated during the political disorders
of the eighteenth century, and in the early nineteenth
century the holdings of Taluqdars comprised several hundred
villages each* The villages in the taluqs were joint or
zamindari or depopulated villages re-established by the
Taluqdars or a combination of these- factors* The Taluqdars
as a class do not admit of a uniform origin* Their tenure
originated from direct or indirect grant of the state or
from factors independent of it but receiving state
recognition explicit or implicit* The right to collect the
revenue of a large tract of land was granted to an
individual of influence or of wealth or to a court favourite*
In disturbed times an individual, either a Zamindar or a
member of a village body or an adventurer, established his
power over a group of villages whom the state for lack of an
alternative recognised as Taluqdar* Taluqdars were also
descended from the families of Hindu Rajas, when the raj
disintegrated and some members of the family established
control over a number of villages, or a Raja himself shrunk
to the status of a Taluqdar* Amils also created Taluqdars
when they entrusted the collection of the revenue of difficult
1* See below pp*306-07.
2. See above, p* 37 ff* and pp. 59-60.
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regions to individuals of influence or when they gave the 
control of depopulated villages to individuals at a nominal 
revenue* The acts of joint village "bodies also contributed 
to the growth of taluqdari tenure, when they sought the 
protection of a powerful man against the oppression of an 
Amil or when they transferred their proprietary rights to the 
Taluqdar (in whose taluq their land was included), because 
they could not pay the revenue
Originally the Taluqdar had only the right of
collecting the revenue of his taluq and his remuneration was
p
a percentage on the revenue collected* He might also be the 
Zamindar of a portion of his taluq* In the early nineteenth 
century he claimed proprietary rights to a substantial 
portion of the taluq, and paid a fixed amount of revenue
z
which was insignificant in comparison with his receipts.^
In point of fact, he had a proprietary right based on 
uninterrupted possession in that portion of the taluq where 
he or his ancestors had re-settled depopulated villages or 
acquired rights from the joint village bodies in a fair way
lL
or by force* In the rest of the taluq he was a hereditary
1* Classic examples of the growth of taluqdari tenure are to 
be found in the cases of Mursan and flathrass parganas of 
Aligarh* The two Taluqdars descended from a common 
ancestor. An excellent account is to be found in J. 
Thornton, Aligarh S.R., pp.247-51; Minute of Bentinck,
26.9.1832, paras.£6 and 28-30, Bg.R.C. 27.12*1832, 79; 
Baden-Powell, op.cit*,pp«157-8« 160-62, 204-05, 207, 214 
and 216.
2* H.Mackenzie, memo. 1*7.1819, paras.395 and 398, Bg.R.C.
16.9.1820, 4.
3* Ibid., paras.407-08; Minute of Bentinck, 26*9*1832, 
para.24, op.cit.
4. Bentinck fully acknowledged Taluqdars proprietary rights in 
part of their taluqs. 'See below, p.34-5.
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middleman. The British policy towards him was non-committal, 
but as yet a practicable approach had not emerged.'*'
Besides the three main tenures discussed above there 
were those of the raiyats, those held rent-free and those of 
revenue farmers. All raiyats, despite the views of the 
Home Authorities, of the Bengal government and of Holt
2
Mackenzie, did not have a right to pay at fixed rates.
*
Rent-free tenures still lay uninvestigated.^ Revenue farmers
existed in villages without proprietors or where the
proprietors had refused engagements. Their profit consisted
of ten per cent on the revenue collected, and also what they
could illegally exact from the raiyats ♦
In the view of Holt Mackenzie a proper appreciation
of the various tenures and their protection was possible
zl
only through the investigation and record of rights* The 
Regulations of 1803 and 1805 bad no intention of taking away 
the right of an individual and conferring it upon anothert 
but had not defined or discussed the tenures or laid down 
the principles upon which engagements for revenue were to be 
taken or proprietary disputes settled. In practice the 
Collectors treated a revenue engager other than a revenue 
farmer as proprietor, whether or not he was proprietor of 
the whole or a part of the holding. This Altered the
1. See below, P* 299ff.
2. See below, P* 345ff.
3. See below, pp. 310-11.
4. See above, p. 220.
5. See above, p. 37 ff.» pp.64-5, 96-9 and 102-04.
6. See H.Mackenzie, memo. 1.7*1819* para.414, Bg.R.C.
16.9.1820, 4.
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relationship within the joint village bodies, and if the 
land was sold then the right of the non-engaging bodies 
lapsed by default and entirely new rights were created in the 
auction-purchasers* Regarding the proprietary disputes the 
Collectors hitherto had no powers to settle them, nor were 
there any principles of settling disputes laid down in any 
of the Regulations. The Civil Courts were the institutions 
to settle disputes but they had no information to proceed 
upon, and the rural society neither understood nor was it 
accustomed to the British judicial system.
Mackenzie laid down the principles on which 
engagements ought to be taken. The joint village bodies were 
to be admitted to engagements through one or two 
representatives but the rights of the rest were to be 
recorded. This would evidently secure the interests of the 
non-engagers. Where it was possible members of the joint 
bodies were to be encouraged to enter into individual 
engagements.’1' In this case it should be noted that the 
revenue engaging and proprietary rights would be one and the 
same. Where Zamindars existed, Mackenzie had no bias against
them whom he considered to be of ancient origin and entitled
2
to the full protection of the government. In contrast and by 
ignoring facts he considered Taluqdars as mere middlemen.^ 
This view which Mackenzie shared with a few others was based
1. XbicL, paras. 753 said 74-4-.
2. rbid., para.74-5 and see below, pp. 273 and 4-69. 
3* It)id., paras. 395* 398 and 74-5*
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on the assumption that Taluqdars by the custom of the 
country were not proprietors of land, and had enlarged their 
holdings by acts of violence or fraud or usurpation* He was 
in favour of dispossessing this class with due compensation 
and settling directly with the joint village bodies.^" If, 
because of political reasons it was not possible to 
dispossess Taluqdars, then a mufassal settlement was to be 
formed with the joint village bodies, and the Taluqdars were 
to be continued as the medium of revenue payment on an
p
allowance to be determined by the government.- It should be 
pointed out, that Holt Mackenzie was assuming the universal 
existence of joint village bodies in the taluqdaris, but 
this was far from true. The principle suggested for the
*
taluqdaris was to be applied to the rent-free tenures also*
In villages without proprietors where revenue farmers existed,
iL
they were to be continued as hereditary Mukarraridars * But 
this was not to bar the proprietary claims of individuals 
which may have been dormant. On establishing their claims in 
the Courts of law, such individuals were to be admitted to 
engagaments after the deaths of existing revenue farmers.
In proprietor-less villages where Mukaddams engaged for the
1* it>id. > paras. 74-5-6.
2. ibid., para. 74-7*
3. Ibid., para.74-8.
4*. Mukarraridar = An individual granted the right to collect 
the revenue of a tract of land and to pay a fixed sum to 
the state. It was generally a life tenure.
5. H.Mackenzie, memo. 1.7*1819* para*716, op.cit*
revenue, the same principle as regards the revenue farmers
1
was to he followed.
Proprietary disputes were to be determined by the 
Collectors while forming the settlements and investigating 
and recording the tenures* The principle of determining the 
dispute was to be the possession and occupancy of land or 
the right to dispose of its produce unless contradicted by 
records. Those who claimed proprietary rights but had no 
possession of land were to be directed to the Civil Courts. 
The Collectors were to correct past mistakes regarding 
proprietary rights on the foregoing principle. With a view 
to redress injury suffered by individuals Mackenzie was even 
in favour of investigating the rights of the auction-
purchasers and of the Sadr Malguzars with whom settlements
2
were formed previously.
Holt Mackenziefs Memorandum thus embraced all the 
problems of settlement-making - methodological , fiscal and 
tenurial. Before proceeding to form settlements on his 
proposals, he suggested that the government should obtain the 
views of the Court of Directors on two subjects - first on 
the principles of settlement and secondly on the permanent 
settlement of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces Mackenzie 
certainly had drawn the right lesson from the fiasco of 
Regulation X of 1807.4
1. Ibid., para.717*
2. TbxcL, paras, 734— 7 and 750-1.
3* Ibid., paras. 683-4*
4. Government had presumed upon the support of the Court of 
Directors and it was embarrassed when the latter refused 
a permanent settlement. See above,Chap. 2.
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The greatest credit one can give to Holt Mackenzie 
is in his having compiled a settlement scheme* That which 
hitherto remained in the realm of ideas came nearer to 
practicability. The Home Authorities had put forward ideas on 
the methodology of settlement, and insisted on shaping the 
revenue system in accordance with the customs and traditions
of the people of the region*'*' The Bengal government under
2
Hastings shared those ideas of the Home Authorities* The 
same ideas can be seen in Holt Mackenzie’s Memorandum* 
Mackenzie himself did not originate any ideas , and in his 
detailed provisions also there were few original suggestions* 
The originality lay in his proposals for 'rent* estimates to 
check the accuracy of assessment, and in advancing his 
principles to determine engagements for revenue and the 
settlement of proprietary disputes. There was nothing new 
in his bias in favour of the joint village bodies and the 
raiyats, and in his bias against the Taluqdars» Nor was 
there anything new in his advocacy of survey, of 
investigation^of the effective use of the Patwari and
lL
Kanungo offices and of a mahal by mahal settlement. Above 
all, Holt Mackenzie was not experimenting with any theories, 
but applied his mind to the practical task of forming a 
detailed settlement. His settlement scheme was a fitting 
climax to the discussions on the revenue system of the Ceded
1. See above, p, 198ff. and also Chap*2,
2. See above, pp, 208-12 and 214-6,
3* See above, pp. 220-21 and 231-3*
4. See above, pp. 198, 210-11 and 214-5 and also Chap,2*
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and Conquered Provinces, started nearly a decade before, 
Mackenzie’s proposals were adopted by the Bengal 
government in December 1820, but not without a final 
resistance by two great supporters of a permanent settlement 
- Edward Colebrooke and George Dowdeswell.^ They fully 
believed in the theory of the permanent settlement, wished 
for its immediate introduction, and had no patience with 
detailed investigations which would take time. Some of their 
arguments for a permanent settlement of the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces were old, some were new. The government 
was pledged to the measure, the Zamindars were dissatisfied 
because of its non-fulfilment, the existing pressure of the 
assessment was high, and the moment now was suitable to 
redeem the pledge. The objections to a permanent settlement 
on account of waste land, disputed rights in land and an 
inadequate understanding of tenures did not make any 
impression upon them. Waste land could be excluded from a 
permanent settlement, and assessed as it came under 
cultivation. Disputed cases could be determined in the Civil 
Courts, while the permanent settlement could be made with 
the existing engagers. The determination of the assessment 
was the most important thing for the permanent settlement,
p
and this was not at all difficult.
1. Dowdeswell was a member of the Bengal Council, He arrived 
in Calcutta in 1783* He served in various capacities 
mostly in the Secretariat. He had no district experience. 
He retired from service in December 1819* Personal 
Records, 3? p.155*
2. Minutes of E •Colebrooke, 17«3«1820 and 12.7*1820, Bg.R.C. 
16.9*1820, 7 and 10; Minute of G.Dowdeswell, 7*10,1819, 
Bg.R.C. 17.12.1819, 39.
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Hastings, who wrote a minute in reply to that of 
Dowdeswell, had no illusions about an immediate permanent 
settlement. He used much the same arguments as had been put 
forward by the Home Authorities in the past against the 
permanent settlement of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. 
With whom the permanent settlement was to be made was the 
main question in Hastings's view. This could not be answered 
without first determining the rights in land. In Bengal 
this had not been done, and many individuals suffered* The 
experience of Bengal should therefore be the guide in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces. He was prepared for a 
permanent settlement only on condition that it was made 
with the right persons,that it was proved that they were 
the right persons, and that the financial interest of the 
government did not suffer.^
The Bengal Councillors James Stuart, John Adam and 
John Fendall were all in favour of a permanent settlement,
but they were at the same time impressed by Mackenzie's
2
proposals. The Revenue Letter to the Court of Directors of 
16 September 1820, sought permission for a permanent 
settlement at fixed revenue or fixed rates, not immediately, 
but on the completion of a detailed settlement under 
Mackenzie's proposals with adequate safeguards for rights
1. Minute of Hastings, 31*12.1819, Bg.R.C. 16.9*1820, 6.
2. Minutes of J.Stuart, J.Adam, and J.Fendall, 28.4-, 1820, 
24.5*1820 and 29*8.1820 respectively, Bg.R.C. 16*9*1820,
8, 9, and 11*
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in land* This was not an extraordinary request* The Home
Authorities had not ruled out a permanent settlement and
Holt Mackenzie had submitted his proposals so that that
2
measure could be facilitated*
In 1821 the Court of Directors at the instance of 
the Board of Control sent a short despatch peremptorily 
refusing a permanent settlement or even a hint to the 
Zamindars that it was under consideration. The curt 
phrasing of the despatch and the prompt acceptance of the 
Board’s instructions by the Gourt confirms the view that the 
Home Authorities in their private opinion had ruled out a 
permanent settlement between 1810 and 1815} but had allowed 
a promise on paper to continue to appease the Bengal
iL 5
government. Edmonstone ^  did not understand the
position when he vehemently opposed the despatch of 1821 and
considered the Court to have violated a public pledge*
His dissent had no effect on the order of the Court* The 
Court gave full support to Mackenzie’s plan of settlement 
and ordered that the existing settlements were to be
n
renewed for five years only.( The intention clearly was not 
to pronounce a definitive arrangement until some detailed
1. Bg*R*L. (C. & C.P.), 16*9.1820, paras. 6 and 7*
2. See above, pp. 171? 218-9 and 233*
3. Board to Court, 9.5.1821, 5, PP.342-3; Bs *r ,d . (C. & C.P.)
1.8*1821, 1, para.3.
4. See above, pp. 157-8, 171-2 and 189-90.
5. Edmonstone, a retired Bengal civilian, was now a member 
of the Court of Directors.
6. Dissent of IT, B. Edmonstone, 31.7*1821,paras. 2-15} App. 
to Court Minutes, 3.
7. Bg.R.D. (C. & C.P.), 1.8.1821, 1, paras* 4 and 6.
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settlements materialised and were reported to the Court* The 
government cheerfully reconciled itself to the orders of 
1821,^ and enacted Regulation 711 of 1822,^ thereby 
terminating a long period of inactivity and confusion which 
prevailed since 1801.
The settlement mechanism which emerged by 1822 was 
the result of discussions between the Home Authorities and 
the Bengal government. The initiative and ideas underlying 
it came from the Home Authorities, and a concrete plan was 
developed in Bengal by Holt Mackenzie. It was an evolution 
and not a spurt. In its principles and technique it differed 
both from the raiyatwari and zamindari settlements, yet it 
was influenced by both of them. A proper attention to 
several rights in land and their minute record was 
unnecessary in Madras, and did not take place in Bengal.
The principle of assessment was more minute than that 
of the raiyatwari. The process of settlement - i#e*, by 
mahals - was non-existent, unknown or unnecessary either in 
Madras or in Bengal# The effective use of indigenous offices, 
survey and investigation of resources were in accordance 
with raiyatwari principles and largely under their influence# 
The form of settlement, that is, the persons with whom the 
settlements were to be made, was zamindari - the Bengal 
influence. In the judicial aspect of the settlement the
1. Bg.R.L. (C. & C.P.), 1.8.1822, 3, paras. 10-12 and 24-25*
2. For a discussion of Regulation VII of 1822, see below,
p. 240ff.
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power given to the Collector was a modification of the 
Cornwallis principles of administration, hut not a radical 
one as the Civil Courts were to continue to take cognisance 
of proprietary and rent disputes. No modification in the 
western type of property introduced by Cornwallis was made, 
but the rights of joint village bodies were to be adequately 
secured. From the Courtfs point of view, the settlement 
mechanism would amount to a modification within the 
Cornwallis system of 1793* From the Board1s point of view 
it would amount to conformity with the customs and habits 
of the people. This was the Munro idea of administration.
The settlement’s avowed object, apart from securing the 
interests of the state, was to protect existing tenures on 
the basis of the customs of the people. This was a 
conservative principle. The Cornwallis zamindari settlement 
was as much conservative as the raiyatwari and the 
mahalwari, the difference lay in their techniques and in 
the understanding of the local situation. Being the last in 
the line of development, the mahal wari was the most developed, 
complex and scientific of the British land systems in India, 
though it still had to be tested.
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Chapter IV
The Failure of Regulation VII of 1822 and 
Land Revenue Settlements, 1822-33*
Regulation VII of 1822 was a major breakthrough in 
the British land revenue policy in India* Its method was 
essentially empirical and in its scope of enquiry and in the 
magnitude of its objectives it overshadowed the raiyatwari 
settlement of the Madras Presidency. Before 1822 the policy 
of refraining from interference in the rural social and 
economic structure, had paradoxically allowed a revolution 
in land-holding to take place. Regulation VII by interference 
in the affairs of rural society sought to prevent any further 
revolution in property holding, and even to redress as far 
as practicable that which had already taken place. If it 
failed in achieving quick results this was because the weight 
of enquiry burst through the seams of the scheme. Its failure 
in no way invalidated its objectives, which were substantially 
incorporated in the revision of policy which was accomplished
by 1833.
The great objective of the arrangement as the 
government Resolution of 1 August 1822 Itself put it, was to 
make property, ’... more secure and valuable.’1 Its detailed 
provisions when viewed together reveal a coherent theme -
1. Para. 99, Bg. R.C, 1.8.1822,V6U.
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that the stability of the government and its revenue were
dependent upon the stability and security of property,
which in itself it must be pointed out, was to rest on the
fully ascertained custom of the country.
In mahals jointly owned by the village communities
the revised settlement under Regulation VII was to be made
jointly with all the co-sharers or with a majority of them
or with a few representatives of the community selected with
advertence to the wishes of the co-sharers and the custom of
the village.^ If the settlement were not made with all, the
names of the remaining members of the community were to be
2
duly recorded. Where within a joint mahal. land was
distinctly and separately owned by an individual or
individuals then separate settlements by partitioning the
3
mahal into distinct units were to be made. In mahals where
multiple interests in land existed, such as- those of the
Taluqdars and the village community or those of the
Zamindars and the community then the discretion in forming
the settlement with one or the other party lay exclusively
L
with the government. But where the taluqdari or zamindari 
tenure were merely managerial in nature, and underneath 
existed the heritable and transferable joint properties1,
1. Reg. VII of 1822, S.10/3.
2. Ibid.. S.10/10.
3. Ibid.. S.10/9.
4. Ibid.. S.10/1.
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then a mufassal settlement was to he formed. The terms and
conditions of the settlement between the Taluqdar or
Zamindar and the community were to he clearly set out and
entered in the instrument of engagement of hoth the parties
In joint 'estates1 the liability for arrears of
revenue was fixed upon those who engaged for the revenue
unless the liability of the whole co-sharing body was
specifically stated in the engagement. To offset the
2
disadvantage of the Sadr Malguzar, he was- empowered to
realise the revenue from the co-sharers at the rates
3
prevailing before. This confusing provision, which 
subsequently gave rise to contradictory interpretation among 
revenue officers, stemmed from the desire to give security 
to the rights of the non-engaging co-sharers, who had unduly 
suffered in the past from the default of their principals. 
The default of the principals had led to the sale of entire 
mahals. Now by pinning the responsibility upon the 
principals, it was only their share of the property which 
was liable to sale. The principle of this limited 
responsibility was sound, but it ignored some practical 
considerations. The value of the land of a Sadr Malguzar 
who was himself a co-sharer would yield nothing, as it would 
amount only to a fraction of the mahal, An entire mahal or
1, Ibid,v S.10/2,
2, Sadr Malguzar = chief revenue engager.
3, Reg. VII of 1822, S.10/8.
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a substantial part of it, on the other hand, wa.s something 
real and transferable when put up for sale on default of 
revenue. If no serious evil arose from the provision under 
discussion it was entirely due to the fact that sales of 
land fqr arrears of revenue, were generally kept in 
abeyance in accordance with the orders of Court of Directors 
and of the Bengal government between 1822 and 1833*
In joint tenures of bhaiyachara type in Bundelkhand 
a different kind of problem existed which made individual 
property and government revenue insecure. There was an 
inherent tendency in the tenure to produce inequality of 
Jama, as well as in the actual possession of each sharer.
In theory each co-sharer held land according to the Vr\^c\\\o.
of t i f u e  e \tu i\ d iv is io n .
ancestral share-. But in practice the land held by each 
 ^ t Weo YG-tiCdl
sharer was either more or less than the ancestral share,K
because some were more resourceful and capable than other 
members of the community. Whereas the revenue responsibility
-t neoire-tic<il
of each sharer was in proportion to the ancestral share, 
and it was not proportioned to the actual individual holding. 
It was from this circumstance that disputes among the 
members of the community arose, as also arrears of land 
revenue occurred. The customary remedy was to re-allocate
Jtv,c o Tfetica\
land and to re-apportion revenue according to the ancestral 
share. This internal re-arrangement was understandably 
opposed by those members of the community who were 
advantageously placed under the unequal state of affairs.
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The existing Regulations had in no way provided for the 
solution of the internal and public problems of the tenure 
of Bundelkhand. Various Collectors since 1807 had proposed 
government intervention to solve the problem by empowering 
the Collector to intervene. Another alternative would have 
been to form individual settlements of the raiyatwari type; 
but this was inexpedient and impracticable. A  raiyatwari 
settlement would dissolve the community, and as common 
privileges and obligations existed, it was not practicable 
either. Regulation VII therefore sought to resolve the 
problem by empowering the Collector to repartition revenue 
responsibility, and possession of land wherever inequality 
existed.1 This was along customary lines, but much would 
depend upon how the Collector proceeded, and how the co­
sharer reacted to his award. In Alexander Ross* opinion,
the provision was hardly calculated either to prevent
2
disputes or facilitate the realisation of revenue.
So far as the resident raiyats with a permanent right 
of occupancy were concerned, the Resolution of 1822 came 
out strongly in favour of protecting them. It went to the 
extent of stating that the government was inclined to 
protect even those resident raiyats who were not entitled 
to protection by the custom of the country. Non-resident 
raiyats i.e., those who came from outside the village to
1. Ibid., S.12.
2. A. Ikoss, remarks on the proposed draft of a regulation, 
25.2-.1821, SRJ.5. pp.315-16. Alexander Ross was Senior 
member of Board of Revenue for the Western Provinces.
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cultivate and the tenants-at-will were however to he excluded 
from protection* Protection to the resident rai.yat was 
not to he granted by mere legislative enactment as was done 
in Bengal, and which had proved ineffective* Here it was to 
he done hy distinctly acting, T ... upon the principle of 
minutely ascertaining and recording the rents payable hy 
individual ryots, of granting pottahs, or, at least, 
registering the ryotTs holdings, and of maintaining the rates 
established at the settlement during the term of such 
settlement as an essential part of the assessment*1 It 
should he pointed out here to prevent misinterpretation of 
the reason for protecting resident raiyats* that the rent 
theory had nothing to do with it. It was the result of a 
growing body of opinion both at the Court and in Bengal for 
over a decade, that the rents paid hy raiyats must he fixed. 
It was based on an assumption as old as the permanent 
settlement of Bengal, that under Indian custom they were 
always so fixed, and therefore the justice of intervention
3
hy the British government was unquestionable*
The general policy of fixing the rents of resident 
raiyats, however, admitted of an important qualification.
In extremely underdeveloped regions where low rates of rent 
prevailed, the inexpediency of fixing them for the period of
1. Resolution of Govt. 1*8.1822, paras. 105 and 107-08,
Bg. R.C. 1.8*1822, 6h.
2* Ibid., para.125* See also paras. 23 and 21U-17•
3* Ibid., paras. 33, 110-20 and 123-25*
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settlement was self-evident. In such cases only the
desirability of substituting cash rents for rents in kind
was stressed, but they were not to be at a higher valuation,*^
which would create another problem.
In revising the settlement the object was moderation
in assessment and not its enhancement, which was to be
2
combined with the equalisation of the jama. The dangers of
a detailed scrutiny into the assets, and a disclosure of the
real profits, and. a. discovery, of lakhira.1. tenures were fully.
realised. They could suddenly lead to an increased demand,
which the engagers would be unwilling to bear, and might
abruptly deprive them of a margin of comfort to which they
had become accustomed as a result of the enjoyment of
3
private, and so far undisclosed source of income. Besides, 
a sudden and sharp increase based on detailed calculation 
could also create a political problem as had been the
l±
experience in the case of Khurdah in the Province of Orissa. 
Moderation in demand was therefore to be the 'leading 
principle of the whole arrangement', which was to be
g
applicable to all varieties of tenure. This injunction to 
the Collectors was of a general nature, as a precise 
definition of what constituted a moderate demand was not
1. Ibid., paras. 286-95*
2. Reg.VII of 1822, preamble.
3. Resolution of Govt. 1.8,1822, paras. 73 and 79# op.cit.
k. Ibid., paras. 7^-6.
5* Jbid.. para* 35* See also para. 81
6. Ibid., paras. 77-80.
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possible.1 However the principle of a moderate demand seemed
nowhere more applicable, than in the regions where waste
land abounded in the vicinity of cultivated areas. A  high
assessment would soon become unequal and unbearable, because
cultivators from developed areas would shift to undeveloped
ones. The undeveloped part would thus be brought under
cultivation only by the transfer of labour and stock from
2the developed region.
The amount of ’proprietary1 profit to be left with
individuals was to depend upon circumstances. Where an
increase on the existing .jama was demanded, then the profit
■3
to be left was to be 20 per cent on the jama. By 
implication it followed that where no increase was demanded, 
then the pre-1822 principle of ten per cent deduction on the 
jama was to continue to operate.
In regard to waste land two aspects of the question 
were of considerable importance - that of its ownership and 
of bringing it under cultivation. The right of the state 
to all waste land in excess of what was necessary for 
pasturage was unambiguously put forward. This declaration 
was qualified only by the proviso that if a Zamindar proved 
his right to waste land, then the state’s claim would be 
withdrawn.^ The reason behind claiming all unappropriated
1. Ibid., See paras. 72-3*
2. See H. Mackenzie to BOR.W.P. 18.7.1822, paras,35-8, 
Bg.R.C. 18.7.1822, UU.
3. Reg. VII of 1822, S.7/2.
1+. ybid.. S.8; Resolution of Govt. 1.8.1822, 
para.228, Bg. R.C. 1.8.1822, 6k*
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waste land was obviously to create additional revenue for 
the state, promote extension of cultivation, and create new 
rights in such lands. To encourage cultivation of waste lands 
two courses were open, as was pointed out hy Holt Mackenzie.^ 
Those courses were either to attract capital from a distance 
hy the inducement of long leases, or to give easy and 
attractive terms, so that people in the neighbourhood would 
he interested in developing the waste.
.......After, the settlement.had been revised, it was to he. .
formed for a longer period, hut Regulation VII made no
2
specification about its duration. This was deliberately
3
omitted from the Regulation for two reasons. The Court of 
Directors had not yet given authority to government for 
leases beyond five years, and secondly, the state of 
agriculture was so uneven that a uniform period of long 
leases was not possible* The mistake of having pledged the 
government to a permanent settlement in the early years, 
without knowing the conditions, would thus seem to have been 
very much in mind.
Yet in the official documents which were not made 
public then, it was clearly understood that a longer lease 
would be necessary, and in this respect the support of the 
Court of Directors was confidently expected. According to
1. See H. Mackenzie to BOR. W.P. 18*7*1822, 
paras, U8~9« Ob.cit.
2. See Reg. VII of 1822, S.7/1.
3. See Bg. R.L, (C. & C.P.), 1.8.1822, 3, paras, 21~3.
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the government a longer lease was necessary not only for the
speedy conclusion of revision work for the province as a
whole, hut also to assuage the feelings of landholders
disappointed hy the abandonment of the policy of a permanent 
1
settlement. This was for general application, hut in
particular cases, government was still in favour of 
2
permanency. In this context it is interesting to note that 
Alexander Ross was advocating a permanent settlement for 
developed festates' because government was pledged to it, and
a detailed settlement in his opinion would remove real or
3
supposed objections to permanency of assessment.
The government had considered a lease of ten or 
twelve years as sufficient after the revision of the 
settlement, while Ross had recommended twenty-five years 
when settlement was made with the proprietors1, and 
'estates* were susceptible of improvement. The general 
opinion among revenue officers was also in favour of longer 
leases.^
The settlement under the new dispensation was to rest
1. See Resolution of Govt. 1.8.1822, paras. 66-7 and 81.
Op.cit.
2* Bg.R.L. 1.8.1822. Op.cit., para.2U; Resolution of Govt.
1.8.1822, para.57. Bg.R.C. 1.8,1822, 6k.
3. See A. Ross remarks on ... draft of a regulation, SRJ.5. 
p.316. But in 1835 when a proposal from Charles Metcalfe 
for permanency in the Western Provinces came up before 
the Council, Alexander Ross opposed it, and used Ricardian 
rent theory to support his argument. See below p«428 
k • Resolution of Govt. 1,8.1822, paras 71 and 68, Op.cit.
A. Ross, remarks on ... draft of a regulation, SRJ.3.
P.313.
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on the solid foundation of detailed inquiry. The underlying 
method was a ’synthetic1 one, and that completely rules out 
any suggestion of an approach based exclusively on any 
economic theory, such as the Ricardian theory of rent. (This 
is however not to deny rent theory a little influence in 
the calculation of the assessment. This hypothesis can be 
substantiated by an examination of the instructions issued 
to the Tahsildars.) A review of those instructions even at 
the.risk of making the. narrative heavy with detail is ... . 
relevant to an understanding, not only of the policy but of 
its working in the subsequent years.
The information to be obtained by the Tahsildars^ 
falls into four distinct categories. These concerned land, 
assets, rights, and social and economic factors. The village 
rukba or area was to be shown through four different 
sources - from the records of former Kanungos, from those 
of the present Kanungos. from the records of five 
settlements which had taken place under the British 
administration, and from the measurements of the land which
were to be carried out by the Tahsildars. The rukba was
2 3then to be distributed into malguzari and non-malguzari
land showing the quantity of land in each case. In regard
1. The analysis is based on the Instructions to Tahsildars, 
in the draft of a parwana issued by BOR. W.P* n.d.,
- - Bg-. -Rid. 26.6.1823,-^5*..............................   ■ ■
2. Malguzari = Land paying revenue to the government.
3. Non-malguzari = land not paying any revenue to the 
government•
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to malguzari land the shares of owners were to he shown# 
Particulars of crops with special reference to the staple 
crop of the village, together with the yield per bigah of 
each kind of land were to he exhibited. Lands appropriated 
for orchards, for village servants, mafi1 land and cultivable 
waste were to be stated. The measurement of land by jarib 
(chain or rope used for the measurement of land), and
expressed in bigahs was to be specified. The length of jarib
' in'gaz or yard, and the length of the gaz were also to be
2
given. If the standard village .jarlb differed from the 
standard pargana jarib, then the rukba was to be given in 
the latter measure also. Particulars relating to the 
standard village bigah were also required, and if it 
differed from the standard pargana bigah, then the latter 
was also to be given.
3
In regard to the assets of the village, rai-bandi 
in kind or money payment was to be furnished, which was to
1. Mafi =■ Land exempted from paying revenue to the 
government. Such land was generally a small parcel, 
assigned in lieu of service or granted for charitable or 
religious purpose.
2. Jarib = Its length was 60 gaz; G-az = 33 inches. This 
was the standard established by the British and the 
measurement was actually done according to that standard. 
Akbar's gaz which was usually referred to in the region
had no uniform standard. It varied between 29 and 35 inches.
3. Rai-bandi ~ a statement or table of rates, a document 
showing the rates at which different descriptions of land 
are usually assessed in any particular district.
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"be of three different types - one from the village itself,
based upon the depositions of the Zamindars, Patwaris and
cultivators, the second from the neighbouring villages for
similar kinds of land, and the third the rai-bandi of the
pargana in which the village was situated. The next important
document was to be the .iamabandi of the cultivated land
including the siwai1 and abwab collections for the past five
years. The .iamabandi was to be prepared in two ways, one
according to the pargana and the. other according to the
village rai-bandi. Besides, a statement of annual zamindari
2
profit from .jalkar, bankar, phalkar, and nazarana were to 
be furnished. To balance the assets against the village 
management expenses, the annual charges for the last five 
years as entered in the patwari account was also to be 
obtained.
As regards village rights the inquiry was to begin by
3identifying the village with one or the other taluq, If it 
came within the jurisdiction of a Taluqdar, then his right 
and interest in the village was to be inquired into. It was 
also to be inquired if the Taluqdar could raise the jama of 
the village at will, or manage it in any way he liked, or if 
he could transfer the rights of village Zamindars. Then the
1* Siwai = any collection besides Land revenue, e.g. from 
forest, river, pond or a cess,
2. Jalkar = profits or rents derived from the water, lakes, 
ponds, etc. in an festate * or village including the right 
of fishing; Bankar = profits derived from the produce of 
forest; Phalkar = profits derived from the produce of 
orchards.
3* Taluq = a revenue sub-division comprising several villages.
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rights of village co-sharers were to he investigated in the 
presence of all the members, and the names of sharers 
together with the extent of their shares were to he recorded* 
Claimants to the right to own land who were not in 
possession were also to he recorded with the length of their 
dispossession* Each cultivator was also to he interviewed in 
the presence of Zamindars* and information on how they
became cultivators, the period of residence, the manner of
........................... e ........
collection and adjustment of rents to^gther with their
A-
rights were to he recorded*
The Tahsildars were also required to furnish 
information on rural administrative, social, and economic 
organisation* Such as how the Lambardar^ was chosen, and
what was his profit thereof. How the Patwari and other
2 3village servants like Balahar and Chaukidar were chosen
and remunerated* Information on population and its
distribution according to caste and occupation, and the
village custom relating to sites of houses, whether any
ground rent was paid for it, or it was free occupation, or
the permission of Zamindar was needed for erecting houses-,
1* Lambardar = village headman or Mukaddam or Sadr Malguzar* 
The term Lambardar is of entirely British origin used for 
the first time by Holt Mackenzie in his memorandum of 
1*7*1819* It is derived from the word numbers used in the 
records for serialising revenue engagement* Thus the 
holder of a particular ’number f became a Lambardar in 
mufassal phraseology.
Balahar = village sweeper who originally served as 
watchman also*
3* Chaukidar = village watchman. This was a British 
innovation*
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were also required# In regard to economic factors, 
information was required on the number of ploughs and 
hullocks, and the number of bigahs one plough could prepare 
for cultivation# Information on the irrigation of the 
village was also asked for. The disposition of the labour 
force in the village was also to be noted. Data on the 
internal and external economic factors, such as roads, 
bazars, hats,1 and the prices of articles sold in the last 
ten years were also to be supplied. The Tahsildars were 
also to communicate information on the names and places of 
residence of different agents and bankers, and their 
customary mode of transacting business#
Thus the intention behind the gigantic scale of the 
inquiry was to enable the government to understand the 
agrarian structure in all its details, together with the 
social and economic factors affecting it# This was to be 
made clear to the Zamindars. The purpose of the enquiry was 
not, as the Tahsildars were informed by the Board of 
Revenue, to enable the government to increase the revenue# 
Its purpose was to regulate the .jama, to prevent over­
assessment, and to ascertain the rights of sharers and 
cultivators so as to secure them. The Collectors were to 
base their proceedings on information furnished by the 
Tahsildars, but not without verifying each item on the spot
= moveable market or a market that was held only on 
certain days of the week.
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and "by questioning Zamindars, cultivators, and Patwaris 
publicly in the presence of the village community*
In the revision of the settlement, apart from the 
principles on which the calculation of the assessment was to 
rest, the grant of judicial powers to the Collectors for the 
determination of disputes of proprietary* title and rent 
cases was an extremely important feature of the scheme. The 
process of forming a settlement, in so far as the 
determination of proprietary* rights were concerned, was 
essentially a judicial one. All relevant evidence 
pertaining to a 'proprietary* title would have to be gone 
into, before the title was actually awarded. Similar 
process would be required in disposing of rent-disputes* As 
the Civil Courts could not be shifted from the Sadr station 
to the village one after another, the need for vesting
1
judicial powers in the Collectors was the only alternative.
It was clearly a breach in the administrative
2
principles of 1793 but not an undesirable one, as was 
mistakenly suggested by Henry Newnham, a member of the Board 
of Commissioners for Bihar and Benares or the Central 
Provinces. It was at the same time not as radical a 
departure as the exclusive cognisance of revenue matters by 
Collectors only which Alexander Ross for instance, had
1. See Bg. R.D. (W.P.), 24.10.1827, paras. 11-12.
2. B.O.C.C.P. to Bg. Govt., 8.3.1822, SRJ.3.p p .307-08.
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1
recommended. The Collectors 1 judicial power was to he kept
within well-defined limits, and appeals from their decisions
2
were to he allowed to the Civil Courts. Still, the 
advantage of such grants of power was considerable. It would 
not only resolve any unnecessary dispute, hut would also 
produce substantial advantage to the people, by cutting 
down the distance separating the mufassal from the Civil
3
Courts and delivering justice at their door-step. But at
the same time it must he pointed out that this arrangement
looked excellent and efficient on paper only* And one would
not disagree with the observations of the Court of Directors,
and Henry Newnham, that either the judicial task of the
Collectors would suffer on account of other settlement
business, or that the work of revising the settlement would
k
be delayed by the judicial duties of the Collectors*
Collectors were empowered to decide causes of rent
5
and disputes of ownership. This power it should be noted 
was to be exercised only in the village where resettlement
g
was in progress* The main reason was to prevent the over-
7
loading of work upon the Collectors. The basis of decision 
on suits of ’property* was to be the actual possession of
1. See Resolution of Govt. 1.8.1822, paras. 239-J+O. Bg.R.C.
1.8.1822, 6k.
2. See Reg. VII of 1822, S.29/6.
3. See Bg. R.L. (C.& C.P*), 1.8*1822, 3, para.275 A.Ross,
remarks on .•. draft of a regulation, 23*2.1821, SRJ.3,
PP*315-6,
k. Bg. R.D. (W.P.), 2k.10.1827, para.7; B.O.C.C.P. to Bg,
Govt., 8.3.1822, Qp.cit.
5. Reg. VII of 1822, preamble.
6. Bg. R.L. (C.& C.P.), 30.7.1823, 5, para. 13*
7. BOR. W.P. to Bg. Govt., 2.1.1823, Bg.R.C. 6.2.1823, 52.
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land or receipt of proprietary1 profit. Collectors were
not to disturb the existing possession of land and claimants 
without possession were to be referred to the regular courts 
of justice. However, where government thought it just to 
review an otherwise valid title in the light of claims made 
by others, the Collectors could be empowered to determine 
such cases. The exercise of judicial power with the same 
limitations was also applicable to lakhiraj and mukarrari
tenures*1...................................................
As the settlements could not be revised instantly 
throughout the province as a whole, the existing ones were 
to be renewed for five year periods until revision was 
accomplished* The renewal of a settlement did not imply an 
alteration in the existing assessment excepting in cases 
where ’estates1 were relinquished* The districts of 
Gorakhpur and Azimgarh were however to be excluded from five 
yearly renewal, because past settlements in these two caseB
had been singularly defective. But here also no increase in
2
the jama was contemplated. The wholesale renewal of 
existing settlement was dictated by the need to concentrate 
administrative energy and resources on the task of revising 
the settlement. But strangely enough and without thought 
the benefit which was expected from extending the existing
1. Reg. VII of 1822, SS. 13-16,
2. Ibid.« SS.2,i+,6 and 7; Resolution of Govt. 1.8.1822, 
paras. 37 and U3, On.cit. See also Reg. IX of I82i+ and 
II of 1826.
3. Bg. R.L. (C.& C.P.), 30,7*1623< 5$ para.29*
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settlement was wasted by legalising the resignation of
Zamindars from their engagements of revenue. Such Zamindars
had the option of re-engagement at the end of five years,
and during the period of exclusion they were entitled to
receive a malikana of five to ten per cent of the net
collections.1 The motive behind the provision was to
protect all revenue engagers from the pressure of the
existing assessment which was unequal and therefore partly
2
over-assessed. The logic therefore being, that under the 
provision of resignation only those ’estates’ would be 
resigned which were really over-assessed. It was hardly 
realised that such a provision could become a general 
invitation to resign, which would bring the management of 
thousands of ’estates’ into the hands of revenue officers, 
and thus deflect them from the great object of revision of 
settlement under Regulation VII of 1822.
Divergent expectations of the results of the revision 
of the settlement were held at the time. The Western Board of 
Commissioners was exceedingly optimistic when it estimated 
a period of 5i years as adequate for the revision work.
The Bengal government had no such illusion and considered a
k
long period of time was necessary for a detailed arrangement. 
Henry Newnham was the only prophet of doom when he stated
1. Reg. VII of 1822, SS. 2 and 5.
2. See A.Ross, remarks on ... draft of a regulation, 23*2.1821, 
SRJ. 3, p.317.
3. BOG. C. & C.P. to Bg. Govt., 1U.8.1821, SRJ.3t P.313.
4. Resolution of Govt., 1.8.1822, paras. 19 and 2k,
Bg. R.C. 1.8.1822, 6k.
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that, the 'closest discussion of a law differs from the 
practical application of it.' He also implied the entire 
collapse of the scheme if the Collector did not receive 
complete cooperation within a village; and unless the 
Collector was a master of revenue affairs he would not he
p
in a position to administer 'scientifically’.
In view of the amount of industriousness which
produced the plan of 1822, and the earnestness of intentions
behind it, it would he uncharitable to characterise the
scheme as a great failure* Yet the fact remains that very
little was achieved even ten years after the settlement had
been in progress. At all levels of the revenue administration
the unsatisfactory progress of settlement was fully 
*
acknowledged. But what is extremely surprising is, that 
as late as 1830 it was not even known what actual progress 
had been made. In September I83O we find the Board of 
Revenue requesting more time to submit a statement on the 
progress of settlements, which produced a sarcastic remark 
from Metcalfe, - that even after eight years the Board had 
no information to offer to the government.^
1. BOC. C.P. to Bg. Govt., 8.3*1822, SRJ. 3, P*305*
2* Ibid.. pp*306-07*
3. Memo, on Settlements unsigned, n.d* Bentinck MSS.2650.
[The memo, in all probability was. prepared by W.H. 
Macnaghten who as revenue and judicial secretary had 
accompanied Bentinck in the tour of Upper Provinces from 
1830 to I833].
U. SBOR. on deputation to Bg. Govt., 3*9*1830, SRRNWP. 2; 
Minute of C. Metcalfe, 7*11.1830, Ibid.
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In a statement given in Lord Bentinck*s minute of 
20 January 1832 which was "based on information furnished by 
the Collectors, we get an account of settlements made up to 
I83I. The progress, or the absence of progress was very 
uneven. We notice that no Settlement had been formed in
A
Bundelkhand and Kampur, while Gorakhpur which could boast 
of having the highest number of settlements, had not a 
single one of them confirmed by government. And the time 
required for the completion of the arrangements in the 
several districts varied from three to sixty years* The 
following statement would show the actual progress.1
District or 
sub-division
No. of
villages
revised
Period 
required for 
completion
Settlements 
confirmed bj; 
government
Agra 145 16 or 18 yrs. none
Saidabad 187 16 or 20 yrs. none
Aligarh 327 10 or 20 yrs. none
Kanpur none 14 or 20 yrs. none
Fatehpur 4 20 or 25 yrs* none
Allahabad 25 20 or 25 yrs. none
Farrakhabad 260 not specified none
Bel ah 34 60 years none
Etawah 32 not specified none
Sirpurah 226 15 years none
Mainpuri no return no return none
Gorakhpur 765 7 or 8 years none
Azimgarh 8 8 years none
continued on page
1. Minute of Bentinck, 20*1.1832, para.43, Ibid.
2G1
continued from page
District or 
sub-division
No. of
villages
revised
Period 
required for 
completion
Settlements 
confirmed by 
government
Southern
Moradbad 38 not specified none
Northern
Moradbad 78 2k years none
Saheswan no return no return none
Bareli 383 12 years 26
Shah jehanpur 3k0 25 years 10
Pillibhit 57 Ik years none
Southern
Bundelkhand none not specified none
Northern
Bundelkhand no return no return none
Meerut 116 3 years 18
Bulandshahr 396 3 years 10
Muzaffarnagar 60 15 years 5
Saharanpur 12k 25 years none
According to a statement prepared “by the Board of 
Revenue in 1831 we get some more information on settlements* 
The number of villages which were surveyed amounted to 
6,35^ for the province as a whole, and the quantity of land 
measured amounted to 5*701*080 bigahs. The uneveness of 
even this paltry progress stands out very clearly, which 
varied from a minimum of six villages in Fatehpur to 709 in 
Azimgarh, and 1,23^ 4- in Gorakhpur. The assessment of these 
villages before survey and revision was Rs.2,727,082* The 
number of resettled villages submitted for confirmation to
282
government was 1,368, whose former jama was Rs.866,^98 and
whose proposed jama was Rs.937,792. There were also villages
whose settlement was completed either hy the Collectors or
Tahsildars hut which were not submitted to the higher
revenue authorities. Of such villages Collectors had
settled 2,33^ whose previous assessment was Rs.792,127 and
the proposed one was Rs.7^7>577* Tahsildars had
completed the settlement of 2,652 villages assessed formerly
at Rs.1,077,331
A review of the settlement actually formed under
Regulation VII, both from the standpoint of the adjustment
of rights and the calculation of the assessment would be
worthwhile and necessary for an understanding of the
mistakes committed in the process of forming those
settlements. The adjustment of rights however does not
require any detailed remark because there is very little
that requires notice. Engagements were taken from parties
found in actual possession, whether as Zamindars of entire
villages or as joint Zamindars in a uattidari village as
2
was done in Meerut, or from, a Taluqdar where no claimants
came forward to engage as was the case in some of the
3
settlements in Bulandshahr. According to Regulation VII
1. Statement of Settlement under Reg.VII of 1822, Annexed 
to SBOR. letter to G.G. 25.5.1831, Bg. R.C, 27.12.1832,
35
2. I.R.L., 6.7.1835, para.12.
3. Ibid., para.17#
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the rents of resident raiyats were generally to he fixed, 
hut in Aligarh the rents of such raiyats were not fixed
“because they were considered not to possess the right to pay
1
at fixed rents. In Agra on the other hand, we find the
Collector fixing the rents even of the tenants-at-will,
which drew the disapprobation of the government, on the
ground that rents so fixed were on a fictitious and
2
arbitrary basis. As the Bengal government wrote to the 
Court of Directors regarding some settlements in Meerut,
*the fields cultivated by each ryot have been recorded, but 
the rates of rent paid have been noted in the Collector’s 
proceedings in sums which seem to have been fixed by no 
certain rule, and the process of ascertaining which has not 
been explained according to any legitimate s y s t e m . T h e  
same was true in Agra and Bulandshahr. The fictitiousness 
of fixed rents can be justly inferred from the fact, that 
they were not adhered to in practice. The payments of the 
raiyats continued according to actually prevailing rates.^ 
When we come to examine the calculation of the 
assessment we notice a wide gap separating principle and 
practice. The principle of the assessment in the 
arr%igement of 1822 was sought to be clearly defined so as 
to put a limit to the demand of government. This had become
1. Bg. R.D. (W.P.), 2U.10.1827, para.19.
2. R.L. 7.7.183U, 8, para.122.
3. I.R.L., 6.7,1835, para.12,
U. Ibid.» paras. 12 and 17; R.L., 7.7.183U* paras. 121-2.
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imperative "because up to 1822 a vague notion existed that
customary rates regulated the payments of the raiyats; while
a. scrutiny of documents obtained from Zamindars and
Taluqdars revealed no principle by which the interests of
raiyats and government were to be regulated* They contained
only general exhortations in favour of the protection of
the raiyats. The principle laid down by Akbar had long
ceased to exist,'1' and payments of raiyats were only limited
by their ability- to-pay* - In the absence -of a living rule and
accuracy of data the assessment under the British was
*rather a composition for undefined demands than an accurate
2
adjustment of rights, or a well understood contract,* The 
irony of the situation in fixing the assessment was vividly 
pointed out by Holt Mackenzie when he stated to the 
Parliamentary Inquiry Committee that, *... the collector 
and the community [were] playing at a game of brag, in which 
all knowledge was on the one side and nearly all power on
-Z
the other,,,** Or as James Stuart remarked, in the 
absence of authentic accounts *the collectors have too 
generally been obliged to satisfy themselves with various 
imperfect substitutes of conjectural estimates, partial 
measurements, secret intelligence, and by putting up the 
lands to a sort of auction, in which speculators and 
adventurers, and enemies, have been encouraged to. bid
1 . Resolution of Govt,, 1 ,8,1822, para.89. Bg.R,C,l*8,l822,6i|.
2, Ibid., paras. 86 and 8h*
3* Evidence of H. Mackenzie, P«Po 1831-2, 11, p.298.
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against the hopes and fears of the zemindars* t1 Thus, 
hitherto the basic question whether there was to he a 
recognised limit to the government’s demand had not been 
posed*
In 1822 it was decided to fix the assessment upon 
every field and upon every resident raiyat* The payment of 
the resident raiyat was to be the gross revenue, from which 
a part was to be relinquished to the Zamindar as his 
proprietary due*. But In the .determination.of the gross 
revenue the Zamindar was to have no hand, and the sum so 
fixed upon the resident raiyat was to remain fixed for the 
term of the settlement. The assessment for the province as 
a. whole was to be built up from individual fields upwards 
through the villages, parganas and districts: this was 
justly characterised as the detail to aggregate method*
For calculating the gross assessment, the gross 
produce principle was rejected on the ground that it was 
unsound* In rejecting it the assumptions of rent theory were 
applied* The government stated that in lands of varying 
fertility of soil and situation, *there must necessarily be 
much land cultivated of which the whole crop does little 
more than repay the labour of [the] husbandman, and much 
that affords a large surplus, after meeting the wages of 
labour and the charge for capital employed in its tillage* *
1* Minute of J. Stuart, 18.12.1820, SRJ. 3, p.222.
2. See Resolution of Govt*, para.127» op.cit.
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A flat rate of the partition of the gross produce would 
lead to an inequitable assessment* James Mill stated the 
same thing in his evidence before the Committee of House 
of Commons in 1831. According to him the gross produce 
principle was the practice of rude Indian governments which 
if followed would prevent land of less fertility from being 
cultivated."*"
It should be pointed out that both the Bengal
government and-James Mill were mistaken in their............
understanding of the working of the gross produce principle*
As was shown by James Stuart, the assessment in India based
on the gross produce, and paid in kind or cash varied
according to the crop and to the fertility of the land. He
goes so far as to say that given a species of produce and a
certain proportion of land the assessment was invariable.
In case of valuable crops like cotton and sugar-cane cash 
2
rates existed and for the poor soil a favourable rate to 
the cultivator existed* It would therefore be wrong to state 
that the gross produce principle was a disincentive to the 
expansion of agriculture. The views of the Bengal government 
and of James Mill only serve to show the danger of applying 
theoretical notion to different situations and practices.
The principle of assessment inculcated by the Bengal
1* Evidence of J. Mill, h.8*1831, Q.3163, IMP. 1831, 5,
p.296*
2* Minute of J. Stuart, 18.12.1820, op.cit.* pp.215 and 217.
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government was a combination of Indian peculiarities and 
the rent theory* The calculation was to he made with
1reference to the produce and capabilities of land1* The 
emphasis here was that the assessment was not to he based on 
the net rent, hut on the results of detailed inquiry, checked 
by the net rent* The net rent was to he assumed by striking 
an average of the produce of several mahals and taking one*- 
third or one-fourth of the average produce as the net rent* 
■This would then be applied to test the accuracy of the 
actual assessment, and its regulation* As was stated by 
government, fwe may thus establish a general rate or rates 
according to which the amount to be required from an 
officer or malgoezar charged with the collections of an 
extensive pergunnah shall be regulated and their accounts 
checked* But such rates cannot generally be applied to 
individual villages, still less to individual fields, 
further than as one means of determining their aggregate 
produce*1 The regulation of the assessment clearly meant 
the prevention of over-assessment* In this context it was 
observed that, 1 .*. there must always be great danger lest, 
while we imagine that we take only a share of the net rent, 
we in fact encroach on the fair wages of labour, and profits 
of stock, or even compel the cultivators to sacrifice the 
means of maintaining the actual cultivation in order to
1. Reg* VII of 1822, S. 7/2.
2* Resolution of Govt*, 1.8*1822, para.128, Bg*R*C. 1*8*1822,
6U.
discharge the Government jumma. fl It was also enjoined that 
where the outlay of capital for the improvement of the land 
was projected additional moderation was to he shown to the
2raiyat hy ensuring a liberal return on capital and labour.
It was also the full intention of the government to 
preserve the varying degrees of privileges and peculiarities 
obtaining in a custom ridden society. The danger of 
upsetting these privileges through the use of the 'net rentf 
concept was fully foreseen. The- two were to be reconciled.' 
It was pointed out that, Tthe numbers, castes, characters, 
habits, situations, and institutions of the people must be 
carefully considered, as well as the nature and 
productiveness of the land and the facilities of disposing
■3
of its produce*
The calculation of the assessment in all its aspects 
- the actual assessment, its regulation by the net rent, 
the estimate of the net rent, the confinement of the 
assessment within the limits of rent, and the preservation 
of peculiarities and privileges, all depended upon the 
results of inquiry.
Prom what has been stated above regarding the use of 
rent theory in forming the assessment, James Mill would 
appear to be mistaken when he stated that the government in
1. Ibid.. para.101.
2. Ibid., para.102. 
3* Ibid.. para.98.
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1
India had no notion of the rent concept. As the settlement
scheme was formulated hy the Bengal government, and as there
was no policy-making despatch Between 1820 and 1833 from
the Home government for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces,
we must credit the former alone for the application of rent
2
theory to land revenue. We also discount utilitarian 
influence through James Mill on the land revenue arrangement 
in the Western Provinces when Regulation VII was enacted and 
was Being implemented. But it is interesting to note that 
some features of the principles propounded By government 
were similar to those stated By James Mill in his, 
'Observations on the Land Revenue of India1 Those 
similarities related to fixing the assessment direct on 
every field, and keeping it within the Bounds of the net 
rent. While James Mill's advocacy of a field assessment 
arose from the prevailing Belief in state landlordism in 
India, the example of Madras raiyatwari, and the notion of 
rent-owners Being an unproductive class, that of the Bengal 
government arose from the Belief that all resident raiyats 
were entitled to have their rents fixed By government and to
1. Evidence of J. Mill, 18.8.1831, Q. 3883, P.P. 5, p*36U,
2. The Bg. R.D. (C. & C.P.), of 1.8*1821, 1, only contained 
six paras., and confirmed the arrangements of the Bengal 
government for a detailed settlement, while a permanent 
settlement was refused. The Court and consequently James 
Mill as an Assistant Examiner in the revenue department, 
had no hand even in this short and rather unimportant 
despatch, Because it originated with the Board of Control.
See above p.237*
3. I5.8.I832, P.P., 11, App.7> See also E*Stokes, The 
English Utilitarians and India, p.92«
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pay accordingly, which would he hest achieved hy proceeding 
on a raiyatwari basis.1
The individual who introduced rent theory into land 
revenue administration undoubtedly was Holt Mackenzie* In
p
his memorandum of 1819, we find evidence of rent law, and
3
so also in the Resolution of 1822 and Regulation VII, which 
no doubt he drafted* In the evidence before the House of 
Commons committee also we find him developing its connection 
with land revenue* Holt Mackenzie’s understanding of the 
rent theory and in grasping its relevance to India may have 
been the result of several factors* He was a student of 
Malthus, and may have read his tract on The Nature and 
Progress of Rent which appeared in 1815 and his Principles 
of Political Economy which appeared in 1820* Mackenzie may 
also have read Ricardo’s Principles which was published in 
1817* He may have read Mill’s History too, which showed the 
connection of rent law with land revenue in India.^
Besides Holt Mackenzie, there were other individuals 
in the Bengal administration who understood the theory and 
advocated its application as a principle of taxation - for 
instance William Wilberforce Bird and Alexander Ross. Lord 
Bentinck even when its use in forming the assessment had 
failed insisted on using ’rent’ in the technical sense, i.e.
1. See Resolution of Govt., 1.8.1822, para.270, op*cit*
2. H.Mackenzie, memo. 1.7*1819* para.369n. and 636,
Bg.E.C. 16.9.1820, 4.
3. See above, pp.250 and 265-8.
4. See vol.l, pp.324-7•
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what remained after the wages of labour and the profits of
stock had been substracted from the produce.1
Rent was considered to be the result of the pressure
of population upon land which forced the community to
undertake the cultivation of poorer soils. The richer soils
in the varying degree of fertility would yield rent, while
the marginal or poorer soil would only yield the cost of
production and the profits of capital* Rent could be
calculated by deducting the cost of production, and profits
on stock from the produce. It was thus distinct from profits
and wages* While Mai thus saw no obj^tion to the
appropriation of rent by landowners, Ricardo considered it
an evil and advocated its taxation. Since rent did not enter
as an element in the cost of production, profits, wages
2
and prices remained unaffected by it.
James Mill had expounded the application of rent 
theory to the Indian revenue system in his History and in 
some of the revenue despatches to Bombay and Madras between 
1822 and I83I which were probably drafted by him* But, it 
was only in 1831-32 before the House of Commons committee,
1. Minute of W.W.Bird, 27*^-*l832, paras. 22 and 21, Bg.R.C. 
27.12.1832, 58; Minute of A .Ross, 27*7*1833, paras 11-12, 
Bgc R.C. 9*9*1833, 36; Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, 
para.15* Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 79; Minute of Bentinck, 
29*2.1832, para.13, Bentinck MSS* 2903*
2. T.R.Maithus, Principles of Political Economy, p.217;
J.H . Hollander and Gregory (ed*)* Ricardo, Notes on
Maithus1 Principles of Political Economy , pp.XXIII-IV.
3. See below, p.382.
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that, he put forward the idea of the applicability of rent
theory to India with great force and inexorable logic* This
no doubt was the result of his experience in India House,
and the distinction which he had gained there.^ Here only
a few of his suggestions should be repeated. He maintained,
that rent was the ideal source of revenue which when kept
within its bound would not discourage industry. The creation
of rent-owners either in the form of Zamindars or raiyats
was undesirable because they would consume rent, and .......
prevent the accumulation of capital. The assessment was to
be fixed directly on the raiyats. and to guard against the
pressure of demand part of the rent was to be left to them.
If intermediaries were to be maintained, which would be
inevitable in zamindari areas, they should only be for
collecting revenue, and should be remunerated from the
2government share of property. James Mill was reconciling 
the advocacy of state land-lordism with the creation of 
limited property in the raiyats. and due incentive to 
agriculture. Appropriation of substantial portion of rent 
by government would amount to its ownership of land. On the 
other hand the surrender of a portion of rent to the raiyat.
1. See E.Stokes, op.cit., Chap.2.
2. J.Mill, Observations on the Land Revenue of India’, 
15.8*1832, op.cit.; Evidence of J.Mill, U.8.I83I and 
19,8.1831, Q.3975-76, 3162, 3555 and 3556, PJP. 5, 
pp.372, 296 and 33U-5.
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and to see that the intermediary did not impinge upon the 
profit of raiyat would create limited property and encourage 
improvement of agriculture*
Holt Mackenzie as compared to James Mill!s teaching, 
considered the state as, a fgreat rent-owner * and saw no harm 
in appropriating the whole rent, hut he was prepared to 
leave private rent where the right to appropriate it existed**1’ 
He was closer to Maithus when he referred to the 
contribution of the British aristocracy specially in the 
political affairs of England; which he believed might he 
repeated in India hy the Indian aristocracy. Besides, to him,
p
1••• existing rights are of course sacred things*1 The
Bengal government while using the rent theory in thrashing
out principles of assessment did not abolish private rent.
It was only to he fixed and limited where resident raiyats 
3existed. It may also he interesting to point out, that 
Alexander Ross, W.W. Bird and Lord Bentinck though 
subscribers to rent theory, were advocates of valuable 
property hy allowing private rent to the Zamindar* In their 
thinking neither the rent of raiyat was to he fixed, as 
Mackenzie and Bengal government had thought in 1822, nor 
part of rent was to he allowed to the raiyat as Mill had 
advocated.^*
1. Evidence of H. Mackenzie, P.P. 1831-2, 11, p.301.
2* H. Mackenzie, memo. 1.7.1819, para. 369 n* Op.cit.
3« See above, pp. 24-4-6 and 265«
See Chap. 5.
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It has heen shown above that rent theory was 
considered a good foundation of a reformed land revenue 
system. The Edinburgh Review, and what is more surprising 
John Stuart a«& Mill have gone so far as to state that 
Indian land revenue was actually based upon rent. (J.S.
Mill had rejected the applicability of rent theory to India 
in an earlier work). The arguments in favour of the 
applicability of rent theory in Indian circumstances is 
however totally unacceptable, and the assessment was not 
actually based upon it.
The rent theory assumes the presence of a rental
market, which implies agricultural production for market*
It implies in other words, that the market determines the
volume of production and the extent of land under
cultivation* It is this circumstance which attracts
(capital farmer) to agriculture* The capital employed by
the farmer would be determined by the market conditions,
his profit would be governed by the competition for capital.
The surplus value of the produce after deducting the cost
of production, and the profit of the farmer in all land
except that of marginal fertility would be rent. The point
to be noted here is, that rent from land in the true
1* Article on TThe Revenue System of British India’,
Edinburgh Review. LXX (1839-UO); (J.S.Mill*), Memorandum 
of the Improvements in the Administration of India during 
the Last Thirty Years* pp*3> 20 and 21; E.Stokes, op*cit.. 
pp.130-31 and 136-7.
2* See E.Stokes, op.cit., pp*135~7«
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classical economic sense, would be formed within a capitalist 
economy with a large urban sector depending upon the 
agricultural sector for its food supply* Such was the case 
in England in the 19th century*
In the case of India to ascertain the formation of 
economic rent, we have to apply the test of capitalist 
farming, and the demand for agricultural produce* The 
organisation of agriculture in India primarily was to 
preserve self-supporting villages at a primitive level of 
existence, and to pay the fluctuating state demand. Farming 
was: not capitalist, unless of course we include money-lending 
of the village maha.lan or the takavi advance of government, 
as capital employed in agriculture* This would however 
amount to a misinterpretation of the term capitalist 
farming* The capitalist farmer primarily produced for profit 
and for a market by capital obtained at a reasonable rate 
of interest, determined by competition for capital, and by 
employing labour whose wages were paid according to market 
rates* He would normally not incur a loss by paying wages 
on the one hand and rent on the other* The borrowing of the 
raiyat from the maha.ian^  or his receiving takavi from the 
state was not with a view to increasing his profit in 
response to a favourable market. It was used to facilitate
1
1* For the dependence of raiyats and petty Zamindars
on mahajan see below pp*2/6-7 * 323 and 330-3 and. minute 
of A,fio’ss, 27.7*1833, para*14, Bg*R*C*9*9*1833| 36*
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the payment of revenue, and to maintain the subsistence level 
of return, hy buying seeds or a pair of bullocks in case of 
emergency. Perhaps in exceptional cases it was used for 
digging wells or introducing superior crops like sugar-cane 
or cotton or indigo or tobacco. And in some cases it may 
have been used to meet social obligations. The rate of 
interest which the rai.yat paid would go to show the drag of 
borrowed capital on agriculture and consequently on his 
profit, instead of a positive employment of capital for 
improving' agriculture. There was no uniform money market for 
the country as a whole, which can be easily inferred from 
the varying rate of interest. The maximum legal rate of 
interest was 12 per cent. In actual practice in Calcutta it 
fluctuated between 5 and 12 per cent, in smaller towns it 
was 6 per cent. In the villages it was 2k per cent to which 
the money-lender added the special condition of buying the 
produce at his own terms.^ The rate of interest at which 
the government advanced takavi was 12 per cent. The private 
rate of interest and the government rate in the villages 
was actually a monopoly rate, because apart from these two 
institutions no capital existed there. The nature of the 
money-lenderT s rate was usurious, and its burden on 
agriculture and agriculturists must be considered as 
terrible. Holt Mackenzie has rightly stated that the labour
1. H. Mackenzie, memo. On Usury Laws, n.d., Bentinck MSS. 
2729.
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of the raiyat was supported on borrowed capital - *the food
he consumes being advanced to him at usury, the seed he
sows is almost invariably so.1^*
From the above it is clear that the relation of
capital to agriculture in India was not of the same nature,
as in England or in any other capitalist economy. In India
no organised money market existedto enable capital easily to
shift from sectors of abundance to those where it would be
welcomed. Either the capitalists in the town did not grasp
the significance of employing it for raising the level of
production, growing marketable crops, and reaping the
profit or the agriculturists were unaware of the availability
of capital in the towns. This peculiarity only goes to
confirm the primitive organisation and backwardness of the ‘
2
economy as a whole. This brings us to the second criterion 
of economic rent, i.e. the demand for agricultural produce.
On this important question we are still in the dark because 
the data relating to trading in agricultural produce have 
not been worked out. It is therefore difficult to determine 
the extent of the market, and what is more important, but 
still more difficult to assess, is the awareness and 
response of the agriculturists to market advantages.
1. Ibid.
2. We can treat Indigo plantation as an exception, but it 
was exclusively an European enterprise. Here also the 
profit derived by Zamindars were wasted. However, from 
the viewpoint of the government, it facilitated the 
collection of land revenue. See below, pp.319 and 453.
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We can however arrive at fairly accurate inferences 
"by a consideration of well-known facts regarding the 
question of the demand for agricultural produce* The demand 
can he split into internal and foreign. The internal demand 
would depend upon the extent of urbanisation, hut here also 
we encounter the difficulty of not knowing the ratio of 
urban to rural population* .All that we can say is that the 
urban population in comparison to the rural, must have been 
very small, as no economic growth and structural change in 
the economy was taking place, and on the other hand the 
urban handicraft industries were on the decline* We can say 
that a limited internal market existed and we know that in 
commodities like indigo and cotton foreign market existed.
The important point to determine, which has already 
been stated is whether the agriculturist took into 
consideration the existence of an internal and external 
market. In general perhaps he was not aware of the market
conditions and in all likelihood the money-lender, the
1 2 trader and the merchant exploited the market to their own
advantage* The raiyat would probably exchange only that
portion of his produce which would cover his debts, interest
and revenue commitment. The rest of the produce would be
for home consumption; and with the pressure of population
1. Trader = person engaged in the exchange of goods, either 
by barter or for cash.
2. Merchant = person engaged in wholesale transactions of 
goods, especially with foreign countries.
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on land the raiyat would either have less for exchange or 
less for consumption. In certain cases we can concede an 
awareness of the market on the part of the agriculturist. 
For example the villages near towns must respond to market 
forces* In such villages the agriculturists most likely had 
an awareness of prices obtaining in the markets of the 
neighbouring towns, and the items of produce which could be 
sold there* Similarly the agriculturist who grew such crops 
as cotton, sugar-cane, vegetables, tobacco and high quality 
grains raised them primarily for markets* These crops 
required special preparation of soil and investment of 
money, and the object most certainly was profit* They could 
hardly be disposed of in the village itself. Their rents 
were invariably in cash partly because their value could be 
ascertained from the markets.
Thus it would be correct to state that the classical
theory of rent in the context of Indian agriculture had no
application. The two basic ingredients of rent formation as
pointed out above did not exist in India in the same way as
they existed in England. Capitalist farming was conspicuous
by its absence, and although a limited demand for produce
existed the agriculturist almost took no advantage from it.
Further, we also note that revenue in India was not
determined by calculating the profit of the raiyat and
appropriating all the surplus, but by the exigencies of the 
s
2tate, increase in population, and if there were anyA
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moderating factors these were of custom and the discretion
of the ruler. Under rent theory a farmer would not allow
rent to encroach upon his profit, whereas in India a raiyat
would pay any amount ahove the subsistence level. As
Edward Anderson Reade stated with reference to a pargana
in Gorakhpur the return to the raiyat in exchange for the
labour he bestowed upon agriculture was a living from hand
to mouth.1 It should also be pointed out that according to
rent theory, rent did not affect price because it was not an
element in the cost of production, but in India revenue
affected price because it was actually a tax on the produce,
2
and so it would be passed on to the consumers.
With the rejection of the application of rent theory 
to India we also reject the notion that revenue was based 
upon rent. Among the Indian officials Metcalfe was the only 
one to ridicule the use of the term in the Indian context.
He rightly stated that to call revenue part of rent was to 
mystify the whole question. Land revenue was a large 
portion of the gross produce. This would have been the 
reply of a raiyat if he was asked, not that revenue was part 
of rent or the zamindari receipt. It cannot be considered 
as part of rent because ten-elevenths of the gross collection 
was appropriated as revenue, and the gross collection was 
generally based upon the appropriation of one-half of the
1. E.A.Reade, On Rights of Ryots,, n.d», p,13.» Eur.MSS.L.279•
2. Minute of J. Stuart, 18.12,1820, SRJ. 3, p.22-1; See 
below p,315ff*
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1
gross produce. It may "be relevant to point out that the
profit and allowance of the Zamindar was not part of rent
hut part of the gross revenue. It should therefore he
appropriate to consider revenue as part of the gross
produce, and as James Stuart has stated, as a tax upon 
2
produce. But we cannot fully agree with James Stuart when 
he states that this tax upon produce fell not upon the 
cultivator, hut upon the consumer. Theoretically speaking
James Stuart was right, hut the reality of Indian..........
agriculture would suggest that the revenue fell upon the 
cultivator as well as the non^producing consumer. The 
raiyat cultivated small plots of land with crude tools, his 
produce would thus not he large, he was part consumer of 
his own produce, he had to pay revenue and meet the 
obligations of the maha.ian. It would thus follow that he 
had little or no control over the disposal of his produce.
He would not obtain a market price let alone his own price, 
because the pressure of his public, and private commitment 
would prevent him from withholding produce from exchange 
until a more favourable price was offered. The exchanger 
whether the maha.ian or the Zamindar would benefit by passing 
on the burden of tax upon the urban consumer, and not the 
raiyat.
1. Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 31.10.1831, Bg.R.C.27.12.1832, 43.
2. Minute of J.Stuart, 18.12.1820, op.cit.. p.221.
The continued use of the rent concept “by Indian
1
officials should thus he considered as a misconception.
At hest its use can he considered as a fiction whose main 
purpose was to confine revenue within economic rent* Holt 
Mackenzie, James Mill, ALexander Ross and Lord William 
Bentinck no douht wished to do so, hut they were in error 
in equating gross revenue with economic rent.
If on theoretical considerations rent theory was not 
applicable to India, objections to it on practical grounds 
arising from peculiarities of ownership, and the dubiousness 
of the data required for its calculation were all the more 
strong* Even the notable advocates of rent doctrine like 
Holt Mackenzie, and James Mill have admitted the difficulty 
of determining the productive power and value of land in 
India.^ Lord Auckland has gone further in stating precise 
arguments against the possibility of rent calculation. He 
has rightly explained the impossibility of estimating the 
rent receipts of land owners. Many were cultivating 
^Proprietors * who confounded their profits as ’proprietors’ 
with the wages of their labour. They paid their revenue by 
a rate on the land each cultivated without reference to its 
productiveness. In the second category we have the non­
1. See J. Strachey, India, pp.75-75 Imperial Gazetteer of 
India, k , p.23k*
2. Evidence of H. Mackenzie, P.P. 1831-2, 11, p.301; J. Mill, 
’Observations on the Land Revenue of India*, 15*8*1832, 
P.P.,11, App.7; Evidence of J. Mill, U.8.1831, Q.31&2,
P.P.i5. p.296.
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cultivating proprietorsT who received rent in kind, thus 
blending their profit as proprietors’ with those of 
traders or speculators. In the above two cases all nice 
calculations of either the productive power of the land or 
the expenses of production would not or did not reveal the 
assets of the village* The case was simpler where the non­
cultivating proprietors* with money rents existed or where 
revenue farmers existed* But here also estimates were 
exposed to error from deciet or fraud,^ because, as the 
Sadr Board of Revenue pointed out, the real accounts of 
rents cannot be obtained from persons interested in with­
holding them* It is curious to find the revenue Board which 
had been using the term rent in its classical sense, 
categorically dismissing the possibility of the Collector 
calculating rent* Its argument was very simple. The 
Collector had no knowledge of the agricultural operation 
and therefore had no means of estimating rent* To Lord 
William Bentinck it wrote, a contrary assumption would be 
to *••• presume that in support of which neither the actual 
results of experiment nor the fair deductions of reason can
p
be assumed* 1
The importance of data in computing land assets 
requires no emphasis, and as the data were untrustworthy no
1* Auckland to Court, 18*8.1838, 3, para.U7 (Bg. R.L.
Vol.29).
2. SBOR. on deputation to G.G., 25*5*1831, para.20, Bg.
R*C. 27.12.1832, 33*
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credit can "be placed upon calculations carried on "by
Collectors. One of the Settlement Officers employed in
revision work in Meerut spoke with diffidence of his
estimate. He gave several reasons which can "be considered as
equally applicable to the other districts. The statements
required from the Kanungo had not been previously required
from him. As he was employed in the Tahsildar Ts office he
had very little information to offer. The Patwari papers
were equally unworthy of credit.^ Henry St. George Tucker
(a member of the Court of Directors) who had gone through
some specimens of village statistics was categorically of
2
the view that they were useless. William Hay Macnaghten 
made a damaging comment when he stated, fin fact the papers, 
though voluminous in the extreme, and exhibiting a 
superabundance of details, have little in them, but the 
appearance of reality, and seem generally speaking to be at 
best but compilations of error, from which no conclusion can
be drawn, entitled to be considered in any degree just and
*
satisfactory.
In order to calculate the net assets it was necessary 
to know the yield of the land, the money value of the yield, 
the cost of production and the determination of the profits
1. Cited in H.Mackenzie, memo, on Revision of Settlements, 
19.10.1826, SRRNWP» 2.
2. Dissent of H. St. Tucker, 25.5.1827> App. to Court 
Minutes, 4, pp.364-5.
3. Memo, on Settlement, unsigned,' n.d., Bentinck MSS. 2650.
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on stock* It was impossible to ascertain accurately the 
produce of grain in any one year or in a series of years*
To fix a money value on the produce was also difficult. The 
determination of these two items was difficult because 
weights and measures showed a lack of uniformity even within 
a district, prices showed great fluctuations from year to 
year. Accuracy or even an approximation to it was utterly 
out of the question* The determination of the cost of 
production, and of the profit on the stock was equally 
impossible* This point was explained by Edward Reade* A 
raiyat !s outlay on implements and bullocks, and the cost of 
depreciation of stock were subjects of speculation. He did 
not possess capital and anything approximating to it was to 
be considered in the nature of floating capital, i*e. his 
stock. The market value of his and his family’s labour was 
an arduous task to calculate* As Edward Reade observed,
*the value of such labour if correctness be studied, must 
be computed in grain, money wages being unusual, and 
between the season of cultivation and the season of harvest, 
the price of the grain with which the labourers are paid 
often fluctuates very much: nor is the daily rate of 
allowance exempt from change.’1 The calculation of the
1* E.A.Reade, On Rights of Ryots, n.d*, p.11, op.cit*;
Reade was assistant to the Collector of Gorakhpur.
Subsequently he rose to the position of the Senior member
of the Sadr Board of Revenue, N.W.P.
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profit on the stock was also a difficult matter. The items 
which could he fairly accurately ascertained were the rate 
of rent per bigah, the rate of interest for money borrowed 
to pay revenue, and interest on the grain borrowed for 
seed or consumption. But on the real matter of the value of 
raiyat *s tenure no precision and accuracy was possible.'*' 
In spite of the difficulties detailed above in 
calculating the value of the land, the official effort to 
do so cannot be belittled, though its accuracy may be 
questionable. To determine the value of the produce, the 
official method took into consideration the quantity of the 
crop grown and its money value at market price. A  
miscellaneous item of value was the quantity of husk and 
its value remaining after the crop has been thrashed. For 
the calculation of cost of production the expenses of seed, 
ploughing and watering the field, and of cutting and 
harvesting the crop were taken into account. From the value 
of crop was deducted the cost of production, customary gifts
to village servants, and rent for the field; and the
2
remainder was the profit of the cultivator.
Reverting to the principles of assessment under 
Regulation VII, we have to point out several defects. The 
'synthetic* and 'positive* method of assessment though
-1-* rbicU , pp.11-12.
2. See App. B.
disclaiming uniformity of principle, actually imposed a
rigid form of assessment* Lord Bentinck on the strength of
the opinion of Collectors has rejected the applicability of
a uniform rule in India.^ The difficulties in the way of
2
such an application were aptly stated by William Fraser, 
who wrote that fthe mode of using the land, the extent of 
capital, the application of labour amongst the different 
classes, are very different: how can it be calculated, and 
then formed into the shape of a general rule for the 
Western Provinces? What charges bring down gross to net 
rent for these different classes? Any fixed rule bearing 
upon people in such widely different predicaments, and of
3
different nations and tribes, must inevitably be futile.
The point which William Fraser made relates to the 
connection of caste and tribe with agriculture, which made 
breaches in the assessment principle of 1822, and which was 
not sufficiently considered at that time. Some Settlement 
Officers drew attention to caste and tribe considerations. 
An officer from Allahabad remarked, that supposing T... two 
villages have the same kind of soil, but in one the 
cultivators and chiefly koormees and kachees, in the other 
mostly Brahmins and Rajpoots. In this case the produce of
1. Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.27$ SRRNWP. 2.
2. William Fraser was Commissioner of revenue and circuit 
Delhi territory, in whose jurisdiction part of.Western 
Provinces was included. ^
3. Cited in Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.37, Op.cit.
2 8 8
the first would exceed the produce of the latter by at
least one-third; yet if the settlement was made on the
classification of soil, both must be assessed at the same
r a t e . O n  the same point another interesting illustration
can be furnished from information provided by David Home,
acting Collector of Farrakhabad. The land near the town of
Farrakhabad would be willingly taken by a Kurmi at a high
rate, and he would make a good profit by growing potatoes,
while an Ahir or a Chamar who was no potato grower would
refuse to rent the same land even at one-third of the rate
paid by the Kurmi cultivator. Similarly, a Kurmi or a
Kachi cultivator would prize land on the sites of old
villages which was highly suitable for growing tobacco. A
Rajput  ^ on the other hand, would not even rent such land
2
for he was no tobacco raiser. Besides the peculiarities 
pointed out, we have the peculiarities of privileged rents 
for Brahmins, Rajputs and Syed cultivators.
The framers of the scheme also showed a lack of 
awareness of two vital considerations affecting the 
assessment, the individual engager and agriculture alike. 
Supposing all difficulties in the way of computing assets 
were overcome, it remains to be asked how much residue was 
to be left with the proprietor 1 • It would actually be
1. Ibid.. para«53*
2* Ibid.» para.52*
3. Ibid., para.51.
289
impossible to lay down a uniform standard, because the 
question would depend upon the individual circumstances of 
the Zamindar. Secondly, the assessment once fixed would be 
for a longer period and would have to square with future 
economic uncertainty. The conditions at the time of the 
settlement might differ from those obtaining later. A 
revision of the settlement was a revolution in the 
agricultural, conditions of a village, because it resolved 
disputes and released new land for cultivation, while 
greater enthusiasm or exertion on the part of the producer 
would create a demand for additional labour. These 
multifarious factors would produce an expansion of 
agriculture, an increase in total output and a fall in 
agricultural prices. Or the prices of some commodities when 
compared with those at the time of the settlement may fall 
or in some cases increase. Thus no assessment could be 
formed on the basis of certainty.^" And certainty in 
assessment was the aim of the 1822 arrangement.
It is ironical to notice the actual assessment 
formation under Regulation VII which in no way conformed 
with the principles propounded by government. The principles 
were mutilated. The assessments under it were guesses, and 
very bad ones. There is enough evidence to substantiate the
1. Auckland to Court, 18.8.1838, 3* paras. 48-9*
statement made here# In Rohilkhand ahle officers had made
settlements of many mahals which failed completely from the
standpoint of assessment* The calculation of assets, as
Lord Auckland stated was fictitious so a© to deliberately
bring out specious results* Rates applied to land cultivated
by the 'proprietor1 lacked factual basis, and so was the
case in the valuation of rent paid in kind. On both heads
the Settlement Officer used his judgement, whose sole basis
was arbitrariness, i.e. no investigation and computation
were conducted by him.'*’
The settlement formed by Robert Glyn in Meerut, who
was a competent officer, bore no resemblance to the method
sanctioned by government* The calculation of the gross
estimate was arrived at by a rough accounting of the
quantity and description of culturable land, and a comparison
with the former assessed .jama, rather than by a minute
investigation of the various sources of rent. Having done
this he distributed the demand on the village in a
fictitious form, so as to make up an account the amount of
2which would agree with the demand. Even the distorted 
observance of the principle of assessment was merely a form. 
As William Byam Martin wrote, ’... the principal data of 
settlement appear to have been derived from a review of
Ibid., paras. 52-3*
2. I.R.L., 6*7.1835, para.13; Bg. R.L., 7.7.183^, 8, para.139
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past payments compared with present circumstances, and from 
other obvious considerations of position, and facility in 
realizing the current revenue, aided by the reports of 
Tehsildars concerning the character and condition of the 
proprietor*f
In the Agra division comprising the districts of 
Agra and Saidabad the productive power of the land was
determined by a classification of soil and average produce,
 2
and in theory the assessment was supposed to be based on it.
In practice as the Collector of Agra has remarked, 1 * •. the
plan generally pursued in the distribution on the lands of
the sum which the village is con;)ecturally supposed capable
of paying, and so to assess them as aggregately to yield
such an amount. * Or as the Collector of Saidabad observed,
'the real basis of ••• all assessment is the acknowledged
rent which the land can afford to pay, which its occupiers
will willingly agree to, but beyond which they refuse to
engage; and I believe it to be in vain that the attempt is
made to check and amend this estimate or even to explain
it by any statistical calculations.*^ This observation
1. W.B. Martin to Secy, to G.G., 25*5.1831, para.13, Bg.R.C* 
27*12.1832, 36* W.B. Martin was Chief Commissioner of 
Delhi under whose jurisdiction part of Western Provinces
came •
2. Reply of W.H.Tyler, 6.8.1831, to queries issued by SBOR. 
on 2^.6.1831, Q.7, SRRNWP. 2.
3. Ibid.. Q.llw
U. Reply of J.G.Deedes, 25*7*1831 to queries issued by 
SBOR. on 2^..6.1831, Q.7, SRRNWP. 2.
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shows that the principle was not only not applicable but it
was also futile.
In two settlements in Gorakhpur we, find the Collectors
basing the assessment on rent actually paid by the raiyat s.
Edward Currie, who formed the settlement of Rajsattasi
’estate', stated that ’the rents actually paid by the
cultivators for the different fields are what I have taken
as the basis of the assessment, and it seems to me the only
safe principle; for the ascertainment of the actual produce
must be liable to very great uncertainties, and the
productive power of the different classifications of the
soil must vary much in the same class from contingencies of
situation .... and facility of irrigation. In village
Burleh (Saharanpur district) the assessment was founded not
upon capabilities of land but on a division of the crop at
a rate determined by the Collector on the average produce
of different sorts of land, and its money valuation at the
average price of the past ten years. The calculation of the
village rental was not at all an accurate one as Holt
2
Mackenzie has noted.
Thus a heterogeneous practice was observed in forming
1. Cited in Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.50» SRRNWP.2\ 
See also H.Mackenzie, memo, on Revision of Settlements, 
191*10.1826, paras. 433 and kh9, Ibid.
2* Ibid.. paras. 27-9; The Collector had taken 2/5 for grain, 
1 / 3 for cotton and i for sugar cane, Ibid., para.29*
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assessment under Regulation VII which has been graphically 
portrayed in a passage hy William Fraser. The assessments, 
he wrote, ’... seem to he made on different grounds, some hy 
rates on produce, some on estimates of gross produce, taking 
a half or a third as the right of government, others on the 
classification of soils and rates applied, some on this 
year’s produce, a great number on bargain ... not one that 
I have seen on a thorough based estimate of cost, produce, 
and profit, as the ground-work, and advertence to local 
free-will rent as the rule.’1
The wide gap between the theory and practice of 
assessment under Regulation VII did not arise from 
incompetence and therefore it was not a reflection upon the 
Collectors. The gap was a result of the basic flaws in the 
principles of assessment, which did not square with the 
reality and peculiarity of the situation in the Western 
Provinces.The same defectiveness in the nature of the 
principles of assessment can be seen in the Bombay-Deccan, 
where the most laborious calculations of Pringle proved 
unavailing in determining the net-rent. His assessments 
actually produced over-assessment and proved unrealisable.
The slow progress and poor results of the settlement 
under Regulation VII require explanation for which we have
1. Cited in Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.53* ou.cit.
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to consider several factors. The Court of Directors,
Lord William Bentinck and Holt Mackenzie resorted to an 
extreme criticism of the revenue administration, which 
according to them was mainly responsible for the failure of 
the Regulation, The Court wrote to the Bengal government 
that the failure implied a f.., reprehensible perverseness 
,,,! on the part of the revenue officers because they did not 
work satisfactorily, and it was a reflection upon government 
also because it had the controlling power.1 The absence of 
proper supervision by the revenue Boards, - the inexperience 
of officers in detailed settlement work, and the distance 
of the scene of action from Calcutta which made government 
control difficult were no doubt factors exposing defects in
revenue organisation, as was pointed out by Lord William
2
Bentinck and Holt Mackenzie, The sarcasm of Holt Mackenaie 
and the criticisms of the Court and of Lord William Bentinck 
were arguments more in favour of reform rather than a cool 
analysis of the reasons for the failure of Regulation VII of 
1822* The revenue administration must certainly bear some 
responsibility for what happened, but the blame cannot be 
exclusively placed upon it. In a minute written in 1835
1. Bg. R.D,, 15.2,1833, 2, para.55 I.R.D., 12.4.1837, 6, 
paras. 10-11,
2, Bentinck to R.Campbell, 11.5*1831, Bentinck MSS,2594; 
Minute of Bentinck, 19.3*1835, Board’s Collection 63873;
H, Mackenzie, Report on Revenue reorganisation, n.d.,
Bg. R.L., 10.12.1828, encl.2; H.Mackenzie, Note, 
13.11.1828, paras. 6-7, Bg. R.L., 10.12.1828, encl. 8.
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Bentinck had to admit the inadequacy of the numerical 
strength of the revenue officers to the task in hand, which 
could only have been carried out hy multiplying the staff 
hy at least five times the existing number.^-
That the inefficiency of the revenue administration 
was not the basic factor in the failure of the settlement 
seems borne out by the fact that the reform of the revenue 
administration carried out in 1829 produced no immediate 
result, and would have proved unavailing had not the 
settlement mechanism been reshaped in 1833* We thus have to 
look into the arrangement of 1822 for the basic reasons of 
failure, to which the administrative weakness was only a 
contributory factor.
Holt Mackenzie and Charles Metcalfe asserted that
the revenue officers were deterred more by imaginary than
2
real difficulty in forming the settlement* Despite the 
views of these two eminent administrators it must be stated 
that the assessment principle which constituted the core of 
the scheme was, as has already been shown impracticable*
And many among the officials, as has been pointed out by 
Macnaghten held the view that the whole scheme though 
excellent in theory was impracticable*
1* Minute of Bentinck, 19*3#1835* Board’s Collection 63873*
2. H. Mackenzie, Note, 13*11*lo2o, para.11, op.cit*; Minute 
of C.T,Metcalfe, n*d*, Bg. R.C. 27*12*1832, 92*
3* Memo, on Settlements, unsigned, n.d;, Bentinck MSS.2650.
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In addition to being impracticable the framers of the
plan ignored a vital consideration which rendered nugatory
the basis of the scheme - the inquiry into the assets of the
village. This could be obtained only by the cooperation of
the people* Even in a backward and rural community which
rural India was, the instinct of possession was very present,
and people resented the exposure of their private means
through an inquiry. To them its purpose must have appeared
to be an increase in revenue collection. The inquiry
therefore, as Tucker stated, excited great uneasiness among
the people of the Western Provinces.^ The key source of
all information, the Patwari. was in an unenviable position.
He was, as Auckland recorded, called upon to swear on the
'sacred emblems1 of his religion the true assets of the
village. The Patwari might well antagonise the Zamindar,
whose servant he was, if he told the truth, and if the
Collector suspected that he did not he faced the risk of
prosecution for false statement. If the Zamindar was
antagonised then the Patwari faced the unwelcome prospect
2
of being murdered. On the whole, then, the detailed 
inquiry was unpopular as William Bird aptly commented, 
f... it is notorious, notwithstanding the benefits with 
which it was expected to be attended, that a proclamation
1. Dissent of H. St. G. Tucker, 25.5.1827, App. to Court 
Minutes, p.263.
2. Auckland to Court, 18.8.1838, 3, para.US.
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notifying the abandonment of the measure, would he hailed 
generally speaking with universal satisfaction, f
The last important reason for the slow progress of 
the settlement once again underlined a lack of imagination 
on the part of government, in other words the provision 
allowing the engagers the option to relinquish their 
’estates’ if they wished. Curiously enough this good 
intentioned provision produced the greatest drag upon the 
progress of work under it. Innumerable ’estates1 were 
resigned which consumed the energies of a limited European 
agency in managing or summarily resettling them, which would
otherwise have been fruitfully employed in the regular
2
settlement work. Under the provisions of Regulation VII 
of 1822, Regulation IX of 1824 and Regulation II of 1826 
engagements at the end of a five year period were resigned 
in Moradabad, Etawah, Meerut, Shahjehanpur, Aligarh,
3
Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Farrakhabad, Saheswan, Bareli 
and Bundelkhand. The Bundelkhand region consisting of Banda 
and Kalpi districts saw very many of such resignations. In 
1825“26, 631 mahals assessed with a jama of Rs.1,595*362, 
and in 1830-31, 934 mahals assessed at Rs.2,042,574 had to
1. Minute of W.W.Bird, 27.4.1832, para.9, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 
58.
2. H. Mackenzie, memo, on Revision of Settlements, 19.10.1826, 
para.639n., SRRNWP. 2., Memo, on Settlements unsigned, n.d., 
op.cit.. I.R.D., 12.4,1837, 6, para.12; Minute of W,W.
Bird, 27.4.1832, paras. 4-8, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 58.
3. See Bg, R.L., 16.8.1827, paras. 234-67.
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be resettled by revenue officers in Bundelkhand, on account 
of the resignation of the revenue engagers.1
The story of Regulation VII of 1822 and what it aimed 
to realise would remain incomplete and one-sided, without 
a review of what happened under the temporary five-year 
settlements. Under the temporary settlements the subjects 
requiring notice are the attitude of government towards 
revenue engagers who resigned, or whose engagements were 
not accepted, the policy towards Taiuqdars, the question of 
lakhira.1 tenures, and the very important and complex: 
problem of revenue collection.
When the revenue engagers vested with ’proprietary’ 
rights resigned the management of their land, or were 
excluded from management by government, then the question 
of paying them an allowance technically called mallkana 
arose. The disposal of claims thus arising was to be 
governed by a flexible principle, so as to accommodate the 
various cases, and circumstances of individuals.
Compensatory allowance was to vary from five to ten per 
cent on the jama. In practice we find malikana being 
invariably given, where exclusion arose from government 
action, and it was withheld when it was due to the recusancy 
of the engagers. In a case in Fatehpur, for instance, when 
the revenue of a village was farmed, the excluded
1. See Bg. R.D., 2^.h.l835, 3, paras, 2k and 26.
299
’proprietors’ were paid at the full rate of ten per oent on 
the .jama# In another case, a leading one, the Zamindar of 
pargana Bara in Allahabad who was excluded because of his 
incompetency, and the management taken over by the Collector, 
was at first allowed five per cent which was subsequently 
raised to ten per cent on the jama. While in a case of 
recusancy in Bundelkhand we notice that no malikana was 
allowed to the Zamindar.1
Prom the beginning of British rule the policy towards 
Taiuqdars (who had generally held on an istmrari grant for 
life from the previous governments) was one of gradual 
reduction of their power, influence and wealth. The 
reasoning behind their reduction as well as the gradualness 
of this process was essentially political. To this we should 
also add a better appreciation of the rights of village 
Zamindars which had slowly begun to develop after 1807*
By 1822 the village communities were considered to be the 
real owners of the land, while the Taiuqdars were considered 
to have only revenue managerial rights. But in actual 
practice right up to I833 no uniform practice of reducing 
or even eliminating the Taiuqdars had been developed, and 
government was still groping for a formula of uniform
1. Bg. R.L., 7*7*1829, 2, paras.181-3, 185 and 212; Ibid.,
28.9.1830, paras. 143-6; For more details on Malikana 
question see Bg.R.C. 13*12.1827, 35-6; 25*5*1627, 203-05;
14.6.1827, 97-9; 16,8.1827, 77-9; 28.2.1828, 35-9*
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application. The result was to allow the continuation of 
Taluqdars in a somewhat truncated form, and at an increased 
revenue at each new succession to the taluq. The chief 
difficulty lay in the absence of precise information on the 
part of government regarding the nature and origin of 
taluqdari tenure. The Taluqdars invariably set up extensive 
’proprietary* claims in support of which they produced sanads 
and sale-deeds, and pointed out the force of prescription 
which undoubtedly was in their favour. Another difficulty 
was the ignorance of the village communities concerning 
their own rights, which arose from the fact of long and 
absolute subjection to the Taluqdars. The government 
considered the documentary evidence of the Taluqdars in 
support of their ’proprietary1 rights as dubious, and argued 
that prescription alone was the strongest point in their 
favour, which entitled them to compensation when excluded 
from an engagement for revenue, and from ’proprietary’ 
right.1
To substantiate what has been stated above, some 
illustrations of more or less peaceful dismemberment of 
taluqdaris which started around 1813* should be given here. 
Ram Dyal held an extensive taluq in Saharanpur at a fixed 
annual .jama of Rs.lll,597« On his death the taluq was 
settled for five years in 1813 at a jama of over five lakhs
1. See Bg. R.D., 29*9*182U, paras. 8U-90.
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of rupees annually. A large number of village Zamindars
were allowed to engage for the revenue. But in a subsequent
resettlement the engagement from the entire taluq was taken
from the late Raja Ts widow, because of the general poverty
of the people, and the advantage of settling with individuals
of resources# This latter arrangement was not supposed to
affect the village rights in any way - the question of
ownership being kept distinct from that of engagement.
Another Istmrar, Ramdhun Singh also of Saharanpur
had held land at a fixed .jama of Rs.39,215 a year. The
land had been in possession of the family since 1755* After
Ramdhun *s death, resettlement took place in 1815 and a
considerable increase on the previous .jama was obtained.
A considerable portion of the villages were settled with
the Ra.ja’s son, partly as ’proprietor* and partly as
revenue farmer. The ’proprietary* right was put forward on
the strength of sale-deeds from village Zamindars. As his
claim to ’proprietary* right was not challenged by anyone,
it was thought unobjectionable to make a temporary
settlement with him. In the remainder portion of the
villages settlements were made with village Zamindars as
2
’proprietors *.
1. Bg. R.D., (C & C.P.), 2.4*1817, paras. 24-5 and 28;
I.R.L., 6.7-1835, 5, paras. 7-8; see further Bg. R.C. 
18.7.1822, 32-4; 12.9.1822, 35; 13.2.1823, 55; 20.3.1823, 
73; 12.6.1823, 40-41; 21.4.1834, 34-6.
2. See Bg. R.D, (0 & C.P.), 1.8.1821, 2, paras. 58-61.
T^e taluq of Hathrass in Aligarh which was in 
possession of Raja Daya Ram, a powerful jat chief became 
open for resettlement in 1817. Daya Ram’s recalcitrance had 
led to a minor war resulting in his expulsion from British 
territory. The resettlement of Hathrass was partly formed 
with Mukaddams and partly with the Raja’s family, while an 
increase in the jama of Rs. 2 lakhs was obtained. The 
forming of settlement partly with the family of a fallen 
Chief shows as much, a consideration of prescriptive right 
and liberality of government, as political expediency.
Raja Nyne Singh-was another extensive Istmrardar in 
Meerut, who held the tenure at a jama of Rs. 49,309. After 
his death only 35t villages were settled with his son 
Natha Singh. Natha Singh however set up extensive 
’proprietary* claims on the basis of sanads, and prosecuted 
the government in the Bareli court of appeal, whose decision 
went in his favour. In view of this decision government had 
to accept the family’s ’proprietary’ claim, but it was 
interpreted by it as the right to collect and manage the 
revenue alone. The government conceded to Natha Singh only 
an istmrari right to 35i villages, together with five per 
cent compensation on the jama of villages from which he was 
exoluded.^
1. See Bg. R.D, (C & C.P.), 8.8.1821, 2, paras. 27-8.
2. See Bg, R.L. (C & C.P.), i.8.1822, 2, paras.85-95; Ibid..
16.8.1827, paras.277,270-72, and 275; For further details 
see, Bg. R.C. 28.8.1823, 43-9; 2.1.1824, 78-80 and 82; 
30.4.1824, 95-7.
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In the case of the Raja of Sheorajpur in Kanpur we 
find government setting him aside temporarily around 1821, 
and paid him one-eleventh of the mufassal jama as 
compensation. The Raja was excluded on public grounds.
Though he claimed hereditary rights to the taluq, his claim 
was bitterly opposed by the village occupants, so much so 
that the Judge and Magistrate feared a breach of the peace, 
if the settlement was made with the Raja. The settlement 
was made with the village Zamindars and a full investigation 
into rights for arriving at a conclusive decision was 
ordered. But as late as 1827 no final orders on this case 
had been issued.**"
Hira Singh an Istmrar of British creation in 1810, 
had held several taluqs in Saidabad at a jama of Rs.68,381.
On his death the taluqs were open to resettlement. The 
local authority was opposed to a resettlement under 
Regulation VII of 1822, and considered his son Pitamber 
Singh, and Sumer Singh an inferior but joint beneficiary 
from the istmrari entitled to full consideration. Only the 
jama was recommended to be increased by Rs.29*378. As there 
was no likelihood of any party advancing ’proprietary1 
claims, because even the existence of such rights was
2doubtful, the settlement was made with those two individuals.
1. See Bg. R.L., 16.8.1827* paras.282-3? Ibid., 1.8.1822,
2, para. 96; See also Bg. R.C, 25.9.1823, 15-23.
2. See Bg. R.L., 10.2.18314-, 1, paras. 47-51; For further 
details see Bg.R.C. 27.1.1309* 17-20; 20.6.1810, 31* 
12.6.1832* 40; 17.7.1832, 26; 22.1,1833* 23-7; 8.3.1833, 
48-50.
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The uargana of Mursan in Aligarh was the taluqdari 
of Bhagwant Singh another powerful jat Chief who though 
related to Daya Ram had remained loyal to the British. On 
his death an engagement for the revenue was taken from his 
son Tikam Singh, and besides a 15 per cent taluqdari 
allowance on the jama, considerable sir land was allowed 
revenue-free to the family. Two .jagirs which had been 
granted to Bhagwant Singh for life by the British were 
however resumed. The' engagement with Tikam Singh was not to
bar the admission of private rights, which might be
subsequently found to exist. The revenue payable by the
village occupants was to be fixed by the Collector, and not
the Raja, who was merely to collect it as Sadr Malguzar
The taluq of Jharki in Saidabad district reveals the 
dilemma of practical policy towards Taluqdars. This taluq 
comprised forty villages and in a greater number of them 
no ’proprietary* right existed, while the right of the 
Taluqdar to engage for the government revenue was fully 
recognised by the local authority. The assessment upon 
the villages was fixed on the same principle as in the 
case of Mursan -pargana. i.e. it was the Collector who 
determined the amount paid by the Mukaddams of the different 
villages, and to be realised by the Taluqdar as Sadr malguzar.
1. See Bg. R.L., 16.8.1827, paras. 319-22; For further
details see Bg. R.C. 13.11.1823, 51-3; 17.1.182^, U9-51; 
17.9.182U, 37-9; U.5.1830, 27-8; 29.3.1831, 31-2.
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The case of Jharki taluq raised the question of deciding 
taluqdari rights in actual practice. The question which 
government asked itself was, if the ’proprietary1 right of 
a Taluqdar was not established, and at the same time no 
opposing ’proprietary* right existed, then what course was 
to he adopted? As the problem involved developing an 
integrated practical policy towards Taluqdars of the 
province as a whole, it could not be disposed of on a 
consideration of an individual case alone It implied, as 
has already been stated, detailed and precise information 
which was possible only under a detailed settlement. As a 
detailed settlement under Regulation VII did not materialise, 
the practical policy towards Taluqdars had therefore to 
await the formation of a settlement under Regulation IX of 
1833 which fructified by 1849.
It would also be interesting to examine the character 
and extent of landholding, which would give us some idea 
about the condition of the Zamindars. Such an examination 
for the province as a whole is however not possible. As an 
alternative we shall confine our analysis to two of the 
districts for which statistics are available, and which are 
reliable.
The districts of .Allahabad had 15 parganas with a 
rukba of 3*299,481 bigahs and assessed with a revenue of
1. See I.R.L., 6.7*1835, paras. 19^23 and 25; see also 
Bg. R.C. 21.1.1834, 13-5; 5.5*1834, 51-3.
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Rs.l,870,750* The total number of villages in the district
was khalsa, and 239i lakhira.i villages. The
approximate numher of Zamindars was 5,056 and the number
of revenue engagers was 3,207,1 which shows that every
Zamindar was not an engager - a fact that would affect his
condition to some extent. Among the largest zamindaris ware
Khyragarh and Bara which were individual pargana-zamindaris.
The pargana of Khyragarh contained six taluqs with a total
of 811-^  villages of which 62?- were lakhira.i. It ‘belonged to
2
Lall Rudin Pratap Singh, whose family had held possession 
of the pargana for a few generations. Its assessment was 
Rs. 336>893 - 1 3 - 0 .  According to John Dunsmure, the 
Collector of Allahabad, the receipts of the Zamindar 
amounted to Rs.550,000, giving him a clear income of 
Rs.213,106 3 - 0 a year.
The pargana of Bara contained 283 khas and 13 
lakhira.i villages. Its .jama was Rs. 105,101. In 1802 it was 
fraudulently acquired by the Ra.ia of Benares, who was 
drawing an income of Rs.132,899 from the pargana in 1825 • 
Under Regulation I of 1821 the Ra.ia of Benares lost 
possession of the pargana, which was restored to Jagat Raj
1. See statistics of Allahabad, 6.2.1828, annexed to 
Bg. R.L., 10.12.1828, App.E.
2. Only two Testates! in the pargana were not in possession 
of Pratap Singh.
3. See J. Dunsmure to H. Mackenzie, 6.2.1828, annexed to 
Bg. R.L., 10*12.1828, App.E.
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the rightful owner, Jagat Raj was adjudged incompetent to
manage the pargana by government. Under the Court of Wards,
the Collector raised the assessment to Rs.222,931* allowing
the Zamindar an allowance of slightly over Rs.20,000 a year.^"
The number of Zamindars in the rest of the parganas
was very great. In Chail pargana for instance, there were
934 Zamindars of whom 575 engaged for a jama of Rs.173*688.
In Kurrah pargana there were 656 Zamindars of whom 513
engaged for a .jama of Rs.i57>l67* Half of the revenue of the
2
district came from six out of the 15 parganas.
It is very difficult to estimate the income of the 
Zamindars in Allahabad. If we had statements and returns on 
zamindari income and expenditure available we would be on
surer grounds. Since such is not the case we have to resort 
to a less reliable method of computation. Two methods can be 
distinguished. If we take agricultural production and 
compute it in money in current prices, we have the total 
value of the produce. Prom this we deduct the amount left 
with the raiyat and the revenue paid to government. What 
remained after this was zamindari income. This simple method 
of computation is, however, impracticable because we are 
not in possession of production figures, the very basis of 
computation. We have to use, therefore, an alternative
1. See Ibid.
2. See Statistics of Allahabad, 6.2.1828, Ibid.
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method. Let us first take the total assessment and calculate 
10 per cent of it as zamindari income, which was generally 
the rule of allowance practised hy the government. The 
amount so derived should then he divided hy the number of 
Zamindars which would thus yield the average per capita 
income of the Zamindars, The .jama of Allahabad was 
Rs* 1,870,750. The equivalent of ten per cent would be 
Rs* 187,750 and its division by 5>Ofj6,'L which was the number 
of Zamindars would yield the-average per capita sum of 
slightly over Rs*37* This sum was then the average annual 
income of the Zamindars.
It should, however, be stated that we cannot 
categorically assert that the sum of Rs*37 can be accepted 
without qualification as the per capita zamindari income in 
Allahabad* We have no knowledge of the undisclosed income 
of the Zamindars, say from exactions from the raiyats, 
from land under cultivation which may have been concealed 
and not known to the Collector, from lakhira.i land and 
from land lately brought under cultivation but not yet 
assessed to pay revenue. The case of Khyragarh and Bara 
parganas confirms the argument that the Zamindar might be 
drawing an income much in excess of the sum legally allowed* 
But we should also not make the mistake of generalising to
1. See above, pp. 305-06*
2* See above, p* 305•
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the effect that every Zamindar in Allahabad had a large 
undisclosed income. A large undisclosed income would he 
possible only in an extensive zamindari held by a single 
person or by very few. On the other hand we should also 
state that -parganas having innumerable Zamindars would not 
only not have an undisclosed income, but might actually be 
unable to bear the jama. The competition to engage for the 
payment of revenue would step up the demand beyond the 
ability to pay. In the light of the argument presented here, 
though our estimate of Rs.37 is a rough one, it is the only 
one so far attempted. If we could have also calculated the 
per capita zamindari expenditure then we would have shown 
whether the Zamindar derived any profit from land or just 
made the two sides of the balance-sheet meet together, or 
actually incurred a loss. So far evidence on zamindari 
expenditure has not come to light, therefore we, cannot 
answer the question of zamindari balance-sheet.
The district of Gorakhpur had 20 parganas with a 
rukba of 3,^-98,625 bigahs» comprising 13,569 villages of 
which 2,213 were lakhira.i. The jama of the district was 
Rs.810,603, the approximate number of Zamindars was 18,192 
and the number of persons engaging for land revenue was 
1,397«'L Estimating the income of the Zamindar at ten per
1. See Statistics of Gorakhpur, 2.U.1828, annexed to 
Bg. R.L., 10.12.1828, App.G.
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cent of the jama gives a figure of Rs.8l,060 which when
divided hy the number of Zamindars yields a trivial per
capita annual income of approximately Rs.U-8-O, The remarks
made on the per capita zamindari income in Allahabad are
also applicable to the case of Gorakhpur#
The slow progress of Regulation VII had also affected
the investigation of lakhira.i tenure, which under the scheme
was to be combined with the settlement of the malguzari 
1
land. If the government had desired, it could'have'easily 
brought a large number of lakhira.i villages under assessment 
by summary resumption, because the lakhira.i tenure had 
generally remained unregistered, in violation of Regulations 
XXI and XXVI of 1803* Actually a proposal supported by the 
Board of Revenue, had originated from the Collector of 
Moradabad to attach and assess lakhiraj villages whose value 
amounted to 2 lakhs of rupees. The government advised 
moderation while admitting the legality of the attachment 
and assessment of unregistered lakhira.i villages. The 
government wanted the measure to be attempted experimentally 
on a small scale in a -pargana. At the same time the holders 
of lakhira.i villages were to be shown proper consideration 
by giving them the opportunity to explain their failure to 
register, and in passing a decision attention was to be paid
1. Resolution of Govt*, 1.8*1822, para.318, 
Bg. R.C. 1.8.1822, 6U.
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to individual circumstances,1 The extent of lakhira.i land
for the province as a whole must have heen very considerable,
hut reliable statistics are not available. In Allahabad, for
instance, it was slightly over one-twentieth, and in
Gorakhpur slightly over one-sixth of the total of the
2
recorded number of villages.
Before reviewing the process of revenue collection, 
we must first examine the attitude of government to long 
outstanding arrears of revenue and to sales of land on 
account of revenue default. The attitude of government in 
regard to those two matters was liberal, no doubt as the 
result of lessons learnt from the past. The retention of 
revenue arrears in accounts in the hope of realising them in 
future, howsoever desirable from the point of view of 
government, had always presented a peculiar problem*
Whatever may be the reasons of revenue deficiency, it 
burdened the revenue payer beyond his ability to pay and 
reacted upon the current collections, and which were made 
difficult to realise, thereby perpetuating arrears of
1. Bg. R.L. (C & C.P.), 28.9.1830, paras. 184-5.
2. See Statistics of Allahabad, 6,2,1828, and Statistics of 
Gorakhpur, 2.4,1828, on.cit.: For details on lakhira.i 
land in the Province see correspondence between government 
and the revenue Boards, Bg, R.C. 7,8.1823, 27-31; 
16.10.1823, 25; 31.10.1823, 59-935 7.5.182U, 73,76,79; 
6.7.1824. 42} 30.7.1824, 50; 6,8.1824, 41-4; 21.8.1828, 
39-40; 28.8,1828, 32; 23.10.1828, 18.
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revenue* The government was fully aware of the problem which
was faced boldly and judiciously by relinquishing arrears of
revenue from time to time. Between 1822 and I833, we
therefore find government relinquishing arrears of revenue
amounting to Rs.2,702,561, for the province as. a whole* A
part of the arrears so relinquished had accumulated since
1812, but a sizeable part had originated after 1822. And
Bundelkhand was the region which accounted for well over
1
one-third - of the- relinquished -sum*..........................
The public sale of land was the lever to prevent
arrears of revenue and its realisation when it actually
occurred. In practice however, abundant evidence had been
furnished of its ineffectiveness* On the one hand the low
price of land and the absence of a proper land market made
impossible the realisation of arrears of revenue. On the
other hand it affected the guilty and the innocent in the
same degree in joint villages, and it also produced a
fraudulent acquisition of land in the past. Besides, it was
not at all clear, as Holt Mackenzie stated, either to the
revenue or judicial officers or even to the government itself
2
what was actually sold in a public sale. On the same subject 
the Bengal government observed, Tno one can say precisely
1. See Bg. R.L., 16*8.1827, paras. 282-3; Ibid.. 20.10.182^, 
paras. 117, 129-30, 135, 137-8, li+9, 151, 155-6, 159 and 
161. From the figure given above some minor and fractional 
amounts have been omitted.
2. H. Mackenzie, Note, n.d., Bg, R.L., 10.12.1828, encl.9.
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what has "been sold. On the one side the great hody of land 
owners have to urge that a just Government can never have 
designed to deprive thousands of their hereditary property, 
■because; the heavens denied their rain; or to subject them to 
a cruel confiscation ‘because some of their hody were 
improvident. On the other hand the purchasers allege that an 
honest Government cannot have exposed to sale what it did 
not intend they should. 1
In the Official Circles and in the Court of Directors 
there was a considerable feeling that injury to the co­
sharing hody from public sales should he prevented, especially 
in a temporary settled area. The Court of Directors had two 
objections to public sales - that they affected parties other 
than the actual defaulters, and that in the past they had 
been resorted to without adequate justification* If these
two objections were sufficiently met then it was not opposed
2
to public sales. Meanwhile the Bengal government as a 
result of pressure exerted by the Home government had 
prohibited local authorities from resorting to public sale 
without its confirmation. The government was willing to 
give permission when it was distinctly shown that the arrear 
had resulted from fraud, embezzlement and contumacy on the
3
part of the Zamindars. In actual practice another
1. Resolution of Govt., n.d., Bg, R.L., 10.12.1828, e n d .10.
2. Bg. R.D. (C & C.P.), 1.6.1832, 18, para.27.
3. Bg. R.L,, 16.8.1827, paras. 172, 175-6.
condition had become necessary - that is, to resort to sale 
when there was no way of realising the revenue. This was the 
case in Bundelkhand in I83I and 1833, "but peculiarly enough 
the government itself was the largest buyer* In the former 
year the government bought 29 ’estates* and in the latter 
year a substantial portion of the 65 ’estates1 which were 
put up for sale. The intention behind government buying was 
to resettle the village communities who had given way to the 
auction-purchaser in previous sales or to private purchasers, 
through private sales. Most of the ’estates’ that were put 
up to auction were bought for Rs.5 apiece, while a few 
fetched a price around Rs.1,000 in Bundelkhand. In other 
parts of the province we have evidence of a very few public 
sales. It therefore must be said that the public sale of 
land was generally kept in abeyance for the province as a 
whole between 1822 and I833.1
Now turning to the very important question of revenue 
collection, we notice that the assessment of the revenue 
from 1822-23 onwards was more or less constant at slightly 
over 36 million rupees annually. The annual deficiencies 
varied between 1.75 m. and 4*12 m. rupees, the lowest 
deficiency was in 1827-28 and the highest was in 1829-30*
The annual collection of land revenue within the year varied
1. See Bg. R.L. (C & C.P.), 7*7.1829, 2, paras. 159 and 161; 
Ibid.. 26.6.1832, 2, para.3; Ibid.. 20.10.1834, 11, 
paras. 25-49*
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"between 31 m. rupees and 3b m. rupees. The annual 
deficiency was however more or less counterbalanced by the 
collection of past arrears. Such annual collection of 
arrears was between 1.19 m# and 3*27 rupees. In view of 
this, the actual collection of revenue averaged slightly 
over 35 ni* rupees annually. This therefore narrowed the gap 
between assessment and collection to within one million 
rupees annually."1’
The large arrears of current revenue would still 
however require explanation. For this we have to take 
several factors into consideration which are essentially of 
an economic character. The prevailing price level, the 
pressure of the assessment on the land (over-assessment in 
some cases and under-assessment in others), the volume of 
currency in circulation, and the stimulation or depression 
of agriculture, have a direct bearing on the collection of 
land revenue. The price level itself is determined by the 
state of production, and by such factors as the volume of 
trade and commerce, the value of currency, and an incidental 
factor like a war near a particular region. If the 
assessment is fixed in relation to prices then, any 
alteration in price would either make the assessment
1. The source of the above analysis is the Statement of 
Revenue prepared by H.St. G. Tucker, enclosed in his 
Dissent of 27*12.1832, App. to Court Minutes, 5> p*292.
316
unbearable or very easy to realise.1 If other things being 
equal, the revenue was still unrealisable, then it would 
suggest a case of over-assessment, which over a period of 
years would adversely affect the productive powers of the 
land.
The price level during the years 1822-33* according to 
several contemporary official observers, was declining in 
comparison to the one obtaining around 1820. The value of 
precious metals had increased: this was indicative of a
2
shortage of currency and depressed commercial activity. If 
we examine the returns from the customs and town duties then 
the case of depression becomes very clear, because these 
returns depend upon the volume of trade and commerce. In 
1822-23* for instance, the receipts from that source stood 
at 2.23 m# rupees which declined to 1.57 nu in 1826-27* and 
rose only to 1.78 nw rupees in 1829-30.
The foregoing analysis of the problems of revenue 
collection can be illustrated by some case studies. The case 
studies relate to the districts of Bareli, Farrakhabad,
1. W.C.Neale has argued in the context of the agrarian 
distress in U.P. around 1930, that if the revenue was 
fixed at the time of high prices then a fall in prices 
would make the level of revenue high. The long term 
assessment according to him was not fixed at the time of 
high prices. The distress during the great depression in 
the U.P. originated from the nature of the agricultural 
economy; Economic Change in Rural India, p.162 ff.
2. See below Jp. 318 ff.
3. H. St. G. Tucker, Statement of Revenue, on.cit.
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Kanpur and Bundelkhand* Three of them have "been selected 
mainly because numerous resignations of revenue engagements 
occurred there, in spite of the fact that the .jama was not 
increased after 1822* Elsewhere in the province the cases of 
resignation were few. Thus an analysis of the reasons behind 
resignations and resettlement of Estates1 would throw light 
on the question of revenue collection. The fourth case, that 
of Kanpur has been selected for two reasons. The district 
was threatened with agricultural crisis and the revenue 
collection was jeopardised. Drought had succeeded depressio.n 
of trade but ultimately the revenue collection was unaffected. 
Secondly, Edward Anderson Reade, the Collector of Kanpur, 
has furnished important and authentic information on 
revenue collection and trade and commerce of the district.
A consideration of the case studies would also reveal a 
general law of revenue collection, and also show the effect 
of over-assessment on the condition of the people and the 
agriculture of a region*
In the Bareli district a group of 112 1estates’ had 
paid a jama of Rs. 8Q,hk3 from 1812 to 1826. These Testatesf 
had to be resettled in 1828-29 because they could no longer 
bear the same jama. The new jama was Rs. 65,053# a. reduction 
of nearly 25 per cent of the former jama. The reasons for 
this sharp decline were several* Agricultural production 
over a period of time had been adversely affected because of
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the prevalence of batai rent and insalubrious climate. The
original rate of assessment was admitted to he high, while
no attention had been paid to soil and climate factors in
the past settlements. The situation was further aggravated
by a fall in prices around 1826 which was succeeded by two
bad seasons.'1' Similarly, in the tarai parganas of Rudrapur
and Gadrapur, and in the taluq of Kilpuri in Bareli district
successive five year settlements, each one at a reduced
e
.jama than the previous settlement failed completly. The
settlement of all the three units had to be made with Raja
Goman Singh at exceptionally favourable terms which were out
of character with the general policy. The main reasons had
been the insalubrious climate of the tarai which reduced
population by the spread of disease and the encroachment of
the jungle on land, which when combined with the general
poverty of the people made even a light assessment 
2
unbearable.
In the district of Farrakhabad 17 'estates* whose 
former jama was Rs. 29,665 had to be resettled. The revision
1. See Bg, R.L., 7.7.163U, 8, paras. 97 and 101; Ibid..
28.9.1830, paras. 31 and 3U« Batai = division of crop 
between Zamindar and cultivator. It was injurious because 
until the Zamindar was ready for division the crops would 
not be cut or it could not be removed from threshing 
floor until division took place. Meanwhile the crop was 
exposed to damage from weather factor or pilfering. The 
cultivator suffered under it and if the Zamindar chose,
he could ruin him for a few years by delaying the division 
and thereby damaging the crop.
2. See I.R.L., 6.7.1635, paras. 60 and 63-5.
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produced a great decrease in the jama which was in many 
cases as much as three-quarters (reduction) of the former 
assessment. These mahals were nearly in a state of decay 
which was "brought about by various factors. The rate of 
assessment in the first place was high. This was combined 
with the adverse results of the encroachment of the river 
Ganges and the cessation of Indigo cultivation as a result 
of depression,1
On the problem of the revenue collection of Kanpur 
district we are on firm ground. On the basis of a Report by 
Reade, the revenue collection of Kanpur falls into two 
distinct phases* The period 1818-25 was. a favourable one for 
easy collection of revenue. But during the years 1825-33 the 
favourable circumstances gradually receded, thereby creating 
some difficulty in revenue collection. The agricultural 
economy of Kanpur and especially its revenue collection to 
a large extent depended upon the trade in Indigo, cotton 
and grain. Between 1818-25 on account of these three items 
of commerce the circumstances were highly favourable. On 
account of Indigo alone money amounting to Rs, 3 nu 
poured into the district. For raw cotton the price was high, 
and the district had received Rs, 200,000 as advance from 
the commercial resident of Kalpi* The price of grain too was 
high. After 1825 these factors changed, and the Collector
1, Ibid,» See paras, 28-9•
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was apprehensive about revenue collection especially as a
drought occurred in 1833• He recommended a remission of 
Rs, 1+00,000 which however proved unnecessary and his 
apprehension groundless because grain scarcity led to high 
prices which facilitated revenue collection in 1834.
The Bundelkhand region consisting of Banda and Kalpi 
districts offers an excellent, and very important testing 
ground for an analysis of the problem of revenue collection.
Since 1820-21 the region was presenting a grave problem of
management to revenue authorities. In that year 657 'estates'
bearing a .jama of Rs. 1,561 #608 had resigned engagements. In
1825-26 and in I830-3I also numerous resignations took place
- 631 'estates' assessed with a jama of Rs. 1,595,362 in the
former years, and 934 'estates' with a jama of Rs. 2,042,574
3
in the latter year. The numerous resignations not only
1. E.A.Reade, My Public Report on the Cawnpore district,
28.10.1833, pp.53-61, Eur, MSS. D.279; The price of raw 
cotton over a series of years shows considerable 
fluctuation. Before 1812-13 it varied between Rs, 8 and 
Rs. 13-5-0 per maund. (Maund being pukka = 40 seers).
Its average price between 1812-13 and 1817-18 was
Rs.14-8-0 a md., between .1818-19 and 1821-22 Rs. 16-2-0 
a md., between 1822-23 and 1827-28 Rs. 16-12-0 a md., 
between 1828-29 and 1831-32 Rs. 10-6-0 a md., and in 
1833 it was between Rs. 12 and Rs. 13 a md. The price of 
foodgrain in the month of Jyte probably in 1825 was 
Barley 30 seers, wheat 25 seers and grain 32 seers per 
rupee; for the same month in 1833 and for the same items 
it was 37, 32 and 38 seers per rupee respectively. Ibid.. 
pp.55-60.
2. See E.A.Reade, Report on the Cawnpore district for 1833-34,
20.11.1834, pp.27-44, Eur.MSS. D. 279.
3* See Bg. R.D., 24.4.1835, 3, paras. 20,24 and 26.
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created a problem of resettlement but actually produced 
large arrears of revenue, compelling government to grant 
remissions, as well as to reduce assessment. Between 1820-21 
and 1829-30 a total of Rs. 1,1814-,902 was the outstanding 
arrear of revenue. By 1829-30 deficiencies of revenue 
amounting to Rs.8l8,l68 was relinquished by government.1 
The .jama meanwhile at the expiry of each five year settlement 
went on declining, and so did the current collection of 
revenue. In 1820-21, 1825-26 and I830-3I the .jama stood at 
Rs.3,773>8U4, Rs.3,624,935 and Rs.3*092,212 respectively.
The current collection of revenue on account of those years 
was respectively, Rs.3,14-60,7^ 6, Rs.3,263,614-6, and Rs. 1,989*392. 
In the years of resettlement in 1821-22, 1826-27 and 1831-32
Vhe .jama was Rs.3,533,8lU, Rs.3,^59,683, and Rs.2,955*095 
2
respectively. The current collection of revenue for the 
years was respectively, Rs.3,2814-,996, Rs.3,187,805, and 
Rs.1,888,109.
It is needless to emphasize the gravity of the 
situation in Bundelkhand from the standpoint of revenue 
collection. Nor is it surprising that the situation received 
the special attention of the Bengal government, of the 
Governor-General who was on a tour (between 1830 and 1833)
1. See Bg. R.L., 26.6.1832, paras:. U and 6; Ibid.» 25.6.1833, 
para.7•
2. See Revenue figures for Bundelkhand l80ij.-5 to 1831-2, 
enclosed in R.D., 2 -^.l4-.l835, 3, App.l.
«i hj
of the Western Provinces,of the local authorities, and above 
all of the Court who showed grave concern over the entire 
matter. The questions to ask regarding the crisis in 
Bundelkhand are whether it was the result of over­
assessment pure and simple, or whether over-assessment was 
only apparent and behind it lay hidden certain economic and 
other factors, which made the pressure of assessment upon 
the people an intolerable one.
In the official correspondence there was a controversy 
over the numerous resignations and heavy arrears of revenue* 
The Sadr Board of Revenue on deputation headed by William 
Pane, (a Bengal civilian who had earlier served as principal 
Collector of Bundelkhand), in its various letters, reports, 
and minutes on the question to the Bengal government offered 
an explanation of the situation in Bundelkhand.*1' The 
general trend of the Board's argument was to deny the 
prevalence of over-assessment. It stated that if certain 
circumstances had not existed the country would have been 
fit to pay the full assessment. The Board emphasized the 
restraint on public sale and the administrative reorganisation 
of 1829 which relaxed the control of the centre upon the 
local authority, thereby making the revenue collection
1. Of 30.10.1829, 24.4.1830, 16.10.1832, 23.10.1832 and 
3O.lO.l832, cited in Bg, R.D., 24*4.1835, 3 I See also 
Bg. R.C. 18.12.1832, 41 and 48; 5.2.1833, 34-5; 18.11.1829, 
28-31.
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inefficient* In 1829 the provisions of Regulation I of 1821 
were extended to Bundelkhand which unsettled the minds of 
auction-purchasers, because the legality of their title 
would be investigated on complaints made by the former 
Zamindars* The Zamindars in general had a tendency to 
encourage the decline of cultivation towards the end of a 
settlement in order to obtain a reduction of the .jama in a 
new settlement* The vagaries of the weather, the peculiarities 
of bhalyachara tenure which caused friction among co-sharers, 
the fall in agricultural prices, and the increase in the 
value of the currency made even a reasonable assessment 
intolerable. The settlement of 1815-16 to 1819-20 which was 
formed by E.Scott Waring had considerably increased the 
revenue whose pressure on land was aggravated by weather, 
tenure and price factors. The result of Waring*s assessment 
was to destroy the key to revenue collection - the village 
maha.jan. Where the village community was in a prosperous 
state the maha.jan was established. It was he who turned to 
profit the surplus produce, and from that profit he aided the 
raiyats in cash or grain. The maha.jan created and controlled 
the credit of the village economy, and enabled the 
cultivators to pay revenue even in a bad season. A 
cultivator left to himself would not accumulate to meet a 
contingency and would thereby exhaust his stock. The maha.jan 
was destroyed because the pressure of assessment prevented
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recovery of his advances.^"
The non-economic aspects of the Board’s explanation 
of the situation in Bundelkhand should he rejected. The re­
organisation of the revenue administration took place in 
1829 while the problem of revenue collection had been 
worsening since 1820-21, Besides the intention behind the
reorganisation of 1829 was to make the revenue administration 
2
efficient and at the time the Board was writing it was too 
early to assess its result. It is also extremely doubtful 
in view of the numerous resignations of revenue engagement 
in successive settlements, whether the full application of 
the sale laws would have been effective. A land market was 
hardly in existence, the price of land was low, and in many 
instances where land was exposed to sale, government had to 
buy it, only to restore its ownership to the community.
The extension of Regulation I of 1821 to Bundelkhand and its 
effect on revenue collection does not make any sense at all. 
Under it, only fraudulent acquisitions of land were to be 
investigated and such cases must have been very few in 
Bundelkhand. The working of that Regulation in Kanpur and 
Allahabad where a number of fraudulent titles were set aside
1. Bg. R.D., 2luU.l835, 3* paras, 35,37>U8,50 and 31;
Bg. R.L., 25*8.1833, para.8,
2. See Bg. R.L., 10.12.1828, paras. 1,3 and 11; Resolution 
of Govt., n.d., Ibid.. end  .10*
3* See above, pp* 312-4.
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had in no way affected revenue collection* Similarly, the 
argument that the Zamindars encouraged the decline of 
cultivation in the last year of a settlement is an obscure 
one in support of which no evidence ha© been adduced* If a 
decline in cultivation was an easy way of obtaining a 
reduction of the .jama.why should innumerable Zamindars 
resign their engagements, and see their Estates’ being 
managed khas or handed over to the revenue farmers? In 
fact economic reasons combined with such factors as the 
peculiarity of the tenure and the uncertainty of the 
weather were not sufficiently emphasized by the Board as 
responsible for the crisis of Bundelkhand* These would 
require a little more consideration.
A consideration of the evidence related to revenue 
collection reveals a general law working behind it. In the 
working of that law price played a very dominant role. If 
the assessment is high, as Henry St. George Tucker pointed 
out,"*" it would raise the price especially of the valuable 
produce. If the price is high, demand would reduce 
which would create a slump in agricultural activity. On the 
other hand in a good season there would be over-production, 
and since the cultivator did not stock-pile his produce and 
rushed to sell it, prices would come down# Another factor
1. Dissent of H* St. G* Tucker, 27*12.1832, App. to Court 
minutes, 5, pp.271-U.
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which causes the price to fluctuate is the volume of precious
metal in circulation. During the period under review there
is enough indication of a shortage of currency which was
causing the fall in prices. A fall in prices or a fall in
produce would leave a fluctuating income to the producer
while the jama remained constant. In other words, in this
circumstance, as. Robert Merttins Bird pointed out, the jama
would he heavier, and it would absorb a greater proportion
of the produce than at a. time when'the prices were high and
the jama was increased."**
The trouble in Bundelkhand was rooted in the first
five year settlement of 1815-16 to 1819-20 formed by Scott
Waring. The annual average .jama of this settlement exceeded
the average of the preceding three year settlement by over
Rs.800,000. Waring has not left proper information on his
assessment, which he defended on vague assertions of
expanded cultivation. His method of forming the settlement
was highly questionable because he exposed the Zamindars to
an open auction-assessment in which numerous Estates’ were
leased to the revenue farmers. Thus the jama to a large
2
extent was determined by speculation. Another exceedingly 
important factor during this settlement was the prevalence
1. Minute of R.M. Bird, 16.10.1832, cited in Bg.R.D.,
2U.U.I835, 3, para.51.
2. See Bg. R.L, (C & C.P.), 20.7.1830, paras, 11-12; Bg.R.D,, 
24.^.1835, 3, para.27; See also Bg. R.O. 25.7.1817, 35-9.
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of high prices and an extensive trade in raw cotton, the
staple produce of Bundelkhand. The high price of grain was
due to the Maratha war which created a large demand for
supplies - so much so, that a bounty was. paid by government
on the export of grain* The exhausted condition of th/$
neighbouring Indian states offered no competition, silver
1
was in abundant supply, and trade was active. Thus the 
circumstances were favourable and the highly increased 
assessment was nearly collected. After 1820 the favourable 
circumstances began to alter. The large armies which were in 
motion in Northern India were withdrawn. The suppression of 
the predatory hordes like the Pindaris led to the extension 
of cultivation, thus narrowing and depressing the grain 
market. The increase in the value of silver lowered the 
price of cotton which in 1832 was selling 30 per cent below 
the price prevailing around 1820, and was at its lowest 
since the acquisition of Bundelkhand in 1803* Under this 
changed condition the jama generally became heavy, and where 
it might have been encroaching upon the private resources of
individuals in Waring’s settlement, it now became impossible
2
to realise.
The high assessment of Waring, the fall in prices
1. Minute of R.M. Bird, 16*10.1832, op.cit.. para.51J
H. Mackenzie, memo. 1.7*1819, para.139, Bg.R.C. 16*9*1820,
2* Ibid*: H.S. Boulderson to A. Campbell, Bentinck MSS.2650.
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combined with peculiarities of tenure and uncertainty of
weather led to tremendous hardship among the people and a
severe strain upon agriculture.'1’ M l  these factors found
expression in resignations from revenue engagements, large 
a s
unreliable arrears of revenue and a declining Jama. Bentinck 
was convinced of the hardships of the people and to holster 
up their morale he ordered the local authorities to announce
p
that takavi would he granted. In I83O the Court was
blaming the Zamindars for the crisis in Bundelkhand* hut in
1832 and more fully in 1835 after consideration of local
reports it fully acknowledged the high pressure of .jama and
3
recommended its liberal reduction.
Holt Mackenzie and Montagu Ainslie (Commissioner of 
Northern Bundelkhand) have left graphic accounts of the 
state of the region resulting from the continuous pressure 
of the assessment. Mackenzie wrote in a note prepared in
1. For the evils of bhaiyachara tenure and the vagaries of 
weather, see Bg.R.D.(c & C.P.), 8.8.1821, 2, paras.12-13; 
Ibid.. 29*9*182U, para.70; H. Mackenzie, memo. 1.7*1819, 
para.l3U, on.oit., Bg.R.L•, 16.8.1827, para.51; In India 
the margin between subsistence and starvation was 
generally a thin one. A  drought therefore exposed the 
weakness of the Indian economic structure and imposed a 
tremendous strain on people. For instance in the drought 
of 1833 in Kanpur cattle were sold or slaughtered, and 
children were either sold or abandoned. See E.A.Reade, 
Report on the Cawnpore district for I833-3U, 20.11.183U, 
p. 36, 3ur« MSS. B.279. „ ,
2. Bg. R.L., 23.B.I831, 7, paras. 83-6; Bg, R.C, 23.3.1831,
21.
3. Bg. R.D. (W.P.), 22.12.1830, 7, para. 3; It>id.. 21.11,1832, 
7, para.7-
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1828 after passing through Bundelkhand, 1 there is I fear 
indisputably much of misery and mismanagement. The empty and 
roofless houses or filthy ruhhish that fill up a considerable 
space of once populous townships, the beggarly appearance 
of numbers, the untidy habitations of all, the scantiness 
of stock, the waste and unweeded fields, the imperfect 
tillage, are all I fear, so unequivocal proofs of national 
decay Ainslie in a letter of 2 April 1830 wrote to
Sadr Board bn deputation,'!of upwards of one hundred 
villages which I have visited during the past month, I can 
only specify four that appeared in a flourishing condition; 
whole quarters I found deserted and unroofed, and the 
contrast between those which have an appearance of 
improvement and those reduced to the state I have mentioned 
was too striking to escape observation.1 He has further 
observed that, 'mud walls are succeeding to burnt brick 
houses ... there is not throughout the parts of the district 
which I have traversed in all directions, a landed proprietor 
possessed of the means of even repairing his dilapidated 
property.
Ainslie while countering the view of the Sadr Board 
on the pressure of the assessment, movingly portrayed the 
plight of the people. In the letter already cited he asked,
1. Cited in Bg, R„D., 2U.U.I835, 3,para. 27*
2. Ibid., para.28.
3. Ibid.
fhave the respectable inhabitants of this district naturally 
a disposition to grovel in the dust by fifties and hundreds 
at the feet of the European officer, to line the road with 
their bodies to prevent him from passing, to seize the 
bridle of his horse, and to entreat him to see and judge of 
their condition by visiting their villages and traversing 
their estates, acknowledging abundance of land, but pleading 
paucity of hands and means to cultivate it, and urging him 
to ascertain by personal examination, by the height of the 
jungle, the quantities of grass, the dilapidated state of 
villages, and the extent of their engagements with the 
Muheyzans, [sic] whether they are, or are not in a condition 
requiring indulgence •
The long-term effect of Waring!s settlement was not 
only on agriculture and Zamindars. but it also affected the 
professional revenue farmers and the money-lenders. In that 
context Holt Mackenzie wrote, that, fBy this system it seems 
to be certain that in some pergunnahs and in several 
villages, in all, the people were impoverished, and their 
stock swept into the exchequer, and that the persons from 
whom they would have expected pecuniary aid have shared 
their fate. The farmers may not personally deserve pity, 
but their ruin has in effect operated like a confiscation, 
and the sum of national wealth has been proportionally
1. Ibid.
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d e c r e a s e d . W a r i n g ’s settlement functioned easily as long
as prices were high and money could he borrowed. With
deflating prices money-lenders could not indefinitely
advance large sums* Many of the money-lenders with whom
Ainslie had spoken explained they had lost enormous sums of
money they had advanced, because the property of debtors was
not worth having# The civil courts showed very few claims
filed by the creditors, and in those where decrees were
awarded in their favour, execution yielded only a small
2
proportion of their dues.
We have so far noticed the high pressure of the r1ama*
which constitutes one aspect of the problem of revenue
collection. There is another aspect of the question requiring
brief consideration - the case of under-assessment. It is
difficult to say for the province as a whole, to what extent
under-assessment prevailed# Yet we can generalise that in
every district there must have been ’estates’ where the .jama
was low in comparison to their resources. We have already
seen that in the parganas of Khyragarh and Bara in the
district of Allahabad the profits of the Zamindars were 
3
excessive. In several other parganas of that district a
considerable disproportion between resources and jama is
k
known to have existed. The district of Gorakhpur was
1. Ibid., para. 27*
2. Ibid., para.28,
3. See above, #p. 306.
4. J.Dunsmure to H.Mackenzie, 6.2.1828, annexed to Bg. R.L.,
10.12.1828, App.E.
332
generally under-assessed* According to the Collector the 
Zamindars admitted the extreme lightness of the jama, and 
expressed surprise at its not being increased, as a. result 
of which the government was losing between two and three 
lakhs of rupees a n n u a l l y I n  the parganas whose revenue 
was collected directly by the Collector^ office the .jama 
was Rs. 222,000 which could have been easily raised by 
another Rs. 50,000. The pargana of Gujpur paid a .jama of 
Rs. 27*867 while its resources were estimated at Rs.80,000.
The festatef of Rajsatta&i was another case in point whose 
mufassal collection was Rs.76,000 while the jama was. merely 
Rs.31,000.2
That the jama in the districts of Allahabad and 
Gorakhpur was extremely light seems probable in view of the 
fact that between 1822 and 1828 the total arrears of revenue 
in the former amounted to Rs.5,409 (the jama in 1828 was 
Rs.1,870,750), and in the latter to Rs.42,982 (the jama in 
1828 was Rs.810,603); while in neither of these districts 
was a. single !estateT sold for default of revenue. Besides, 
for the province as a whole considerable arrears of revenue 
accumulated of which Bundelkhand alone had been responsible
1. J.Armstrong to H. Mackenzie, 2.4.1828, Bg.R.L.,
10.12.1828, App.G.
2. H. Mackenzie, Note, 13.11.1828, para.3, Bg. R.L.
10.12.1828, encl. 8; J. Armstrong to H.Mackenzie, 2.4.1828, 
Bg.R.L. 10.12.1828, App.G.
3. Statistics of Allahabad, 6.2.1828, Ibid., App.E;
J. Dunsmure to H.Mackenzie, 6.2.1828. Ibid., Statistics 
of Gorakhpur, 2.4.1828, Ibid.. App.G.
for one-third of it.
The reasons behind under-assessment are very easy to 
explain. Since 1822 the general ruling had been not to 
alter the existing assessment unless settlement under 
Regulation VII had been completed. In the meantime since 
1801 waste land, and large jungle tracts had come under 
cultivation, which either paid only a nominal assessment or 
remained excluded from the CollectorTs account because no 
detailed investigation- had taken place. The lakhira.1 land - - 
must also have increased in value while no revenue was 
yielded by it. And in some instances where the Indian 
revenue servants were also landowners, they had deliberately 
depressed the account s.
The few illustrations given above relating to over­
assessment and under-assessment by no means exhaust the 
list of cases, but they fully bring out the reasons behind 
them. It also emerges from these case studies that the 
assessment was unequal, that its principle and practice were
defective, and that it was, as Baden-^owell has remarked, too 
2
rigid. The inequality of assessment was. harmful to the 
interests of agriculture, producers and the government alike. 
The government was conscious of this fact which ultimately 
led to an improvement in the calculation of assessment in
1. See J. Armstrong to H. Mackenzie, 2.4.1828, Ibid., App.G.
2. B. H. Baden-Powell, op.cit., 2, p.l4.
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1833 and thereafter. There certainly existed over-assessment 
in various parts of the province, which was as has "been 
shown above, exacerbated by a variety of situations like 
climate, weather, tenure and economic factors.
To conclude briefly, neither Regulation VII of 1822, 
nor the five year settlements during the period under 
review met with any success. The Regulation in question 
however, remains a landmark in land revenue policy. The 
defects in the formulation of the policy of 1822 and its 
impracticability, together with the weaknesses of the 
resulting settlements led to a better understanding which 
culminated in the rethinking of policy in I833.
Chapter V 
Revision of Policy
The slow progress of Regulation VII of 1822, the
distortion of its intent and purpose in its implementation,
and the failure of temporary settlements, had combined to
create an administrative problem of great magnitude. The
crawling pace of the settlement affected the interests of
the government and the agricultural classes alike - the
interests which it was the professed object of the
settlement to secure.
There were three alternative ways of resolving the
situation. The proceedings under Regulation VII could be
somehow expedited, or a summary revision of the assessment
for a longer term could be made to facilitate detailed work,
or the principles of settlement under Regulation VII could
be altered in such a way as to create conditions for
accelerating the progress. The first alternative was
unacceptable because if had been proved its own
*
impracticability. The second - that of an intermediate 
settlement - was actually under the active consideration of 
government for some time. Under it the assessment was to be 
fixed for a period of 15 to 20 years on general considerations 
but the survey, the ascertainment of resources, the 
investigation and recording of rights, were to go on, so 
that after the termination of the intermediate settlement,
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a detailed one could Toe made.'*’ This was Lord William 
Bentinckfs proposal. He expected that it would encourage
p
agricultural improvements and reassure the Zamindars,
perturbed by summary assessments and detailed scrutinies
since 1822. However, his plan did not gain wide support from
the revenue officers, nor did the Sadr Board of Revenue on
*
deputation show any enthusiasm for it. Even those who 
supported it, such as the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, and 
the Commissioner of Meerut, were actually recommending 
modifications in the existing modes of settlement under the
Ll
1822 dispensation. Bentinck accepted the inutility of his 
proposal in view of two considerations. If Regulation VII 
could be modified to increase the speed of settlement, then 
there was no need for an intermediate settlement. He also 
accepted the disadvantage of loss of revenue under 
intermediate settlements because much land lay concealed and 
unassessed.
The attention of the administration was therefore 
directed towards the modification of the 1822 scheme (because 
the settlements under it had failed), which originated with 
the Sadr Board of Revenue, consisting of William Fane and
1. G.G. to SBOR. on deputation 7*4*1831 , paras. 7-8,
SRRHWP. 2.
2. Ibid,, para.89#
3. SBOR. on deputation to W.H. Macnaghten, 22.7*1831, 
para. 17, Bg. R.C. 27*12.1832, 41.
4. See G.G. to SBOR. on deputation 7*4.1831? para.44,
SRRNWP. 2.
5. Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.46, Ibid.
6. See G.G. to SBOR. on deputation 7*4.1831, para,45, Ibid.
Richard Milbank Tilghman. For the revised settlement plan 
which emerged in 1833 the greatest credit is due to Lord 
Bentinck. He was on tour of the Western Provinces since 
1830, and remained there until the early part of 1833* The 
chief object was to end an unsatisfactory state of affairs.
He was regularly in consultation with the Sadr Board of 
revenue on deputation which was specifically sent to attend 
on the Governor-General in solving the problems of land
revenue settlement of the region. Lord Bentinck also .......
discussed problems with Collectors and Commissioners of 
revenue. His revenue minutes and letters - especially those 
of 7 April 1831, 20 January 1832, and 26 September 1832 
- show a keen understanding of the problem and a firm, 
clear, and practical approach to it. His minute of 26 
September 1832 was the basis of the revised scheme which 
was discussed at a revenue conference in Allahabad between 
21 and 23 January 1833* After that, Regulation IX of 1833 
modifying certain provisions of Regulation VII of 1822 was 
enacted.
The revision of the policy which was under discussion 
between the years 1830 and 1833 embraced the familiar 
subjects of ’proprietary1 and cultivating rights, the 
principle of assessment, the 1 quantum of residue1 to be 
allowed to the 'proprietors1, the duration and procedure of 
settlement making. The views ultimately adopted on the 
question of 'proprietary1 and cultivating rights had a
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crucial bearing on the making of detailed settlement*
Since the year 1810, as a result of pressure 
exercised by the Home government, which was itself 
influenced by raiyatwari ideas, there had emerged a cautious 
approach to ‘proprietary1 right* Its recognition was no 
longer to be based on a supposition that this or that person 
was a ‘proprietor* , but every claim was to be examined and 
even where no claim was preferred, the fact of 'proprietary* 
right was still to be investigated* There had, in fact, 
existed a bias and even contempt against persons whom the 
British had acknowledged as Zamindars and 'proprietors' in 
the early years of British administration, or against those 
who, under the legal framework of the British, had bought 
'estates' at public or private sales.^ Charles Metcalfe
expressively called them the Tovergrown creatures' of the
2
Regulations.
The great effort made under Holt Mackenzie to 
investigate the nature of landholding, and to recognise 
rights in land accordingly, had not only proved unavailing, 
but had also failed* William Fane and Richard Tilghman 
therefore set out to show systematically and in a simple 
way the basic nature of landholding in the Western Provinces. 
According to them, consistent with the government policy,
1. See Chaps. 3 and 4.
2. Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 31.10.1831* Bg.R.C. 27*12*1832, 
4-3#
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only two types of proprietary1 rights existed - zamindari
and pattidari, In the zamindari village, there could be
one or more proprietors’, the land was not shared but held
jointly and the right extended over the entire village. The
’proprietary1 interest was expressed in fractions of a
rupee. In the pattidari villages the co-sharers each held
a distinct portion of land, and the ’proprietary’ interest
was measured in fractions of a bigah.^ The settlements had
been made with these two categories of. ’proprietors1. Their
’proprietary’ profit consisted of the difference between
the rent received and the revenue paid by them. They had
the power to enforce payment from the raiyat by summary
process, and in some cases even to determine the amount of
rent he had to pay. When they did not engage for the
payment of revenue, then in acknowledgement of their
’proprietary’ right malikana was paid to them. The waste
*
land in both cases, belonged to the ’proprietors’.
The Sadr Board deduced from its views of the 
’proprietary* tenure, the inapplicability of the raiyatwari 
form of settlement which the Home government had been
lL
recommending from time to time. The two essential features
1. SBOR. to G.G. 25.5.1851, paras. 6-7, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 
33-
2. SBOR. Cited in Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.17,
SRRRWP.2.
3. ibid., para.23.
4. SBOR. to G.G. 3.9.1830, SRRNWP. 2, pp.205-6; SBOR to 
G.G. 7.12.1830, paras.3-5. SRRNWP. 2.
raiyatwari were settlement with the actual occupant of the 
soil, and individual field assessment. The field assessment 
was actually introduced by Holt Mackenzie.*, and it occupied 
a very prominent place in the 1822 settlement scheme* Since 
1proprietary1 rights independent of occupancy of land 
existed in the Western Provinces, the Board considered the 
raiyatwari model as irrelevant to the situation there* The 
Board, it should be noted, was actually claiming for the 
‘proprietors1 a complete freedom of organising their 
internal affairs, because that was the right connotation of 
the term ‘proprietor1, and government had recognised the 
position of the proprietors1 provided that they paid their 
revenue and protected their raiyats so far as the government 
wished* This was a whig notion of ‘property1 introduced by 
Lord Cornwallis, with a mixture of physiocratic ideas and 
Adam Smitifflsian economic theories* Both Fane and Tilghman 
had had their training in Bengal and were great admirers of 
Cornwallis and the permanent settlement.^
The view of the Board on landholding provoked 
Charles Metcalfe into writing several fiercely challenging, 
brilliant, and majestic minutes. He loosely agreed with 
the Board that only zamindari, and pattidari rights existed. 
The term zamindari was a composite one which included single
1. SBOR to G.G* 25.5.1831, para.24, Bg.R.C. 2?*12*1832, 33.
2. Minute of C.T*Metcalfe, 31.10*1831, Bg.R.C.27*12.1832,
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Zamindars and village Zamindars or the co-sharing joint 
'proprietary1 body* Metcalfe's complaint was that the 
rights of the community were not sufficiently recognised, 
and many individuals who were mere headmen of their 
villages, or who bought land at public sales which were 
erroneously put up to sale, or whom the British mistakenly 
recognised as Zamindars, were not the 'proprietors' of the 
land.^ The difference in tenure between Madras and the 
Western Provinces which the Board saw was, according to 
Metcalfe, due to British legislation* He wished to see the 
end of 'fictitious' 'proprietors' created through
p
legislation* Metcalfe also considered the use of the term 
'proprietor' , and the meaning it conveyed as misleading and 
detrimental to the interest both of the village community 
and of the government* The true Indian revenue system 
throughout India outside the permanently settled area, was 
the same* Rights in land were those of possession and use 
subject to payment of revenue* The admission of intermediaries 
to collect the government's share of the produce, did not 
vest in them 'proprietary1 rights and they did not receive
LL
rent but collected revenue. He therefore rejected the
1. Ibid., Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 29*6*1832, Bg.R.C. 
27712*1832, 66; Minute 3*2*1831, SRRHWP* 2, pp.230-01.
2. Minute of 0.T.Metcalfe, 3.2.1831, Ibid*, pp.229-30 and 
233*
3. Ibid., p.234*
4. KInute of C.T.Metcalfe, ?* 11*1830, Ibid., pp.210-15;
Minute 3*2.1831, Ibid., p.233; Minufe3l.10.l831, QP.cit.
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Board's explanation of 'proprietary1 profit as the difference 
Between rent and revenue, on the ground that it was an undue 
sacrifice of revenue and a departure from the revenue system 
of India.^ If any proprietary1 right existed at all, it 
was vested in the village Zamindars, and the co-sharing 
body, and there were no 'proprietary1 interests in land 
unconnected with the cultivating interests.^ All else1
Metcalfe wrote in his minute, 'is of our own invention, to
voen
no good purpose, neither with defined nor well understood, 
but tending to confusion and injustice, the injury of the 
government, and the injury of the real land-owners.1^  The 
Indian revenue system, as Metcalfe understood it, and the 
heart of which was the village community, was not only to 
be preserved but also to be restored where regulation 
'proprietors' had obtained possession, and it was in no
Zl
case to be subverted until something better was substituted# 
His admiration of the village communities was so great and 
genuine that he considered them to be indestructible, 
graphically described them as 'little republics' and 
dreaded 'everything that has a tendency to break them up.'^ 
Between the view expressed by the Board, and 
Metcalfe's conception of tenure there existed a wide
1. Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 7.11.1830, SRRNWP. 2, 214-15; 
Minute 3*2.1831, Ibid., p.233#
2. Minute of C.T.Metcalle, 3.2.1831, Ibid., pp.230 and 234.
3. Ibid., p.234.
4. Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 7.11.1830, Ibid., p.215.
5. Ibid., pp.218-19.
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difference. One was a straightforward exposition of the
tenure as it existed then, and in accordance with the
enactments of the government. The other, expressed in
flights of rhetoric and romanticism, had very little
relevance to reality* Metcalfe’s understanding of Indian
tenure was far from correct,1 and it offered no solution to
the immediate problem on the hands of government* His
adoration and advocacy for the preservation and restoration
of the village community, the backwater of civilisation, •
was actually reactionary. The acceptance of his proposal
would have led to the repeal of all proclamations and
Regulations since 1801.
The Board*s definition, however, had not covered
the taluqdari tenure or villages where no claim to
’proprietary* right was put forward and only raiyats
existed# Lord Bentinck fully acknowledged the right of
Taluqdars to be 1 proprietary* where it could be proved, and
to entail merely the collection of revenue where it was not 
2
proved. In his view attention to the rights of Taluqdars 
was as necessary as to those of the cultivating classes.
As to the zamindari and pattidari rights, and the 
Regulations concerning them and he fully agreed with the
1. See Chap. 3 for a discussion of ’proprietary* rights.
2. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, para.31* Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 
79*
3* Ibid., para.32.
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views of the Board of R e v e n u e A s  the bulk of 'proprietary1 
right was in the hands of the village communities, the 
settlement was generally to be made with them. Where the 
Taluqdars did not establish their claim to 'proprietary* 
rights, then a mufassal settlement was to be made with the 
communities, and the former were to receive an allowance of 
a percentage of the revenue. In large zamindari 'estates' 
held by an individual or a family, the 'proprietary* right
of the • Zamindar was to be recognised, subject to t h e .......
occupancy right of the cultivators• Lord Bentinck fully 
accepted the intention contained in the preamble to 
Regulation VII to protect and acknowledge the variety of
p
'proprietary' rights. The preamble declared that it was 
the aim of the government to protect the rights of those, 
'owning, occupying, managing, or cultivating the land, or 
gathering, or disposing of its produce, or collecting, or 
appropriating the rent or revenue payable on account of 
land, or paying or receiving any cesses, contribution, or 
perquisites, or holding a part of any village or mehal.1
It should be noted that Lord Bentinck who laid 
down the broad lines of recognising 'proprietory' rights 
supported the Board's views, and ignored those of Metcalfe.
1. Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.4, SRRNWP.2;
Minute of Bentinck 26.9*1332, para.17> Bg.R.d. 27*12.1832,
79*
2. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, paras. 20-21, 31 stn<i 16,
Ibid.
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The Home government, on the other hand, had held views 
similar to those of Metcalfe for a long time and fully- 
supported him,'*' Its despatch of 15 February 1853 containing 
its exhortations on proprietary1 rights, reached Calcutta 
after Bentinck had finalised the new arrangements, Even if 
it had arrived earlier, it is highly doubtful whether 
Bentinck would have shifted his position on the proprietary 
question*
On another great question with far-reaching 
consequences on agrarian relations and agricultural 
development, a decision consistent with the existence of 
proprietary1 rights in the Zamindars, was taken* Bentinck 
in consultation with the Sadr Board, and several other 
revenue officers, decided not to fix the rents of all 
resident raiyats, but only of those who had paid the same
p
rent continuously for twelve years. For ordinary raiyats
resident in the village, only a kismwar^ namabandi was to
be maintained, and at one stage both Bentinck and/Sadr
Board were prepared to give them the option of paying in
kind, as a way of protecting them from the exactions of
4.
Zamindars. On reflection, Bentinck decided against
1* Bg* R.D. 15*2.1833, 2, para.17*
2. Minute of Bentinck, 20.1*1852, para.72, SRRFWP.2;
C. Macsween to J.G.Deedes, 8.5*1833, para.2; Bg.R.C,
8.3ol833, 64-.
3* Kismwar = according to the soil classification*
4. Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.74, B K R H W . 2;
Minute of Bentinck, 29*2.1832, para.16, Bentinck MSS,
2903; SBOR. to G.G. 25*5*1831, para.23, Bg.R.C,
27*12.1832, 33*
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pursuing the point seriously, "because it was likely to
produce loss of revenue. ^ However, he was in favour of
recording the shares of produce between Zamindars and 
2
raiyats. The Sadr Board had categorically stated the
absence of any right in the raiyats to have their rents 
*
fixed.^ Bentinck, on the other hand, was in support of 
fixing the rent but only where such a right existed. About 
the time the decision was taken for the Western Provinces, 
it was decided for.Bengal, also.. In Bengal,, as. a result of . . 
Henry Colebrooke's initiative, the question of fixing the 
rent of khudkasht raiyats had been under discussion since 
1812. The Home government had extended full support for the 
raiyats, and the Bengal government saw no objection to this 
in 1822. The fixing of raiyats1 rent had the approval of such 
celebrities in official circles as Cornwallis, and Shore.
The question was on what criterion it was to be done? The 
rates of 1793-94- had not remained stationary. It was only 
natural that the question lay dormant until John Herbert 
Harington revived it in 1827*^ Bus to the inefficiency of
1. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, para.69, Bg.R.C. 27*12. 
1832, 79*
2. Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para*74-, SRRNWP. 2.
3. SBOR. to G.G. 25*5*1831, paras. 23-4-, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 
33*
4. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, para.66, Bg.R.C.
27*12.1832, 79*
5. See Minute of J.H.Harington, 3*7*1827, Bg.R.C. 11.10.1827, 
10; For drafts of Regulation prepared by Harington
see Bg.R.C. 11.10.1827, 11-12.
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the secretariat, a decision was taken only in September 
1832.^“ It was, that to fix the rent of the raiyats was as 
1 absurd as to fix the price of food or the wages of labour
p
in perpetuity*' There was a good deal of common reasoning 
in the decisions* And it should be noted that the decision 
of 1832 especially for the Western Provinces, was a radical 
modification since the days of Holt Mackenzie, and it was
*
in violation of the instructions of the Court of Directors*
.Was. there .any. Justification in this?........................
Robert Merttins Bird had arrived in Bengal in 1808 
as a writer, and served in various subordinate capacities 
in the judicial branch of the administration* His first 
independent and permanent charge came in 1820, when he was 
appointed as judge and magistrate of Gorakhpur. Previous to 
this, he had seen service in Calcutta, Benares, and Jaunpur# 
In 1829 came a change in his career which has left its 
imprint on the revenue history of the North-Western 
Provinces* He was appointed Commissioner of Revenue and 
Circuit of Gorakhpur division. In 1831 he was promoted to
1. Minute of Bentinck, 29*9.1832, Bg.R.C. 29*1*1633, 3*
2. Ibid*\ Blunt and Metcalfe fully supported Bentinck.
See Minutes of W.Blunt and C.T.Metcalfe, 17*11*1832 and 
25*1*1833 respectively, Bg.R.C. 29*1*1833? 24-5*
3* In 1822 fixing rent of resident raiyats was an important 
plank of the settlement scheme. See above, pp#244-5*
Court had zealouslv championed protecting raiyats since 
1810* See <5bo\/<? -f-f- uric\ Se.e. b&lov*.
p* 354- n*3* Bentinck himself had assured the Court; 
of full protection of raiyats in 1831* See Bentinck to. 
Court, 15*9*1831, paras* 7-8, (Bg.R.L.20).
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"be an officiating member of the Sadr Board of Revenue on 
deputation, he reverted to the post of Commissioner of 
Farrakhabad division in 1832, and rejoined the Board in 
1834.1
In 1832 before Bentinck had completed the policy­
making document of 26 September 1832, Bird made a powerful 
and impassioned plea for the fixing of the rents of all 
resident raiyats# According to him, resident raiyats had * 
the right .to fixed rents. To. him,, it. was .'proved* that , such 
a right existed. The basis of fixed rents was of an 
uninterrupted usage, and from ancient times, the sovereign 
had the duty to fix the portion of the produce to be paid 
by them. The British had also recognised this, and there 
was no incompatibility between 'proprietary1 rights, and
the fixing of rents. In the Regulations, there was a co-
2
existence of the two interests. The condition of the
raiyats was not what it ought to be * ... under a Christian
*
or civilised government..,.'-' Bird therefore proposed that 
the rent of all resident raiyats should be fixed for the
Zl
term of the settlement. It should be noted that he was 
stating all resident raiyats, that is, he was not drawing 
a distinction between a days residence, and that of several
1. See Personal Records, 20, pp.57-58•
2. Minute of R.M.Bird, n.d., paras. 9>12> and 38-4-2, Bg. 
R.C. 27.12.1832, 84; Minute of R.M.Bird, 22,9.1832,
Ibid.,89.
3. Minute of R.M.Bird, 22.9*1832, Ibid
4. Minute of R.M.Bird, n.d., paras. 11,36 and 47, Ibid.,84.
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years, (When criticised by Holt Mackenzie at an earlier 
stage, he clarified his suggestion* There were many villages 
in the region, which had been newly colonised, while there 
were others which had been depopulated, but had come to life 
again* In these two categories of villages, the present 
raiyats were the original ones, and therefore should be 
treated on a par with the hereditary raiyats in the older 
villages. His modified proposal stood thus: that no right 
to fixed rents was to be conceded where it did not belong, 
that is, he would include raiyats in new villages, and in 
older ones, those who had permanent rights in the villages 
to the benefit of fixed rents).^
Bird strengthened his proposal by advancing economic 
arguments* Not to fix rents was potentially unsound from 
the agricultural and fiscal standpoints. Once the settlement 
was concluded, the Zamindar was sure to double the rents of 
the cultivators, producing a deterioration of the land, and 
consequently a failure in the payments of rents and revenue. 
On the contrary, he pointed out the preponderating advantages 
of fixing rents. The fixation of rents, he conceived, would 
act as a great incentive to cultivators, who would bring 
about agricultural improvements, and strengthen the source
1* H. Mackenzie’s remarks on Bird’s memo, on settlements 
and Bird’s reply, n*d. (both in the same document), 
Bentinck MSS. 2650; It is curious what Bird admitted to 
Mackenzie privately, was not included in his official 
minutes*
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of land revenue. Many substantial raiyats had told Bird
that they refrained from laying out capital in the sinking 
e
of masonry w^lls, improving land, and raising valuable
products from fear of the Zamindar demanding an immediate
increase of rent.'1'
Bird also showed the way in which rent could be
fixed. There was no rule either in law or in prescription1 •
The only principle seems to have been the arbitrary will of
the monarch* If there was any guide, it was in batai lands,
2
but batai, Bird detested. It was injurious and crude. He
therefore looked to money rents which prevailed in every
part of the province. These should be ascertained, and
combined with the information from other mouzahs, and from
summary suits of rent, in constructing accurate records of 
*
rent rates.^ And in villages where the cultivators were 
proprietors’ as well, there was no need to ascertain rents.
Zl
Only revenue rates were to be recorded for these villages.
In his insistence that raiyats had a right to have 
their rents fixed, was Bird generalising from limited 
experience? Or was he carried away by sentiment and the 
desire to do good? Bird was personally against generalisation 
and was critical of this fault in Holt Mackenzie. He wrote 
about his own approach in a memorandum: 11 prefer the
1. Minute of R.M.Bird, n.d., paras. 23-4- and 33? Bg.H.C.
27.12.1832, 84-.
2. Ibid., paras. 14— 17 and 28.
3. Ibid., paras. 18 and 20-21.
4-. Ibid., para.52.
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synthetical philosophy & wish to have each fact fixed "before 
I found a principle upon it.1^  But he admitted that in 
future in the course of extended operations, he might also 
tend to generalise. The answer then lies in his personal 
make up. First, he genuinely believed that the raiyats had 
rights which would not trench upon the vested interests of 
the Zamindars, so long as they were assured of the ‘accident 
of the management1. Secondly, he did not consider the
interests of Zamindars, .Rajas and T a l u q d a r s to. have.........
arisen from land. !I am entirely satisfied1, he stated,
‘after every investigation & enquiry I can make, that there 
was under the former Government no agricultural class 
between Government & the Cultivators ... all else were
i p
Government officers, or Government assgnees*. Thirdly,
*
Bird considered the Zamindars as a ‘host of unproductives1 , 
wasting their resources on marriages and extravagant
4
habits. He further wrote about them: ‘None of the 
jemindars [sic] being anything better than annuitants of 
the worst kind, unproductive themselves and wasting all 
their means on the unproductive*.^ Fourthly, Bird believed 
in raiyatwari principles, but somewhat differed from Munro 
in the details of operation, though he agreed with what had
1. H. Mackenzie1s remarks on Bird’s memo, on settlements and 
Bird’s reply, n.d., Bentinck MSS. 2650.
2. R.M.Bird, Further thoughts respecting settlements, n.d., 
Bentinck MSS.2650; the phrase ‘accident of the management’, 
is attributed by Bird to Holt Mackenzie, Ibid.
5. Minute of R.M.Bird, n.d., para.12, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1852,84.
4. R.M.Bird, memo, respecting settlements, n.d., Bentinck 
MSS. 2650.
5* Ibid.
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1
been arranged in 1822# None of his suggestions and 
criticisms of Zamindars were new. They had all been 
expressed many times over. But in official circles around 
1832, he must have appeared as a radical* He wrote of 
himself: 'I believe my zeal on this point [the fixing of 
rents and of a field assessment] brought me under some 
suspicions of a desire to pirate the invention but it was 
nothing but a desire for the welfare of the people which 
led me to press it on various occasions. I thought it
p
conducive & the "greatest happiness principle"1. Bird’s 
views consequently made no impression on the official policy 
towards the raiyats in the new arrangements. Of all persons 
even Metcalfe had to differ from him. In 1832, Bird stood 
alone in advocating that the rents of raiyats should be 
fixed.
William Bane, Bird’s colleague in 1832, had arrived 
in Calcutta in 1805* He served as an assistant at the 
Board of Revenue, next as acting Collector of Jessore, then 
in the customs department, and in 1819 was appointed 
Collector of Tirhut. His first contact with the Western 
Provinces came in 1824- when he was appointed Principal 
Collector of Bundelkhand, the first and last experiment in
1. Ibid.
2. H. Mackenzie!s remarks on Bird’s memo, on settlements 
and Bird's reply, n.d., Bentinck MSS* 2650*
3« E. Stokes seems mistaken in stating that Bird with the 
support of the Home Authorities established the rights 
raiyats to fixed rents. See The English Utilitarians 
and India, p.121.
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those regions on the Madras model. After that came his
appointment as Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit in the
Sarun division. And in 1830 came the peak of his career,
when he led a branch of the Sadr Board of Revenue on
deputation to the Western Provinces to assist Bentinck in
settling the vexed revenue problems.'*' Thus his name, like
that of Bird - less famous than the latter, but no less
entitled to fame - is linked with the Western Provinces*
Pane’s arguments were in antithesis to those of
Bird* He absolutely denied the right of the raiyats to
fixed rents, except of course, for maurusi, who were
2
cultivating ’proprietors’. Pane produced a lengthy argument 
to the effect that the fixing of rent was neither legal, 
nor desirable, nor practicable* Unless the Civil Courts 
acknowledged the rent fixed by government, it was useless. 
Rents in India had always been liable to adjustment annually
Ll
or at intervals. It would alter the very foundations of 
the agrarian relationship, and the system that emerged,
* * *. would be a sort of half measure between ryotwar and 
mouzahwar settlement.’^  Tension would also be created 
between the revenue officers and the Zamindars * One trying 
to enforce the rule, the other trying to evade it, Pinally.
1. Personal Record, 16, pp.1005-023.
2. Minute of W. Pane, 12.1.1833* paras.2-3* SRRNWP* 2*
3. Minute of W.Pane, 4.9.1832* paras.3-5* Bg.R.C. 27.12. 
1832, 88.
4. Ibid., para*3.
5. Ibid., para.4.
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it was practically impossible to fix rents without a loss 
of revenue, without considerable expenditure, and without 
an enormous waste of time.’*'
The leading question is what actual rights the 
raiyats had* The historian must ask whether Bird or Fane
was right, whether the earlier position taken up by the
2
Bengal government, was justified, whether the insistence 
of the Court upon protecting the raiyats from 1810 to as 
late as 1837 was based on a mere supposition;^ and whether 
the decision taken by Bentinck was based upon a correct 
appreciation of the raiyats1 rights. How could the 
administration have arrived at the truth, and how can we 
arrive at the truth? We must answer the second question 
first, which is a technical one. For the administration 
and also for us the source of information, must be the 
village jamabandi and rent cases of the time. It is fair to 
assume that revenue officers who had served at the district 
level must have had a fair acquaintance with these sources 
of information. So far as we are concerned, the information 
lies deeply buried in the district and pargana records 
where it survived the holocaust of ’18571* Unless a large
1. Ibid., para.5*
2. Under the arrangement of 1822, see Chap. 4,pp. 244-5*
3. See Chaps. 2 and 3* pp.347 n*3. Court continued to 
insist that raiyats had a right to fixed rent and an 
interest in land, and unavailingly charged the Bengal 
Government to secure those interests to them. See
Bg. R.D. 15*2.1833* 2, paras. 11-13 and 16; I.R.D. 
12.4.1837* 6, para.24.
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scale processing is conducted of the surviving data, truth 
will not emerge. This has still to he done* We therefore, 
have to fall hack upon the direct testimony of individuals 
connected with the revenue business of the time. In our 
present stage of knowledge therefore, only an approximation 
can he made to what might have heen the truth.
First then the classification of the raiyats♦ From 
analysing the several classifications advanced hy various 
officials, a three-fold hroad categorisation emerges.^- 
First, there were the cultivating proprietors* variously 
called in India, as mirasdars, maurusi, khudkasht and kadim. 
Secondly, there were those called hy Bird and Bentinck, 
‘prescriptive occupancy* raiyats or, called in official 
correspondence, hereditary resident raiyats at fixed rates, 
and in local revenue terminology, chapparband, tjamai» dehi 
tjadeed. Thirdly, there were raiyats without a right of
A
occupancy in land, who may or may not he residing in the 
village. In the latter case, they were called paikasht.
The British called the non-occupancy raiyat a tenant-at- 
will.
In the case of the first and third categories of 
raiyats there was no controversy* The cultivating
1. Minute of R.M.Bird, n.d., para.33) Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832,84; 
Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1632, para.35) Ihid., 79;
Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, n.d., Ihid., 93*
2. Perhaps 'hereditary* would have heen a more accurate 
term in describing the rights of some of the resident 
raiyats.
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’proprietors1 were ’proprietors* and only they should pay 
revenue. The tenant-at-will would have to make the hest 
bargain he could. It was on the second category that the 
controversy centred. How the tenure originated, how others 
could acquire it, was not clear, and a claim to fixed rates 
was therefore, a matter for caution, depending upon 
individual cases, as Bentinck pointed out.^ Bird, on the 
other hand, as we have noticed, asserted that the rent 
of all resident raiyats should be fixed, but he adduced
very little evidence in support of his argument, save the
2assertion that it was *proved*. The Sadr Board had denied 
the existence of a fixed rent in the case of resident 
raiyats from Gorakhpur to Delhi, including the Kingdom of 
Oudh* William Blunt, a member of the Bengal Council, 
admitted the right to fixed rent, but with certain
Ll
exceptions. Metcalf was very vague: the resident occupancy 
raiyat paid according to village custom or law; it depended 
upon the local situation. He was prepared to 11 give the 
Devil his due*,* i.e. he was against controlling the rent 
of the ’manufactured proprietors’ or ’new fangled propriet­
ors1 (as he called the emergence of ’proprietors* under 
the British as distinct from indigenous ones) in their
1* Minute of Bentinck, 26.9.1832, paras. 36, 41 and 44, 
Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 79.
2. See above, pp. 348-50.
3. SBOR. to G.G. 25.5.1831> para.24, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832,33.
4. Minutes of W.Blunt, 30.11.1831, 21.12.1832, para.15, 
Ibid., 44 and 94.
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relation with the resident raiyats who did not have a 
previous right, “because government had no power to do so.'*" 
Alexander Boss also, did not consider that any raiyat had
p
the right to pay at fixed rates. In Bengal in 1827? on
the other hand, the Board of Revenue consisting of James
Pattle, Wigram Money, and Nathaniel Halhead, had supported
fixing rents of khudkasht raiyats. The khudkasht raiyats
of Bengal, were similar to the chapparhand raiyats of the
Western Provinces. While Henry St. George Tucker, writing
in 1852, disagreed with the general view held hy the Court
on rights of khudkasht and chapparhand raiyats. To call
him as the Court had done, as f<joint-tenant1 or fco-
proprietor* with the government, according to Tucker was
Zl
a 1.., mockery of his condition.1
The views of senior officials in the administration, 
have heen noticed ahove; it would he interesting to review 
the opinions of the district and subordinate revenue officers 
hased on personal knowledge and settlement work. In Agra, 
according to William Hardinge Tyler, who had formed several 
settlements under Regulation VII, only maurusi raiyats had 
a right of occupancy with fixed rents, changeable only with
1. Minute of C.T.Metcalfe% n.d., Ibid., 93•
2. Minute of A. Ross, 6.5.1827, Bg.R.C. 11.10.1827, 1.
5. Minutes of J. Pattle, 1.6.1827, W. Money, 51.5*1827,
and N.J. Halhead, 25.5*1827, Ibid., 8.
4. Dissent of H. St. G. Tucker, 27*12.1852, App. to Court
Minutes, 5, PP* 282 and 284.
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the increase of revenue. The fixing of the rents of the
raiyats in villages which were revised under Regulation YII
was resented hy the Zamindars.'*' John Gordon Deedes from
Saidabad, tells us that the resident raiyats had no rights
beyond those of tenants-at-will, and the fixing of rents
under Regulation VII, had made them objects of Zamindars 
2
dislike, 'who sooner or later will either induce them to 
give up the obnoxious document, or ruin them by some
lL
easier method.1 The payment of rent in Saidabad was not 
regulated by custom or any acknowledged practice, but it
5
was governed by how much the cultivator could pay. From 
the sub-collectorate of Belah, William Ogilvy stated that 
hereditary raiyats were not liable to dispossession as 
long as they paid the established rent, or that paid in the 
neighbourhood.^ What was the established rent, we are not 
told. For the district of Kanpur, we have contradictory 
evidence. Beni Prasad, an official in the Collector's 
office, stated that the Lambardar, while issuing annual 
pattas to the raiyats, always conformed to long-established 
rates.^ What precisely that rate was, he did not specify.
'1# Reply of W.H.Tyler, 6.8.1831, to queries issued by 
SBOR. on 24.6.1831, SRRNWP. 2, pp.318-20.
2. Reply of J.G.Deedes, 25*7*1831,to queries issued by 
SBOR. on 24.6.1831, Ibid., pp.329 and 354.
3. He is referring to patta which contained statement of 
fixed rent.
4. Reply of J.G.Deedes. 25.7*1831* op.cit., p.334.
5* Ibid., p.329.
6. Cited in Ninute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.51> SRRNWP.2.
7. Examination of Beni Prasad, Huzoor Tahsil of Kanpur, 
5*1.1831, Bentinck MSS. 2650.
359
But, according to Mala Buksh, Serishtadar of Kanpur, only 
1 jangli boonee1 , and fbund kutty* raiyats had a right of 
occupancy: they did not cultivate by patta, but by pledge, 
they were therefore cowli raiyats. About the fixity of rent 
Mala#Buksh absolutely denied its existence in Kanpur* 
Zamindar had the freedom to offer land after the expiry ofJL 
annual patta to any one paying higher rent.^ He therefore 
contradicts what Beni Prasad had said. We cannot, however, 
accept Mala Buksh * s testimony completely; it is very, likely 
that he was favouring Zamindars, as he himself had an 
extensive zamindari paying Rs.40,000 annually in Tirhut 
district.^
In Azimgarh, as reported by J.T.Reade, the agrarian 
relationship was puzzling and confusing. Technically 
speaking, no occupancy right existed because patta was 
unknown. Permission from the Zamindar to cultivate, was 
taken every year. Even if[ patta were introduced, they 
would not be taken because raiyats never cultivated the 
same lands continuously. According to individuals with 
knowledge of the best period of the Nawab's administration, 
the raiyats were considered to have no rights. The raiyats 
considered themselves as mere 'ploughers of lands and
1. Examination of Mala Buksh, Serishtadar of Kanpur, 10*1. 
1831* Bentinck MSS. 2650. 1Jangli Boonee1 = clearer of 
.jungle . fBund Kutty1 = chapparland. Ancestors in both 
cases settled with original iproprietary1 community* 
Ibid.
2. rbid.
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payers of rent1 , claimed no right in the soil, yet 
considered themselves to have a social tie with the 
Zamindar amounting to a right. If turned out of their fields 
; they would not resist, hut complain of the Zamindar1 s
Violence1 or 'injustice1* As to the determination of rent 
the only method was bargaining - one side trying to extract 
as much as possible, and the other to give away as little 
as possible, both sides with full knowledge of the 
! productive powers of the land. The raiyats did not consider
Zamindars entitled to enhance rents; and what is significant,
I
rents had remained stationary in Azimgarh since the British 
acquisition. Reade was puzzled by what he learnt in
!
Azimgarh, and considered the rights of the raiyats
i
I indefinable, because on the one hand, no understood right
in land existed, and on the other, no obligation.***
To search for data throwing more light on the 
rights of the raiyats, it is necessary to descend to the 
village itself. We shall here examine the cases of eight 
villages situated in the districts of Saharanpur, Etawah-, 
and Aligarh. These villages were covered in the revised 
settlement under Regulation VII, and were reviewed by Holt 
Mackenzie in 1826.
The village of Burleh in Muzaffarnagar sub-division
1. J.T.Reade, Minute on the Rights and Conditions of the 
Ryots in the Chukleh Azimgarh, 1.9.1822, pp#2-10, Eur. 
MSS. D.279*
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of Saharanpur district, was owned by the Toga# community*
The maurusi raiyats paid at the same rate as the village 
Zamindars, at the rate of one-third the produce. It is 
surprising to note that these raiyats had a history of one 
hundred years behind them, but possessed no right of 
occupancy* They held fields from year to year and were liable 
to be ousted* Other resident raiyats paid at one-half the 
produce as their rent.^" We do not know whether the rents of 
the latter could be enhanced.
In the village of Khaddah (Saharanpur) three types 
of raiyats are mentioned. The first class was connected 
with the 'proprietary1 community, had a right of possession, 
paid at the same rate as the Zamindars, but had no voice in 
the village management. The second class, in spite of its 
residence in the village from time immemorial, had no rights 
whatever* How much rent the second category paid, is left 
unstated. The third class, the paikasht paid i for some and
A
/3 for the other kind of produce, besides zamindari
p
perquisites* The raiyats in the village of Mundleh in the 
same district, unless they were connected with the *proprie- 
tary* community, had no right of occupancy. At what rate 
the rent was paid was not stated. In the village of Rajpur 
Mustafabad (Saharanpur) the hereditary resident raiyats
1. See H. Mackenzie, memo, on revision of settlements etc.,
19*10*1826, paras. 4, 5 and 10-11. SRRNWP. 2.
2. Ibid*, para.42.
3. Ibid.» para.46.
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enjoyed a fixed right of occupancy, and could resume their
fields even after a temporary relinquishment,1 Ahout their
rent, there is silence*
The village of Bujatari (Saharanpur) was an absentee
zamindari village. There were two main categories of raiyats
- residents with hereditary rights of occupancy and
residents with rights of occupancy which were not hereditary.
There were two raiyats in the former category, and in the
latter, thirteen. The hereditary ones could.not be ousted,.
were entitled to re-occupation after absence, they could
divide their land among their sons, but could not sell. But
they had no right to any particular rates of rent. The right
of the second category (which had settled for the last 40-
45 years) to occupancy was acknowledged, but they were
liable to dispossession for neglect of cultivation, default
of rent, or relinquishment of the holding. They paid at the
same rate as the hereditary raiyats. Cavendish, the
Settlement Officer, tells us that the absentee Zamindars
encouraged the growth of occupancy rights because the
settled raiyats in the village, would ensure their 
0
perquisite, In the village of Anickowli in the pargana of
Meerut, we are told the raiyats were entitled to hold at 
*
fixed rates. Neither the category of raiyat nor the 
precise meaning of fixed rates has been explained.
1. Ibid., para.110,
2. rbicL , paras. 48-50. 
3* Ibid., para. 125*
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The raiyats in mahal Doondgaon (Etawah) had no 
right of occupancy and were oustahle if strangers offered a 
higher rent. But the Zamindar showed some consideration, 
for if they paid Rs.4 as rent and an outsider offered Rs.5* 
the Zamindar would settle with the former at Rs.4-8-0.^ In 
village Kheri Buzury (Aligarh) raiyats not connected with 
the community had no rights either of occupancy or 
pertaining to rent. It is significant to note here that this 
village was part of a region which was- in a- high state of
p
cultivation, and higher rents obtained. In another 18 
villages in the pargana of Hathrass, in the same district, 
William Hardinge, the Collector, did not consider the
x
raiyats to have any rights beyond the year of cultivation.
It may also be asked what the ’new fangled1 
’proprietors1 thought of the rights of the raiyats. John 
Briggs, who travelled from Calcutta to Delhi in 1831 * 
records an interesting account of an East-Indian who had 
recently bought an’estate1 in the Western Provinces. This 
new Zamindar considered all raiyats including khudkasht as 
mere tenants, who could be ejected at his convenience. He 
realised one-half the gross produce as rent, and exacted 
3g per cent of the gross revenue of his ’estate1 as
1* Ibid., para.268.
2. IbidV, paras. 204 and 203*
3. Ibid., para.248.
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remuneration for the #atwarl. Briggs tells us of another
a
case in a village in Aligarh* There Pitamhar Singh, one of 
Lord Lake’s servants, was granted jagir rights. He soon 
started to claim the rights and privileges of a landlord, 
and considered himself empowered to dispossess even 
imaurusi raiyats. The Mukaddam of the village, however,
p
disputed this assertion.
Ramdin, a Zamindar of several villages in Allahahad,
who.had acquired his ’.property* through private sale during .
1bhe British rule, considered Zamindars generally to he fully
entitled to demand competitive rents, from their raiyats,
and to dispossess them on their refusal to agree. Bachman
Dass, an ex-Diwan of Raja Ram Dyal, who had recently bought
some land in Saharanpur, denied any rights to the community
4
ex-village Zamindars and to the hereditary raiyats.
These views can be summed up as follows. The Court, 
the Bengal government around 1822, Bird,Blunt and the 
Board of Revenue for Bengal, were of the view that the 
hereditary resident raiyats had the right to pay a fixed 
rent. The Sadr Board on deputation, Ross and Tucker (by the
1. The Patwari cess yielded Rs.236 annually, while he paid 
a pittance of Rs. 6 P.m. to that functionary. He 
regularly bribed the minor revenue and judicial servants, 
J. Briggs, Rotes taken during a journey from Calcutta to 
Dehly etc., 3•10*1831, Bentinck MSS. 2650*
2. Ibid.
3* Examination of Ramdin, a Zamindar of Allahabad, 7*12.1830, 
Bentinck' MSS.2650.
4. H. Mackenzie, memo, on revision of settlements etc.,
19.10.1826, para.61, SRRNWP. 2.
implication of his argument in favour of the Zamindars) 
were of the opposite opinion. Bentinck and Metcalfe, who 
radically differed on other aspects of land revenue problems, 
were on this question more or less of the same opinion, that 
a right to pay at fixed rates, might exist in some cases.
The opinion of officers in Agra, Saidabad and Azimgarh, falls 
in line with that of the Sadr Board, and those from Belah 
and Kanpur supports the view of Bird and others. The facts 
at the village level, are also of three types. In many of 
them, the evidence is against fixed rents, in some nothing 
can be said either way, and only in one instance, was there 
proof of fixed rents. And the views of the ’manufactured1 
’proprietor^ were against fixed rents.
An automatic deduction follows from the above: 
neither the supporters nor the opponents of fixed rents, 
had a clear understanding of the situation, and both were 
substantially wrong in their views. The decision initialled 
by Bentinck, was, on the other hand, based upon a judicious 
appreciation of the problem. No generalised opinion on 
inadequate and inconclusive data was possible, therefore no 
universal concession of fixed rent was given*
A few remarks on the question of fixed rents, apart 
from the official discussion presented above, may not be 
out of place here. The evidence of fixed rents might have 
existed or a ’natural’ right to it might have been there, 
but due to several reasons, it was not effective. The
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political chaos which existed before the establishment of 
British rule and its impact on land'holding over a period 
of several decades, may have made the hereditary raiyats 
forget their own rights, and be content to cultivate on any 
terms. ^ Bird was probably correct when he stated that the 
raiyats had a right which they could not exercise owing to
p
past oppression, but when any raiyat was maltreated by the 
Zamindar, he had the sympathy of others. In some of the
villages there is concrete evidence of hereditary possession
 *
of land, but curiously not to a fixed rent. Yet a possessory
right unaccompanied by a fixed rent is meaningless. Under
the British rule the emergence of a new proprietary1 class
also damaged the right of the hereditary raiyat, and even
those of the ’proprietary* community over whom they were
LL
superposed. Fane has narrated how some Zamindars tricked 
the raiyats into paying higher rents.^ The extension of 
indigo cultivation, as Mackenzie pointed out, may also have
1. See H. Mackenzie*s remark on this point in his memo, on 
revision of settlements, 19.10.1826, para.522, Ibid.
2. Minute of R.M.Bird. n.d., para.50, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1632,84.
5. See above, pp. 360-65*
4. See Minute of E.Colebrooke, 15*6.1827, Bg.R.C. 11.10.1827,
6.
5* Fane tells us that in Tirhut a Zamindar desiring to
increase rents, would persuade some principal raiyats to 
agree publicly to an enhancement; while privately he 
gave them a written undertaking not to increase their 
rent. The rent of others would be increased and if any 
opposition was shown, the Zamindar would start legal
proceedings, and achieve his end. W. Fane, to R.Tilghman,
21.4.1827, Bg.R.C. 11.10.1827, 4.
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affected the rights of possession and fixed rents.^ In the 
case of ,jamai raiyats in Bundelkhand, and such other 
hereditary raiyats who settled with the original ’proprietary1
i 2
community,;had the right to pay at revenue rates. In short,
\
the suggestion that the right to pay at a fixed rate around 
1830 was potentially more extensive than it was possible to 
admit, would he quite sound. The chief difficulty lay in 
proof and the burden of proof was on the raiyats. The 
. growth of. occupancy rights and.partially fixed rents towards 
the last quarter of the 19th century and the ease with which 
they were acquired, strengthens the suggestion made here. 
Under Indian custom, resident raiyats acquired certain 
rights which under the security of British rule and 
comparative improvement in agricultural conditions, resulted 
in the growth of occupancy rights. British policy did not
%
create it but simply acknowledged what had come to exist.
But one cannot surmise even at an abstract level, that all 
resident raiyats had a right to pay at a fixed rate. The 
status of the hereditary raiyats underwent a change in the 
turbulent period before British rule, as also during it.
And the view that all resident raiyats had a right to pay at 
fixed rates at best was a fiction. References to a customary
1. See H. Mackenzie, memo, on revision of settlements,
19.10.1826, para.448, SRRNWP*2.
2. See B.H. Baden-Powell« The tjand Systems of British India.
2, p.189.
3. Ibid., see p.186.
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rate of payment were extremely equivocal. Fane and Ross 
rightly stated that nobody knew what the customary rate was, 
and no recorded law or authorities to which one could refer, 
were in existence.^* Further, the enhancement of the raiyats1 
payment arbitrarily in the pre-British days was well known*
The argument for customary rates of rent, therefore loses 
all force. It was, in fact, a backward-looking argument, 
ignoring the changes which had occurred in agrarian relations, 
and it referred to no. fixed .period, of .time, or to. any exact. . 
standard governing the amount to be paid. Customary rates 
might have existed under some of the Mughal rulers but not 
in the early 19th century.
Apart from the view taken of the rights of the 
raiyats there were three other reasons behind the decision 
of 1832-33. The encouragement to a rent market flowing 
from the recognition of 'proprietary1 rights in the Western 
sense; the impracticability of fixing the rents, an attempt 
which had already failed, together with the desirability of 
preserving the traditional form of agrarian relationship in 
the interest of the raiyats themselves; and the overall 
British economic interest in India. The first and third 
reasons were interlinked and the second fitted into them 
very easily.
1. W. Fane to Bentinck, 5*12.1829> Bentinck MSS. 953? 
Minute of A.Ross, 6.3*1827, Bg.R.C. 11.10.1827 > 1*
The proponents of a fixed rent in India, had ignored 
simple economic assumptions. To consider that rents should 
remain constant during the currency of a settlement, was a 
static notion of the agricultural economy. With the increase 
in population and the rise in the price of food-grains, 
rents would automatically ascend. If, in the first quarter 
or so of the 19th century, or before it in certain parts of 
the Western Provinces, rents had not risen, it still does 
not invalidate. the increasing, rent, theory., rather, it .shows . . 
certain peculiarities in the state of agriculture which can 
be easily accounted for. A constant rent might be due to 
an inadequate population ratio to land, or to former 
depopulation of a region, or to bad soil or to bad climate. 
There can also be a third possibility, that of fluctuating 
rents originating from an uncertain state of production due 
to floods or drought* Nevertheless, increasing rent was a 
dynamic notion, and constant and fluctuating rents only 
constituted exceptions to it.
Increasing rents, as it appears from the arguments 
of Ross, Pattle and Bentinck,endorsed by William Wilberforce 
Bird, Blunt and Metcalfe, resulted from market forces - the 
market for rent and the market for produce. It seemed healthy
to subject the raiyats to market forces. Those of them who
*
were inefficient and uneconomic, would turn into wage- 
earners and labourers. The increasing rents collected by the
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Zamindars would lead to capitalist farming and "by removing 
hindrance to market, such as internal duties, salt and opium 
monopolies and restrictions on European enterprise, would 
improve the economy, and increase the wealth of the country. 
The raiyats, so the argument ran, would then he better off. 
Hold down the rent and you perpetuate the present poverty 
of the raiyats, and an undeveloped agriculture.'*'
The aim of encouraging a rent market was unmistakably 
there* Bentinck minuted in favour of the Zamindars, thus: 
’much has been said of late as to the inutility of the class 
of persons who are rent owners in contradistinction to the
p
cultivating community..•*, and any action against their 
interests would be harmful to the raiyats, to agriculture, 
and to the government. A rent market was to take its own 
natural course, and Bentinck supported his argument for non­
interference, even from Munro's teaching* He wrote, ’fixed 
rates on certain classes of soil would seem, independently 
of other objections, to be unjust if intended to regulate 
the demand of Government on the malgoozar, the sole 
objection would be the difficulty of fixing the rate with 
fairness and on proper data. Sir Thomas Munro has distinctly 
laid down the rule that all that Government should fix is
1. See Minute of A.Ross, 6.3.1827 * Ibid., and of 27.7.1833* 
para.17 and n. to para. 25* Bg.R.C. 9.9*1833* 36;
Minute of J. Pattle, 2.5*1832, para.4, Bg.R.C.27*12.1832, 
59*
2. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9.1832, para*4-4-, Bg.R.C.
27.12.1832, 79.
their own demand upon the ryot for revenue* While the rent 
which the ryot shall demand from his cultivating tenant 
must vary according to seasons , crops, demand for particular 
produce, and numerous other details too minute for 
Government to meddle with. There seems, indeed, no reason 
why the Government should interfere to regulate the wages 
of agricultural more than that of any other description of 
labour.(Bentinck was equating the Madras raiyat with the 
Zamindar . and .’proprietor1. . of the. Western. Provinces, and. 
the tenant of Madras with the raiyat of the Western Provinces 
who had no right to pay at a fixed rate; the first part of 
the analogy was technically correct, but the second part 
seems to be extremely doubtful*)
Por practical reasons also, there was no need to 
fix rents where right to them did not belong* It was stated 
that no rule existed by which rents could be fixed, and to 
devise one universal rule in a varying state of affairs was 
a difficult matter* But this argument is more in the nature 
of a justification for not fixing the rent rather than an 
argument against fixing it* All that was required was to 
ascertain the actual rents paid by the raiyats * which would 
not have been a difficult thing at all. Because, this was 
actually the procedure adopted in fixing the assessment#
The second part of the argument, which stated that it was
1. Ibid., para.67.
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not desirable to fix the rent, was a sound one.^" Because 
where a constant or a fluctuating rent existed, there was 
no need to fix it over longer periods« In many parts the 
raiyats themselves did not desire a commitment for rent 
beyond the year of cultivation# And in several instances, 
where the rent was fixed under Regulation VII, it was not
p
observed by any of the parties. Besides, there was a real 
danger in fixing rents, as argued by Tyler, the Collector of 
Agra. If the raiyat happened to be a weak one financially 
and dependent upon the Zamindar or the money-lender for 
aid, then either the patta would be flouted by the Zamindar 
or the land would be controlled by the money-lender. In cases 
of adversity or failure of crop, the Zamindar treated the 
raiyats tenderly, but if the rent was fixed, he would always 
demand his pound of flesh. Bentinck also made much the
IL
same argument.
The third reason was the link between the land 
revenue arrangements, and the problem of transmitting the 
surplus from India to Britain.^
It may be pointed out here that the decision of 
1832-53* implied both an encouragement to a rent market as
1. Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, paras. 70-71* SRRNWP. 2*
2. See Chap. 4.
3# Reply of W.H.Tyler 6.8.1831* to queries issued by SBOR.
on 24o6.1831 * SRRNWP. 2, pp.320-21.
4-. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, para.44-, Bg.R.C. 27.12. 
1832, 79.
5# See below, pp. 413-18.
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well as restraint upon it* The tenancy legislation of the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, owes considerable 
inspiration to it* The twelve-year rule of Bentinck^ was 
incorporated in the legislation of 1859? 1873 and 1881 as 
the criterion of occupancy right* The decision of Bentinck, 
however, was an executive one and was not made into a law. 
The two aspects of the rent question in fact, owe their 
origin to Cornwallis arrangement of 1793? the only weakness 
being that the restraint on market was not worked out. From 
there, and in that form, Wellesley had introduced it to the 
Western Provinces in Proclamations and Regulations between 
1801 and 1805* One may also ask if the rent market, and 
restraint upon it could be stretched back to the pre-British 
times* A restraint upon the market no doubt, was the Indian 
practice which the British incorporated in their policy* 
and improved upon. Concerning the existence of rent market 
in pre-British India, it has been stated in a recent study 
that it did not exist; it was created by the British because
p
they believed that it existed. This statement is purely 
speculative, as much so as if one stated that a fully 
developed rent market existed in pre-British times. The 
possibility that there was a rent market in the pre-British
1. See above, p* 345.
2* W.C*Neale, Economic Change in Rural India, p*65« x
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times, though it remains to he shown, is however, a genuine 
one* The revenue market which existed under the Nawab would 
tend to create competitive rents. Cash rents were fairly 
prevalent, and for certain crops they were universal* It 
has heen said that cash rents were a mere conversion of the 
customary state share in kind. But it has heen shown ahove 
that the use of the term ‘customary1 does not signify 
anything. It is highly likely that there were competitive 
rents for certain quality of land, and near towns, cities, 
markets, and roads. When indiscriminate fixation of rent 
took place under Regulation VII, Tyler has remarked for 
Agra, that the ‘Natives1 considered it against long-standing 
practice and an encroachment upon the rights of Zamindars. 
This remark is if true, highly significant.
On the question of assessment, two aspects require 
attention - the mode of assessment and the soil criteria, 
hoth of which generated a good deal of controversy before 
any decision was reached on them. In the 1822 arrangement 
the mode of assessment was from detail to aggregate or 
fieldwise. In the rearrangement of 1830-33 * this was
1. Ihid., p.65; B.H.Baden-Powell, op.cit., pp.48 and 193*
2. Reply of V.H.Tyler 6.8.1831, SRRNWP.2, p.320.
3. See Chap. 4,p.265. The field assessment could he fixed 
in two ways, either hy ascertaining the produce and 
value of each field as was tried under Regulation VII 
and known as detail to aggregate, or hy first fixing 
assessment on a village or group of villages and then 
distributing it on fields, called aggregate to detail.
The latter was the raiyatwari mode.
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abandoned in favour of aggregate to detail. There were 
several reasons and a good deal of logic behind the decision.
The Sadr Board and Bentinck disapproved of the 
implications of field assessment, it would trench upon 
’proprietary* rights, and would be against the spirit of 
the land-law which recognised those rights.^ Field 
assessment was synonymous with fixing the rent of the 
raiyats which could not fully square with the tenure
prevailing in the Western Provinces, where a land-owning
2
class existed. It suited the raiyatwari system of the 
Madras Presidency because no ’proprietary* class was 
interposed between the government and the raiyats. In the 
Western Provinces the object was to levy the assessment upon 
the proprietors1 *rent*, (the term ’rent* was being used in 
a Ricardian sense) but not to fix or calculate the demand 
upon the raiyats» The 'proprietors* had the freedom to 
regulate the 'rent* payable by the raiyats. Thus there 
was justification in determining the revenue upon the 
'proprietors', but not the rent iipon the fields. There was 
therefore no relevance in a detailed mode of assessment, 
beginning from the fields and moving upwards to the final
1. SBOR to W.H.Macnaghten, 31•1*1832, paras. 6-7, Bg.R.C.
27.12.1832, 51.
2. See SBOR. to G.G. 25.5.1831, para.20, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 
33.
3. See SBOR. to W.H.Macnaghten, 31.1.1832, paras. 6 and 8, 
Ibid., 51; Minutes of Bentinck, 2*1.1832, para.18 and
5372.1832, para.14, Bentinck MSS. 2903.
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determination of revenue. Metcalfe,^ on the other hand,
2 3supported hy Blunt, and the Court, repeatedly clung to
the argument that revenue was part of the gross produce,
therefore the field was the basis of every mode of
assessment. The difference in tenure did not vitiate that
basic fact, that government had the same right to regulate
revenue in the Western Provinces as in Madras, and !rentf
was a meaningless term in India.^ The votaries of a field
assessment consisting of Metcalfe,^ Blunt,^ Bird,1'7 and the
Q
Court of Directors, turned a blind eye to the chief 
difficulty in its implementation, which in the Sadr Board1s 
and Bentinckfs view constituted another reason for its 
rejection.
1. He admitted where village communities did not exist, 
assessment would fall on rent and field assessment would 
not be applicable, Minute, 7#11.1830, SRRNWP.2, p.209*
2. Minute of W.Blunt, 30.11.1831, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 4-4-.
3. See Bg.R.D. 15*2.1833, 2, para.17*
4-. Minutes of C.T*Metcalfe , 7.11.1830, op.cit., pp.209-14-; 
and 31*10.1831, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832,
5. Metcalfe considered field assessment sound and productive 
of equitable assessment, but he held back from 
recommending it where village communities existed from 
fear of their disruption. It could be applied where they 
were already dissolved. Minutes, 31*10.1831, Bg.R.C. 
27*12.1832, 4-3, and 29.6.1832, Ibid., 66.
6. See Minute of W.Blunt, 30* 11 * 1831, -Lbid., 44-.
7* Bird was recommending detail to aggregate field
assessment, just as in the 1822 arrangement and was 
opposed to Munro1s aggregate to detail because of its 
arbitrariness, an4 its unsuitability to the Western 
Provinces due to complex tenures requiring adjustment, 
Minute n.d. , paras. 2-3, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 84-.
8. See Bg. R.D. 15*2.1833, 2, para.14-.
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The pathetic progress of settlements under
Regulation VII had been essentially due to the detailed mode
of assessment where even some of the ablest officers had 
1
failed. Detailed inquiries had turned out to be useless,
and the labour bestowed in determining the produce and value
2
of land, had proved futile. What the proponents of field
assessment had been recommending, had nothing but a seal of
failure stamped upon it. Even in the Bombay Deccan, where a
field assessment had been tried and of which James Mill
spoke with enthusiasm before the Parliamentary Committee of
*
1831-32, it had proved unequal, and failed. The Sadr Board 
and Bentinck were therefore realistic enough to look for an 
alternative method.
Behind the emergence of aggregate to detail assess­
ments there was then a certain logic and history. The new 
method was a timely recognition of the impossibility of 
fixing a precise assessment. The aim was a fair assessment 
based on comparative and analytical data. Its acceptance was 
made possible because cash rents were sufficiently wide­
spread, and the data to test the fairness of the assessment 
were already in existence in district and tahsil revenue
1. See Chap. 4, p.286ff.SBOR. to G.G. 25*5*1831, para.20, 
Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 33*
2. See Chap. 4, p .286ff.Minute of J.Pattle, 2.5*1832, paras. 
3-5, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 59*
3* See Minutes of Bentinck, 29.2.1832, paras. 15-17,
Bentinck MSS. 2903 and 26.9*1832, para.49 and note facing 
it, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 79*
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records. These data it should "be pointed out, were those 
which resulted from pre-1822 settlements, and not those 
under Regulation VTI. Before 1822 settlements were formed on 
loose asset estimates, producing inequality of assessment 
and rendering constant adjustment of revenue inevitable.
It was this frequency of adjustment v/hich had led to the 
accumulation of valuable information which had remained 
unexploited. There could also be useful and genuine patwari 
accounts in some areas, and there were the proceedings of 
revenue and judicial officers on rent cases *^" So cash rents, 
the information from past fiscal history when combined with 
/ the results of survey operations, were to constitute the 
groundwork of the aggregate to detail assessment. There was 
then no need for minute information and estimates of field 
rentals. The Sadr Board, it must be admitted, brought a 
simple approach to a difficult question without the fanfare 
of 1822. When it was first developed by Richard Carr Glyn, 
an outstanding settlement officer in Meerut, the Board in a 
flash saw in it the solution to an important problem.^ To 
Bentinck, the Board justified its utility and who cited the 
parallel of raiyatwari mode which was also aggregate to 
detail. Bentinck too saw, what the Board had already seen
1. SBOR. to G.G. 25.5*1831, para.21, Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832,33.
2. Ibid., para.20; see also R.C.Glyn to W.B.Martin,
5475*1831, paras. 8-10 and 13, Ibid., 37*
3* Ibid.; It should be noted that Board had rejected
raiyatwari field assessment but accepted aggregate to 
detail, cf. above pp.375 and 377.
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in it.'*' Two of the members of the Sadr Board at Calcutta, 
William Wilherforce Bird, and James Pattle, had also
p
supported the deputation Board*s solution.
The aggregate to detail mode as conceived by the
Board and subsequently developed to a degree of excellence
ironically enough under Robert Merttins Bird, its erstwhile
opponent, was as follows. The assessment was preceded by the
measurement and survey of the land. Maps and statistical
information regarding a pargana were passed on to the
settlement officer by the surveyor. The data comprised an
English map of each village in the pargana with particulars
exhibited on the face of the map. Secondly, a 'native* field
map with each field marked with a number, together with a
khasrah or field book with each field numbered to correspond
with the field map, gave the size of the field, the name of
the *proprietor', the quality of the soil, and the crop it
bore with the money rates it paid according to the patwari1s
statement. Lastly, a pargana map was furnished compiled
from scientific village maps and showing the general features
*
of the country, and the disposition of the villages.
The survey result was then analysed and estimates 
of the village assets were prepared; then the former fiscal
1. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, paras. 46-7 and 99,
Bg. R.C. 27^12.1832, 79.
2. Minute of W.W.Bird, 27.4.1832, para.33 and Minute of
J.Pattle, 2.5*1832, paras. 3 and 5? Ibid., 58-9*
3. Auckland to Court, 18.8.1838, 3> para.32.
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history of each village was compiled from existing records. 
This two-headed source of information was classified into 
a tabular form showing the former assessment of each 
village and its present resources and assets. After the 
subordinate revenue officers had prepared this digest of 
the data, the Collector stepped in to initiate the 
assessment proceedings. By using his local knowledge, he 
classified villages according to the properties of their 
soil, their irrigation facilities and similar considerations. 
And by bringing into play his experience, he assumed a jama, 
more or less than the existing one which the pargana could 
bear without injury to its resources. The aggregate or the 
lump jama so assessed, was then distributed over each 
cultivated and cultivable acre in the pargana. This 
distribution which gave the average pargana rate was then 
corrected village wise according to the soil classification 
rates obtaining at the village level* The corrected village 
rate then yielded a fproximate* jama for the village which 
was entered in the tabular village statement mentioned 
before. Besides, another village rate was assumed which 
could be fairly paid by each description of soil ascertained 
from recorded information, and that of the Indian officers, 
and the Collectorfs own experience. The assumed village rate 
was then applied to the returns of each village, which gave 
a second ’proximate1 jama, which was also recorded in the
381
tabular statement.^"
The assessment then entered its final phase in which
each individual case had to he examined. The two •proximate1
.jamas were compared with the former assessment and with the
estimates formed by the Indian officers* And if there
occurred a great discrepancy in the figures after comparison
then it was to he examined and explained satisfactorily* In
the fixing of the actual .lama upon •estates1 and ’proprietors1
great skill.and discretion.was required of the.Collector* . . .
It had to he a personal assessment because land of the same
quality did not have the same capacity to pay revenue* The
circumstances which produced these differences themselves,
did not admit of an ’arithmetical calculation'• The caste
and class of the raiyats or 'proprietors', the tenure under
which the land was held, and the potentiality of the land
to improve, had to he taken into consideration before a
2
'fair' assessment could he reached*
When the .jama upon an 'estate' was fixed and an 
engagement for it was taken, then the 'proprietor* was called 
upon to file a rent-roll with an individual description of 
the various tenures, whether heritable and transferable, and 
on fixed rates or at will, with the total amount payable by 
each raiyat♦ The rent-roll would then be publicised in the
1* Ibid*, paras* 33-4-5 see also SBOR* to W.H.Macnaghten, 
5T7T.1832, para.9> Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 51; B.H.Baden- 
Powell, op.cit*, pp.4-2-3*
2* Auckland to Court, 18.8*1838, 3i para.35*
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village with, a view to invite objections. If no objections
were raised and the rent-roll appeared to be fair and
reasonable, then it became the official (and legal)
criterion of transactions between landlord and raiyat.^
Here the revenue officer was not to interfere with the
regulation of the rent except where there was a right to it,
but to offer his good offices in the negotiation of the
rent. The rent-roll was in no way to prevent the enhancement
of. rents save in some .cases., but- it was to be used a s .......
evidence in rent disputes and it was to be kept up to date*
While the method of assessment was contrary to the
well-known views of the Court, Bentinck was in full
it
agreement with them regarding the principle of assessment*
The principle of assessment was to be the soil criteria, a 
fair deduction from rent theory, and in its formulation the 
influence of James Mill can be clearly seen* The Court 
had inculcated the principle of soil assessment first to 
the Bombay government in 1822, and then to that of Madras 
in 1824, and subsequently the principle was repeated and 
explained to those two governments in several other
p
despatches. In the Western Provinces the principle made its 
way in 1831 , to which Bentinck gave his full support, while 
Metcalfe, even without understanding the meaning of soil
1. Ibid., para.37; B.H.Baden-Powell, op.cit., p. 71*
2. See B.R.D. 13*2.1822, para.122; M.fi.l). 18.8.1824, para.47; 
M.R.D. 17.1.1827, para.20; M.R.D. 21.11.1827, para.38; 
M.R.D. 15*6.1831, 2, para.10; M.R.D. 30.7*1828, para.8; 
M.R.D. 3*8.1831, 3, paras.6-7; B.R.D. 16*7*1830, para.2;
B.R.D. 16.7*1830, para.2; B.R.D* 15*6.1831, para.11.
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assessment, opposed it,
The principle of soil assessment when simply 
expressed, was that 1lands equally productive should he 
equally taxed, whatever they are made to produce.1^  If 
the assessment on valuable crops was more than that on 
ordinary crops grown on land of equal fertility, then the 
assessment of the former was to he on par with the latter. 
On the other hand, if there was a change from ordinary 
to.more, valuable produce, on.the same land,.then.no increase
p
of assessment was to take place. It was the productive 
power of the land which was to he assessed and not the 
produce, which implied complete freedom of cultivating any 
crop for the raiyat. The principle did not imply, as 
Metcalfe wrongly thought, a reduction of the assessment of 
the superior crop to the level of that of the inferior one, 
nor was there a danger of loss of revenue arising from the 
application of soil assessment as he feared. The greatest 
utility expected from the soil assessment was that it would 
hinder hindrances to the cultivation of valuable crops and 
that it would prevent increases in the price of valuable
1. G.G. to SBOR. 7.4.1831, para.117, SRRNWP. 2.
2. B.R.D. 16.7-1830, para.2; B.R.D. 1 $ .6.1831, para.11; 
M.R.D. 3-8.1831, 3, para.6.
3. See Minute of 0.T.Metcalfe, 29-6.1832, Bg.R.C. 
27*12.1832, 66; Metcalfe has stated that if soil assess­
ment was applied, then, fthe greater part of Revenue 
would vanish and India be lost1, Ibid.; Minute of
C.T.Metcalfe, n.d., Ibid., 92; See also Minute of 
Bentinck, 2.1.1832, para. 17, Bentinck MSS. 2903;
Bg.R.D. 15#2.1833, 2, paras. 40-42.
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products, the evil of which would otherwise arise if 
assessments were to he according to crop.
The need for a principle of assessment arose during 
the revision of policy, Just as it had arisen in 1822 from 
the absence of a coherent set of rules in India to which 
one could refer as a broad standard of assessment. Even 
where zabti rent prevailed, its basis according to Bentinck 
could not be explained, for it was determined by the ability
p
of the raiyat to pay. Secondly, crop assessment (although 
it is doubtful if it was a universal form of assessment in 
the Western Provinces) was considered injurious to the 
cultivation of superior crops and iniquitous in principle. 
For land of the same fertility might bear different crops, 
and if the assessment was determined for a term of years on 
a crop basis, and soon after the settlement land bearing 
inferior crops was converted into that bearing superior 
crops, then land which was assessed at the rate of the 
superior crop at the time of the settlement would be 
adversely affected. Crop assessment, therefore, on the 
one hand, impeded the freer cultivation of' valuable crops 
and on the other, was inequitable. An incentive for superior 
crops had to be provided, not only for reasons of Indian
1. See Bg.R.D. 15.2.1833, 2, paras. 39-4-1; I.R.D. 12.4.1837, 
6, para.33; See E. Stokes, op.cit. , p.129.
2. Minute of Bentinck, 2.1.1832, para.20, Bentinck MSS.2903*
3. Ibid., para.40; G.G. to SBOR. 7.4.1831* para.114, 
gRRNWP. 2; M.R.D. 18.8.1824, para.47*
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agriculture alone, but also for those of British economic
interests in India
In fixing the soil assessment, several factors were
to be taken into consideration to make it equitable. In
addition to the position and fertility of the land, the
value of the produce was to be assumed with reference to
2
market facilities or their absence. To provide positive
incentives for individuals, the fruits of outlay on land
and .its improvement were to. be.exempted from enhanced rates
of assessment until a fair return on it had been acquired
by them. However, if improvements in existing cultivation
or in the breaking up of waste were the results of state
initiative, then an immediate enhancement of the rate was
to be enforced at the time of settlement. If the
cultivation of waste was the result of individual exertion,
then an allowance had to be made in assessing it. Normally
cultivable land was to be the object of assessment and
waste was to be left to future circumstances and subject to
*
the two conditions mentioned.
The doctrine of soil assessment was discussed in 
the Bengal Council in 1831 and Bentinck gave his full
1. See below pp.416-8.
2. G.G. to SBOR. 7*4.1831, para.119, op.cit.
3* M.R.D. 17.1.1827, para.20; M.R.D. 21.1171827, para.38; 
M.R.D. 30.7*1828, para.8; M.R.D. 15*6.1831, para.10; 
M.R.D. 3*8.1831? 3} para.7; Minutes of Bentinck,
2.1.1832, paras.11-12, Bentinck MSS. 2903; and 20.1.1832, 
para.30, SRRNWP. 2.
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support to it*^“ Metcalfe, on the other hand, continued to 
write dissenting minutes right to the end of the year 1832*
Up to 1837 it was admitted that the principle was not 
observed, as the practice of assessment by crop had continued
p
in the Western Provinces. But Lord Auckland assured the 
Court in 1838 that the government of India, and the 
subordinate governments fully accepted the principle, and 
the revenue officers understood all its implications.
....... It should be pointed out that Bentinck and the
Court were guilty of inconsistency and even contradiction 
between their advocacy of soil assessment, and other 
aspects of land revenue arrangements. It should be borne 
in mind that Bentinck had allowed the appropriation of 
private rent to 'proprietors1 and had rejected field 
assessment, yet he was recommending soil assessment. The 
two are irreconcilable. Soil assessment cannot exist 
independently of field assessment, because after the 
settlement the landlord might charge his rent according to 
crop. The Court however, had been in favour of field and 
soil assessment, and its inconsistency lay in the fact that 
in the same despatch, it was preaching soil assessment, and 
admitting that revenue was part of the gross produce of the
1. See Bentinck to Court, 15.9*1831 * para.10.
2. I.R.D. 12.4-.1837* 8, para.27*
3* I.R.L. 2.4.1838, 9, paras.1-2; I.R.L. 4.9*1837? 10, 
paras. 10-11; Por Correspondence with subordinate 
governments and officials on soil assessment, see I.R.C., 
26.6.1838, 1-34.
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land.^ The gross produce notion is in contradiction to the
soil assessment principle as deduced from the rent theory*
Apart from the contradiction noted above, soil
assessment like its complement of an earlier day* the net
rent principle, was not applicable to the revenue system in
India* The notion of soil assessment, though not deduced
from rent theory, together with the idea of giving
incentives to production by not inhibiting enterprise and
2initiative,, was already prevalent in India* .The Court and 
Bentinck were not introducing any novelty when soil 
assessment was recommended* But in any principle of assess­
ment the value either of the produce or of the soil was a 
nominal one* The gross assessment was extracted from gross 
produce in the shape of money rates upon crops, varying 
with wet and dry soils and in keeping with local practice, 
and by comparing with those obtaining in the neighbourhood* 
Although Metcalfe did not understand the soil assessment 
principle propounded by the Court and Bentinck, his 
criticism of it has considerable force and relevance.* Any 
principle of assessment according to him, could not be 
divorced from the actual produce of the soil, 'it is the
x
beginning and end the alpha and omega of all settlements.1^
1* See Bg. R.D. 15*2.1833, 2, paras. 39-4-2 and 17*
2. Bentinck to Court, 15*9*1S31, para.11; Minute of 
Bentinck 20.1.1832, para.27, SRRNWP. 2; Minute of
C.T.Metcalfe, 29*6.1832, Bg.R.C. 2?.12.1832, 66;
R.C.Glyn to W.B.Martin, 24.5*1831, para.13, Ibid., 37*
3* Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 29*6.1832, Ibid.
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In those bhaiyachara villages where a flat rate of 
assessment prevailed, soil assessment would not be applicable 
even nominally! Where an equal division of land among co­
sharers prevailed, that is, each had a jumble of good, bad 
and indifferent land in his possession and there was a 
uniform rate per bigah. In this context and that of soil 
assessment, the Collector of Saidabad in his reply to 
queries issued by the Sadr Board, pertinently observed:
'for. one case in which .the. European officer will improve. . . . 
upon the existing arrangements and internal economy of a 
village, in 99 cases will the whole community join to correct 
and equalize the arrangements made by him whenever he has 
introduced novelty or reform.''*' According to Glyn soil 
assessment was applicable to a rich agricultural community, 
but not to India without large remissions of revenue,
’varying with the various [abilities of the ] proprietors 
to avail themselves of the natural fertilities and local 
advantages of their tenements, independently of their
p
relative positions with respect to market conveniences *1 
It would therefore, be correct to say that soil assessment 
was a mystical guiding principle, and no more than that#
In keeping'with the desire to give value to 
'property1 by conceding a private rent to the 'proprietor1,
1# Reply to J.G.Deedes 25.7*1831* "k° queries issued by 
SBOR. on 24.6#1831, SRRNWP.2, p.333.
2* R.C.Glyn to W.B*Martin, £4.5•1831, para#8, Bg.R.C.
27.12.1832, 37.
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and by so assessing land as to encourage the production of
valuable crops, another far-reaching decision was taken -
a decision on the Quantum1 of state demand or the residue
which was to he allowed to the ’proprietor1• Before 1822 the
residue, which was also called proprietary profit or
ftialikana, was 10 per cent on the net jama exclusive of the
expense of collection* Under the 1822 arrangement, the 10
per cent rule was incorporated with the modification, that
where an increase on the existing jama was taken, then the
profit was to he 20 per cent on the net jama, Bentinck,
basing himself on the views of revenue officers and the
Sadr Board, laid down a highly flexible residual scale. It
was to vary between 15 per cent and 35 per cent on the
gross jama, or gross rental as Bentinck preferred to call
it, and was to cover profit, the expense of collection,
and all risks and responsibilities of collecting it, and
pwas to hold good under all circumstances. In the technique 
of deducting the residue, it should be noted that there was
1, Bentinck was using rent theory terminology* By gross 
rental he meant the produce or its value remaining after 
defraying wages of labour and profits of stock, See 
Minute, 26*9.1832, para.11, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 79, and 
Minute, 20.1.1832, para.57, SRRNWP. 2; Bentinck was wrong 
in using the term 1 gross rent*, what he meant would have 
been correctly expressed by the term actual rent, i.e. 
what was paid by the raiyat.
2. G.G. to SBOR. 7.4.1831i para.106, SRRNWP. 2; R.C.Glyn to 
W.B.Martin, 24.5.1831, para.12, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 37; 
SBOR. to G.G. 22.7*1831, paras. 14-15, Ibid., 41;
Minute of Bentinck, 20.1.1832, paras. 25-6 and 57*
SRRNWP.2; Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, para.13,
Bg.R.C. 27*12.1832, 79; Minute of W.Blunt, 21.12.1832, 
para.9, Ibid., 94.
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a change from the method pursued since 1801. Formerly the 
technique was clumsy: from the gross jamabandi, first the 
expense of collection was deducted, then the jama was 
estimated upon which 10 per cent was allowed to the 
'proprietors*. Now every species of deduction was to he 
deducted from the gross jama or jamabandi or rent-roll*
The great flexibility in the amount of the residue 
to be allowed to the 'proprietor* undoubtedly arose from 
the need to provide a general, but not rigid, rule, so as 
to meet a wide variety of individual, agricultural, economic 
and local situations. It was the revenue officer who was 
to exercise his discretion in awarding the amount of the 
residue. Bentinck agreed with the Sadr Board that in certain 
circumstances where a substantial increase in the assessment 
had accrued to the state, then the residue could be increased 
beyond the maximum he had laid down.’*' This was to constitute 
the only exception to the general rule on the residue laid 
down by Bentinck*
The assumption behind allotting the increased 
proportion of the residue to the Zamindars was in striking 
contrast to the utilitarian teaching. In the context of 
increased profit, Bentinck raised the question, 'after all 
may not this be considered as the capital by which improve-
p
ment is accomplished?' When in 1833 the Court was outraged
1. SBOR. to G.G. 22.7.1831, para.14, Ibid., 41; Minute of 
Bentinck, 20.1.1832, para.14, SRRNWP. 2.
2. G.G. to SBOR. 7.4.1831, para.106, SRRNWP.2; R.C.Glyn to 
W.B,Martin, 24.5.1831, para.12, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 37.
t> *j  i
"by Bentinck's decision on the grounds that it had no sanction 
in law or tradition, and that the Zamindars did not carry 
out any improvements,^ Bentinck saw no reason to alter his
p
decision* There was also the political aim of conciliating
the Zamindars behind the decision.^ Bentinck1s decision had
the support of revenue officers, the Sadr Board, and the
Bengal Council and although Metcalfe considered it a large
4
sacrifice of revenue, he did not oppose the decision* It
should be. noted that the. '.quantum1, of . the residue was 
consistent with the notion of 'proprietary' tenure accepted 
by Bentinck and the Sadr Board. But the opposition of the 
Court was consistent with its notion of 'proprietary' right 
and of the Indian revenue system. The 'quantum' of the 
residue cannot be considered as large, because under 
Regulation VII 20 per cent on the net tjama was a partially 
accepted rule, to which should be added village expenses of 
5 to 10 per cent, which would give a figure of between 25 
to 30 per cent, while Bentinck had decided on a variable 
rate of 15 to 35 per cent on the gross ,1ama. It is 
significant that the Court's view on it was completely
1. E. Stokes is not fully correct when he states that the 
Court's opposition to a large residue was exclusively 
due to the utilitarian influence, See The English 
Utilitarians and India, p.114, cf. Bg. R.D. 15.2.1833*
2, paras. 35-6.
2. Minute of Bentinck, 4.9.1833, Bentinck MSS.2903.
3. Minute of W.Blunt, 21.12.1832, para.9, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832, 
94.
4. Minutes of C.T,Metcalfe, 31.10.1831 and n.d., Bg.R.C.
27.12.1832, 43 and 92.
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ignored by Bentinck.
Erom the arrangement of 1832-33 the Zamindars had
certainly emerged with a prosperous prospect before them.
Not only was the 1 quantum? of the residue increased but all
legitimate increase in the rent after the settlement was
concluded was to be appropriated by them. A long term
settlement was emphasized once again as the basis of
prosperity. Bentinck was in favour of a 15 to 20 year
period for .a. settlement, while in .1837 the Court allowed
*1
30 years as the maximum duration of a settlement. The 
long term settlement no doubt, was a compromise solution 
between the promise and refusal of permanent settlement.
This compromise gave heart to such inveterate supporters 
of permanent settlement as Henry St. George Tucker. He 
wrote in a private letter in 1845 (to whom is not mentioned),
p
'I, accordingly (in 1827)? was a party to the introduction
of leases for thirty years in the Western Provinces, by way
of compromise for violating the pledge which had been given
to the landholders in 1803 and 1805 to confirm the
-z
settlement, then made with them, in perpetuity.1 ^  Tucker
1. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, para.103? Bg.R.C.
27*12.1832, 79? and Minute of 29.2.1832, para.21,
Bentinck MSS.2903; I.R.D. 12.4.1837? 6, para.3.
2. 1827 was not the year when the Court sanctioned 30 year 
leases. It was 1837* Tucker, or Kaye who edited the 
Tucker Papers has made a mistake in mentioning 1827.
3. H. St. G. Tucker, 'System of Land Revenue1, in J.W.
Kaye (ed.), Memorials of Indian Government, Selections 
from papers of H. £>t. GT T u c k e r pp. 109-10>
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has claimed undue credit for long leases: compromise 
undoubtedly there was but it goes back to a much earlier 
period. Between 1810 and 1813 the Court had rejected a 
permanent settlement with one hand, and conceded periodical 
settlements with the other. The notion of periodical 
settlements propounded by the Court was the forerunner of 
thirty year leases. The Bengal (government’s advocacy for 
long leases since 1820 was inspired by the Court's teaching 
between 1810 and 1813*
The leading questions of land settlement which had 
agitated the minds of administrators since 1801, were
restated and resolved by Bentinck as has been shown above,
There remained only the technical and procedural aspect 
of actually forming the settlement. On the technical points 
also, Bentinck had been in consultation with the Sadr 
Board, and revenue and survey officers. Bentinck formulated 
his solution in the minute of 26 September 1832 which 
became the basis of discussion at the revenue conference of
p
21-23 January 1833 * over which he himself presided. The 
individuals who attended the conference were William Fane, 
Robert Merttins Bird as the two members of the Sadr Board 
on deputation, the Survey officers, the revenue officers of
1. See Chap. 2» p. 14-8 ff.
2. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9•1832, paras. 99-100, Bg.R.C.
27-12.1832, 79; W.H.Macnaghten to J. Thomason, 24.1.1833?
paras. 1-2, Bg.R.C. 8.3»1§33? 63*
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Allahabad, Charles Macsween, the Commissioner of Agra, and 
Richard Milbank Tilghman, now acting Commissioner of 
Bundelkhand.^ The conference with slight modifications,
p
approved of Bentinck1s proposals. Where the result of the
conference required legislative action to remove some of the
impractical procedure of Regulation VII of 1822, Regulation
IX, a well-known enactment, was passed in 1833• It should
be pointed out that the procedure of settlement was fully
in accord, with, the needs, of the. revised, policy* .In .fact,. . .
the revision of policy was done with one eye on the 
*
procedure. In 1822 the aims of policy were so heavy that 
under its pressure the procedure of settlement disintegrated* 
Under the revised procedure, a professional survey 
department was to do the bulk of survey work instead of the 
crude methods of the Indian surveying establishment* The 
assessment was to be fixed according to the aggregate to 
detail method, and the net rent principle of 1822 which had 
been the cause of great confusion, was deleted from the 
revenue law* The responsibility for the payment of the 
assessment in joint’estates1 , was to be collective, and in
1* W.H.Macnaghten to J. Thomason, 24-.1.1833? para.2, Ibid*
2. Ibid., paras. 3 and 17; C.Macsween to J.G.Deedes,
S7JT1833, para. 5, Bg.R.C. 8.3.1833, 64.
3. See SBOR. to G.G. 25*5*1831, paras. 19 and 39, Bg.R.C.
27.12.1832, 35.
4. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9.1832, para.99, Bg.R.C.
27.12.1832, 79; Bg.R.L. 9.9.1833, 7, para.7.
5. Reg. IX of 1833, S.2.
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its apportionment among co-sharers, the Collector could
offer his good offices, hut was not to interfere unless
internal disputes regarding it, arose among the members*'*’
No change was to be made in regard to ’proprietary1
rights in land and such rights as the raiyats possessed to
fixed rents. No right was to be trampled upon, and no new
right was to be acknowledged which did not have a previous
p
existence or which was not claimed, and duly established.
Special care was to be taken in the preservation and
protection of the rights of the co-sharing village bodies*
The weaker member of the community was to be prevented from
being swallowed by the stronger one, by a clear and
indisputable record of individual revenue obligations* A
salvage attempt to protect the village community where it
had been expropriated by Taluqdars, large Zamindars or even
Efakaddams was to be made* In this case where the members
of the community still paid at fixed rates, then it was to 
75
be recorded*
The exercise of judicial powers by the Collector, 
which began simultaneously with the ascertainment and
1* Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, paras* 99 and 55? op*cit., 
Minute of Bentinck, 20*1.1852, para.20, SRRNWP*2,
Minute of A. Ross, 27*7*1853? para*27? Bg.R.C. 9*9*1833? 
36.
2. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1852, para.99? Bg.R.C* 27*12* 
1852, 79; C* Macsween to J.G.Deedes, 8.5*1853? para.2, 
Bg.R.C. 8.5*1853, 64*.
5* Minute of Bentinck, 26*9*1852, paras. 59-61, Ibid*
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determination of the assessment under the 1822 arrangement 
was also rescinded.^* It had proved to he an impossible 
task and had failed to achieve either of the two ends in 
view. Now the exercise of judicial power was to be taken 
up after the assessment had been determined. The reason was 
to achieve efficiency in settlement making, and in many 
cases of disputes the cause may have been the uncertainty 
of the assessment itself. So if the assessment was already 
determined on fair and equitable grounds, this would
automatically remove the causes of dispute which arose
2
because of its uncertainty. The Collector would, however, 
have still to determine ’proprietary* and boundary disputes, 
which also could be best decided after assessment fixation, 
because the Collector would have no other burden of 
settlement work weighing upon his mind. In the discharge of 
his duty in this regard, the Collector could just as under 
Regulation VII, seek the assistance of arbitrators selected
Zl
from the village by him and also of the village panchayat.
As the procedure of assessment was modified and 
a simple view of tenures was taken, the investigation 
regarding the data for assessment, and of rights in land
1. Reg. IX of 1833, S.3.
2. See W.H.Macnaghten to J. Thomason, 24.1.1833, para.11, 
Bg.R.C. 8.3.1833, 63.
3. Ibid.
4. SgTR.L., 10.2.1834, 1, para.41; Rg.IX of 1833, SS. 5-8.
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and preparation of records were also simplified* Which 
was the most important of technical decisions without 
which settlements would not have progressed rapidly* Under 
Regulation VII the record of one village alone produced a 
thick quarto volume. Much of the information had constituted 
an 1 immense mass of useless writing1^  pertaining to 
individual fields, rent-rolls, proprietary1 rights, price 
currents, individual depositions, and the village census. 
Nobody put any faith in those records, and according to
Deedes, every Zamindar laughed at the minute investigation
2conducted regarding the produce of land. Now for 
assessment purposes, as has already been stated, no 
unnecessary and ambitious collection of data was required.
To protect proprietary1 rights and to make the transfer of 
land easy, two different types of records were to be 
prepared. In zamindari villages a simple statement of 
proprietary* rights was to be prepared: there was no need 
to connect the owner to particular fields because the right 
was definable and general, and expressed in fractions of a 
rupee. Here it was easy to give possession to a purchaser 
who bought an interest in the land amounting to so much 
fraction of a rupee. It was only in the pattidari villages
1. SBOR. to G.G., 25.5.1831* para.25, Bg.R.C. 27.12.1832,33.
2. Reply of J.G.Beedes, 25*7*1831, to queries issued by 
SBOR. on 24.6.1831, SRRNWP.2, p.337*
where the co-sharers held more or less than their actual
ancestral share expressed in fractions of a bigah that a
detailed record was necessary* An accurate record of
the actual possession of the co-sharer would have to be
made# In this process a survey would play the dominant role*
In the absence of such a record for the pattidari villages
it would be difficult to effect transfers of land. So far
1
as the raiyats were concerned, the khasra would offer all 
the .necessary particulars., whether some of them had certain
p
rights to possession and fixed rent. The proposal for
the simplification of records had originated with the Sadr
Board, and several other revenue officers had similarly
urged a reform in the preparation of records• Bentinck
4
fully complied with those solicitations.
To impart efficiency at the lower levels of revenue 
administration, certain significant measures were to be 
taken# The Patwari office was to be made efficient, and the 
Kanrngo office was to be re-established# The village
1. Khasra = field book, The result of survey which showed 
fields and raiyats and their relation to Zamindars.
2# SBOR. to G.ffl" 2575.1831, paras. 12-16, Bg.R.C# 2?.12. 
1832, 33.
3. Ibid.; Reply of J.G.Deedes, 25.7.1831, to queries issued 
by SBOR. on 24.6.1831, op.cit.; Reply of W.H.Tyler 
6.8.1831 to queries issued by SBOR. on 24.6.1831,
SRRNWP.2, p.326; W.B.Martin to G.G. 31.5.1831* para.9, 
Bg.fi.5. 27.12.1832, 36; Minute of W.W.Bird, 27.4.1832, 
paras. 27 and 29. Ibid. , 58.
4. Minute of Bentinck, £6•1.1832, paras# 47 and 69,
SRRNWP.2.
accounts were to “be open for the examination of any person, 
and if the Zamindar created any obstacle in this regard, 
then he was to be penalised. Finally, to raise the 
standard of performance of the subordinate Indian revenue 
officers and to lift them above corruption, a salutary 
remedy originating with William Wilberforce Bird was 
applied. He pointed out that the Indian revenue servants 
had had an unfair deal from the British, for their salary 
was low and their work went unacknowledged. In some 
districts the settlement work was actually done by them 
while the Collectors were given the credit for it. He 
therefore argued for the appointment of Indians as Deputy
Collectors: the cost of it would be cheap, and settlement
2
work would be done effectually. Bentinck was in agreement: 
so emerged the Indian Deputy Collectors, and collaboration 
between Indians and British in settlement work at a some­
what more honourable level for the Indians than they had 
enjoyed since the days of Tahsildari Raj in the early years.
The plan of 1832-53* which became the basis of the 
revenue system of the North Western Provinces, was a slight 
modification in fundamentals when compared with that of
1. Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, para.99* Bg.R.C* 27*12. 
1832, 79; Reg. IX of 1833, SS. 13-4«
2. Minute of W-W, Bird, 27*4*1832, paras. 43-4, Bg.R.C.
27.12.1832, 58; Minute of Bentinck, 26.9*1832, 
paras.104-05, Ibid., 79; Reg. IX of 1833, S.16.
the 1822 scheme, but it was a considerable improvement in 
method and procedure upon the latter arrangement*
In regard to the question of ’proprietary1 rights 
and the persons with whom settlements were to be made, 
there was some difference between the two schemes* In both 
we notice the earnestness of the administration to protect 
each species of ’proprietary1 rights that were found to be 
in existence* The village communities under both the 
schemes were to be objects of tender care. In 1822 the 
resident raiyats were generally to have their rents fixed, 
in 1835 only such of them who had a provable right to it 
were entitled to that privilege* It was in regard to the 
inquiry into *proprietary* rights that the 1832-33 arrangement 
deviated considerably from that of 1822. In 1822 an almost 
ruthless inquisition was to take place into ’proprietary’ 
rights, obviously forced upon the administration by the 
exposure of early errors, and by the obliterating effect of 
sale laws. The zeal in this endeavour, whose chief advocates 
had been the Court and Holt Mackenzie, was merely 
effervescent, because the task itself was impracticable*
In 1832-33 the approach was level-headed. What ever injury 
had occurred, it had simply occurred.^ After all it had
1* See Minute of Bentinck, 4*9*1833* Bentinck MSS.2903* 
differing with Metcalfe and the Court, and supporting 
the views of Sadr Board on what attitude government 
should adopt on ’proprietary* rights.
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emanated to a certain extent, from the initial state action. 
The rights of the auction-purchaser, the 'proprietary1 
rights of large Zamindars and Taluqdars (where such rights 
existed) were to be on a par with the 'proprietary' rights 
of village communities. In the eyes of the law, every 
species of 'proprietary' rights had equal respectability.
The criterion was to record rights which were in existence 
and for which there was proof. The intention was to 
maintain the status quo in the existing state of 'property1 $ 
the old rights which were even now in existence, were to 
be on the same footing with the new ones created since 
the British rule. The 1832-33 decision regarding 'proprietary* 
rights was undoubtedly taken without emotional involvement, 
nor was there the meaningless romantic harking back to the 
past that village Zamindars alone were the 'proprietors', 
characteristic of an earlier period, and robustly advocated 
by such individuals as James Cumming, Charles Metcalfe, 
and to a lesser extent, by Holt Mackenzie. An obsession 
with the past was only to blunt the ability to take 
decisions on current problems, which was to bring to a 
speedy conclusion the settlement proceedings. The foot, 
therefore, had to be put down firmly. And the modification 
in 1832-33 therefore, must be considered to be a realistic 
one. It may also be pointed out here, that it was not a 
mere coincidence that at about the same time the proceedings 
under Regulation I of 1821, on the fraudulent acquisition
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of land in the early years of British rule, were also 
terminated* ^ The reason was to stabilise landholding and not 
to excite the mind of landlords by special judicial 
investigation into their past* The Civil Courts were there 
to solve disputed proprietary1 rights.
The principle and method of assessment of 1832-55 
were considerably different from those of 1822. Baden-Powell 
appears to be in considerable error when he remarks, 'it 
will not-be -supposed that- the Regulation of.1833 altered or . 
overthrew the principles that were established eleven years 
before, it merely simplified the method of assessment, and
3 2
rendered work possible. He is not at all clear in what he 
states because he does not sufficiently explain the principle 
of assessment of 1822* If he means that in 1822 as well as 
in 1833 the object was to avoid arbitrary assessment as had 
been the practice in the past, then he would appear to be 
correct* In 1822 the net asset notion was part of the 
principle of assessment, and this was discarded in 1833*
Here is what Regulation IX of 1833 had to say: the section 
of Regulation VII of 1822 which, 'prescribes, or has been
1. In the reorganisation of revenue and judicial administra­
tion which came into force in 1829, the Special Commission 
set up under Reg.l of 1821 was abolished and its function 
was transferred to the new divisional Commissioners*
See Bg*R.L. 10*12.1828, para*6. And in 1835 the function 
of investigating early frauds was brought to an end 
altogether* See India Act III 1835*
2. B*H.Baden-Powell, op.cit** p.27*
4 03
understood to prescribe, that the amount of the juma to be 
demanded from any Mehal shall be calculated on an ascertain­
ment of the quantity and value of actual produce, or on a 
comparison between the costs of production and value of 
produce, is hereby rescinded.Eric Stokes would also 
appear to be in error when he states that though rent theory
p
was given up in practice, it was retained in theory.
In fact, neither the principle of 1822 nor that of
1832-53 were to be guided exclusively by rent theory. In . -
both the object was to attain a fair assessment upon
perfectly intelligible principles, and to terminate what was
considered to be the crude and arbitrary Indian method of
assessment upon the gross produce. In both,the method was
essentially empirical. The 1822 method was 'synthetic1,
'positive' and 'inductive', and the rent of each field was
to be fixed before fixing the assessment. The 1832-33 method
was fanalytic' and 'comparative' and the assessment was to
be fixed upon the 'proprietor' first, before fixing the rent
*
of raiyat where he had such a right. In both, the 
settlement officer had to make an inspired guess in fixing 
the assessment - in 1822 such a guess was not officially 
sanctioned, but it was practiced, in 1833 it was officially
1. Reg. IX of 1833, sec.2.
2. Op.cit., pp.104-05*
3* The terms 'synthetic', 'positive', 'analytical1 and 
'comparative' were used by Auckland in his letter of 
18 August 1838 to the Court of Directors.
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avowed* In the 1822 method there was every likelihood of 
error creeping into the assessment because it was based 
upon individual and independent consideration of each 
field, village, and pargana, in 1833 mistakes would be 
possible only under stupid settlement officers, because 
there was a continuous check and comparison between various 
sources of assessment before it was finalised* There existed 
a built-in corrective element in the principle of the 
assessment of 1832-3.3• Hie . 1822 method did not ensure the 
cooperation of the people because it involved ascertaining 
the positive resources of a village which the people would 
combine to conceal* The 'comparative1 method of 1832-33* on 
the other hand, assured the cooperation of the villagers, 
because an aggregate sum was to be distributed on a group of 
villages, therefore all would have to combine to make its 
distribution equable*'*'
It may be a little surprising to note that one 
feature of the 1832-33 mode of assessment resembled very 
closely the one developed before 1822 under Edward Colebrooke 
and John Deane* The estimate of the capability of land was 
to be determined in both cases by the Tahsildar on several
considerations, and was to be subsequently checked by the
2
Collector* The only just criticism that can be levelled
1. See Chap. 4 ' see above pp* 379-82;See Auckland to
Court 18*8.1838, *3, paras. 44, 50, 36 and 45*
2. See Minute of A.Ross, 27*7*1833> paras. 8-95 Bg.R.C.
9*9.1833, 36.
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against the 1832-33 mode is that it could have been made 
more efficient, and its determination should have been left 
in more competent hands. The surveyor, the Tahsildar and 
the Collector were to cooperate in fixing the assessment*
But the role of the surveyor did not extend beyond furnish­
ing survey data. But in estimating the capability of the land 
the Tahsildar and the Collector were to duplicate each 
others work, which was a waste of time, without any 
guarantee against over-assessment, because the consideration 
of the circumstances for estimating the capability of land 
eluded any precise valuation. As the actual rent constituted 
the only definite and certain data for assessment, it could 
have been best ascertained by the surveyor and not by the 
Tahsildar or Collector, because the surveyor had the 
technical skill and a first hand opportunity at the time of
1
survey in which to extract true information regarding rent.
In regard to the protection of land rights too 
there was substantial modification of the 1822 scheme*
Under that arrangement the investigation into rights was 
given equal importance with the fiscal aspect of settlement. 
But under the revised scheme it was the problem of assessment 
which was to take precedence over the question of rights, 
for reasons already explained. However, it would be wrong 
to infer that the investigation, recording and protecting of
1, Ibid. See paras. 9 and 21.
406
rights was to he done casually* There was of course, no 
obsession with the protection of rights. These were the 
proper priorities. Survey and assessment would give an 
accurate account of the land, its extent and produce. The 
assessment being already determined, it would be easy for 
the settlement officer to solve disputed rights, and to 
give titles to each portion of cultivated, culturable and 
waste land where it was necessary, and to record fractional 
shares in zamindari ’estates1. When subsequent disputes 
arose, they could be easily settled in the courts on the 
basis of the records now made.'*' Similarly, the Zamindar - 
raiyat relationship was also placed upon a proper foundation.tu
The field map and khasra enabled^Zamindar to obtain his 
dues and the raiyat whatever right he was shown to possess*^ 
In agrarian disputes the record would be the most authentic 
piece of evidence.
The technique of settlement and the details of the 
scheme of 1852-33 was a mean between those of 1822 and those 
which prevailed before 1822. One would fully agree with 
Metcalfe’s observation on the new scheme as compared to the 
previous ones, it was ’more detailed and accurate than the 
latter which [was] blamed for its frequent incorrectness ... 
and less detailed than the former which has been found fault
1. See above P V ^ee Auckland to Court 18,8.1838,3, 
paras. 53-58,
2. See Auckland to Court 18.8.1838, 3, para.57; see above 
pp. 379, 381-2 and 398.
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with on account of its minuteness.*1
Behind the revision of policy there were powerful 
and compelling economic reasons bearing upon the relations 
between Britain and India* The creation of valuable property 
- by handing over private rent to the Zamindars, by 
acknowledging the value of soil assessment, by moderate 
assessment and long leases - was not an act of a government 
merely charitably disposed towards its subjects. Britain 
wanted a solution to the vexed problem of exchange between 
Britain and India, it also desired and was ready to provide 
a market for the raw material of India, and it sought a 
market in India for its own manufactured goods. All these 
economic motives hinged upon the land question. The 
improvement of agriculture was to be the sine qua non to 
the solution of those questions. For improving agriculture - 
chiefly by plantation enterprise - Europeans were to be 
allowed to hold land in India without of course, any 
prejudice to *native* landholding.
For European landholding on an unrestricted scale 
and for all forms of enterprise, the initiative came from 
Bentinck. It was forced upon him because of the economic 
connection between England and India which required radical 
rethinking, and the pressure exerted by agency houses. He 
was a convert to * colonisation*: when he arrived in India
1. Minute of C.T*Metcalfe, n.d., Bg.R^C. 27*12.1832, 92.
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he was opposed to it. In his fervour for 'colonisation' he 
was several steps ahead of the Court of Directors and the 
Board of Control. His theoretical justification of 
Colonisation', which was duly supported by Metcalfe and 
Bayley, was a remarkable and imaginative piece of exercise 
in logic. He argued that India's export trade based on 
handicraft was finished. Without export trade the economic 
future of India and British interest in it, was gloomy. For 
a flourishing trade new articles of export must be developed 
which was possible only through 'European capital and 
skill *• He dismissed the common apprehension of the time 
that colonisation was politically dangerous to government, 
and economically harmful to Indians. There would be no 
flood of immigrants. Climate reasons and density of 
population would operate as a natural check. Cheap immigrant 
labour in competition with Indian labour, would perish.
Only a skilled, managerial and financially well-off class 
of immigrant had a future. Such immigrants would be actually 
a source of political stability from whom administrators 
could also be recruited. There would be no clash of economic 
interest between immigrants and Indians. Land law was fully 
defined, and a well established government existed to enforce 
it. Europeans would be interested in plantation, and would 
not be in competition with Indians for the rent of land.
If they did attempt to compete they would be bought out by
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Indians• On the contrary, Indians would welcome close 
contact with Europeans, because Indian social habits were 
changing under British influence and economically 
enterprising Indians were emerging. They would benefit from 
example of European enterprise. Thus, in Colonisation1 
alone, Bentinck saw economic prosperity of India.**'
It can perhaps be argued that Bentinck was influenced 
by 'free trade1 principles, in his plea for European land- 
holding in India. But it would be wrong to theorise that 
'free trade1 principles were the foundation of his decision. 
It was the compelling economic reason which was the 
dictating factor. On the question of European landholding 
Bentinck has himself admitted that he was opposed to it on 
his arrival in India as Governor-General.
In order to make the story of European landholding 
intelligible, it is necessary at least to give its brief 
history. Its history before 1787 is not very clear.
Europeans certainly held some land for indigo cultivation 
and manufacture in Bengal and Benares. That is why the 
revenue rules of 1787 prohibited European landholding 
outside Calcutta without government permission. This rule
1. Minutes of Bentinck, 30.5.1829 and 8.12.1829* Bg.R.C.
1.9.1829, 2, and Bentinck MSS. 2903 respectively;
Bentinck to Ellenborough, 18.12.1829, Bentinck MSS.2594-5 
Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 19.2.1829* encl. in R.Tilghman 
to P. Auber, 1.9.1829* 3; Minute of C.T,Metcalfe,
13.12.1829, encl. in Bg.R.L. 1.1.1830, 4-; Minute of 
W.B.Bayley, 31.12.1829, Ibid., 3.
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was incorporated in Regulation XXXVIII of 1793 which 
specified that land could he purchased or rented for 
residential purposes or for erecting business premises, 
land to be held for any other purpose was to require 
government sanction. The reason was that Europeans were not 
amenable for legal purposes to provincial courts of 
judicature as Indians were. Similar Regulations were enacted 
for Madras and Bombay Presidencies. It should be noted that 
the government in India was competent to grant land to 
Europeans for any purpose and for any duration. Yet, the 
Bengal government seems to have been inhibited in granting 
land, that is why in 1822 Dr. Wallick in conjunction with 
the agency house of Mackintosh made representation to the 
government for grant of land for coffee cultivation, which 
produced the Resolution of 7 May 1824. Under it Dr. Wallick 
was granted 11,000 bigahs of land for 99 years for coffee 
cultivation. The grantee under the Resolution was to 
observe the terms of engagement and to show good behaviour 
otherwise the lease would be cancelled# Subsequently, the 
scope of the Resolution was extended to cotton and sugar­
cane also. The Resolution of 1824 and its extended application 
had support of the Court of Directors. In 1829 on the 
representation of the agency houses, the principle of 1824 
was extended to indigo, and other forms of plantation 
enterprise or in other words, freedom to hold land for any
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enterprise was allowed, The Court was somewhat annoyed for 
having been ignored by Bentinck on what they considered to 
be an important question. Its despatch of 8 July 1829 which 
originated with it, was hastily drafted and on which very 
little discussion was allowed, and which had the full 
support of Ellenborough and the Duke of Wellington, the 
Bengal government was ordered to modify its Resolution of 
17 February 1829, A particular provision of 1824 Resolution 
which provided for cancellation of lease on misconduct, had- . 
been altered in 1829 into empowering the government to 
deport a European on misconduct. The Court considered this 
to be an ineffective provision and desired the restoration 
of 1824 provision in that regard. The Court also laid down 
that land for any agricultural enterprise was not to be 
granted for a period beyond 21 years. In principle, however, 
there does not appear to be any difference between the 
Bengal government and the Court of Directors. There was only 
apparent technical difference, because the 21 year lease 
was bound to be renewed, for enough capital would already 
have been invested by Europeans. At any rate, the modification 
ordered by the Court soon lost its force because in 1836 
Europeans of any nationality were allowed to hold land with 
full property rights and for any terms of years in British
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India.1
The opposition to colonisation in the Court came 
from a small hand of diehards whose chief spokesman was 
Tucker. The argument was old hut it was made with great 
passion and force. Colonisation* was politically harmful 
to government and economically disastrous for Indians. 
However, a tightly controlled landholding to he permitted in 
exceptional cases hut not as a general rule, was not
p
undesirable. Tucker, in his condemnation of the general 
policy of •colonisation* and the pressure group behind it 
rose to a feverish pitch of eloquence. Here is what he 
wrote in 1829 , *We have departed from that broad line of 
policy to which we are indebted, more perhaps than to any 
other circumstance, for the maintenance of our Indian 
Empire in a state of internal tranquillity. That forbearance 
- that abstinence - that sacrifice of a selfish interest in 
favor of our native subjects which the most intelligent 
foreigners can scarcely credit, but which has extorted from
1. See Dissent of J.G. Ravenshaw, 17.7* 1829, App. to Court 
Minutes, 4, pp.600-04 and 610-24; Resolution of Govt. 
17.2.1829* encl. in R. Tilghman to P. Auber, 1.9*1829,2; 
Bg.R.D* 8.7*1829, paras. 2,5-7, 9 snd 15; Ellenborough 
to Bentinck, 6.7.1829, Bentinck MSS.934; Dissent of
H. St.G. Tucker, 9*11*1838, App. to Court Minutes, 6, 
p.265.
2. See Dissents of H. St.G. Tucker, 13*7.1829, J.Bebb, 
21.7*1829, J.G. Ravenshaw, 17.7*1829, App. to Court 
Minutes, 4, pp.570-75 and 632-6; and see Dissents of
H. St.G. Tucker, 9*11.1836, N.B. Edmonstone, n.d.,
R. Campbell, 14.11.1836, App. to Court Minutes, 6, 
pp.265-8 and 273-9.
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them an involuntary tribute of admiration and respect - that
high and honorable course of policy, has been abandoned*
The sacrifice has been made to popular clamour. We have not
dared to resist the importunate demands of interested
merchants and manufacturers1.^ In 1836 Tucker complained
that all recent economic reforms in India had originated
with local government, behind which was the influence of
agency houses* He wrote, fa small body of individuals,
resident in Calcutta, have constituted themselves the public
of India and are disposed to take a very active part in the
management of public Affairs. They have found a powerful
auxiliary in the press: and indeed some of our own servants
••• are to be found of late among the active promoters of
popular clamour. We have thus the germ of a popular power,
and we cannot more effectually promote its early development
than by exposing to its grasp a vast Rental, affording a
temptation, which cannot fail to encourage the resort of
2
European Adventurers to India.1
The problem of exchange between England and India 
had been causing concern for a number of years. The 
remittance from India to England consisted of expenses 
incurred in London on account of India administration and 
supplies, the remittance of European fortunes and savings 
from India, and remittance on account of imports from
1. Dissent, 13.7.1829, Ibid., pp.566-7.
2* Dissent, 9.11.1836, op.cit.* pp.276 and 274— 6.
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England. The value of all this amounted to £8m. a year.
This composite demand on India was realised through India’s 
export trade with England directly or indirectly through 
China , and this amounted to £7m. a year.^ The £lm. 
deficiency was further complicated by the fact that India 
goods were losing their market in Britain, and were
p
unsaleable. This problem could be solved by promoting the 
growth of articles in India, such as raw cotton, sugar-cane, 
raw silk, coffee and tea for which Britain would provide a 
market. In the context of the problem of exchange, the 
’chairs’ wrote to Ellenborough, ’there is not, nor can 
there be any way in which India can furnish funds for a 
transfer of capital except by produce and therefore this 
serious hindrance to the making of adequate returns for an 
export trade with India is irremediable until means can be 
derived for augmenting the productiveness of India and for 
creating new marts for the sale of such increased produce#
The problem of remittance was one aspect of the 
effort to develop raw material in India. Its other aspect 
was to ensure the supply of primary produce for British
1. Court to Board, 4.9*1829, 10, pp.24,31 and 32; See also
H. St. G. Tucker, ’Exchange Operations - Home Remittances’, 
in J.W. Kaye (ed.) Selections from Papers of H. St.G. 
Tucker, pp.381-2.
2. Court to Board, 4.9*1829* Ibid., p.23; Board to Court,
4.8.1829, 7, P*322.
3* Court to Board, 4.9*1829, Ibid., p.34#
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industry and British consumer. In this regard practical
steps in Bengal had "been taken since 1801 under the Court’s
initiative, and subsequently the Bengal government and the
Calcutta agency houses were most interested in this question.^
In 1820 the Agricultural and Horticultural Society was
founded in Calcutta which had official support, and its
object was to improve the culture of a variety of commercial
crops. In the 1820's the Court, the Board of Control, the
British Board, of.Trade and.the Bengal government were in
equal earnestness to see the development of raw material in 
2India. Bentinck thought that it would produce immense
*
'political* benefit both to Britain and India. Ellenborough 
expressed himself very clearly when he wrote to the 'chairs', 
'there is another object to which the attention of the 
Court will be constantly directed, not merely for the 
purpose of facilitating Remittances, but for that of 
connecting England and India by the Bonds of mutual Interest, 
the object of drawing forth all the natural resources of 
India and of enabling us to derive from our own dominions
1. See H.R. Ghosal, Economic Transition in the Bengal 
Presidency, 1795-15557 ~PP«555-9; A, Tripathi, and 
Finance in the Bengal Presidency, 1793-1853» pp.165-6;
See above BP.410-11.
2. See Minute of Bentinck, n.d., Bentinck MSS. 2903; In 
spite of the views of Bentinck, Ellenborough and others 
on drawing raw materials from India for British industry, 
it is hard to enumerate even a single product used by 
that industry from India around 1830. They were only 
thinking in future terms.
3. Ibid.
i
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the raw materials of our most important manufactures.1^  It 
would make Britain independent of supplies from foreign 
countries.^
The corollary to the solving of the exchange problem 
and to promoting the growth of raw materials , was to sell 
manufactured goods to India. If Britain did not buy Indian 
raw materials, India could not buy British goods. Secondly, 
to enable India to buy British goods, wealth must be created 
in India by reforming its revenue structure. To Bentinck, 
Ellenborough had written, ’India cannot rise under the 
pressure of present taxations & to make the people of that 
country consumers of the manufacture of England we must
7s
first make them rich.*^
To Bentinck the economic salvation of India upon 
which depended the superstructure of British economic
Ll
interest, lay in colonisation and in direct state action;
India had lost;market for her staple product, she had not
\
progressed in scientific and technical fields, 1 she is as 
she was, ages ago ....1^  He speculated concerning the 
functions of state action in promoting the development of 
India in a letter to Ellenborough. He wrote, !... you must
1. Board to Court, 13.10.1829* 7> p.390.
2. Ellenborough to Bentinck, 19*5*1829, Bentinck MSS.932a; 
See also C.H.Philips, The East India Company, 1784-1834, 
(First ed.), p.262.
3. Ellenborough to Bentinck, 19*5»1829? Ibid.
4. Bentinck to Ellenborough, 5.11.1829 ancT"7.11.1830, 
Bentinck MSS. 2594-; and see above p. 407-09*
5« Bentinck to Ellenborough, 5.11.1829, Ibid.
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always recollect that the Government here are the real 
landowners*, therefore Government should carry out 
improvement, and I look at all this country as a great
Estate, of which I am the chief agent, whose principal 
business is to improve the condition of the tenantry and to 
raise the income, not by rack-renting and subletting, but by 
bringing into play, by judicious management, all the 
resources which it had and circumstances abundantly offer**1 
The revised land revenue policy, to a large extent, was to 
solve the economic problem stated above* One of the 
advantages of soil assessment was thought in 1837 "by the
Court to be to encourage production of raw material for
2
the British market* In 1837 the Court was pointing out to 
the India government, that Europeans would take full 
advantage of their opportunities in developing plantation 
industries and Indians would not be their equals in respect 
of capital and enterprise, so it was the duty of the 
government, ’occasionally to lead and assist them [Indians] 
in the line of improvement, this we consider to be the true 
policy of a liberal Government ruling over a people not 
possessing the knowledge or means of developing all the 
resources of their native land.f> The revised policy was 
admirably' suited to the encouragement of the development of
1. Ibid*
2* See I.R.D* 12.4,1837> 6* para*28*
3* Ibid,, para*31•
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agriculture by Indians themselves. In the same despatch the 
Court had observed, fno better means of securing this good 
object can be pointed out than the adoption of such a mode 
of assessment as shall leave the cultivator in possession 
of an ample and encouraging remuneration for the exercise of 
his industry in the growth of articles adapted to the 
demands of the home market* The policy of long leases and 
moderate assessments is therefore not only recommended by 
general principle and general experience but is enforced by 
the peculiar circumstances of the time*’^
In conclusion it should be pointed out that the 
arrangement of 1832-33 was entirely due to the initiative 
of the Bengal government, and in it very little influence 
of the Home government and consequently of the utilitarians 
through James Mill is noticeable. In a recent study a mountain 
has been made out of a molehill of utilitarian influence on
p
land revenue policy in the Western Provinces. Landholding 
according to James Mill, was to be vested in the raiyats, 
and the Zamindars were to be tolerated only on sufferance* 
Only one-tenth of ’rent* was to be allowed for private 
appropriation in either case. In the rearrangement the 
large Zamindars, Taluqdars. auction-purchasers, and village 
Zamindars were to be fully accepted as 'proprietors’ to the
1. Ibid., para.32.
2. See E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India,
Chap* 2, particularly pp.il5-16, 120-22, 128-9 and 
132-33*
3* See Chap.4, pp. 269-73.
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extent that they had such a right. The raiyats were not at
all to be treated as ’proprietors1 nor were their rents to
be fixed in all the cases. The ’proprietors' were not only
allowed an increased proportion of the gross revenue, i.e.
15 to 35 per cent, but private rent, which would emerge
after the assessment had been fixed, was also handed over
to them in a great measure.^ Does this not stand out in
sharp contrast to what Mill had been teaching? Mill wanted
the creation of limited property of the raiyatwari type, and
what the Bengal government did was to lay down the
foundations of valuable property in the Western Provinces.
By no stretch of the imagination can this foundation of
private property be considered to have been deduced from
utilitarian concepts. Mill’s conception was a cross between
the rent theory and the raiyatwari form oflandholding;
whereas behind the decision of 1832-33 liberal principles
at work since the days of Cornwallis in Bengal are
discernible, combined with what government honestly believed
to have been the state of ’property* before, and since the
British rule. The Revenue despatch to Bengal of 15 February
1833? no.2, whose author, it has been suggested, was James 
2
Mill, objected to the view taken by the Bengal government 
on ’proprietary* rights and the large residue proposed to 
be handed over to the 'proprietors’, and considered the
1. See above, p .388 ff.
2. See E. Stokes, op.cit., p.114 n.
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neglect to protect raiyats as 'criminal'.^ In this despatch 
there was nothing new nor was there much of utilitarian 
content in it* The Court had been airing its views on 
proprietary1 rights and had been deploring the fate of the 
raiyats under the British since 1810* The Court was 
objecting to the decision to hand over a large portion of 
the gross revenue to the Zamindars not on strictly 
utilitarian grounds, but on the grounds that it was an undue 
sacrifice of revenue and was against Indian tradition, 
though it did state in support of its objection that the 
Zamindars did not carry out improvements* No doubt this 
distrust of Zamindars can be considered as an utilitarian 
argument, but it should be at the same time, pointed out 
that the Court had stated the same thing much before James 
Mill came to the India House* The objections raised in the 
despatch of 1833 had no effect on the government’s decision* 
Bentinck, in his minute of 4 September 1833? on the despatch 
under discussion, refuted the objections put forward by the 
Court, and defended the views which he shared with the Sadr
p
Board on ’proprietary’ rights. In 1837 we find the Court
>5
reconciling itself to the arrangement of 1832-33•
Another feature of James Mill ’ s scheme for revenue 
reorganisation in India was the principle of field
1* See above, pp.345 & 390-1; and- see Bg.R.D. 15*2.1833? 2, 
para.21*
2. See Minute of Bentinck, 4.9*1833? Bentinck MSS.2903*
3* I.R.D. 12*4.1837, 6, para.15*
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assessment, clearly borrowed from Munro's raiyatwari system* 
Field assessment was nothing new, and the Court knew all 
about it before Mill had the opportunity to grasp its 
significance* In fact, it would not be wrong to state that 
the Court needed very little schooling, or none at all, on 
Indian land revenue matters from James Mill or anyone else. 
However, to come back to the question of field assessment 
which was part of the utilitarian blueprint for Indian Land 
Revenue, it should once again be pointed out that it was 
rejected in 1832-33* Assessment was not to fall upon field 
and raiyat, but upon a mahal and therefore upon a Zamindar 
or Zamindars *
On the question of the principle of assessment, in 
so far as soil assessment was part of it, the government 
certainly accepted the Courtfs instructions and therefore 
Millfs teaching* But the notion of soil assessment had 
existed in India too from an unknown time* And it was never 
a practical principle nor did it become so under the British* 
The basic principle of assessment was what has already been 
described as 1 analytic1 and ’comparative1 and its touchstone 
was the actual rent* The soil assessment principle which 
Metcalfe ought to have described as a *new fangled* principle 
was used and could be used only in an academic sense* The 
government and the revenue officers did understand it, and 
the government promised adherence to it, yet it would be
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wrong to call it the basic principle of assessment in India 
after 1833* At any rate, to consider the principle of 
assessment as developed in the region after 1833 as an 
essential utilitarian contribution, is too exaggerated a 
claim to be admitted.
On the question of long leases, there was complete 
unanimity between the Court and the Bengal government. This 
again, was not a new principle when it was incorporated in 
the rearrangement or when the Court approved of it in 1837* 
The credit for it goes entirely to the Court who first 
suggested it in 1812, and it was deduced from Adam Smith’s 
teaching on land tax, James Mill in no way originated the 
principle of long leases. In the thinking of the Bengal 
government the acceptance of long leases was first reflected 
in Lord Hasting^s minute of 1815, and in 1820 and after it 
the government was repeatedly seeking permission from the 
Court, to announce its intention to settle for a long term 
of years. As the prospect of a permanent settlement receded 
into the background, the Court had no hesitation in upholding 
long leases, and the proponents of permanent settlements had 
no option but to support it too. But it would be a mistake 
to consider the growth of long leases as a result of a 
compromise solution between two contending schools of thought 
alone. It was a well thought out concept in its own right, 
and should be considered as a dynamic element in agricultural
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development, aimed at increasing wealth and revenue, and 
perfectly capable of universal application.
With the rearrangement was closely linked the subject 
of European landholding. Here also, the lead came from the 
Bengal government while the Home Authorities were trailing 
behind. The decision to create European landlordism in India 
had profound and far-reaching consequences in the development 
of the Indian economy, both for good and bad. The Indian 
economy was to be geared to that of the British, and 
obstacles were removed to the flow of capital into India.
In the reshaping of policy, there was no commitment 
to any economic doctrine nor was there a theoretical model 
to which policy and institutions were to conform. In the new 
policy we can perceive a meshing of liberal ideas, local 
problems and facts, and British economic motives. The great 
and immediate problem was to solve a question which had 
remained unsolved for three decades, to expedite the 
settlement proceedings. In its solution Bentinck was of 
primary importance. His position as a revenue executive is 
unique in the annals of British land revenue administration. 
He had the genius which mastered the complex, boring and 
awesome problem of land settlement, and showed a way to 
tackle it in a skilled and sophisticated manner to the 
minutest detail. His achievement has not been surpassed by 
any British administrator before or after him. Cornwallis
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had genius as an administrator hut no mastery of the details 
of revenue affairs* Munro too, had genius but he failed to 
create a sophisticated revenue system* Holt Mackenzie had 
great industry and the study of detail overwhelmed his 
intellect* The responsibility for the failure of Regulation 
VTI should be placed squarely upon him* He did not have a 
system or ideas, he only had loose notions* Metcalfe had 
flashes of brilliance, but he was a dogmatist, he was even 
superficial, and his contribution to the solution of problems 
was almost nil. To use an American legislative expression, 
Metcalfe was a pastmaster in the art of 'filibustering1. He 
would repeat practically the same points in minute after 
minute to prevent decisions of which he disapproved. The 
Sadr Board on deputation had industry and a competent and 
clear approach to problems, and its role was subordinate 
only to that of Bentinck* Alexander Ross, who has been 
identified as a utilitarian, had no hand in shaping the 
rearrangement* When the discussions were going on, he was 
busy as a judge of the Sadr Court in Calcutta, he came to 
the Bengal Council in 1833 when the scheme had been 
finalised. William Blunt, who was a member of Council during 
the revision of policy, played no effective role* He wrote 
several minutes, but most of their contents hardly differ 
from Metcalfe* The decisions were taken by Bentinck outside 
Bengal in the Western Provinces, and the Bengal Council
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ultimately had no option but to endorse them* Without 
Bentinck, the problem would have still been solved, but it 
is doubtful if it could have been done as rapidly as it 
was actually done under him*
The path was now clear for Bird and then Thomason 
to carry out the first great settlement which is incomparable 
in the entire range of Indian history* The North-Western 
Provinces had taken the lead over the Madras and Bombay 
presidencies by creating the first sophisticated revenue 
system in India*
Conclusion
The British administrators were essentially practical 
and although they understood the principles of contemporary 
political economy they used them in no dogmatic fashion. They 
found a debased land revenue system and it took them over 
three decades to establish a regular policy of reform. This 
more than anything else is a very strong argument in favour 
of interpreting their policy as an empirical one. The driving 
force of that policy centred round the problem of revenue 
collection, without destroying the prevailing, agrarian . . . .  
structure. Even when in the early period permanency of 
assessment was almost imminent, there was no intention of 
destroying the agrarian structure. After 1813 the land- 
holding system of which the village communities formed the 
bulk was to be used as a sub-structure for the civil 
administration of the country. A government Resolution 
stated: 'the existence of such communities, like that of 
Parish and country associations, appears to offer to 
Government an invaluable facility in the administration of 
affairs; the details of which, if not administered by the 
people for themselves, can never be well administered. The 
union they secure-, while municipally thus advantageous, seems 
to present no danger of political inconvenience: but on the 
contrary to offer, in some cases, under good management, the 
prospect of political security.'^
The two main aims of this policy - to ensure
1* Resolution of Govt., n.d., annexed to Bg.R.L.10.12.1828,
&nclc10»
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increasing revenue for the increasing wants of the state, 
and to create conditions for a stable agrarian structure and 
for the expansion of agriculture - were to be secured through 
periodical settlements lasting between twenty to thirty years. 
The idea of a periodical settlement emerged as an antithesis 
to a permanent settlement. But it did not triumph without a 
resistance from the supporters of a permanent settlement. In 
1835 after the policy decisions had been taken, a proposal 
for permanency originated from Metcalfe, then Governor of the 
newly formed but short-lived Presidency of Agra. Metcalfe!s 
permanent settlement was not to be of the Bengal type, for 
which he had undisguised contempt. The shafts of his 
criticism did not even spare Cornwallis personally. In 1831 
he had written in a minute about Cornwallis, that 1... he 
was the creator of private property in the State Revenue and 
the great Destroyer of private property in land in India, 
destroying hundreds or thousands of proprietors for every 
one that he gratuitously created.1 Metcalfe however was not 
opposed to a permanent settlement with the village
p
community. In 1835, when he sought authority from the Court 
of Directors to concede a discriminative measure, he laid 
down two conditions. Nine-tenths of the land must be under 
cultivation, and the assessment should be fixed on the 
principle of corn-rent, so as to prevent the effect of 
fluctuating price upon revenue* The proposal of 1835 drew
1. Minute of C*T.Metcalfe, 31.10,1831,Bg.R.C.27-12.1832,43.
2. Minute of C*T.Metcalfe, 29*6.1832,Bg.R.0*27.12.1832,66.
3• C.T.Metcalfe to Court, 28.2.1835, Board1s Collection
63873-
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support from Bentinck, and from Henry Thoby Prinsep, a 
member of the Governor-General1s Council.^ Bentinck was of 
the view that the government was pledged to permanency 
because of the early policy measures. Where survey and 
assessment had been completed a permanent settlement, 
according to Bentinck, should be made, but from it waste 
land was to be excluded and subjected to assessment as it 
came under cultivation* Metcalfe’s proposal, however, did 
not receive uniform support in the Governor-General1s 
Council* Opposition came from Ross who used Ricardian rent- 
theory to emphasize the folly of permanency* He stood for a 
tax system weighted against agriculture and in favour of
p
manufactures, trade and commerce. Ross was supported by 
Morison the military member of the Council.
At the Court two inveterate supporters of permanency - 
Edmonstone and Tucker - had been agitating for permanency* 
Tucker ironically was one of the two Commissioners who had 
recommended the postponement of permanency in 1808. In 1832 
he recollected his earlier recommendation, and did not 
consider it to mean an absolute denial of permanency* 
Permanency had been unmistakably promised, and 'that pledge
il
can never be effaced, altho* it remains unfulfilled1, wrote 
Tucker in his minute of dissent. Edmonstone and Tucker met 
with no success and in 1837 the Court turned down Metcalfe's
1. Minutes of Bentinck,19*3*1635 and. H.T.Prinsep,29*3*1835> 
both in Board's Collection, 63873*
2. Minute of A.Ross, 26.3*1835* Ibid.
3* Minute of W.Morison, 24.4.18357Tbid.
4. Dissent of H* St*G.Tucker, 27*12.1832, App.to Court 
Minutes, p*290.
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1
proposal of 1835* The rejection of permanency by the Court 
was not at all inspired by a commitment to rent-theory, nor 
was it a manifestation of utilitarian influence, as has been
p
stated ill a recent study. The question had been exhaustively
discussed by the Court between 1810 and 1815 ? and it was to
these discussions that the Court was now referring.
It may be of interest to point out that the despatch
of 12 April 1837 which rejected a permanent settlement was
3passed by a slim majority of one only, by the Directors.
And Tucker took the initiative in drafting the minority 
dissent* The dissent was almost an indictment of the official 
policy of the Court. It presented the stock political and 
economic arguments in favour of a permanent settlement. It 
accused the Court of distorting the sense in which the 
promise of permanency was made in 1802, 1803 and 1805? so as
h
to deny it absolutely. The condition of that promise had 
been that at the time of forming a permanent settlement,the 
land must be in a sufficiently advanced state of cultivation. 
One of the arguments which the Court had given in rejecting 
permanency was, that the phrase ’sufficiently advanced state 
of cultivation* was meaningless because it was not defined by 
government* There can scarcely be any doubt that the Court 
used the ambiguity of that condition as a pretext for
1. I.R.Do, 12.4.1837? 6? paras.2-3*
2. See E.Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India,pp.116-7.
3. Dissent of H.St.G.Tucker, 2.4.1837? App.to Court Minutes, 
6? p.345*
4. Ibid., pp.340-4 and 339-40.
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rejecting permanency. It was pertinently asked in the dissent, 
was not there a single ’estate1 in the whole of the Western 
Provinces which fulfilled the condition? Tucker brought down 
his wrath upon the Court in a severe expression, perhaps very 
rarely used by a member of the Court* He wrote, !to evade the 
performance of a public engagement upon any frivolous 
pretence, or any perversion of the plain import of words, is 
dishonest, discreditable, and injurious to a Government; and 
I cannot believe that any instance of such evasion will ever
- occur in this Court.' ^ ...................................
The characteristics of periodical settlement were 
broadly speaking two-fold. On the one hand the state demand 
and its collection were put on a sound basis. In the early 
period there had existed an uncontrolled revenue market. The 
resulting uncertainty had therefore been reflected in the 
collection of revenue as well as in the changes in the 
ownership of land. The final form in which the policy 
emerged in 1833 implies the control of the revenue market.
All the uncertainties and peculiarities of that market were 
to be closely studied before determining the state demand 
over a period of time. The aids called upon for the exercise 
'of control were the survey results, and the ’analytic1, and 
’comparative* principles of assessment. The control of the 
revenue market in no way implied an unnecessary sacrifice of 
revenue. Defaults in revenue, however moderate, would still 
occur and public sales of land would still be enforced. The
1. Ibid., p.340.
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public sale of land therefore clearly implied the creation 
of an ’open' land market. This market during the period under 
review did not work at all because land had not acquired a 
marketable value.
The other characteristic was to stabilise rights in 
land, to make them valuable, and to bring about agricultural 
development. The short settlements, lasting between three to 
five years which were characteristic of the first three 
decades of the policy ran contrary to its objectives. It was 
only under a. long-term, settlement that a proper, investigation 
into rights could take place, the results be recorded, and a 
respite from frequent assessments ensure a fair expansion of 
agriculture. In order that some degree of improvement in 
agriculture in the form of commercial crops could be brought 
about, not only were transferable rights in land created, 
but the ’proprietor1 was allowed an increased proportion of 
the residue and a private rent over and above the amount of 
the revenue. But where the raiyats had a right to fixed rents 
restraints upon the ’proprietor’s’ private rent were imposed. 
The transfer of private rights in land also implied the 
creation of land market, and the subjecting of ’proprietors1 
to market forces,so as to maintain efficiency in agriculture 
by eliminating inefficient ’proprietors’.
It has been argued by some official commentators, 
obviously the supporters of a permanent settlement, that a 
detailed settlement was a source of fraud, corruption,
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exaction, and oppression.1 The subordinate revenue servants 
were clearly the object of distrust here, and there was also 
clearly implied a distrust of vesting the executive with too 
much authority - a whig notion of the minimum functions of 
government. The criticism noticed here undoubtedly has some 
force* In a detailed revenue organisation, as was built up in 
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, the control of the 
supervisory level of authority over the subordinate servants 
would be naturally loose. Consequently a host of petty 
officials would be left with considerable authority which 
they would exercise to advance their own mundane aims. A 
poor, semi-literate subordinate bureaucracy lacking economic 
or ethical standards was bound to prey upon the ignorance, 
credulity, and fears of the Zamindars and raiyats alike. The 
reasons were plainly socio-economic. Material advancement is 
a crude instinct ingrained in man in every community in the 
world, differing in expression according to the sanctions and 
traditions from community to community. In the India of 1964 
also it should be no surprise to find innumerable instances 
of corruption and abuse of authority at the village level 
and upwards. These defects in the revenue organisation 
however in no way detract from the merits of a periodical 
settlement.Without it, it would have been impossible to 
secure private rights, to compile records of rights, to fix 
the assessment, and to collect revenue accordingly. Its
1. See Dissent cf N.B.Edmonstone, 28.5*1827> App*to Court 
Minutes, 4, p*396; Dissent of H.St.G.Tucker, 27#12.1832, 
App. to Court Minutes, 5? PP*274-5*
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technique in juxtaposition to the zamindari system of Bengal 
was far superior. In the latter system what really went on in 
the interior was simply unknown to the revenue officers.
In the shaping of the policy and in the forging of the 
system there was a confluence of contributions from the Bengal 
government and the Home Authorities. The Bengal government had 
the advantage of being near the centre of activity and at a 
distance from London. Consequently at the moment of certain 
crucial decisions the Home government was bound to be ignored, 
and as the latter exercised its authority through despatches 
alone, it was not always in a position to interfere effect­
ively. Lord Wellesley had set the policy in motion by 
inaugurating a phase of short settlements covering a period 
of ten years which was to be followed by a permanent settle­
ment, He informed the Court of the arrangements he had made, 
but it should be noted that he did not insert any provision 
in the proclamation and Regulations reserving the Court's
sanction
reaction to a permanent settlement. He clearly ignored the 
Court or assumed its support.
The policy followed the course chalked out by Wellesley 
until 1811. Most of the crucial land Regulations owe their 
enactment to this period, and even Regulation VII of 1822, 
sind Regulation IX of 1833 did not in any material degree alter 
the provisions regarding property rights, rights of raiyats 
and the collection of revenue. It is the confusion of the 
early period which has distracted the critics of the early 
policy including James Cumining, Court, and Holt Mackenzie of
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acknowledging the positive aspects of the arrangement, and in 
failing to foresee its influence on the subsequent growth of 
the policy* Had it not been for the confusion in the revenue 
administration, it is perhaps right to suggest that a 
permanent settlement might have been carried out* The Bengal 
government in 1811 had sought authority to declare permanent 
settlement in some districts of the region. The period 1801-11 
should therefore be rightly characterised as one in which the 
initiative of the Bengal government was dominant, and almost
unchallenged. .................................................
The period between 1811 and 1819 witnessed the decisive 
influence of the Home Authorities. It was this period in 
which policy turned away from the beaten tracks of permanent 
settlement. The question of a permanent settlement was raised 
on several occasions, in 1820, in 1835? in 1842 by R.M.Bird 
and in the 1860*s in the wake of the mutiny and famine; but 
for all practical purposes it had been disposed of at the 
period of the Home Authorities* initiative. It was on the 
question of permanency that London exerted a most vital 
interference in the shaping of the policy. Without this 
interference it is difficult to see how periodical settlements 
would have emerged, especially in view of the reluctance of 
the Bengal government to accept the rejection of a measure 
which was the centre-piece of its administration and economic 
thinking. It was again the Home government which planted the 
seed of periodical settlements. But the contribution of the 
Home government was in the realm of administrative and
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economic thinking. It was not in a position to oversee the 
blue-print of the plan based on its formula, and much less its 
implementation. It could only guide without participating in 
the logical development of its ideas. The development of its 
ideas was therefore entirely left to the discretion of the 
Bengal government. And by 1819 the periodical settlement 
mechanism was for the first time forged by Holt Mackenzie.
The roles therefore of the Home government and Bengal 
government were complementary to each other, despite the 
latter1s inclination in favour of permanency after a detailed 
settlement had been carried out.
It was perhaps easy to shape a settlement plan, but it 
was quite another matter to see to its implementation. The 
policy of periodical settlements was put in operation between 
1822 and 1833 "but it was an ignominious failure compelling 
the Bengal government to re-think the problems involved, and 
to modify the settlement mechanism. During this entire period 
the initiative chiefly came from the Bengal government, and 
there were certain glaring reversals of the 1822 arrangement 
chiefly in regard to agrarian relations, and the method and 
procedure of settlement. Over the question of agrarian 
relations and the amount of residue to be surrendered to the 
Tproprietors *, the views of the Court were utterly ignored by 
the Bengal government. Thus the policy in its final form as 
it emerged in 1833 was the result of equally important 
contributions of the Bengal and Home governments.
The influences that shaped the policy were various and 
interpenetrating* There were the influence of the Bengal 
zamindari settlement, the raiyatwari influence, the influence 
of the local situation and along with them concurrently ran 
certain loose notions of political economy* The agrarian 
structure as recognised officially was imbued with Bengal 
zamindari idea of settlement* To be sure the heterogeneous 
character of tenures was fully recognised, but the settlement 
was to be made with an individual or a group of individuals - 
they were intermediaries between the government and raiyats* 
Here was an attempt to preserve heterogeneity within a broad 
zamindari framework of landholding* There was no intention of 
imposing uniformity upon what in its nature was not uniform, 
yet uniformity of a sort was imposed* In a non-raiyatwari 
region there was perhaps no alternative to forming settlement 
with intermediaries as in Bengal and the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces. The influence of the Bengal notion can be clearly 
seen in the creation of private property in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces, and in making it valuable by allowing 
private rent plus an increased proportion of residue and in 
treating it as sacrosanct* The Bengal notion in itself was 
the product of the whig attitude to private property*
The influence of the raiyatwari system was minimal, and 
had an erratic course in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* 
The Court and the Board were undoubtedly greatly impressed by 
raiyatwari settlement* The Court had introduced the Bengal 
government to the technicalities of raiyatwari * and had
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desired to know if it could be applied in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces, hut the Bengal government was not 
pressed to adopt it. The Board of Control, on the other hand, 
had desired the adoption of the raiyatwari system throughout 
British India outside the permanently settled area* But the 
Board at the Courtfs persuasion gave up its extreme proposal* 
The Bengal government viewed the raiyatwari system with 
considerable distrust, and to borrow ideas from Madras seemed 
to it as a slander upon its Bengal revenue experts, and the 
tradition that had grown since the days of Cornwallis. Even 
an inveterate paternalist and admirer of Munro like Metcalfe 
had considered the adoption of raiyatwari in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces as unwise, and inapplicable generally, 
because it would break up the village communities*^- Yet 
certain crucial influences of raiyatwari did creep into the 
revenue system of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* The 
fiscal aspect of the 1822 scheme and that of fixing the rents 
of raiyats rested upon the notion of field assessment* The 
only distinction was that in Madras the field assessment was 
arrived at from the distribution of an assumed aggregate sum 
upon the fields, while in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
it was to be arrived at from the consideration of the field 
itself* In 1833, however, much against the protest of the 
Court and of P.M.Bird the 1822 principle was discarded. But 
in 1831-33 it is interesting to note that the Sadr Board on
1. Minute of C.T.Metcalfe, 31.10.1831, Bg.R.C.27.12.1832,43.
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deputation, an arch opponent of raiyatwari, and a great 
admirer of the Bengal system, borrowed the raiyatwari 
technique of an aggregate to detail assessment* Another 
feature of raiyatwari influence upon the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces system was in the use of a survey in ascertaining 
the data of assessment. The use of a survey as an integral 
feature of the land systems of British India was developed 
first in the Madras Presidency. It came to be used in the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces as a result of pressure from 
the Court.
The local situation contributed to some of the main 
attributes of revenue policy in the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces. In Bengal no detailed inquiry was considered 
necessary into the right of property in land and no record of 
rights was prepared* In the raiyatwari system of Madras 
Presidency the ascertainment of rights was not a basic 
feature of the system: there it was the demand upon each 
parcel of land that was the main question. Once the demand 
was fixed any one could cultivate land and pay directly to 
government. There was no place for Zamindars in the raiyatwari 
system. In the Ceded and Conquered Provinces there existed 
several categories of what were considered to be ’proprietary1 
rights. Joint-property rights were considered by the 
authorities after 1807 to be more sacrosanct than other forms 
of rights, originating from fraud or violence or usurpation 
or public sales. Rights in land in order to be secured must 
be defined and recorded. The defining and recording of rights
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was possible only after their nature had been understood and 
examined. The record of rights which became so important and 
so integral a part of revenue policy originated from the 
state of local tenures. Similarly the use of the mahal as a 
unit of assessment - from which the term mahalwari originated 
- was also the contribution of local practice. The local 
situation, custom and practice also contributed tremendously 
to the method and principles of assessment, and the rules 
governing agrarian relations.
. . . .  In. the periodical assessment of revenue - inspiration 
from Smithsian economic thought can be clearly noticed. The 
role of land in the economy as a whole, from which the state 
also derived revenue, was emphasized. The state must not 
block its main source of revenue by putting permanent bounds 
upon it, but at the same time it must not exact too 
exorbitant a revenue as to discourage agriculture. Since the 
state would have prospects of increasing revenue, it would 
undertake reproductive works. These works would enrich the 
agricultural economy as also augment the revenue of the state. 
These liberal Smithsian ideas were behind the concept of a 
periodical settlement, and it was from these that moderate 
assessments and long leases emerged. But it would be only 
fair to point out that the nature of the Indian land revenue 
system easily lent itself to the application of Smithsian 
ideas of taxation.
In a recent study it has been stated that the 
utilitarians who adopted Ricardian political economy as the
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core of their philosophy, exerted considerable influence in 
the formation of land revenue policy in the Western Provinces. 
It has been asserted that they provided the criterion and 
principle of assessment, prevented a permanent settlement and 
the conferment of freehold rights of property in land, and 
imparted the notion of thirty year leases. It has also been 
argued that the Court’s criticism of the increased proportion 
of the residue left to the ’proprietor’ was inspired by their 
teaching, and that the reduction of Taluqdars and Zamindars 
during the great settlement was the logical development of 
their theory
These statements are partly exaggerated, and partly 
without foundation. It has already been shown that in the 
arrangement of 1822 there was some influence of the rent 
doctrine, but that was adopted by the Bengal government and 
the utilitarians had no hand in that arrangement. Besides, 
the rent theory was not at all applicable to the agrarian 
economy of the Western Provinces. In the rearrangement of 
1833 there certainly was utilitarian influence upon the 
principle of assessment in the form of soil criteria. But 
soil criteria were not to be the exclusive foundation of 
assessment, and could not be applied in practice. 
Utilitarianism therefore had a very loose and partial
p
influence upon the principles of assessment. In rejecting a
permanent settlement and therefore in forestalling the 
 — -    —        .     
1. E.Stokes, op.cit., pp.81, 94-5, 128, 116-7, and 1144
2. See Chap. 4-, pp. O b Z - 8t» 3114 chap. 5, pp.
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creation of freehold rights in land the utilitarians hardly
played any role, except that they were against permanency. It
has been established that it was the Home Authorities which
prohibited permanency in 1811, in 1821 and in 1837♦ The
arguments given by them can be seen in the Revenue Despatches
between the years 1810 and 1815* It was to those arguments
that the Court was referring to in 1837* Nor can the notion
of a thirty year lease be attributed to the utilitarians.
The thirty year lease was deduced from Adam Smith’s teaching
when the Court enunciated the idea of a periodical settlement
between the years 1810 and 1815> and the necessity of longer
leases was being emphasized by the Bengal government also
neither"
since the year 1815* Rent theory inspired.the criticism by the 
Court of the increasing residue of up to 35 per cent allowed 
by Bentinck to the ’proprietors1 nor the dismemberment of 
large taluqs and zamindaris under the Bird settlement although 
the logical consequence of that theory would be a small 
residue, and the reduction of Taluqdars and Zamindars. When 
in 1835 the Court was expressing its disapprobation of a 
large residue, it was doing so on the contention that it was 
against the tradition of Indian revenue system, and that it 
was an undue sacrifice of the state’s resources. The 
reduction of large taluqs and zamindaris had been an accepted 
principle of the policy from the early period itself, and in 
several cases it was applied also. But till 1833 & full 
practical application of the principle could not be developed 
because of the short settlements. The settlement of 1833-4-9
dJ.P•A*. ^  f v
therefore followed the logical course of the early policy 
towards the Taluqdars and Zamindars.
The influence of the utilitarians was not only minimal 
hut several features of policy ran counter to the programme 
as developed by James Mill. The logical development of the 
application of the rent doctrine would have been a minimum 
residue to the individual owners, the aboslute elimination of 
an intermediary class, settlement generally with the raiyats, 
and absolute individual property rights of a very limited 
nature. But this is not the policy laid down. That policy 
sanctioned a substantial proprietary* right and support to 
the zamindar class, and it made possible the creation of 
larger zamindaris through private and public purchase; 
settlement with the raiyats was not only out of the question, 
but they were not to be given any rights which they did not 
already possess or which they could not acquire through the 
custom of the country. Nor did the policy inaugurate absolute 
individual rights, it sought to preserve the motley nature of 
rights in land. Individual rights in land did grow up but
i
this had nothing to do with the utilitarians. It flowed from 
the Regulations of the early period through sale laws, 
private transfers, the partition of 1 estates1, and the 
racketeering in land characteristic of the early period.
' It is futile to interpret the policy solely in terms 
of political economy or utilitarian philosophy. Models drawn 
from abstract principles cannot provide for the conditions 
that exist in an altogether different environment, and a
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fresh set of principles was developed in a country with 
totally different conditions, The point requiring notice here 
is that the rent theory was developed in England in the midst 
of the Industrial revolution, where it had relevance hut made 
no headway. Conditions in India were entirely different*
To dispute the influence of political economy as the 
foundation of British land revenue policy in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces is not to deny the importance of James 
Hill’s thinking on Indian land revenue problems nor his desire 
to apply utilitarian ideas in Indian administration* He was 
also held in esteem in official circles* In a recent article 
it has been pointed out that in his History the indictment of 
Indian society was with a view to apply utilitarian principles 
on Indian administration* It was as a result of his History 
that he was appointed to the India House. The influence of 
his writings on the British attitude to India was great, and 
his History was a text book in Haileybury College*1 Mill no 
doubt had a programme and he was in a position to influence 
the formation of policy as he claimed, and as was confirmed
p
by his son* He certainly must have written the revenue 
despatches between 1819 and 1830* But during this period there 
was not a single policy-laying despatch for the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces. The despatch of 1833 which was of
1. C*H.Philips,1 James Mill, Mountstuart Elphinstone and the 
History of India1, Historians of India* Pakistan and 
Ceylon, 1, pp.219-21; see also D.Forbes,'James Hill and 
India', Cambridge Journal, 5* 1951-2*
2. See E-Stokes, op.cit*, pp. 4-8-9*
considerable importance and whose authorship has been 
attributed to James'Mill, had no practical effect on the 
formation of policy, because Bentinck had already finalised 
the policy which was defended by him.
The policy was essentially conservative,and it was 
interspersed with certain liberal elements for the following 
reasons. The agrarian structure as it was found to exist the 
core of which was the village community system was sought to 
be preserved. Any interference in it was disclaimed. It also 
implied the essential feature of conservatism that institu­
tions grow through the process of historical continuity. The 
Cornwallis system was partly conservative in that it 
ref joined from interfering with the social structure, while 
it anglicised the administration. As a reaction against the 
Cornwallis system the Home government looked to conservatism 
as an alternative basis of policy, and in 1819 in a very 
important despatch it was invoking Warren Hastings' authority 
in support of iljs argument, ^
p
The liberal element in the policy can be discerned in 
the creation of broad conditions for the emergence of valuable 
and individual property rights in land. This was to be 
achieved by determining a fair, certain, and equitable 
assessment for a long period of time, by allowing a larger 
proportion of revenue and private rent on top of it; and by
1. See Chap. 3 pp.212 and 215*
2. Liberal, this is a very vague term and is used here only 
in so far as private property was an integral part of 
liberal thinking.
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providing for the unrestricted transfer of land, and hy 
allowing for the hreak up of large and joint ’estates* into 
smaller individual units. The conservative and the literal 
elements together created a tension within the policy# The 
preservation of joint-hoidings was irreconciliable with the 
provision for their break up.
It may also be asked what were the consequences of 
the policy, how were the interests of government, the property- 
holder, the raiyat and agriculture to fare from it# The 
revenue interest of the government and its wider economic 
motives were fully secured by the policy. There was no longer 
the question of tieing down the revenue from land to affect 
revenue from the fluctuation in the value of money. At each 
successive long settlement the revenue was to increase as a 
result of the improvement in agriculture, and from its 
expansion* At the same time conditions were created for 
colonization, and for the Improvement and culture of 
commercial crop#, so as to facilitate exchange operations 
between India and Britain*
Property in land was made secure, stable, and to some 
extent valuable, by the creation of a legal framework and 
record of rights by defining the revenue demand and by drawing 
agriculture within the orbit of market forces to the extent 
that this was possible* Joint property and individual property 
were to co-exist. The legal framework and the customary mode 
of holding land among a host of sharers were to be fundament­
ally and perpetually in conflict with each other* It was
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through the provisions of the sale laws and through the 
mortgage and partition of 'estates' that property was to he 
transformed from joint to individual holdings. On the other 
hand through the Hindu and Muslim law of inheritance 
individual property would become joint. There would never be 
universal joint property nor would there be universal 
individual property. The British disclaimed intervention in 
the nature of landholding but through the legal framework they 
made landholding 'open', i.e. it terminated the monopoly of 
the village communities, Zamindars and Rajas over land. Land 
could be bought and sold freely. By making land into a 
commodity the full capitalistic conception of property was 
implied. But a land market could not function. The land 
transfers which took place were mainly the result of forced 
sales of land because of land revenue arrears, and the frauds 
of the subordinate revenue servants. The landholding structure 
was nonetheless subjected to severe change through sale laws, 
private transfer of land and commercialisation of crops. Each 
one of them was a powerful factor of change. In the present 
state of knowledge it is impossible to assess the proportion 
of change in property-holding in the first three decades of 
the policy. In 1818 according to Edward Colebrooke's opinion 
about 80 per cent of land was in the hands of joint owners,1 
and towards the end of the nineteenth century it had perhaps
p
diminished to about 30 per cent. Some alarmists who dreaded
1. See Chap.3* p*225«
2. See B.H.Baden-Powell, op.cit., pp.116-20.
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a change in the landholding structure during the crucial 
period of policy formation - such as the Court, James Cumming, 
Holt Mackenzie, and Metcalfe - wrongly attributed the break 
up of village communities to British legislation alone. Land 
legislation no doubt was an ever-present threat to the 
integrity of the community. But there was another and a very 
important source through which the process of disintegration 
was to work itself out* This was within the organisation of 
the community itself* Alexander Ross perceived this.^ The 
•village community had originated with a'distant ancestor, and 
had the same religion and caste. By the custom of the 
community each member had the right to transfer his share 
wholly or in part by sale or in any other way, to persons 
belonging to any religion or caste. This right was exercised 
to a considerable extent and led to the sub-division of the 
original joint holding into smaller ones called thoke or 
beri. The religion and caste of the joint owners of the thokes 
and beris differed from that of the original community, which 
was positive evidence of transfer. Such sub-division had been 
taking place much before the British occupation.
In regard to the village community policy was basically 
directed towards its preservation. So far as the large 
Zamindars and Taluqdars were concerned they emerged from the 
new policy as shrunken and truncated figures. They were 
reduced both politically and financially,although still
1. Minute of A.Ross, 27.7.1833, Bg.R.C.9*9.1833> 36.
retaining much local influence, authority and wealth. British 
policy towards the^)was cautious and ambivalent. They were not 
to be totally exterminated, and they were not to be entirely 
allowed to retain their original power and its economic bases. 
The consequences of this policy were perhaps bad for India. 
Before the British came the Zamindar-Taluqdar class was 
perhaps trying to find new roles in the decline of the Mughal 
Empire. What contribution they would have made in the absence 
of foreign domination of India is a question that cannot be 
answered. But under the British until after 1857 they found 
no new roles above their respective mufassal level, and that 
too was hemmed in by British civil institutions. This class 
therefore became degenerate and sterile.
In regard to the raiyats the new policy was based 
principally on what was considered to be Indian practice, 
combined with the implications of allowing freedom of economic 
relationship between land-owners and cultivators# For the 
protection of the ra.iyats no radical measures were taken. In 
India as in Japan the condition of the immediate worker on 
the land was not oppressive as was the case under feudalism.
He paid half or perhaps slightly more of the produce of land. 
He had the freedom to cultivate crops and freedom to migrate, 
and there is very little evidence to show that he was required 
to perform free services to the Zamindar. He obtained free 
wood from the forest, free grazing land, a free site for a 
house, and had the right to the trees he planted in his field.
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There does not appear to he any tension in agrarian relations 
during this period. And this point is underlined by the 
massive growth of occupancy rights under the twelve-year rule 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century; which was 
accepted by the Zamindars without resistance*
The economic condition of the raiyat was certainly not 
good by modern standards. In the early nineteenth century 
perhaps he did not earn more than a few rupees a year. But in 
times of good harvest he must have certainly had sufficient 
to eat. The pressure of rent was also perhaps hot high: it 
must have been bearable otherwise the revenue would not have 
been realised. And the arrears of rent and revenue do not 
point to its high pitch, but to the state of production which 
depended upon weather and prices. If the condition of the 
raiyat was hopeless according to modern standards, this 
resulted not so much from agrarian relations or from the 
British land revenue system, as from the drawbacks of a landuse^ 
economy producing mainly for internal consumption in the 
village itself.
The effect of the new policy upon agriculture in the 
early period has also to be argued in general terms. Any 
general statement has to be imprecise. But for the sake of 
raising problems so that they can. be solved subsequently in 
the light of fresh data, it is worth risking a general 
statement.The new policy had a very limited relationship to 
the development of agriculture, through the implications of
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the market, through the creation of private property and 
through incentives to individuals. Market mechanism of a sort 
did exist in India but it was nowhere near the conception 
which the British had in mind# Market incentives in all 
probability did stimulate agriculture, but the chief reason 
for its expansion came from certain natural factors. The 
expansion of agriculture can be ascertained only indirectly. 
Revenue is the only index. It is nonetheless a sound indicator 
because there existed a fundamental connection between 
revenue, and agriculture. If the revenue figure is taken and to 
it is added one-tenth as ♦proprietary1 allowance then we 
obtain the gross revenue. The gross revenue - or in other 
words what the intermediaries received from the raiyats - 
was generally estimated at half the produce of the land. So 
if the gross revenue is multiplied by two we have the value 
of the produce. This is a rough method of computation but the 
only possible one at the moment, and subject to the qualifi­
cation that it excludes revenue-free tenures, and over and 
under-assessed land# In 1803 the revenue was Rs.18.5 nu ,*** by 
adding one-tenth to it the gross revenue figure comes to 
Rs.20,350,000 and by multiplying the gross by two the value 
of the produce comes to Rs.40,750#000. Around 1833 bhe revenue
p
stood at about Rs.30 m., the gross revenue would be Rs.33hi* 
and the value of the produce Rs„66 m. From this it has to be 
argued that the value of the produce in terms of money rose
1. See above, p.78 n.2.
2. Dissent of H. St.G.Tucker, 27*12.1832, App.to Court 
Minutes, 5* p.292*
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by 1833 by well over 50 per cent when compared with the 
figure for 1803• The average rate of the annual expansion of 
agriculture for the three decades would work out at nearly
p
1^ per cent* This expansion of agriculture was essentially 
due to the operation of non-economic factors* There is 
abundant general observational evidence in the letters and 
reports of revenue officers of large tracts of cultivable 
waste and under-population during the early period* There is 
also evidence that in spite of the expansion of agriculture 
there was still large cultivable land available at the end of 
the first three decades. The expansion that did take place 
was the result of the security and protection to life and 
property provided under the British rule * and the consequent 
increase in population. What was the rate of increase in 
population and what was the total population at the two 
points of comparison is a question which draws a blank answer. 
No census took place during this period and the first rough 
one was made in 184-8. It should also be stated that the 
expansion of agriculture conceals the increase in production 
due to the increase in the yield per acre or per bigah as a 
result of takavi advances for sinking wells. But the impact 
of wells on production must have been very limited and 
chiefly confined to crops like sugar-cane, tobacco and 
vegetables* Large scale irrigational projects had not yet 
begun.
The role of Zamindars, Taluqdars and revenue farmers 
in the expansion of agriculture had a positive and negative
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side. On a consideration of the positive side of their role 
the view entertained by the Court, Holt Mackenzie, Metcalfe 
and Bird on the destructiveness of this class seems to be 
biassed and without foundation. It should equally be pointed 
out that the rent theory in so far as it considered the 
intermediaries as mere parasites was erroneous. It is fair to 
assume that in face of extensive waste and under-population 
it would only be individuals with capital who would undertake 
to bring deserted villages to life again, and to found new 
villages in waste land by settling cultivators. Capital of 
course was scarce and what there was, was in the hands of 
large Zamindars, Taluqdars and revenue farmers. Cox and 
Tucker in their report of 1808 ^  stated that the Taluqdars 
in Aligarh were conscious of the value of agriculture, and 
even when the heavens denied rain the cultivation in their 
taluqs did not suffer because of their expenditure on the 
protection of cultivation. Similarly the revenue farmers whom 
the early administration encouraged must have contributed to 
the increase in cultivation especially in areas of extensive 
waste such as Gorakhpur, and the Rohilkhand region. The 
speculative nature of their enterprise in no way detracts 
from their solid contribution to the agricultural economy.
A classic case of what a large Zamtndar can do is to be found
in the case of pargana Bara in Allahabad, as narrated by
2
Richard Temple in his report on the pargana in 1850. This
1. 13.4-• 1808, para.162, Bg.R.C. 20.6.1808, 2.
2. Cited in B.H.Baden-Powell, op.cit., pp.165-7*
pargana was owned by the Ratja of Benares for over two decades,
until his ownership was terminated by the Commission set up
in 1821* His ownership was the result of the fraudulent
acquisition of the early period. Ethical questions apart, he
carried out considerable improvements in the pargana during
his tenure. He invested capital in clearing waste and
providing irrigation facilities, and his internal arrangement
was mild and so successful that by 1820 he had doubled his
rent-roll* His management was so popular that as late as 1850
the raiyats of the pargana remembered it as a golden age.
Perhaps there is more evidence in pargana sources of the
positive contribution of intermediaries. On the other hand it
is undeniable that intermediaries were a wastrel class. For
indigo
example, in Kanpur, which had a flourishing/production in 
which Europeans had invested 52 lakhs of rupees through the 
Zamindars in a short space of time, they did not produce any 
improvement. The Zamindars simply squandered the money. Here 
it was the socio-economic structure which was preventing 
capital formation.
It should be pointed out that the expansion of 
agriculture took place under short settlements* This was 
characteristic of the period as a whole* This disproves the 
theory that the expansion of agriculture was possible only 
under permanent settlement. Nathaniel Edmonstone had even 
indicted short settlement as hampering the improvement of
1* E.A.Reade, Minute on the effects of the restrictions now
in force against settlers etc*, 25*2.1833* Eur*MSS*D.279*
pp.80-81.
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agriculture. In support of his argument lie cited letters which 
he received from the Collector of Bareli around 1824. The 
Collector had written to him, ’I had an opportunity of 
personally seeing the greatest part of the Pergunnah, Its 
general state is that of total desolation. I found the 
villages without Inhabitants! the lands waste and uncultivated 
the numerous dams, aqueducts, and smaller pools which ... 
appear to have been so excellently contrived as to irrigate 
almost every field are now overgrown with jungle and going 
fast to decay. The spirit of the remaining Inhabitants also 
appears totally broken and altho1 at first they surrounded me 
with application for the renewal of those works yet when on 
reflection they began to feel the inadequacy of their personal 
numbers and pecuniary ability to complete them they evidently 
shrank from the responsibility of entering into engagements 
to clear and renew them. 1
In another letter the Collector had written to 
Edmonstone about another pargana thus: *1 find the pergunnah 
in such an utter state of ruin that it will be impossible to 
form a settlement on advantageous terms with any description 
of persons. There is scarcely any cultivation in the Kham 
estates and not half the quantity in the Pergunnah generally 
which existed at the periods of the former settlements. The 
villages are without houses and without inhabitants* In 5 
whole and 43 half estates now to be settled there are only
1. Quoted in Dissent of N.B.Edmonstone, 28.5*1827> App. to 
Court Minutes, 4, pp.396-7-
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232 Ryots possessing 170 ploughs and 250 phowrahs (hoes)* The 
rest of the Purgunnah is hut little better; of 148 villages 
which were in a flourishing state in 1218 fs* 108 only are 
reported to have maintained their cultivation while 26 have 
more or less depopulated and 14 are totally wyran,1^(ruined 
or deserted)*
The above two impressions are first-hand observations, 
as such they are authentic* But to attribute the condition of 
the two parganas as Edmonstone does to short settlements is a 
highly dubious argument* The condition may very well have 
been the result of depression which had set in around 1820, 
or it may have been the result of a succession of bad 
harvests. Certainly it was not the result of short settlements 
and especially after 1822 the assessment had been deliberately 
pegged down, and even reduced where it was shown to be 
necessary*
Apart from the improvement in agriculture as it flowed
directly or indirectly from the new revenue policy, the
British had no policy programme for rapid and revolutionary
agricultural development* The period under review was a
crucial one for the future economic development of the region.
And here the British lost a great opportunity to transform
the economy of the country* The population was scanty and
resources were rich* The British, it has been suggested in a
p
recent paper, had no agricultural policy at all. Another
’1* Quoted in Dissent of N.B. Edmonstone, Ibid*, p*397*
2* D.Thorner, ’Long Term Trends in Output in India1, S.Kuznets 
(ed.) Economic Growth : Brazil, India* Japan, p*127*
scholar has pointed out that production and technology was 
not at all emphasised, instead there was an obsession with 
tenures, land legislation, and assessment,^ The decision to 
‘colonize* was a crude division of labour between Britain and 
India. It was a static conception of the Indian economy and in 
the long run the surplus needed for agricultural development 
was siphoned off because it was the Zamindar-moneylender- 
trader combination which benefited from monetization. And 
this class had the least motive for agricultural development. 
Consequently no change in the technique and level of product­
ion was carried out. Of course the indigenous social and 
economic organisation was an obstacle to capital formation 
and to the free functioning of market forces* But this
sociological aspect of the failure of Indian agriculture has
2
been emphasized out of all proportion in a recent study.
Both the social and economic structure were susceptible to 
change, but social policy was conservative and there was no 
effort to create credit for development by channeling savings 
into investment. The net result was to perpetuate the archaic 
mode of production. More areas would be brought under 
cultivation, but agriculture would not be transformed, and 
with the increase in population production would tend towards 
stagnation. The British turned to irrigation, transport,
1. K.Davis, ’Social and Demographic Aspects of Economic 
Development in India’, Ibid., pp.292-Jo
2. W.C.Neale, op.cit., pp.179-80, 183-4-, 196-206, and 279*
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credit policy, and model farming rather late.
The government’s policy in its objective of properly 
settling the revenue and in determining the rights in land 
was an undoubted success. Under it the expansion of 
agriculture also occurred. The greatest contribution of the 
new policy was however in the institutional field. It 
succeeded in creating the mahalwari land system, a highly 
complex and sophisticated organism which has left its 
indelible mark on the region. The development of the 
mechanism supporting the system was a great achievement, 
and helped in the revenue organisation of new regions like 
the Pan jab and the Central Provinces as they came under 
British rule.
Appendix A
An Analysis of S.C.Gupta’s Agrarian Relations 
and Early British Rule in India.
Dr. Gupta’s work is unique in many respects* His 
aim is to ’*.. to light up1 in his own words, fa significant 
cross-section of Indo-British agrarian history, its currents 
and cross-currents, the nature and motivation of state 
policy and the changing structure of agrarian relations 
under the impact thereof, - a cross section, which reflects 
the nature and working of the forces active in the wider 
field of Indian economy*
According to Dr* Gupta, the British agrarian policy 
in India, was connected with the economic, exploitation of 
India by Britain* This economic exploitation depended upon 
agricultural improvement of India* Agricultural improvement 
in its turn, depended upon agrarian relations* The 
exploitation of India, which had been by using her surplus 
revenue to finance the Company’s investment, underwent a 
change in theory in the early 19th century* Now India was 
to be conquered for British industry - to buy British goods 
and to sell raw materials for British industry. (This is 
not a new hypothesis and it has not been worked out at all)* 
Under the earlier notion of exploitation the permanent
1. Agrarian relations and early British rule in India* etc.
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zamin&ari settlement in Bengal was made* (The theory of 
agricultural improvement implicit in the permanent 
settlement relied on the aristocracy as the means of that 
improvement* After the French revolution and with the rise 
of Ricardian political economy the belief in the aristocracy 
as the means of agricultural improvement was undermined. 
Instead, agricultural improvement through small owners was 
emphasized."^ The notion regarding Indian land revenue and' 
land tenures, also underwent a change* The Ricardian theory 
of rent was used as a criterion-on both of the questions.
The raiyatwari system and the presence of village 
communities in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces also 
helped in the shift of ideas on various aspects of the 
agrarian policy* When this change in idea was taking place 
a policy decision for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces was
p
pending. The system which emerged in the province by 1833 
was distinct from that of Bengal and Madras Presidencies.
Dr. Gupta claims to have provided an account of those 
developments in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces and to 
have shown their impact on agrarian relations.
However, Dr. Gupta's work seems to be at best, an 
argument by inference and speculation; and at its worst, it 
degenerates into unargued assertions. The basic argument
1. Ibid., pp.2-3, 14-2-3, 150-52 and 158.
2. FbTd., pp.3, 130-31 and 159-65.
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against his work is simply that his sources are deficient* 
The ones which he has seen only give an understanding of 
the ideas of agrarian relations contained in the Regulations 
and the policy-making documents, and no more* One looks in 
vain from cover to cover, for a factual analysis of 
agrarian relations. There is not even a single illustration 
in his hook* The organisation of the hook is unsatisfactory* 
It is neither chronological nor strictly topical; 
consequently, the hook is replete with repetitions, too 
numerous to he indicated here. There are many errors and 
some lack of understanding of the raiyatwari system.^
The connection between the agrarian policy and the 
exploitation of India has not heen established at all. One 
does not find anywhere in the hook, the flow of *currents 
and cross-currents* of the Indo-British economic 
relationship. His emphasis on the theory of agricultural 
improvement underlying the British agrarian policy is an 
inference. The British certainly desired agricultural 
improvement. But as yet, they had no agricultural policy. 
They only wished to create conditions through law and 
administration under which agriculture was expected to 
improve. Dr. Gupta without question, accepts Dr. Stokes*s 
interpretation that the question of Indian land revenue was 
fully brought within the orbit of utilitarian political
1. Ibid., see pp. 145 14-9 for remarks on raiyatwari.
^G1
economy; that it influenced the rejection of permanent 
settlement for the Western Provinces; and that the 1822 
arrangement for that region was deduced from its premises. 
This is a colourful interpretation but it is highly 
exaggerated and even misleading. The present writer only, 
but only partly agrees with this interpretation.1
When one comes to the brass-tacks of Dr. Guptafs 
work* the results are still less acceptable. The village 
communities were the owner-cultivators of the soil to whom 
belonged all the surplus left after the payment of land 
revenue. The Zamindar-Taluqdar-revenue farming class had 
no proprietary rights in land; it had a right to part of 
the ^tate*s share of the produce for its services. TheA
Regulations introduced by the British were adopted from
the Bengal revenue code. The Regulations accepted the
s
traditional share of the &tate in the produce of land, but
created proprietary rights, equated them to the right to
engage for the revenue, and created a market for land by
making it transferable on private and public account. The
proprietors acknowledged in the Regulations are denominated
fnew proprietors1 by Dr. Gupta and their relations with the
non-engaging members of the community were to be governed
4
on the principles of the laissez faire philosophy. Up to
1. See above, Chaps 4, 5 an<l Conclusion.
2. S.C.Gupta, op.cit., See Chaps. 2 and 3*
3. Ibid., pp.82-92. 
i > pp# 9o-9i*
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1822 the settlements were made with the !new proprietors* 
with insignificant exceptions. The first two decades 
witnessed a veritable revolution in landed property with 
the introduction of the notion of 'new proprietors', the 
law of transfer and their dishonest application by the 
subordinate revenue servants. The net result was that 
'"millions'" of village Zamindars and resident raiyats lost 
their rights* For this, the Regulations alone were 
responsible.^*
A permanent settlement which was promised in the 
early years for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces was 
averted because of the opposition of the Home Authorities. 
This was due to several factors: British financial needs, 
the local situation, the novelty of the raiyatwari system, 
the criticism of the British-India administration by the 
authors of the Fifth Report, the mistakes of the Bengal 
zamindari settlement, the need for a new form of 
exploitation of India consistent with the industrial needs 
of Britain, and the utilitarian influence through James 
Mill were the reasons which undermined the belief in a
permanent settlement. It was the rent theory which finally
2
clinched the case against it.
As a result of powerful forces, such as English
1. Ibid., pp. 104-124-.
2. T5T5., pp.125-65.
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liberalism and utilitarianism and British economic needs, 
there came about a radical change in the British
im vjeste^ -n provinces \>y \ g 5^ .1 ^
agrarian policy by 1823 in the Wes torn Provinces, The
A
arrangements under the new dispensation planned by Holt 
Mackenzie were based on Ricardian rent theory. Upon that 
theory were based both the principles of recognising landed 
rights and the principles of assessment«were derivedr-from 
that theory. Proprietary rights in land were kept distinct 
from rights to engage for the revenue. The village 
communities were recognised as proprietary bodies* But the 
proprietors had no right to regulate rent and the occupancy 
of land* The resident raiyats who too had suffered in the 
past, were to be protected by fixing their rent for the 
term of a settlement and by acknowledging their occupancy 
rights* Dr* Gupta is so enthusiastic about the content 
of political economy in the 1822 arrangement that he 
summarily dismisses as ingenious1 a statement of the 
government that the Bengal revenue code had envisaged
Zl
protection of all rights in land*
The settlements which were made under the new 
principles failed because of the adverse environment: the 
officers responsible for their implementation were opposed
1* Ibid., pp.220-24.
2. Ibid., pp.176-9 and 181-2.
3. Ibid., pp.175, 188-90, 193-5, 200-01 and 207*
4. Ibid., pp.201-02.
to those principles and in favour of the Bengal land
revenue system. The fnew proprietors1 who had influence
over the subordinate revenue servants were opposed to
investigation. Finally, the adjudication of rights and the
calculation of the assessment on the basis of rent theory
1
proved to be too difficult. Bentinck, who desired a
termination of the unsettled state of affairs, solved the
problem with the help of the Sadr Board of Revenue* In 1833
the 1822 principles were considerably modified* The net
rent principle though retained in theory, was given up in
practice. The rights in land of the lnew proprietors1
were recognised alongside those of the village communities
and the generous treatment of the resident raiyats in the
1822 arrangement was watered down in the 1833 arrangement.
The procedure of forming the settlement was also modified*
Between Regulation VII of 1822 and Regulation IX of 1833
Gupta sees a considerable difference, particularly relating
to rights in land, and takes Baden-Powell to task for not 
2
saying so.
Dr. Gupta does not like the modifications in the 
1822 principles carried out in 1833* The recognition of the 
British created proprietors was due to practical and 
political considerations. The rights in land now acknowledged
1. Ibid., pp.226 and 240-49.
2. Ibid., pp.309-17 and 248-52.
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were consistent with the notion of private property.
Private rent was allowed to the proprietors. Had the 1822 
arrangement "been carried out, the pattern of agrarian 
relations would have been different.^" The 1833 arrangement 
by allowing private rent and individual engagements in 
pattidari villages provided the basis for the disruption of 
village communities. Under the 1833 arrangement there were 
considerable transfers of land to the monied class. Land-
p
holding became zamindari. Gupta seems to regret that such 
results should have occurred after 1833*
Gupta is mistaken in blaming the Regulations for 
radically altering the pre-existing forms of property. In 
the first place it has not been authentically shown in any 
work what was the pre-existing form of property. Gupta’s 
own chapter on ’the economic organisation of the villages 
in the immediate pre-British period* is speculative and 
superficial. The area under study was a vast one. The case 
against generalisation therefore, speaks for itself. He 
has made no specific case studies. He has not searched for 
any contemporary evidence, i,e. close to the period he is 
describing. Some of his references have no bearing on the 
region at all, e,g. T. Fortescue’s Report and Metcalfe’s 
minute. Fortescue was writing on the Delhi territory and
1. Ibid., pp.221-2, 268 and 309.
2. Ibid., pp.222 and 323-4.
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the celebrated minute of Metcalfe of 7 November 1830 is 
fanciful* Besides, Metcalfe had no experience of serving 
in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces* The Regulations did 
create individual property rights and a land market; but he 
is wrong in stating that the British merged the engaging 
with the proprietary rights. A clear distinction between 
the two rights was kept from the beginning*^ In practice 
however, such a distinction was not maintained, but to what 
degree we do not know nor does Gupta care to state. He has 
presented not a single analysis of revenue settlements and 
;iumps to the conclusion that up to 1822 settlements were 
generally made with the ’new proprietors1. The safest 
method of arguing on the point, would be the statistical 
one - by finding the total number of the village Zamindars 
in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces at the time of British 
acquisition and the number admitted to engagements for the 
revenue as ’proprietors’ in the successive settlements.
Such an enumeration is not yet possible* However, the truth 
seems to be that after 1807 engagements were increasingly 
taken from the village Zamindars as ’proprietors’ of land.
A statement prepared by Edward Colebrooke and John Deane 
(the Commissioners in the region) shows that in 1802-03 the 
number of engaging village Zamindars in the Ceded Provinces
1. The British did not stop claims to ’proprietary’ rights 
in the early years. See above, Chap.l.
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was 12,34-7} rising to 19,392 in 1808-09 and to 24,618 in
1812-13• In the Conquered Provinces and Bundelkhand the
number was 5}751 in 1805-06, rising to 16,333 in 1808-09
and to 19,629 in 1812-13• The total number in both the
regions thus stood at 44,247 in 1 8 1 2 - 1 3 In Rohilkhand,
according to various officers, no one claimed any
’proprietary* rights: John Deane, after laborious
investigations, traced village Zamindars by hundreds and
admitted them to engagements as ’proprietors’. We are
also not in possession of facts throwing light on the
transfer of land during the early British rule. Gupta
accepts the statement of the U.P. Zamindari abolition
Committee Report (1948), that ’millions’ of people lost 
2
land. Without evidence this statement should be treated 
with suspicion. Only some land changed hands through 
various ways, including fraud. That land changed hands as 
a result of fraudulent activities was basically due to 
the prevalence of revenue farming inherited from the Nawab 
of Oudh. The Regulations only made it easy to acquire 
land, but Gupta states that the Regulations were 
responsible for such transfers. Whatever injury may have 
been suffered by the village Zamindars, was essentially
1. B.O.C. Report on revenues, 21.3.1815} Bg.R.C. 16.9.1820,. 
34 and its enclosures.
2. S.C.Gupta, op.cit., p.118.
3* See above, Chap.l.
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due to the chaotic situation inherited from the Nawab of 
Oudh and the Marathas, with which the early British 
administration failed to cope. Regulations definitely 
affected village rights, hut how, in what way and to what 
extent, remains to he studied.
In the matter of the rejection of a permanent 
settlement for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, some of 
Gupta1s assertions seem to he without foundation. He has 
produced no evidence to show that in the official discussion 
on a permanent settlement, the needs of British industry 
were taken into account. His statement that the rent theory 
and the utilitarian influence too, had a hearing on the 
question, amounts to a gross piece of distortion. For all 
practical purposes a permanent settlement was rejected as 
early as 27 November 1811.^* Rent theory had not emerged nor 
was the utilitarian influence on Indian affairs present at 
that date. His other arguments on the rejection of a 
permanent settlement have relevance.
In the 1822 arrangement, contrary to what Gupta 
says, there was only a little sprinkling of rent theory and 
political economy in the policy discussion. Gupta has not 
established his statement that the 1822 arrangement was 
with a view to the economic exploitation of India according
1. See above, Chaps. 2,4,5 and Conclusion.
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to the changed needs of Britain, Holt Mackenzie has almost 
heen shown as a Ricardian economist* But in his memorandum 
of 1819 which contains 764 paragraphs, only a few reflect 
an understanding of rent theory and its implicationsAnd 
in those few paragraphs , he appears to be nearer Malthus 
than Ricardo.^ The cardinal principle of the 1822 
arrangement was to regulate land rights according to the 
customs and traditions of the people of the region* Inquiry 
was to be the key to a knowledge of those customs and 
traditions* Proprietary rights were not to be pre- 
determined but to be ascertained* The resident raiyats1
1* e*g* paras. 219 n., 317? 329 n., 348, 369 n* and 636 n., w  
Bg* R*C* 16*9*1820, 4, also in SRRNWP*1, in para. 242 n* f  
Holt Mackenzie doubts if land revenue could be called 
rent and suggests that it is more of the nature of a 
tax; In quoting Mackenziefs para. 369 n* Gupta is guilty 
of distortion by omission. The second para, of Mackenzie’s 
note runs thus: ‘In other respects, rent properly so 
called, might perhaps be wholly absorbed by taxation 
without checking the progress of cultivation. The moral 
and political advantages derived from the existence of 
rent holders is a separate question; they are indeed 
incalculable, where, as in our country, they give a body 
of men to manage almost the whole internal Government of 
the country, and to secure its political and civil 
freedom. We may hope that the landholders of this 
country may gradually be brought to contribute in their 
degree to the same ends here, and, at all events, 
existing rights are of course sacred things.1 S.C.Gupta 
unquotes at the first part of the second sentence of 
this quotation, op.cit*, p.178.
2* See above, Chap* 4.
3* See above, Chaps, 3 and 4.
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rent was to be fixed not because of rent theory, hut because 
such raiyats were believed to have that right by the custom 
of the country. It was because of this that proprietors 
with resident raiyats on their land, would have no private 
rent and not because of rent theory. Where no resident 
raiyats existed, the ’proprietors’ were to appropriate 
private rent.^ The Bengal government was right and Gupta is 
wrong in criticising it on the ground that the Bengal
revenue code had envisaged equal protection of all rights
2
in land. It is only in the principle of assessment that
*
rent theory had some influence•
Gupta's work seems particularly open to question
where the settlement under Regulation VTI of 1822 and the
a ,
revision of policy by 1833 are discussed. (He has not 
examined a single settlement under Regulation VII). His 
remark that one of the reasons for the failure of that 
Regulation was the opposition of revenue officers to the 
principles underlying it is unsubstantiated. He is also 
wrong in giving the impression that Regulation VII had 
acknowledged the proprietary rights of the village Zamindars
5
alone, and that the rearrangement of 1833 therefore
1. Ibid.
2• JE>eeChap« 3 •
3. See Chap. 4.
4. S.C.Gupta, op.cit., see particularly pp.227-238, 248-54 
and 255-317.
5* Under Regulation VII all rights in land were to be
protected on the results of inquiry. Although attention 
to the village communities was to be paid, restitution 
of rights already lost, was not its aim. The future 
protection of all rights was, of course, its main object.
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modified it to include the 'new proprietors' also. Nor is 
he aware that all resident raiyats did not have the right- 
to a fixed rent* It was because of this that the rents of 
all resident raiyats were not envisaged to he fixed in 
1 8 3 3 Nor is Gupta correct in criticising Baden-Powell 
for not showing the difference between Regulation VII of 
1822 and Regulation IX of 1833 so far as rights in land were
concerned. Regulation IX says nothing on the question of
2
rights* Such modifications in that regard, as were made 
by the 1833 arrangement, were entered in the various 
official documents and not in that Regulation*
Gupta's hypothesis that under the 1833 arrangement 
by creating the lure of private property the monied class 
was attracted towards landholding, and that this, together 
with the provision of individual engagements from the co­
sharers, undermined the structure of village communities, 
is a sound one. Yet, one would have liked to know how much 
land passed out of the hands of the village communities 
after 18335 at least in a few districts. It is also of 
interest to note that the lands of village communities 
were being absorbed in taluqdaris and pargana zamindaris 
in the pre-British days. Even without the British rule, it 
seems likely that the village communities would have lost 
ground.’The British rule halted the growth of great land-
1. See above, Chap.5*
2* See Reg. IX of 1833.
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holding in the region, and whenever possible, reduced its 
size.^“ Gupta has not considered these questions.
The selection of papers seen "by Gupta contains 
documents relating generally to land revenue policy* There 
is very little in them on agrarian relations. No work on 
agrarian relations in the view of the present writer, can 
"be done without examining the records at the regional and 
governmental level. It may also "be desirable to go down to 
the district and village level. An examination of records 
of the Civil Courts where they may have survived
destruction, would also prove rewarding. Search for old
Z T
records with old fcamindar± and faluqdarj^ families, should
A *
also be made. It is indeed an uphill task. The total number 
of volumes relating to the proceedings of the various 
regional revenue axxthorities and the revenue proceedings
of the Bengal government between the years 1803 and 1833
2
amounts to 1,024. Dr. Gupta has not examined even a 
fraction of these volumes* His work therefore, lacks 
solidity and he does no justice to its title.
1. See above Chap*4.
2. This figure excludes index volumes, and is totalled 
from I.O.L. Catalogue of Bengal Consultations, pp.147-67i 
187-8, 245-60, 265-8 and 270-74.
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Appendix C 
Glossary
Amani = Collection of revenue directly by government
servants.
Contract revenue Collector# Also known as 
Nazim, Chakladar, and Mustajir.
Village sweeper who originally served as 
watchman also.
Profit derived from the produce of forest#
Division of crop between Zamindar and 
cultivator.
A form of joint landholding in which members 
of the community hold land by true and equal 
division* Each member had parts of good and 
bad land, the division being such that the 
value of each (fcfqarer1 s ian(i WOuld be equal 
to that of every one elsefs share.
Bigah, standard one in the Western Provinces « 5,025 sq*
yards = 5/8 of an acre. In Bengal = 1,600 
sq. yards = 1/5 of an acre.
Amil
Balahar
Bankar
Batai
Bhaiyachara=
Chaukidar =
Dastak
Fasli
Gaz
Village watchman. This was a British 
innovation.
Written certificate.
A calendar originating with Akbar in the 
Christian year 1555* That year was Hijri 
965 and Samvat 1612# He deducted 649 years 
from the latter so as to coincide with 
Hijri 965 and called it Fasli. To synchronise 
“the Christian with the Fasli 592 years 
should be deducted from the former. For 
instance 1801 A.D. would be equal to 1209 
Fasli.
55 inches. This was the standard established 
by the British and the measurement was 
actually.donebaccording to that standard. 
Akbar1 s^ a z ^ was usually referred to in the 
region had no uniform standard. It varied 
between 29 and 55 inches.
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Hat
Istmrari = 
Jagir
Jalkar
Jama =
Jamabandi =
Jarib =
Kanungo
Khalsa
Khas
Khasra
Kismwar 
Lambardar =
Moveable market or a market that was held 
only on certain days of the week*
Right to pay a fixed amount of revenue 
generally during the life of a grantee.
Revenue of land assigned to military 
servants. Later on applied to assignments 
on account of loyalty or service performed to 
the State.
Profits or rents derived from the water, 
lakes, ponds etc. in an 1 estate1 or village 
including the right of fishing.
Land revenue. Originally applied to land 
revenue plus cesses.
Statement of amount paid by raiyats to 
intermediaries in a village or ttie village 
rent-rolls, also applied to the district 
rent-roll.
Chain or rope for measurement of land. Its 
length was 60 gaz.
A village or district revenue officer who 
kept records of land and revenue, and when 
required, explained local practices and 
public regulations.
Revenue of that portion of land which was 
directly under state management.
Collection of revenue by subordinate revenue 
servants from individual raiyat; used when 
intermediaries did not engage for revenue 
or when they did not exist.
Pieldbook, result of survey showing fields 
raiyats ' possession and their relation 
to tlhe Zamindars.
According to soil description.
Village headman or Mukaddam or Sadr Malguzar. 
The term Lambardar is entirely of British 
origin. PE is derived from the word number 
used in the records for serialising revenue 
engagement* Thus the holder of a particular 
'number1 became a Lambardar in mufassal 
phraseology.
4-7 6
Mafi =5 Land exempted from paying revenue to the
government* Such land was generally a small 
parcel, assigned in lieu of service or 
granted for charitable or religious purpose*
Malguzar = A pprson who pays revenue for himself or on
behalf of others to government or to a 
 ^ ‘proprietor1 or a holder under a ‘proprietor1 
or the^tate.
Malguzari land = Land paying revenue to the government or
land assessed to revenue*
Maurusi = Cultivating proprietors' of land.
‘ A A
Mufassal = Interior or countryside, a subordinate or
separate district.
Mukaddam and Pradhan signify the same, village headman.
Mukarraridar = An individual granted the right to collect
revenue of a tract of land and to pay a fixed 
sum to thes£Ttate. It was generally a life 
tenure, K
Naib-Tahsildar « Deputy Tahsildar.
Nazarana = Gift or present from an inferior to superior#
Non-Malguzari = Land not paying any revenue to the
government.
Pargana = A revenue and administrative unit, comprising
a group of villages and forming a small 
sub-division of a district.
Pattidari = A form of joint landholding in which sharers
hold land according to their ancestral shares. 
Each one had a portion of land expressed in 
bigahs without reference to unfertility of 
land. (Ancestral share governed according to 
the law of inheritance).
Patwari = Village accountant and record keeper*
Phalkar = Profits derived from the produce of orchards.
Pai-bandi = A statement or table of rates, a document
showing the rates at which different 
descriptions of land are usually assessed in 
any particular district.
ill
Raja
Sadr Malguzar 
Sayer =
Siwai «
Tahsildar =*
Taluq =
Taluqdar =
Zabti
Zamindar
A title given to Hindus of rank by Muslim 
rulers, or hereditary when descending from 
a Prince; later assumed by adventurers also.
= Chief revenue engager.
Internal or transit duties on goods.
Any collection besides land revenue, e.g. 
from forest, river, pond or a cess.
Indian officer in charge of a subdivision 
with revenue and police powers.
A revenue subdivision comprising several 
villages.
Holder of a taluq. Taluq = a dependency, an 
‘estate1 or tract of land. In the Western 
Provinces he did not have ‘proprietary* 
rights over the entire taluq.
Regular or detailed mode of assessment as 
developed under Akbar. Later on also used 
for crops paying at cash rates.
An occupant of land or landholder other 
than a peasant.
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